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Abstract
Embodied theories of cognition state that the body plays a central role in cognitive 
representation. Under this description semantic representations, which constitute the 
meaning of words and sentences, are simulations of real experience that directly engage 
sensory and motor systems. This predicts interactions between comprehension and 
perception at low levels, since both engage the same systems, but the majority of 
evidence comes from picture judgements or visuo-spatial attention; therefore it is not 
clear which visual processes are implicated. In addition, most of the work has 
concentrated on sentences rather than single words; although theories predict that the 
semantics of both should be grounded in simulation.
This investigation sought to systematically explore these interactions, using verbs that 
refer to upwards or downwards motion and sentences derived from the same set of 
verbs. As well as looking at visuo-spatial attention, we employed tasks routinely used 
in visual psychophysics that access low levels of motion processing. In this way we 
were able to separate different levels o f visual processing and explore whether 
interactions between comprehension and perception were present when low level visual 
processes were assessed or manipulated. The results from this investigation show that: 
(1) There are bilateral interactions between low level visual processes and semantic 
content (lexical and sentential). (2) Interactions are automatic, arising whenever 
linguistic and visual stimuli are presented in close temporal contiguity. (3) Interactions 
are subject to processes within the visual system such as perceptual learning and 
suppression. (4) The precise content of semantic representations dictates which visual 
processes are implicated in interactions.
The data is best explained by a close connection between semantic representation and 
perceptual systems; when information from both is available it is automatically 
integrated. However, it does not support the direct and unmediated commitment of the 
visual system in the semantic representation of motion events. The results suggest a 
complex relationship between semantic representation and sensory-motor systems that 
can be explained by combining task specific processes with either strong or weak 
embodiment.
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1. Semantic Representation
1. 1. What is semantic information
The focus of this research is semantic representation; therefore, it is necessary to begin 
with a definition of semantics. In the study of spoken language, information is 
canonically split into three information types: phonology, morpho-syntax and 
semantics. Phonology is the particular sound pattern that any given lexical item has as 
its word form and it includes metrical information. When studying written language 
phonology is replaced by orthography, the graphic shapes that make up letters or 
characters of a word form. Morpho-syntax refers to syntax and morphology; the 
combined term is used here although the two can be studied separately. Syntax governs 
how words are combined into sentences and marked as nouns, verbs, subject, object and 
so on. Morphology is the structure of word forms, which can change via inflection (e.g. 
walk walker/) or derivation (e.g. nation nation#/). In both cases, the information is 
structural: the word form or sentence structure systematically changes to express 
grammatical information. Semantic information is linguistic meaning. In psychological 
terms, it is those representations activated during production or comprehension that 
allow us to know what words and sentences refer to. In this investigation we will deal 
both with the semantics o f sentences and of single words (lexical semantics).
1.1.1. Semantic and conceptual knowledge
"Any utterance is a selective schematisation of a concept" (Slobin, 1996, p.76)
As defined above, semantic information refers specifically to the meaningful 
representations recruited in the service of language, whereas conceptual information 
refers to knowledge in a more general, comprehensive, sense. This does not imply that 
there are no divisions within conceptual information as a whole, for example, the 
distinction between how to do something, like paint the Mona Lisa (procedural 
knowledge), what the Mona Lisa looks like (visual knowledge) and the last time I saw 
the Mona Lisa (episodic knowledge). Semantic information can cut across these 
different knowledge types. I can tell you when I last saw the Mona Lisa, I can attempt 
to describe what it looks like, and with great difficulty I could try to explain how to
10
paint it. Therefore, what is expressible in language varies for different kinds of 
knowledge. This has been divided in the memory literature into declarative knowledge, 
that which I can make explicit by using language, and procedural knowledge, which I 
cannot (Baddeley, 1999). The argument put forward in this section is that in order for 
semantics to serve language, it has to be treated as distinct from conceptual knowledge, 
even if that distinction is minimal.
Semantics must be grounded in conceptual knowledge; otherwise language would be 
useless for communicating our thoughts, feelings and experiences. It is precisely 
because language has this power, allowing conceptual information to be expressed and 
shared between individuals, that it is useful at all (Vigliocco & Vinson, in press). 
Conceptual and semantic information have often been treated as the same thing, for 
example, object naming has been partitioned into the accessing of visual-structural 
information (the object's form), ‘semantic’ information (its function and associations) 
and its label (Humphreys, Price & Riddoch, 1999). In addition, much work on concepts 
and categorisation has treated language as simply another access route to conceptual 
information, akin to using picture stimuli (Vinson & Vigliocco, in press). In this sense, 
the only thing that language does is attach a label to pre-existing concepts. However, 
there are good reasons for separating non-linguistic cognition, and its concomitant 
conceptual information, from information that acts as the 'meaning' for lexical labels. 
Especially in production, psycholinguistic research separates the 'message' (a 
prelinguistic conceptual representation that acts as the precursor to an utterance) from 
the semantic representations recruited in expressing that message (e.g. Garrett, 1975; 
Levelt, 1989; Bock & Griffin, 2000).
The reasons for separating semantic and conceptual knowledge center around two 
points. First, there is no steadfast relationship between general conception and lexical 
semantics. There are things that we can conceptualise of that we are not able to label 
with one word; this has been called the verbalisation problem. For example, most 
people have had the feeling that they can't say exactly what they want. Similarly, there 
are always multiple ways o f naming the same concept, also known as perspective 
taking. For example, a specific horse can be referred to as Dobbin, female horse, mare, 
animal, or mammal; depending on what I want to convey (Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 
1999). If language was a perfect mirror of all conceptual information, one would
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expect that the relationship between the two would be invariant. Instead, there are 
variable ways in which the meaning of words maps onto conceptual structure.
Polysemy and synonymy illustrate this point further, and are problematic for a one-to- 
one mapping between words and concepts (Murphy, 2002). If one word can have 
several meanings (e.g. bank), it must be connected to several concepts. Similarly, if 
several words can mean the same thing (e.g. sofa, couch, and settee), they must all be 
connected to the same concept. Unless there is some flexibility in how concepts build 
lexical semantics, it is difficult to say that one word equals one concept (Murphy,
2002). Second, by separating the two, the semantic system can have a different 
architecture to conceptual information (e.g. Vigliocco et al, 2004). This is useful 
because it allows cross-linguistic differences in semantics, such as English and Dutch 
having two words for 'leg* and 'foot' and Japanese only having one, 'ashi' (Vigliocco & 
Vinson, in press). In addition, it allows the incorporation of linguistic associations (like 
that between 'Jack* and 'Jill') and linguistic contexts of occurrence (like the fact that I 
have come across 'Jack' and 'Jill' in a nursery rhyme, and not in my Psychology 
Textbook) into semantics, without changing the basis of conceptual knowledge (e.g. 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997). Without a separation, semantics cannot be generative and 
productive, expressing novel distinctions across existing conceptual information. Thus, 
it is sensible to postulate a separation between "the aspect of words that gives them 
significance and relates them to the world" and "non-linguistic psychological 
representation[s] of a class o f entities in the world" (Murphy, 2002, p.385).
There are numerous ways that theories present the relationship between semantic and 
conceptual information. For example, they can be seen as separate levels so that 
semantic representations are symbolic and abstract, independent from conceptual 
representations. This distinction is made so that the semantic level can carry 
grammatical information that is not present at the conceptual level (Levelt, Roelofs & 
Meyer, 1999). The idea that semantic information is abstracted from concepts is 
developed differently by Rogers et al (2004). Here, semantics is an abstract mapping 
between concepts and lexical forms; it does not actually carry any meaningful content 
itself but provides access to the relevant conceptual information. The semantic 
representations are amodal but influenced by the conceptual structure from which they 
develop. No mention is made of grammatical or other linguistic information and the 
theory treats mappings from words forms to concepts as isomorphic with mappings 
from pictures to concepts. Semantic information is therefore not much more than
12
sophisticated associations between conceptual content and symbols (i.e. word forms or 
pictures). However, many theories propose a much closer relationship between the 
two. For example, semantic representations can be seen as selected subsets of 
conceptual knowledge (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Murphy, 2002), in this case 
the semantic level partitions conceptual information into chunks which serve as word 
meanings. Semantic information is conceptual information that is packaged for 
language; the two are therefore isomorphic in their content. In similar vein, Jackendoff 
(2002) argues that there is no separation between linguistic semantics and 
conceptualisation, there are only differences in how "linguistic forms map into 
complexes of meaning, not with the content of meaning itself' (p.292). However, he 
does make a distinction within the conceptual system. He postulates a conceptual 
system that is connected to language and supports abstract concepts, propositional 
thought and inference, and a perceptually based system that supports multi-modal 
schemas o f objects and action within the environment. Thus, in order to account for 
certain phenomena, there has to be a distinction that separates information recruited for 
language versus information that is decidedly 'non-linguistic'. Where Jackendoff 
departs from other theorists is in placing this distinction deep within conceptual 
structure, proposing a qualitatively different system of representation, similar in flavour 
to Paivio's Dual-Coding theory (1986). Vigliocco et al (2004) begin with the principle 
that semantic information has to have close ties to conceptual knowledge, but propose 
that it is a separate level that extracts higher order relationships from basic conceptual 
features. Different conceptual features, such as those coding colour, shape or sound, are 
bound together into lexico-semantic representations. Whereas the conceptual level may 
be organized by modality, the semantic level is organized by featural similarity, with 
items that share many features clustered together. Semantics is therefore dependent on 
the conceptual level but separate, being organized by different principles.
Despite good reasons for a separation, there are several current theories that make no 
explicit division between semantic and conceptual knowledge. These are embodied 
theories, which propose that representations directly and necessarily recruit sensory and 
motor systems that are also utilised in conceptual representation, i.e. semantic 
representations are not abstract, they are intimately tied to experience and action (e.g. 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002, 2003; Barsalou, 1999). Hard line 
embodied theories of semantics are the only theories that make this strong claim about 
the involvement of sensory and motor systems. It is unclear where embodied theories
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stand on the question of the conceptual-semantic distinction. Some of these theories are 
only concerned with semantics (Pulvermtiller, 1999; Zwaan, 2004), so it is possible that 
they are comfortable with a division, without being specific about its nature. However, 
other embodied theories see semantic and conceptual information as isomorphic and 
motivated by the same principles of organisation, proposing that the structure of sensory 
and motor information provides the basis for conceptual/semantic and linguistic 
structures alike (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). In some sense, strong 
embodied theories like these have to assume that the conceptual and semantic levels 
operate similarly; it is difficult to see how semantics based in embodied simulation 
would emerge from non-embodied concepts. In contrast, amodal theories of semantic 
representation are still compatible with a frilly embodied conceptual system since they 
are abstracted/derived from the conceptual level and can therefore ‘lose’ information.
In conclusion, there are cogent arguments for separating representations that serve 
linguistic (semantic) versus non-linguistic (conceptual) processes. In this investigation 
we are only concerned with the meaningful representations recruited during language 
production and comprehension, and we make no claims regarding conceptual 
representation. In the next two sections, brief summaries of two alternative views of 
general cognitive function and representation will be outlined. These can be loosely 
termed the symbolic and embodied traditions. By summarising these alternatives, the 
following sections, which describe past and current theories of semantic representation, 
are placed in a historical context. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the 
experiments reported here were designed to test theories o f semantics which are driven 
by embodied views, and these theories are often motivated by criticisms of the symbolic 
tradition. Second, the historical context is useful for establishing the key issues in 
representation that any theory of semantics must address. At the end of the chapter I 
will outline these key issues, focusing on one in particular (content), before introducing 
the next chapter which reviews the empirical evidence for embodied semantics.
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1.2 . Symbolic and Embodied Representation
There are strong feelings around the term 'representation', as for some theorists it has 
become inseparable from a symbolic view of the mind (e.g. Varela, Thompson &
Rosch, 1991). This is not surprising, since symbols designate things, they are 
representations. Since 1 am going to be using this term a lot, I need to start by clarifying 
its use. There are two points. The first is that whether we conceive of the mind as 
standing in some relation to the world (see Section 1.2.1) or as actively construing it 
(see Section 1.2.2) we are always concerned with how mental information is processed 
and transformed. Therefore, we are always concerned with the format of cognitive 
information and how it is instantiated. In this investigation, this broad definition is what 
constitutes the term 'representation'. It is a term used for convenience, to express how 
the mind/brain can come to have informational capacities at all. It is therefore used 
lightly, without any assumptions about how the mind and the world are related, or about 
how cognition achieves what it does. Second, this investigation is about cognitive 
representation in language, and however the mind is conceptualised, language is a 
symbolic process (Jackendoff, 2002). The power of language lies in the fact that words 
are meaningful, and they are meaningful only because they successfully refer to 
particular things. This is the simple classical definition of representation: for one thing 
to stand for another. Without the capacity fo r  representation, semantics is not 
possible. The purpose of this first chapter is to explore different theories and their 
accounts of how semantics achieves representation.
Debates about the nature o f cognitive representation have repeatedly focused around 
one question: Is information about the world embedded with perceptual and motor 
activity, being grounded in our embodied experience, or is it transformed into a 
qualitatively different, symbolic, format? These two different views, embodied and 
symbolic, have existed in various guises within various debates, such as mental imagery 
(Pylyshyn, 1985 ch.8; Kosslyn, 1996), conceptual representation (Barsalou, 1999; 
Murphy, 2002) and semantic representation (Fodor, 1987; Lakoff, 87). The symbolic 
tradition starts with the cognitive domain, what is 'in our heads', whereas the embodied 
tradition starts with the experiential domain, what is 'in our world'. These different 
starting points are the product of different philosophical traditions, beyond the scope of 
this work (see Lombardo, 1987), but it will become quite clear what they have to say 
about representation.
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1.2.1. Computation and Symbols
The symbolic approach starts with one general assumption, there is a world 'out there' 
that needs to be represented by a mental domain 'in the head' (or brain). In order for this 
representation to take place, information is passed into the cognitive system via the 
sensory modalities. Perception is the passive reception of information from the world 
via our senses (Fodor, 1983). This information then has to be cognitively represented so 
it can be cognitively manipulated. Thus there is a separation between basic perceptual 
processes and higher “aggregative” processes such as language and problem solving 
(Simon, 1979, p.385). Pylyshyn (1985) posits three levels, the physical level of the 
brain, a representational level and symbol processing level. Perceptual information is 
transformed either at the representational or symbol level into something qualitatively 
different. The process by which perceptual information is turned into cognitive 
representation is termed transduction, literally transforming it from one information 
type (signal) into another (symbol) so that it can be manipulated by cognitive processes. 
These symbols internally represent the external world (or whatever is needed) and the 
mind then manipulates these discrete symbols with a set of elementary processes. 
Information processing provided “our first precise notion of what symbols and symbol 
manipulation means” (Newell & Simon, 1972, p.6), and when applied in psychology it 
made cognitive processes and representation tractable, rather than enigmatic, problems 
(Johnson-Laird, 1993). The symbolic approach was heavily influenced by predicate 
logic, propositional and computational formalisms (Fodor, 1983; Johnson-Laird, 1993; 
Simon, 1979; Pylyshyn, 1985). Computation was viewed as an incredibly powerful 
formalism through which to study cognition (Johnson-Laird, 1993), allowing dense and 
multifaceted processes to be broken down into elementary units and operations:
“It is a major achievement o f modem logic to have shown that computational processes 
o f any complexity whatever are reducible to (or, looked at another way, constructible 
from) concatenations o f surprisingly small collections of basic operations... the 
postulation of a census o f computational elements on the one hand, and of combinatorial 
elements of the other, the output... being generated by the... application of the latter to 
the former” (Fodor, 1983, p.29).
The idea of cognition-as-symbol manipulation was powerful in its explanatory promise, 
providing a means to precisely define and separate psychological processes. Symbols
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and structures of symbols can “encode information about any conceivable thing 
(including an external object), hence [acting] as a surrogate for it” (Fodor, 1983, p.24). 
These ideas are fully laid out in Newell (1980), where he defines physical symbol 
systems (PhSS) -  symbol manipulating devices that are physically realizable (like the 
computer, or human mind). A PhSS has inputs, outputs, a memory to store symbols and 
symbol structures, a set of operators (basic processes) and a control system for 
interpreting active symbol structures so as to guide the next action. Primitive symbols 
designate external events and objects, but their nature as internal entities is the same no 
matter what they symbolize; they are then able to undergo the same processes regardless 
o f what they designate. This internal consistency allows “the mechanics of processing 
[to be] determined by the nature of the processor” (Newell & Simon, p.29) rather than 
by what the symbols represent in the external world. In other words, there is a stability 
in the internal processes and symbols that is independent of arbitrary variations in 
content. What is important about this approach is the structure, essentially extending 
predicate logic to the mental domain and developing a computational 'language of 
thought’ (Fodor, 1987). Defined like this, the processes that operate on symbols become 
more important than the content o f symbols themselves; symbols don’t change but 
processes that create, interpret and manipulate symbols do. Similarly, in computing, 
binary representation in the form o f zeros and ones is able to represent whatever is 
required, but the real trick is in the processing that manipulates that binary code to do 
everything from providing emails to creating a photo album.
The stability of internal symbols is a necessary characteristic of these logico- 
propositional theories, in order that symbols can to take part in proposition-like 
processes -  comparable to algebraic equations or logical statements. However, one 
interesting consequence of inert, holistic, symbols is the notion of decomposition. If 
symbols make up the combinatorial elements of cognition, then cognition must be 
decomposable into those elements -  both complex elements made up of simpler units 
and primitive elements that cannot be broken down any further. The idea of 
decomposition also applies to the complex and basic processes which manipulate 
symbols with more complex processes built out of simpler ones. The notion of 
decomposition is still pervasive in psychological theory, providing a neat way to 
operationalise theoretical constructs (see section 1.3.2.4 on featural theories of 
semantics). The search for cognitive primitives, i.e. basic units of cognition, remains 
controversial (Fodor, 1987; Jackendoff, 2002) but it has taken many forms. One good
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example is Chomsky’s Universal Grammar, which proposes fundamental parameters for 
linguistic structure (Chomsky, 1965). Decomposition is perhaps the first example in 
cognitive science of the search for fundamental cognitive principles (Chater & Vitanyi, 
2003).
Finally, it is necessary to briefly discuss designation. For symbol systems, designation is 
the term for how a symbol comes to stand for something else: the link between the 
symbol and its referent. As noted above, this is the essential capacity of a symbol (and 
o f representation). Newell (1980) notes that the designatory relation between a symbol 
and its external referent is left open -  how does the symbol ‘cat’ comes to designate an 
actual cat? Within a symbol system designation is realized by the processes that operate 
upon the symbols -  how the system interprets them. The system interprets what a 
symbol stands for and this can influence what processes operate on that symbol. For 
example, it is only when the symbol is interpreted as 'number 2' that numerical 
calculation can be performed upon it. If the symbol is interpreted as 'cat', the system 
cannot use it in numerical calculations.
Designation occurs when physical inputs to the system are converted to symbolic units, 
the process of transduction (Fodor, 1987). For example, the sensory input related to my 
experience of cats has to be connected to the cognitive symbol for ‘cat’. Transduction 
was seen as a basic operation, it was not necessarily relevant for higher cognitive 
processes. Recall that Pylyshyn (1985) proposed three levels, the physical level o f the 
brain, a representational level and the symbol processing level. The representational 
level was argued to have content but no behavioural consequences (ibid p.29); only the 
symbols that stand for representational content have computational possibilities, and 
therefore causally influence the system's behaviour. In order for the representational 
level to exist, transduction has already taken place (i.e. its contents already refer to 
something). Therefore, transduction does not affect the operations of symbol 
processing; it is simply a necessary step to get there. Thus, how an internal 
representation does designate an external entity was sidelined in favour of defining 
higher order process at the symbolic level. This is a non-trivial choice, since theories of 
conceptual and semantic representation could then provide symbolic labels for concepts 
and semantic units, without having to define exactly how a symbol referred to 
something. The fundamental problem of reference was avoided. However, designation 
does matter since the system is semantically constrained: what the symbol means has an
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influence on processing (Pylyshyn, 1985). This is a simple enough statement, since if 
functional processes were not semantically constrained, we would constantly see 
"semantically deviant" behaviours (ibid, p.36), for example, a simple calculation like '1 
+ 1' would produce the answer 'blue'. Therefore, cognitive symbols must have 
consistent and singular reference; they can only have one semantic interpretation. This 
is unlike true functional representations which have many possible interpretations, i.e. 
the symbol 'X' can refer to 'cat', 'blue' or 'Wednesday'. Basic, primitive, cognitive 
symbols cannot take this form; there must be a causal link between functional states and 
what is represented, otherwise any symbolic explanation is "gratuitous" (Pylyshyn,
1985, p.43). Therefore, the symbol system may not be entirely independent of its 
external referents. This is apparently in conflict with the abstracted nature of symbol 
systems and it was a problem that was explicitly recognized (Fodor, 1987; Pylyshyn, 
1985; Newell, 1980). Elsewhere, it has been termed the 'symbol grounding problem' 
(Hamad, 1990; Vogt, 2002) and nicely illustrated by the Chinese Room Argument 
(Searle, 1980), a thought experiment in which an English speaker in a closed room 
receives Chinese symbols through a hatch and returns other Chinese characters 
according to strict rules, without ever knowing the meaning of the character strings.
This demonstrates that if symbols are not causally linked to their referents (the person in 
the room does not know what the symbols mean), internal manipulation of those 
symbols is never enough to establish meaning (the person will never know what 
messages are communicated). In the end, for symbolic theories, the advantages of 
having symbols that could operate within a symbol system were ultimately considered 
to be more important than how transduction might shape symbols. Thus, symbol 
systems elevated processing structure above representational content.
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1.2.2. Perception and Conception
The embodied approach, as the name suggests, starts from the simple fact that the brain 
developed as a control system for the body (Wilson, 2002; Clark, 1998). For that 
reason, all the cognitive processes that are performed by the mind/brain are heavily 
influenced by, and to some extent inseparable from, this relationship. The mental 
domain is not distinct from the perceptions and actions in which it is involved, and the 
notion that there are 'mental symbols' which stand apart from real-world interaction is 
rejected (Clark, 1997; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). It is no more sensible to talk 
o f the functions of the liver outside the body than it is to talk of the functions of 
the mind/brain outside the body. By placing the body center stage, the environment also 
becomes important. In evolutionary terms, the body and the environment are intimately 
related, since the body acts within an environment in order to survive. Thus embodied 
cognition is about the primacy of the physical world, the body and its environment for 
cognition.
For embodied theorists, cognition operates via complex and dynamic interactions 
between perception and action, and it is therefore inherently dynamic and 'on the fly'; 
for example, allowing us to quickly catch and throw a ball, with little effort. This is in 
direct contrast to the basic tenet o f symbolic approaches, that there are internal 'mental 
symbols' which represent the outside world, and upon which cognition operates in order 
to plan actions or respond to stimuli. Under the symbolic description, the mental world 
builds a model o f the external world by transforming perceptual input (Clark, 1997). 
Under the embodied approach, there is only limited modeling of the external world 
and cognition is about real world action rather than symbolic representation (Clark, 
1997; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). In this case, the world is it’s own best model 
so the environment becomes an extension of our minds; a simple example is using notes 
to remind yourself to do something. Rather than keeping check of everything internally, 
we externalize the burden (Clark, 1997; Richardson & Spivey, 2000). Embodied 
approaches can be anti-representationalist, rejecting entirely the notion that cognition 
needs or uses representations of the outside world (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). 
For example, when modeled as a dynamical system whose behaviour falls out of the 
physical parameters of the body and the environment, there is no need for mediating 
symbols to control action. Particular patterns of activity are a natural consequence of 
the physical structure of the agent's body and the environment that it is placed in; like
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the way reaching for objects is dictated by the way our limbs are structured (imagine 
how different it would be if we had tentacles). All that is needed is for a sequence (like 
reaching out) to be set in motion and the parameters of behaviour emerge from the 
system as a whole (Clark, 1997; Lombardo, 1987).
There are various ways in which the embodied framework can be applied to cognition. 
Here are four approaches from those listed in Wilson (2002), in no particular order of 
importance: First, cognition necessarily involves perceptual and motor mechanisms 
since it always takes place in an environmental context, it is situated. Second, cognition 
takes place through on-line interactions with the environment so it is time pressured. 
Third, because the brain developed as a control system for the body, the primary 
purpose of cognition is to produce actions relevant to a situation. Cognition should be 
understood in terms of how it contributes to action. Fourth, cognitive activity is always 
intimately linked to perceptual and motor mechanisms, even when the cognition is 
"decoupled" from the environment (Wilson, 2002, p.626). For embodied theorists, this 
is also termed ‘off-line’ cognition, since it means that cognitive processes are 
independent of any particular environment (Clark, 1997); for example, when we use our 
imagination to think about things that are not present. In contrast, on-line cognition is 
anything that makes a connection between cognitive processes and the body or 
environment; this covers activities such as locomotion, object manipulation or playing a 
sport. This final point grows out from the first three: if on-line cognition is intimately 
connected to perception and action, in order to maintain a coherent system off-line 
cognition should also be embodied. It will depend upon perceptual and motor systems. 
This last claim is the most relevant for our purposes, since it directly links to semantic 
representation. As noted above, semantics is only possible if a representation can be 
instantiated that refers to something. This referential relationship has to be stable both 
when the referent is present and absent. In other words, if I say the word "cat" and you 
are only able to understand that it means 'cat* when there is a cat present that is not a 
successful representation; it is just a rather complex way of pointing to something that is 
there. It only becomes semantically stable if I can say the word "cat" and you always 
know that it means cat, whether there is cat present or not. Now the word is able to 
access a stable semantic representation of what a cat is, so you know what the word 
means. How can a system which is intimately tied to real-world action and dynamic, 
on-line, processes have stable representations? The answer is through simulation:
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"In general, the function of these sensory-motor resources is to run a simulation of some 
aspect o f the physical world, as a means of representing information or drawing 
inferences." (Wilson, 2002, p.633).
Thus, the system internally 'recreates' the environmental objects that it is capable of 
dealing with. As with the symbolic approach, the environment has to be internalised 
somehow, but instead of transducing the signal into a symbolic format, the signal is 
recreated. This idea of simulation has been repeatedly claimed to solve the symbol 
grounding problem (Lakoff, 1980; Barsalou, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). There 
is a non-arbitrary relationship between sensory-motor experience and representation. 
Thus, simulation allows you to keep representations without having to postulate a 
separation between mind and the world. This point has been expanded by Lakoff 
(1980), who retains strong representationalist ideas whilst embracing certain elements 
o f embodiment.
"The human conceptual system is a product of human experience, and that experience 
comes through the body" (Lakoff, 1987, p.206).
For Lakoff (and others, e.g. Barsalou, 1999), the need for embodiment stems from faults 
within the logico-symbolic approach. According to abstract symbolic approaches, the 
contents of cognition have to be a veridical internal representation of entities in the 
external world. It follows from this that they represent the world in a correct (true) or 
incorrect (false) way. Lakoff calls this 'objectivism': there is an external reality which 
must be reflected by internal representations/symbols. He argues this is a false 
framework as it means that "symbols are given meaning independent of the nature of 
the human organism" (p. 177): internal representations are evaluated against external 
reality, thus, they can either be true or false about how they represent external reality. 
The body and the physical ways through which we interact with the world play no part 
in conceptualisation. However, many concepts do not 'mirror' the world; they are 
products of human experience, for example, the category of things that I like to eat or 
even money (which depends on our belief that it has value). Human concepts often 
have no ‘objective’ counterparts: meaning is internal to human beings, rather than being 
a relationship of symbols to referents. Lakoff does not deny that there is an objective 
reality, only that "we have no privileged access to it from an external viewpoint"
(p.259). In order to understand human conceptual representation, we must first
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understand human experience, which is mediated by the body (perception and action). 
Conceptual structure emerges from our experience of the world and this experience is 
constrained by the world itself (what objects and events are there to experience) and 
how are able to experience them (our body's sensory and motor capabilities). In other 
words, we construct our conceptions of the world based on our experiences, so concepts 
are not simply an internal mirror of the external world; they are actively created and 
mediated by our experience. This is an interesting twist to embodied theory. Rather 
than placing body-environment interactions in the foreground with cognition 
emerging from it, the whole o f experience is pushed inside the mind. There is no need 
to set up a link between the mind and world, since the world is already inside the mind. 
This view is adopted by Jackendoff (2002) in his theory of conceptualist semantics (see 
Section 1.3.2.3 below) and it is also accepted in cognitive neuroscience (Frith, 2007).
The idea that perceptual and motor systems can form the basis for all conceptual 
representation has been developed in more detail. For example, providing details of 
how particular neural mechanisms in the motor system could support motor concepts 
(Gallese & Lakoff, 2005), or how organisational principles in perception could support 
object representation and inferential processes during reasoning (Goldstone & Barsalou, 
1998). As these attempts highlight, the problem for embodied approaches is how to 
account for abstract, higher-order cognition, such as that implicated in conceptual 
representation and abstract reasoning. Embodied approaches do very well for on-line 
action between a body and an environment, and offer some intriguing explanations 
about how the environment is utilised to benefit cognition (Clark, 1997; Wilson, 2002). 
However, in order to maintain the embodied framework, simulation is at present the 
only mechanism that could support semantic and conceptual representations.
Simulation easily provides the content of representation with perceptual and motor 
activity, but how the information is structured and processed is more problematic and 
less well defined, especially for abstract cognition (Barsalou, 1999; Lakoff, 1980).
Thus, for ‘higher order’ cognition like semantics and concepts, embodied theories raise 
the importance of representational content above processing structure.
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1.2.3. Symbolic versus Embodied Representation.
In several respects, the symbolic and embodied traditions are directly opposed to each 
other. They begin at different places, symbolism asking how the mind can represent the 
world, and embodiment asking how the mind/body unit can act within the world. The 
symbolic approach adopts a clear structure for the computational processes of the mind, 
stating that there are processes which operate over symbols. The embodied approach 
adopts a clear content for cognitive processes, that which is provided by sensory-motor 
experience and activity. The symbolic account works very well for abstract reasoning 
and conceptual representation, embodiment works very well for real-world, real-time 
actions. Where symbolism falls down is in accounting for cognitive content and for 
real-time behaviour, where embodiment falls down is in providing a clear structure for 
cognitive processes and a good explanation for abstract cognition. When it comes to 
representation, the divide is sharp. Symbolic accounts predict a clear separation 
between representations (such as semantics) and sensory-motor systems, such that 
symbols are abstract and amodal. Embodied accounts predict an intimate relationship 
between the two, such that representations are grounded in perceptual and motor 
content. It is this prediction that is addressed in the current investigation; if semantic 
representation shares a common substrate with sensory and motor systems, the two 
should influence each other.
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1.3 . Theories o f  Semantic Representation
In this section a brief history o f relevant theories will be provided. Selected theories are 
those which are explicitly about semantic rather than conceptual representation, as well 
as those that collapse the two but still refer to semantic representation. The majority of 
theories are concerned with the representation of lexical, rather than sentential, 
meaning. Their primary concern is the structure of the lexicon, proposing how single 
word meaning is established and related to the meaning of other single words. A few 
theories cover both single word and sentence processes; proposing how syntactic 
structures are formed during production (Levelt, 1989) or how individual words and 
syntax are integrated during comprehension (e.g. Zwaan, 1999; Glenberg & Kaschak,
2003). Sentence level semantics must be based on the integration of lexico-semantic 
representations, so all theories o f lexico-semantics make limited predictions about the 
content o f sentential meaning. As will become clear at the end of this Chapter, we are 
primarily concerned with the content of semantic representation (rather than its structure 
or decomposition). This is advantageous since content (amodal or modal) should not 
differ between lexical and sentential representation. Therefore, the particular 
predictions we are interested in should hold for both sentences and single words.
Each theory will be described in some detail, and summarised with reference to three 
parameters: decomposition (e.g. holistic or featural), content (whether representations 
have modality specific or amodal/abstracted content) and structure (how semantic 
representations are organised relative to one another and relative to conceptual 
representation). At the end of the Chapter, three tables summarise the early theories 
(Table 1-1), the current theories (Table 1-2) and the recent embodied theories (Table 1- 
3) with respect to these three parameters.
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1.3 . 1. Early theories: 1968-1995
1.3.1.1. Early Network Models
(Quillian. 1968 and Collins <& Loftus. 1975)
Quillian’s network model is one of the first formalizations o f how semantic memory 
could be structured. The aim was to create a computer program that could approximate 
semantic memory. The model focuses on the representations that allow “the “meanings” 
of words to be stored” (p.216), but Quillian does not make a separation between 
semantic memory and a general memory that is “flexible enough to hold anything stated 
in language, sensed in perception or otherwise known and remembered” (p.221), 
thereby assuming that semantic memory is isomorphic with conceptual memory. The 
model presents a network of nodes that are connected by associative links (see Figure 
1-1). Nodes are named (e.g. ‘cry’, ‘plant’, ‘animal’) and take on two forms, depending 
on how they are connected to semantic information. Type nodes are ‘parent’ nodes and 
have direct links to the other nodes that constitute its meaning. Token nodes are related 
indirectly to a word’s meaning by having an associative link which points to the word’s 
type node. Token nodes therefore make up the constituents of meaning and connect 
different semantic representations to each other. Representations are cohered in planes, 
which comprise one type node and its constituent token nodes. A full representation is 
all the nodes reached by an exhaustive tracing process from the parent type node, 
together with the total sum o f relationships (associative links) within and between 
planes. In this way, word meaning has both structure (links) as well as content (nodes).
Within a concept plane the associative links are of different types and carry the 
particular relation between one node and another. For example, Modification (adjectival 
or adverbial relation) or Conjunct ion/AND (to link word meanings). Because the links 
carrying relations between nodes, the network actually has a propositional gestalt, such 
that when paths are traced from a parent type to token nodes, schematic sentences are 
formed. For example, if we trace from CRY in Fig. 1 we get the following:
[cry]: make sound sad
For this reason, despite being a network, it is logico-propositional in nature (McClelland 
& Rogers, 2003).
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A key element of Quillian’s model is the way in which information is retrieved, for 
example when concepts are being compared. Beginning at a particular parent node -  
one that we want to compare with another (e.g. CRY and SAD) -  the node is activated 
and that activation spreads outwards via the associative connections. As activation 
spreads each node encountered is marked with a tag and when other tags are 
encountered, there is an intersection between concepts. After activating one node (e.g. 
CRY) the other is activated (e.g. SAD) and when activation from those nodes crosses, 
they can be compared. As we shall see, spreading activation becomes more salient in 
later adaptations of Quillian’s model (Collins & Loftus, 1975), as it makes predictions 
about the speed with which similarity judgments can be made.
ligur^U l: Schematic ofOuillian’s Network Model
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Adapted from Quillian (1968, p.239)
The nodes themselves are assumed to correspond to properties (an attribute with a 
corresponding value), rather than “visual pictures or words” (p.231), these properties are 
a base medium by which both linguistic and non-linguistic information can be 
supported. Quillian notes that “it seems logical to suppose that the same static store of 
information that underlies semantic reasoning may underlie perception” (p.229). In 
other words, the properties which form the basis of semantic representation may be of 
the same form as information that is acquired by perceptual mechanisms. This is a non­
trivial point and it is in line with some form of embodiment, although it is not explored 
by Quillian. This model focuses on the structure of semantic memory, rather than its
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contents. The representations (nodes) are holistic, localist representations (i.e. they are 
not decomposed and distributed over smaller parts) and it is the associative connections 
that provide a way of grouping semantic representations and establishing similarity.
Collins & Loftus (1975) expanded on Quillian’s (1968) initial model so that they could 
encompass relevant behavioural results in semantic representation. They made some 
additional assumptions about local and global processes so that predictions about the 
time course of semantic processing could be made. At the local level, only one 
representation is actively processed at any one time, however, activation from different 
nodes can occur in parallel because activation spreads from the node of origin. 
Activation is continuously released as long as a node is being processed; however, the 
level of activation decreases with time and the distance from the node of origin. In 
addition, activation is a limited resource: the more nodes activated, the less each will be 
individually activated. Finally, for intersections between representations to be 
evaluated, activation at that intersection must pass a threshold. Globally, semantic 
memory is organized by semantic similarity with similar representations (e.g. vehicles, 
colours and animals) highly interconnected due to shared properties. Similarity is based 
on the total number of interconnections between two concepts, see Figure 1-2.
Figure 1-2: Schematic of Collins & Loftus Spreading-Activation Theory 
A shorter line represents greater semantic similarity
VEHICLE
CAR
BUS
TRUCK
FIRE
ENGINE
ORANGE
RED
ROSE
Adapted from Collins & Loftus (1975, p.412)
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When the assumptions about local and global processes are combined, a very powerful 
prediction emerges. When one member of a given category is activated, e.g. ‘fire 
engine’, it will activate ‘bus’, ‘truck’ and other vehicles as it is highly interconnected 
with them. However, ‘fire engine’ will not prime other red objects, such as ‘rose’, 
because there are so few connections between them. As such, vehicles will prime other 
vehicles, and flowers other flowers. Each representation is holistic and locally defined, 
as in Quillian (1968), and the links between them define how similar they are. Collins 
and Loftus used their Spreading Activation Theory to explain various behavioural 
results from experiments using property verification or naming tasks. Collins & Loftus 
do not make any further assumptions about the content of the nodes, concentrating 
instead on inter-connections and the structure of lexical activation.
These early models were primarily concerned with the structure of the semantic system, 
the way in which individual representations were related to one another by associative 
links. The links could be meaningful by denoting a specific relationship (Quillian, 1968) 
or they could be summed in order to define similarity (Collins & Loftus, 1975). The 
focus on semantic ‘units’ and their relations made two assumptions. First, the nodes 
implied localist representation. One thing is represented in one place, and that location 
can only represent that one thing. Second, the representations were self-contained, 
detached from one another (except for the links) and holistic. The connection between a 
meaning (e.g. ‘fire engine’) and its components (e.g. ‘red’) were provided by associative 
links rather than ‘red’ being an element within the ‘fire engine’ representation. In many 
respects, this was a reflection of their propositional heritage, providing stable symbolic 
units that could be used in propositional structures. Both theories confound conceptual 
and semantic information and it wasn’t until later, similar theories (e.g. Levelt, 1989) 
that a separation was introduced. For Quillian, there is a hint that perceptual 
information may play a role in the content of representations, but for Collins & Loftus, 
no proposal is made.
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1.3.1.2. Attributes o f  Meaning (Smith. Shoben & Rips. 1974)
An alternative to holism is to decompose semantic representations into attributes or 
features: ‘The meaning of a word is not an unanalyzable unit but rather can be 
represented as a set of semantic features” (p. 215). For example, the category o f ‘birds’ 
has features such as ‘has feathers’, ‘has a beak’, ‘lays eggs’ and ‘flys’. For a given 
item, each feature has a weight that indicates how essential it is for that item. Therefore, 
the meaning of a word is a list o f weighted features. Smith, Shoben and Rips make the 
assumption that “features associated with a given category vary in the extent to which 
they define that category... [with] a continuum along which some features will be more 
defining or essential aspects of a word's meaning, while others will be more accidental 
or characteristic features” (p. 216). The relative weights of each feature define their 
importance. In the model, for a given representation, e.g. ‘Robin’, features are ordered 
from the most essential (e.g. ‘red breast’) to the most incidental (e.g. ‘not 
domesticated’). However, at some point on this continuum there is a clear bound that 
separates the essential from the incidental: ‘This bound therefore creates a distinction 
with features above the bound being considered defining features and those below the 
bound being termed characteristic.” (p.216). Smith, Shoben & Rips used typicality 
ratings to establish how different category members (e.g. ‘Robin’ or ‘Penguin’) were 
considered as instances o f a category (‘Birds’). A further assumption was that 
superordinate terms (‘bird’, ‘animal’) contained less defining features than their 
instances (‘robin’). Multidimensional scaling was used to present the ratings in a two- 
dimensional space that represents the characteristic features of a category. The 
proximity between an instance and its category represents their similarity on those 
features (see Figure 3).
In this model, the semantic features are not defined explicitly (e.g. ‘has wings’ or ‘has 
two legs’), they are assumed. However, the central idea of features as the organizational 
principle in semantic structure remains influential and has been used in several modern 
theories (see Section 1.3.3.3). This model was presented in direct opposition to the 
network models above, taking issue with holism and the use of associative links as 
providing relational structure. Instead, the features that constitute representations 
produce a structure where similarity is based on the number of shared features. In this 
way, featural theories move away from holistic, localist assumptions.
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Figure 1-3: Multidimensional scaling solutions for (a) birds and (b) mammals
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Taken from Rips, Shoben & Smith (1973).
All featural theories are by definition decompositional, since the features are component 
parts of the semantic representation. The structure of the semantic system is determined 
by the way features cluster to form different semantic representations, with similar 
representations having similar composite features. Like all featural theories, this model 
comes up against the problem o f primitives, i.e. what forms a basic feature? For 
example, the feature ‘has two legs’ could be made up of two ‘leg’ features which are 
themselves made up of the features ‘thigh’, ‘knee’ and ‘foot’. It is not clear how you 
can define a ‘basic’ feature (but see Jackendoff, 2002, for an interesting solution to this 
problem). As for the content o f particular features, some of the semantic dimensions 
could be modality specific, such that ‘has legs’ is perceptual whilst ‘non domesticated’ 
is amodal, encyclopedic knowledge. It is not clear whether semantic information is 
modality specific or amodal; but the use of slightly abstracted terms such as ‘has legs’, 
rather than just ‘legs’, gives the features an amodal quality (c.f. Quillian’s (1968) use of 
associative links such as ‘has’ or ‘and’ to define relationships). It appears as though the 
theory does conflate semantic and conceptual knowledge, since it uses only lexical 
labels but it is primarily concerned with categories.
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1.3 . 1.3 . From Intention to Articulation (Levelt, 1989)
Leveh's theory is designed to account for language production and I will summarise the 
parts of the theory that refer to the preverbal message and the representations that 
mediate between the preverbal message and word forms. For Levelt, non-linguistic 
cognition is defined as spatial, sensory or propositional and the format that is recruited 
for language must be propositional. This is so that it can support divisions and relations 
in language such as thematic roles, tense, and categories (e.g. objects, events, places, 
directions). The preverbal message is built upon this propositional format, and it is the 
preverbal message that contains semantic representations.
Under this description, semantic representations are of basic types, for example, 
categories such as events, states, objects, locations, and directions. These categories can 
fill thematic roles within the preverbal message, such as agent, patient, place and path. 
Therefore, the semantic divisions map directly onto basic syntactic divisions. Put 
simply, this theory assumes that there is limited set of semantic categories and thematic 
roles, based on how "the mind organises the world of experience" (p.74), semantic 
representations must fulfill one o f these types. It is at the level of the preverbal message 
that cross-linguistic differences are defined, in terms of what needs to be expressed in 
that language (e.g. the marking of tense). The preverbal message initiates the activation 
of specific lexical items, lemmas, which are selected from the lexicon (the store of all 
the words we know). Each item has specifications for its semantic content, syntactic 
class, morphology and phonological spell out and items are activated when the 
preverbal message meets their semantic or syntactic specifications. Relations within 
and between lemmas determine the structure of the lexicon. Within lemmas, relations 
exist for different specifications of, for example, morphological information. The 
different verb inflections (e.g. eat, eats, eaten, eating) are all found within the same 
lemma. Between lemmas, relations can exist because of shared conceptual information 
(intrinsic) or because of co-occurrence (associative). For example, the lemmas for 'rose' 
and 'flower' are intrinsically related because a rose is type of flower (hypernmy). 
Similarly, 'rose' is related to 'daisy' because they are both types of flowers (they are co- 
hyponyms). These intrinsic relations make up the structure of semantic fields. 
Associative relations exist between 'Jack' and 'Jill' or 'truth' and 'beauty' and they are the 
product of co-occurrence in language, rather than semantic similarities. Intrinsic and 
associative relations can influence one another, such that intrinsically related items can 
become strongly associated (e.g. 'cat' and 'mouse'), and associative relations can operate
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over complex semantic relationships, such as that between ’truth’ and ’beauty’. Semantic 
properties are shared on the basis of class membership, e.g. colours, flowers, animals 
etc., and so the structure of the lexicon is based on these coherent semantic fields. 
Although it is not spelt out clearly, since a division is made between the conceptual 
formats (e.g. spatial, sensory and propositional), lexical items are inherently symbolic; 
gaining their semantic content by reference to the conceptual system (rather than 
consisting of that content themselves). Thus, lemmas are holistic since they are accessed 
as wholes by the speech production system. This theory has more recently been 
implemented in computational model (Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999) with the 
assumptions of amodal, holistic and locally defined semantic representations 
implemented in a similar fashion to Collins & Loftus (1975).
1.3.1.4. Parallel D istributed Processing
(Rumelhart. M cClelland & the PDP Research Group 1987)
Parallel Distributed Processing is introduced here not as a theory of semantics, but as a 
theory of representation (distributed representation) which has been widely used in 
many different specific models o f semantics (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991; Rogers et 
al, 2004). In opposition to localist theories where one unit represents one concept, 
representation of an item is distributed as a pattern of activations over a series of units. 
These same units are used for the representation of other items by means of different 
patterns of activation. Therefore the pattern as a whole, rather than the individual unit, is 
the meaningful level o f analysis. It is worth going over the central elements of PDP 
networks, since this simplifies the explanation of subsequent models that employ them. 
A simple background is given here, followed by one of the earliest examples of a model 
of semantics that used a PDP network. Like network models, PDP used nodes/units that 
are connected by links; however, they are referred to as “simple, neuron like” 
computing elements (Rumelhart et al, 1987; McClelland & Rogers, 2003). PDP 
networks are synonymous with Connectionist or Neural Networks, which are more 
recent terms (Inman, 2000).
In a PDP network there are three layers of units: input units that receive external input, 
output units that produce external output and hidden units that can only interact with 
other units. These hidden units typically mediate between the input and output, allowing
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representations at the output units to be reinstated given certain inputs. Any unit can be 
connected to any other by a link with a weighted value; if the value is positive the link is 
excitatory and if negative the link is inhibitory. The magnitude of the weight indicates 
the strength of the connection between the two units. The activation of a unit is defined 
within an equation that takes the (usually) summed inputs to that unit multiplied by the 
connection weights (e.g. McClelland & Rogers, 2003). Networks learn to represent 
particular material by being trained -  for our purposes with suitably coded conceptual or 
semantic information. Training supplies activations for the input units (input) and target 
activations for the output units (output), altering the connection strengths between units 
so that the desired output is produced. There are a number of different rules that can be 
used to change the connections in order to achieve this. The simplest is the Hebb rule, in 
which the connection between two units is strengthened if they have similar activations, 
i.e. if they both respond positively or negatively to an input. The Delta rule expands on 
this principle by using the error between the actual activation of output units and the 
target output to modify connections in a way that reduces this error term (see Inman, 
2000 for an excellent summary). In the next section (1.3.3), PDP models will appear in 
later formulations of semantic representation (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler 
& Moss, 2001; Rogers et al, 2004). This highlights the fact that these models can 
accommodate a number of different assumptions about the make-up of semantic 
organization. The focus on distributed representation encourages feature type inputs 
(and therefore decomposition) since the constituent parts of a representation can be 
presented at different input nodes. However, the features can be defined as modality 
specific (Rogers et al, 2004; Vigliocco et al, 2004) or they could simply correspond to 
more abstract classes of information, such as functional versus visual (Farah & 
McClelland, 1991; Tyler & Moss, 2001).
1.3.1.5. Multimodalitv and Cate2orv Specificity (Farah &
McClelland. 1991)
Farah & McClelland (1991) used a PDP network to model the featural representation of 
living and non-living objects. These were defined as patterns of activation across 
‘visual’ and ‘functional’ input units. Visual inputs encode visual features, e.g. colour 
and shape, whereas functional inputs encoded ‘use’ information, e.g. that mice are kept 
as pets or that a broom is used to sweep. In a norming procedure, participants were 
given passages describing various living and non-living things and they had to identify
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visual or functional features in descriptions of different objects. For each object, the 
relative frequency of visual and functional features was then used to define the 
frequency of particular inputs into the model (rather than specifying individual features 
such as ‘red’ or ‘kept as a pet’). Thus, each item was entered in to the model as a 
distribution of visual and functional inputs. The output units were the words 
corresponding to the objects ( ‘naming units’). The model was motivated by the idea that 
distributions of feature types (such as visual versus functional features) could underlie 
object representation without a-priori category specific organization. Living things 
contain more visual features and non-living things (such as tools) contain more 
functional features, therefore, distinctions between the two fall out of their featural 
make-up. Thus, they assume that some features (visual or functional) are more 
characteristic for certain categories; note that this is slightly different to Smith, Shoben 
& Rips (1974) who used characteristic features per se to define categorical similarity. 
Farah & McClelland used the network to model category specific deficits for living 
versus non-living things, as found in patients with semantic impairments.
By selectively damaging the visual feature system, living things were more impaired; 
conversely by selectively damaging the functional features, the non-living things were 
more impaired. The features for this model were extracted from verbal passages, but by 
defining categories from verbal passages it conflates conceptual and semantic 
information. However, it is assumed that features are grounded into a particular 
modality o f representation, for example, the visual features would be represented by the 
visual systems and the functional features represented by the motor system. Therefore, 
the content of semantic representation is multimodal, rather than amodal, with 
combinations o f features from different modalities aggregated into semantic 
representations for particular entities (in this case objects); this is in line with some form 
of embodiment. In line with PDP theory, localism is rejected and the representations are 
distributed over these features; the distribution of features supporting category specific 
organisation and the relationship between representations (i.e. semantic similarity).
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1.3 .2 . Summary of Early Theories
Table 1-1 summarises where each of the early theories stand on the descriptive 
parameters in use (structure, decomposition and content). Early theories of semantic 
representation centered on network type models where lexical concepts could be 
represented either by individual nodes in the network (Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 
1975; Levelt, 1989), or as distributions over units that represent semantic features 
(Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Farah & McClelland, 1991). With the advent of PDP 
models, 'semantic networks' were advanced by the idea of distributed representation and 
the addition of features, elements o f semantic content that could combine to form 
different representations (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Farah & McClelland, 1991). 
This introduced the distinction between localist and distributed representation. Feature 
based theories appeared early, and along with it a more explicit place for modal content 
as part of semantic structure (Farah & McClelland, 1991), rather than abstract symbolic 
representations with amodal content (Levelt, 1989). Holistic representation is favoured 
by early theories that use the connections between local nodes to quantify semantic 
similarity (Collins & Loftus, 1975, Levelt, 1989). Holistic representations also allow a 
propositional component to the structure of semantics (Quillian, 1968; Levelt, 1989), in 
line with the symbolic tradition. Distributed representation is favored by featural 
theories which employ decomposition; the focus is how a global structure emerges from 
individual elements, with little or no discussion of how the propositional elements of 
language are produced (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Farah & McClelland, 1991). The 
majority o f early theories confound the global structure of semantics with that of 
conceptual information, making no explicit proposals about their relationship (Quillian, 
1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974; Farah & McClelland,
1991). As we shall see in the next section, features of one kind or another come to 
dominate in theories of semantic representation, along with more articulated ideas about 
the relation between conceptual and semantic content. In addition, recent years have 
seen the development o f both moderate and extreme ideas about the dependence of 
representation on modal content.
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1.3 .3 . 1995-present
1.3 .3 . 1. Latent Semantic Analysis (Landauer & Dumais. 1997)
‘The psychological similarity between any two words is reflected in the way they co­
occur in small subsamples of language, that the source of language samples produces 
words in a way that ensures a mostly orderly stochastic mapping between semantic 
similarity and output distance.” (p.215)
As computational modeling developed, new approaches to semantic representation were 
introduced. Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) uses the distribution profile of a given 
word within a large corpus of text to ‘extract’ the semantic profile of that word. This 
can then be compared to the profile for a different word to generate a measure of 
semantic similarity between those two words. LSA is primarily a mathematical 
treatment of semantic organization, one central claim being that distributional 
information combined with particular mathematical transformations is enough to 
successfully induce semantic content. LSA focused on knowledge acquisition and 
representation; since the model uses text as the source of distributional information, 
conceptual and semantic representation were treated as the same thing. The “contextual 
statistics of usage” (p.211) is the basis for inducting the semantic content of a given 
word: an Encyclopedia was used as the text and 4.6 million words were extracted for 
analysis. The text was broken down into samples, consisting of either a complete entry 
from the encyclopedia or the first 2000 characters, whichever was smaller. A 2 
dimensional table was established, with 60,768 rows encoding one word each and 
30,473 columns encoding the text samples. The cells in the table were marked with the 
frequency with which a particular word appeared in a particular text sample. These raw 
frequencies were then divided by the ‘entropy’ for that word, i.e. its frequency across 
many samples. The more samples a word appears in, the less informative any given 
sample is for the meaning of that word. Finally, the data was transformed using 
‘singular value decomposition’, a technique similar to factor analysis, in which a 
complex data set is reduced to a number of dimensions that capture the most variance 
within the data set. These dimensions are represented within a multi-dimensional 
abstract space as a number of vectors that represent each word and each context: “The 
final output is a representation from which one can calculate similarity measures 
between all pairs consisting of either event types or contexts (e.g., word-word, word-
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paragraph, or paragraph-paragraph similarities).” (p.216). Thus words that appear in 
similar contexts are judged to be similar. The similarity measure used was the cosine 
(angle) between two vectors; this value increases as the angle between two vectors 
decreases, thus, a larger value indicates a closer relationship.
LSA is an excellent example of semantics as embedded within a network: the meaning 
of a word is defined by its relation to other words, rather than by what it refers to. 
Recall that this is similar to the Early Network Models which define similarity as 
associations between individual items; LSA represents these associations as 
probabilities of co-occurrence in text. It is a classically symbolic approach (see Section 
1.2.1) since the meaning of a word is defined as a set of abstracted symbols (vectors). 
The model is constrained by the real world referents of the words, their designation, 
only as far as the text sampled by the model faithfully encodes those referents. 
Consequently, the model has been criticized for being too abstract and has been shown 
to perform less well than theories of semantic representation which directly encode the 
real world properties o f referents, such as their modal qualities (Vigliocco et al, 2004), 
or which take account of the way in which the referents can be employed in real 
situations (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). However, it is still a powerful demonstration 
that distributional information is semantically informative; operationalising the 
straightforward assumption that the context of usage reflects and informs what a word 
means. It is not clear whether semantic representations utilize this distributional 
information but concepts do not (i.e. the two levels are separated). The article stresses 
that this mechanism is useful for several cognitive domains so we can infer that the two 
are isomorphic: this allows distributional information to support the acquisition of all 
knowledge, rather than being ‘limited’ to semantics. In line with symbolic approaches 
the focus here is on the process, proposing a mechanism that extracts the similarity of 
words. As with the Early Network Theories, the content of semantic representation is 
provided by quantified relationships between holistic, amodal units; LSA is a statistical 
reincarnation of these early theories.
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1.3 .3 .2 . Conceptualist Semantics (Jackendoff. 2002)
In contrast to theories motivated by abstract representation, Jackendoff begins by 
arguing against the traditional view of reference that requires a link between linguistic 
symbols and 'the world'. This problem is exactly the same as that of designation 
outlined above (Section 1.2.1), if I am using language (symbols) to refer to something, 
how is that reference achieved? Jackendoff solves this problem by 'pushing' the world 
inside the mind, what he terms the 'mentalistic enterprise' (see Lakoff, 1987 and Frith, 
2007, for a similar view). Linguistic terms refer to the concepts that the speaker has 
about the world, rather than to the things in the world themselves. In order to 
purposefully understand and engage with things in the world, the mind constructs 
"cognitive structures in response to [these] inputs from the senses" (p.299) which form 
the basis o f conceptual representation. These internal concepts are meaning since they 
are what the mind has constructed in response to experience with the external world - 
their very existence is the referential link between the mind and the world. For 
Jackendoff, it is the job of perception researchers to answer how such rich perceptual 
experience is established, providing a store of entities to which language can then refer.
As noted above (Section 1.1.1), Jackendoff argues that "we must consider the domain of 
linguistic semantics to be continuous with human conceptualisation as a whole" (p.282), 
so the distinction between meaningful linguistic and non-linguistic representation is 
made within the conceptual system. A propositional system that directly supports 
language is termed Conceptual Structure (CS) and the non-linguistic system is termed 
Spatial Structure (SpS). Language interfaces with the two systems in different ways.
CS supports the propositional and abstract elements of language, whereas SpS supports 
the interface between language and visuo-spatial percepts (Jackendoff states that other 
modalities such as sound, taste, smell and feelings have their own modal counterparts). 
CS is hierarchical and componential, built out of discrete entities. It supports processes 
that use predicate arguement structure, taxonomic structure (e.g. for categorical 
reasoning) and type-token relations. It is a propositional, combinatorial system that is 
not specifically linguistic but it does interface directly with linguistic processes 
(phonology and syntax), such that it's structure is reflected in language. It is the 
divisions within CS that are 'visible' to grammar, for example, whereas the difference 
between 'yellow' and 'red' lies in their perceptual properties, for the purposes of CS they
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are both labeled as 'kind-of-colour' and therefore undifferentiated grammatically. For 
abstract words that have no sensory-motor correlates and therefore no SpS components 
(e.g .fairness, or logical operators such as and, i f  and not), the proposal is that they have 
only CS components. SpS is spatial knowledge of the world integrated across several 
modalities, incorporating haptic, proprioceptive, visual and motor information. By 
allowing CS and SpS to be united under conceptual structure, removing language leaves 
you with "a non-linguistic association of cognitive structures in memory, much of which 
could be shared by a non-linguistic organism" (p.349). What produces a lexical item 
rather than just a concept is the addition of language as an extra modality into which the 
concept extends. Lexical semantics incorporates both elements from CS and SpS (being 
isomorphic with them), for example, the representation o f ’cat* has both CS components 
that identify it as a mammal and a household pet, and SpS components that identify 
what cats look like, how they move and what colours they can be. One powerful 
consequence o f the separation into CS and SpS components is that perceptual features 
such as 'has legs' or lias a tail' can be attributed to SpS (i.e. supramodal content), rather 
than causing problems for a completely amodal system (cf. the grounding problem, 
section 1.2.1).
Jackendoff is firmly devoted to decomposition within all areas of conceptual structure, 
supporting compositional accounts of everything from object representation to verb 
meaning. It appears that this commitment to decomposition stems from the fact that it 
allows continuity to be found across domains, providing a structured account of how 
concepts are created, and it also allows the productive nature of combinatorial systems 
to be manifest across the whole 'meaning' system (CS and SpS). The components 
proposed by Jackendoff are best considered as features, although he prefers abstract 
features to modality specific ones (see below). Primitives of meaning do not have to be 
perceptual primitives, and for Jackendoff any decomposition will necessitate abstract 
primitives (such as 'cause’ being a primitive for events). It is unclear what the 
relationship of these primitives would be to the CS and SpS systems, although 
presumably they would underpin the conceptual structure of both, with mostly 
perceptual primitives providing the basis for SpS and abstract primitives providing the 
basis for CS.
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In sum, Jackendoff sees semantic and conceptual information as isomorphic, but he 
distinguishes between conceptual information that supports abstract and propositional 
components of language from perceptual information that supports non-linguistic, 
perceptual representations. Language has access to both these information types, with a 
more immediate connection to the CS system. In terms of content, the CS system is 
fundamentally abstract, and the SpS system is also abstracted from any one modality. 
However, he does note that features of modal information such as taste, smell and 
feeling have access to their own modal counterparts. Therefore, the larger conceptual 
structures that support meaning (CS and SpS) are one step removed from perceptual 
information per se, but it appears that there is still the possibility that a more direct 
connection between language and perceptual information is possible through 
specifically modal features. Although this theory is dependent on features (due to its 
decompositional nature) it is not included with other featural theories below, as it has 
not been computationally implemented for empirical purposes. However, it is assumed 
that in line with all featural theories, similarity between items is defined by the 
similarity o f their featural make-up.
1.3.3.3. Recent Featural theories:
1.3.3.3.1. Featural Representations in Word M eaning
(M cRae, de Sa, Seidenberg, 1997)
A descendent of featural theories such as Farah & McClelland (1991), the model put 
forward by McRae et al looked specifically at featural representations within a 
distributed (connectionist) network. McRae et al note that “all distributed 
representations incorporate featural representations of some sort” (p. 100), since a 
representation is presented as a pattern of activation over a series of units (i.e. features). 
Whereas Farah & McClelland focused on functional versus sensory features, McRae et 
al instead looked at how different measures of feature distribution influence 
representation. Their aim was to look at how correlations amongst features would affect 
semantic judgments for different items (this idea is similar to Smith, Shoben & Rips 
(1974) characteristic features that are shared between items of the same category).
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They looked exclusively at nouns from 10 different categories (e.g. mammals, fruits, 
clothing, furniture, vehicles and weapons) and asked participants to list physical 
properties, functional attributes and encyclopedic facts for a subset of those nouns.
These speaker-generated features were then used to generate two different semantic 
representations: one derived from weighted individual features and one derived from 
correlated feature pairs. For the individual representation, each feature was weighted 
according to how many participants listed it for that noun. For the correlated 
representation, correlations were calculated between pairs of features (limited to 240 
features shared by 3 or more nouns). Vectors were computed across these correlated 
pairs; for the features in a given noun, it’s unit was set to 1 if the noun contained both 
items in a pair, 0 if it contained neither and -1 if it contained one but not the other (a 
violation of the correlation). Thus, individual and correlated representations were 
independently computed. Similarity in individual features predicted priming in artifacts 
but not living things, whereas similarity in correlated pairs predicted priming in living 
things but not artifacts. As in Farah & McClelland (1991), a division between living 
things and artifacts falls out of the feature composition; this time without a definition of 
the modal content of particular features. McRae et al proposed that living things have 
more correlated features because the constraints on them are less arbitrary than those for 
artifacts, because of evolution all animals have some similar properties (see Tyler & 
Moss (2001) below for a theory that unites visual and functional modes with shared and 
individual featural distributions by extending this argument). McRae et al note that “all 
feature-based theories of semantic memory assume that individual features are 
represented” (p. 104), although nothing more is said about how this might be 
implemented. It is assumed that features are represented in a distributed, 
decompositional network, but the content of the features themselves is left open.
I.3.3.3.2. Distributed Conceptual Knowledge (Tyler & Moss,
2001)
The distributed account of Tyler & Moss deals explicitly with conceptual 
representation, however the authors operationalise features in a simple connectionist 
network, and use verbally generated features (words) as the basis for their model. They 
therefore collapse conceptual and semantic representation, treating them as isomorphic. 
For this reason, the model is summarised here. Tyler & Moss propose that
42
representations are structured around shared and distinctive features. Shared features are 
those that are common to different concepts, and distinctive features are those that are 
limited to less than three different concepts. This is similar to the correlated and 
individual feature analysis done in McRae et al (1997), except that here the two are 
computationally dependent (the more distinctive a feature, the less it is shared). When 
operationalised in a connectionist network, correlated features (those that co-occur and 
predict one another) support each other in representation, and are therefore less prone to 
damage. The model focuses on neuropsychological literature, and seeks to account for 
various category specific deficits. Using a feature generation task, features were 
collected for 93 different object concepts from animate (e.g. animals and plants) and 
artifact categories (e.g. tools and vehicles). It is assumed that information is “randomly 
distributed without category/domain organization” and the feature distribution means 
the connectionist model will organize itself into “graded, overlapping regions in 
semantic space” (p.249-250). A PDP model was produced with feature vectors 
(distributions of different features) entered via the input layer; training was complete 
when the same vector pattern was reproduced at the output layer. The features 
themselves are categorized as, for example, perceptual or functional (implying some 
modality specific content). The model was then ‘lesioned’ by randomly removing 
connections between the input, hidden and output layers. Results showed that the 
distinctive features of animate concepts were more vulnerable than those for artifacts, 
but the shared properties were better preserved. By categorizing the features as 
perceptual or functional, this theory links the arguments in Farah & McClelland (1991) 
and McRae et al (1997): living things have more shared features because they are 
perceptually similar. The theory takes on the standard assumptions that come with 
features: decomposition, distribution and similarity dictated by featural composition. 
Also in line with other featural theories (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991), conceptual 
and semantic information are isomorphic and there is a hint that features are modally 
defined.
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I.3.3.3.3. FUSS (Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis & Garrett, 2004)
The Featural and Unitary Semantic Space hypothesis (FUSS) assumes that conceptual 
structure is organized by feature type, such as those that are modality specific (visual, 
motor etc.). A separate semantic level is derived from conceptual structure as features 
are bound together into lexico-semantic representations. To obtain features, native 
English speakers were given individual words and asked to generate features “sufficient 
to define and describe different words., [whilst avoiding] free associations and 
“dictionary style’’ definitions” (p.7-8). For example, features for ‘Strawberry’ would be 
‘red’, ‘sweet’, ‘fruit’ and ‘edible’. Features were collected for 230 nouns and 216 verbs, 
moving away from previous theories by modeling action as well as object 
representations. The same organizing principles were used for object and action words 
with lexico-semantic representations that share many features being grouped together.
Features were weighted by how many participants had produced that feature for a given 
item, and then combined across words. A self-organising map (SOM) modeled the 
feature space. SOMs, which are composed of an input and output layer, respond to 
statistical regularities in the input without other structural assumptions. All output units 
are connected to all input units and they are also laterally connected to each other. 
Feature vectors were presented in a random order via the input layer and the unit in the 
output layer that responded maximally to that vector (the ‘winner’) came to represent 
that collection of features. The winning unit inhibited all other units and changed its 
connection weights with the input so that it would respond the next time that feature 
vector was presented (i.e. it would strengthen its winning response). In addition, the 
lateral connections allow winning output units to alter neighbouring output units so that 
they respond more similarly. In this way, after training, a map organized by 
neighbourhoods of similar words was produced in which individual output units 
corresponded to individual lexical items. The output units are organized across feature 
vectors and are a best approximation of lexico-semantic representations, rather than a 
firm commitment to a processing structure. It is notable that rather than measure a first- 
order variable (e.g. correlations between individual features) the output units are 
organized so that second-order relationships (i.e. similarity across all features) dictate 
semantic structure. Similarity between two words was taken as being the Euclidian 
distance between their corresponding units on the SOM (see Figure 1-4). The model 
was used to successfully account for graded effects in priming, picture-word
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interference and error induction tasks. Here, items that were more similar according to 
FUSS produced a greater number of errors in naming, greater priming and greater 
interference as distracters in picture naming. These results held for both action and 
object words
Figure 1-4. Representation o f  the semantic relation between items as depicted by a 2D representation o f
the multi-dimensional space
(Taken from Vinson & Vigliocco, 2002)
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FUSS is put forward as both localist (one best responding unit) and distributed (a 
neighbourhood of responding units). There is clear commitment to decomposition at 
the conceptual level (i.e. conceptual features that are used to create semantic 
representations). These conceptual features are then bound together into more holistic 
semantic representations. This is a good example of separation between the conceptual 
and semantic allowing different organisational principles: decomposition at the 
conceptual level and a greater degree of holism at the semantic level. Theoretically, by 
assuming that modality specific features are an essential part of conceptual (and 
therefore lexico-semantic) representation, FUSS makes a clear statement about the 
semantic representation of words with sensory and motor content. These words are at 
least partly grounded in sensory and motor representations (operationalised as sensory 
or motor features, e.g. ’red’ or 'used for kicking'), and as such, have embodied content. 
By separating lexico-semantic and conceptual levels, FUSS allows specifically
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linguistic information, such as syntax, to be integrated with the lexico-semantic level. 
Lexico-semantic representations can also be repeatedly and differentially derived from 
conceptual structure, allowing different representations across languages. Similar to 
other featural theories, the number of shared features provides the structure of semantic 
organization and the way in which similarity is established. However, the SOM means 
that second-order relationships replace first-order measures that are more directly 
dependent on individual features.
I.3.3.3.4. Semantic representations as mappings between
verbal and experiential representations. (Rogers, Lambon-Ralph, 
Garrard, Bozeat, McClelland, Hodges & Patterson, 2004)
"Semantic representations are defined with reference to the function that they perform 
and not the content that they encode" (p.216)
The following theory was developed to account for the deterioration of semantic 
memory in patients with "selective and progressive deficits in conceptual knowledge" 
(p.205). The theory is that semantics is the stable mapping between modality-specific 
information from different domains and as such it does not "code explicit semantic 
content" (p.206). The mapping allows that content to be accessed, given a particular 
task (e.g. comparing two concepts) or input (e.g. visual input corresponding to a named 
entity). The model is implemented in a simple PDP network that has two sets of input 
units (which also act as output units) corresponding to the verbal (words) and visual 
(sensory) modalities. A set of hidden units has connections to both these input pools, 
and these hidden units stand for the semantic representation. Mappings in these hidden 
units emerge when the model is presented with perceptual inputs for a given entity, for 
example the structured visual information produced by objects. In order to generate the 
input for the visual and verbal unit, the authors employed both verbal and visual feature 
generation tasks. In the verbal task participants list as many attributes (features) as 
possible for a given lexical item, in the visual task participants draw the items and 
features were extracted (e.g. tail, hooves, and legs). It is worth noting that the paper 
only deals with objects, so it is unclear how it would deal with more abstract entities 
(like events, or abstract concepts) which do not have such clear perceptual input.
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Attributes were classified and feature vectors were generated for input to the model.
The model was trained on visual (image), verbal (descriptions) and single name (label) 
inputs, producing representational structure in the hidden units that was constrained by, 
but not reflected in, the visual or verbal modalities. Objects that have similar perceptual 
inputs will also have similar semantic representations, for the simple reason that the 
perceptual inputs - and therefore the mappings from them - are structured in a similar 
way. Commonalities in the verbal labels used to refer to objects (for example in 
statements about objects: "The cat is my pet" and "The rabbit is my pet") will also 
constrain the semantic mappings. Similarity is thus a product of the "deep" (p.206) 
structure across and between modalities; it is a second-order variable that extends over 
features. This is distinct to most featural theories where measures of similarity are 
derived from first order variables fixed to individual features, such as correlations or the 
number of participants that produced that feature (e.g. McRae et al, 1997). However, 
one other featural theory also uses second-order measures to structure semantic 
representations. FUSS (Vigliocco et al, 2004) creates a space that supervenes over the 
individual features that define it, modeling lexico-semantic representation and similarity 
geographically as areas and distances in that space. Also in line with FUSS, the model 
of Rogers et al (2004) is compatible with decomposition at the conceptual level 
(although they do not commit to it) and holistic, unitary representation at the semantic 
level (a stable set of mappings). But where Vigliocco et al (2004) specify modal 
content and a dependence on semantic features, Rogers et al (2004) are strict about there 
being only amodal mappings. Thus, Rogers et al (2004) diverge from all featural 
theories since they do not use first or second-order relationships to demonstrate how 
effective features can be in accounting for semantic representation. Instead, the second- 
order relationships are the representation itself. One further difference is that unlike all 
other featural theories, no commitment is made to decomposition; the structured modal 
input is operationalised as attributes/features only for the purposes of the model1.
The authors are explicit that the model is an abstract and amodal semantic store. 
However, the system is interactive so it builds a semantic architecture reliant on 
structured modal input. Thus, category specific deficits can arise if non-linguistic modal 
information is damaged as this disrupts the mappings from those sources. In sum,
1 Note that mappings across different domains are difficult to implement if there are no features, i.e. no 
individual sources that can be mapped repeatedly for different representations. Therefore, I think 
Rogers et al (2004) have to make a commitment to some kind of decomposition, at least at the 
conceptual level.
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semantic representations are taken to serve a particular function which in turn defines 
their structure. The semantic system consists of abstract representations whose content 
is the higher-order structure extracted from mapping across modal inputs. The theory 
does not explicitly discuss the relationship between semantic and conceptual 
information; however, since semantics is the link between conceptual information (non- 
linguistic modal input) and the linguistic modality, it is abstracted from conceptual 
information whilst maintaining a partial dependence on it.
1.3.3.4. Summary o f  featural theories
These theories all use featural stimuli to tap into the structure of semantic 
representations. Features are typically gathered from feature generation tasks, in which 
participants are presented with a word (e.g. apple) and told to generate as many features 
that define that word/concept as possible (e.g. green, red, edible, fruit, food, grows on 
trees, sweet, crunchy etc.), the features are then compiled. All theories using featural 
representations must assume at some level that the features are represented (McRae, de 
Sa & Seidenberg, 1997), and if those features are taken from verbal generation tasks and 
assumed to be a window onto underlying conceptual content, the theories can be 
criticized for ignoring how different features are acquired from different modalities (e.g. 
verbal, perceptual or motor) (Rogers et al, 2004). However, some models make explicit 
statements about the content, and origin, o f particular feature classes (Vigliocco et al, 
2004). The majority o f theories are also committed to decomposition, since the features 
are component parts of semantic representations (the one exception being Rogers et al, 
2004, but see footnote 1). All theories are concerned with the distributional power of 
featural representations and they employ some computational model to implement the 
features and extract these structural relationships. Therefore, although features usually 
commit theories to certain assumptions (decompositionality for example), they are 
primarily a tool that enables researchers to explore the basis of semantic relationships 
(how two semantic representations are similar and dissimilar, e.g. McRae, de Sa & 
Seidenberg, 1997), the structure of semantic representations (whether shared or distinct 
features across concept domains are important, e.g. Tyler & Moss, 2001), and the 
structure of lexico-semantic representation (whether certain properties of lexical 
representation, like syntactic class, naturally emerge from featural distributions, see 
Vigliocco et al, 2004). Again, the notable exception is Rogers et al (2004), where
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features are used to define an amodal semantic system that maps between conceptual 
and symbolic information. Most featural theories collapse conceptual and semantic 
information (McRae et al, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Farah & McClelland, 1991) and 
in doing so they assume that both semantic and conceptual information are decomposed. 
Those theories that use second-order relationships between features to define semantic 
structure are only partially dependent on conceptual information (Rogers et al, 2004; 
Vigliocco et al, 2004) and are therefore compatible with decomposition at the 
conceptual level and a degree of holism at the semantic level (note that Vigliocco et al 
(2004) is the theory that makes this distinction explicit).
Table 1-2 summarises the above featural theories as well as Landauer & Dumais (1997) 
and Jackendoff (2002) along the descriptive parameters of structure, decomposition and 
content.
1.3.3.5. Embodied, simulation accounts
1.3.3.5.1. The B ra in 9s Concepts (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005)
This is perhaps one of the strongest formulations of embodied conceptual and semantic 
representation, drawing heavily on the performance and representation of motor 
actions. It focuses on the precise neural implementation of embodied content, making 
no distinction between conceptual and semantic information. A key element of this 
theory is the idea that "understanding is imagination" (p.456) and the same neural 
substrates are used for perceiving/doing, imagining and linguistic understanding. A 
system which fuses information from different modalities (e.g. vision, audition and 
motor action) underpins cognition, and is also utilised by language, so that linguistic 
processes are not isolated from general cognition (i.e. language is not modular). The 
system combines modalities within the particular sensory and motor systems 
themselves, so it is multi-modal2. As such, the sensory-motor system is necessary for 
representation. This is a strong claim, made by most embodied theories, but spelt out 
nicely here. Modality specific information could still, in theory, be recruited by 
association areas that integrate the modal information and have access to it, but do not
2 This is in contrast to 'supra-modal' integration that combines information in a separate area that is 
distinct from the modal system itself.
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directly or necessarily recruit them for representation. The evidence for this multi­
modality comes from monkey studies which show neurons in premotor areas selectively 
responding to motor, visual and somatosensory information for the purpose of 
controlling movements in peripersonal space. Therefore, distinct modal information can 
be integrated within the modal areas themselves, rather than requiring a separate 
association area. The authors define areas which perform multi-modal integration 
(within a given modal area) as functional clusters that perform as a unit for a given 
computational function, for example, transforming the spatial location of objects into 
appropriate motor information for that object to be grasped or viewed. The operations 
performed by functional clusters are defined as action simulations; multi-modal 
integration happens for the purpose of performing relevant actions, and is therefore a 
simulation of, for example, interacting with an object at a given location. The 
integration is a simulation which acts as a plan for a given action. For example, 
neurons that fire when the head is turned to a particular location also fire when an object 
is seen or heard in that location; for the authors, this neuron is simulating the head being 
turned towards the stimulus. The structure of representations is inherent in these 
functional clusters, for example, they define a 'general-purpose subcluster' that is 
concerned with the general goal of an action, rather than the detailed manner or timing 
by which it is carried out (these have their own subclusters). In conceptual simulation, 
if this subcluster is activated on its own, it can represent an imagined general action 
with a particular goal: "We can conceptualise a generalised grasping without any 
particular manner being specified" (p.461). There are also subclusters that code for 
parameter values, for example, the role of who is performing a given action (me or 
someone else) or the level of force required to perform an action. These different 
subclusters are taken from the domain of motor actions and presumably similar clusters 
underpin perception and the other senses. With the addition of'control clusters', the 
subclusters form the basis of conceptual representation, producing networks that 
represent "schemas" (p.467) (i.e. concepts). In sum, this theory proposes a heavily 
neural account of how embodied content underpins conceptual 
representation. Semantics representations, since they are isomorphic with concepts, 
have components afforded by the preexisting structure of the sensory and motor 
systems, allowing decomposition to be clearly maintained. Sensory and motor 
information is the necessary content of concrete concepts, and simulation using multi­
modal systems underpins action, perception, imagination and conceptual representation. 
Presumably the similarity in modal content between two items dictates their semantic
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similarity (working along the same principles as the visual/functional features of Farah 
& McClelland, 1991) and representations are clearly distributed (between different 
modal systems).
1.3.3.5.2. Word Webs (Pulvermiiller 1999, 2001)
This account of word meaning is also neurally motivated, seeking to provide neural 
mechanisms for representation that are grounded in Hebbian learning (Pulvermiiller, 
1999). Assemblies of neural populations in distinct cortical areas act together to 
achieve representation, producing distributed networks of co-activated regions. The 
principles of Hebbian learning explain how these assemblies come into existence: 
"Coactivated neurons become associated... Associations can occur between adjacent or 
distant neurons...[and if] neurons become associated, they will develop into a functional 
unit, a cell assembly." (p.254, 1999). The activation of these cell assemblies is defined 
spatio-temporally across participating cortical regions and it forms the basis for 
representation. Neural activity that is stimulus specific and spatio-temporally defined 
has been found, suggesting a particular assembly of neurons that represent that stimulus: 
"A web of strongly connected neurons, each of them contributing to specific sensory 
and motor processes related to an object, may thus become the cortical representation of 
this object" (2001, p.517). Thus, there is a suggestion that conceptual representation 
(e.g. of an object) is also based in cell assemblies, with the addition of word form areas 
to produce semantic representations.
For semantics, the essential process is the association of areas relating to the word form 
(for spoken languages Pulvermiiller locates this to the left hemisphere perisylvian area) 
with areas relating to the perceptions and actions to which the word refers. The 
coactivated neurons in the different cortical regions "develop into a higher-order 
assembly" (p.260, 1999), named 'Word Webs', that encompasses these word form 
specific and semantically specific cortical activations. If these coactivations occur 
frequently then the cell assembly of the word is changed to reflect the correlated 
activation of the different regions. Semantic content determines which cortical regions 
will be part of a word’s cell assembly and once different cortical regions are bound into 
an assembly, their activation becomes interdependent. The different areas within an 
assembly will show stimulus specificity only if other areas of the assembly are intact 
(Pulvermiiller, 2001). This suggests that the representations are not particularly robust
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given damage in one part of the assembly, but no further details are given as to the 
dependence of assembly components. The activation of lexical and semantic elements 
of the word web are 'near simultaneous', with the first activation of the web, known as 
ignition, followed by active reverberation (maintenance) of activity within the web 
(Pulvermiiller, 2001).
For concrete words, which have a clearly identified perceptual modality or experience, 
word webs involve sensory and motor areas. The word form is experienced in the 
presence of the percept to which it refers, the percept causes particular activations in the 
sensory and/or motor cortices and these become associated to the perisylvian activation 
related to the word form. Categories of words which follow this process are, for 
example, those corresponding to experiences in vision, motor action, smell, taste, pain, 
touch, sound and emotion. "Members of these word classes should be represented in 
assemblies with specific cortical topographies [which correspond to the modality of the 
referent.] For example, whereas an assembly representing a pain or touch word may 
include substantial numbers of neurons in somatosensory cortices, sound words may 
have exceptionally high numbers of neurons in bidirectional auditory cortices included 
in their assemblies" (p.262, 1999). Since the referents of concrete words recruit regions 
bidirectionally in sensory and motor cortices, these words are predicted to be less left 
lateralised than abstract open class words or function words, whose context of 
experience is more heavily linguistic. In sum, every word is represented by a Word 
Web that activates lexical areas related to the word form (e.g. perisylvian areas) and 
other cortical areas defined by the semantic character of the word's referent, and 
therefore the neural traces of how that referent was/is experienced. The content is 
influenced both by sensory-motor and linguistic experience: the structure of semantic 
representations is dependent on their neural organisation, i.e. which areas are recruited 
for the representation. As for Gallese & Lakoff (2005) concepts and semantics are based 
in similar organizational principles and semantic similarity is probably defined by the 
similarity of the cortical regions that represent particular words. However, this theory is 
not clearly decompositional, aside from the distinct cortical areas; but it is clearly 
distributed, since semantic representations are dynamic patterns across different cortical 
regions.
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I.3.3.5.3. Perceptual Symbol Sytems (Barsalou, 1999;
Barsalou et al, 2003)
Using a nominal twist on the Physical Symbol Systems account put forward by Newell 
(1980, see Section 1.2.1 above), the Perceptual Symbol Systems (PcSS) account is the 
most wide-ranging theory of how simulation might drive human cognition. For 
example, the theory has been applied to conceptual processing (Pecher, Zeelenberg & 
Barsalou, 2004), social cognition (Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber & 
Ric, 2005) and prepositional reasoning (Barsalou, 1999). The theory makes a firm 
connection between perceptual and conceptual systems (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). 
There is direct modulation of perception by conceptual processing and the genesis of 
conceptual abilities lies in the pre-existing structure of the sensory and motor systems 
(Barsalou, 1999, p.598-590; Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998). In this sense it shares the 
strong assumptions of Gallese & Lakoff (2005) that higher-order cognitive processes 
are the product of lower-order, sensory-motor activity. The theory collapses semantic 
and conceptual processes, since both are based in simulations (Barsalou, 1999), whilst 
maintaining that 'shallow' processing of word associations, at the lexical level, 
circumvents conceptual (read semantic) activation (Solomon & Barsalou, 2004; 
Niedenthal et al, 2005).
This theory is more classically cognitive, making predictions about cortical regions 
rather than using particular neural substrates as a starting point. The focus is on a 
coherent system with component processes and functional units. The PcSS is based 
upon Perceptual Symbols, Frames, Simulations and Simulators. Perceptual Symbols 
(PcS) are based in the sensory and motor neural systems that are active when a percept 
is experienced, thus they are multi-modal, being established in the relevant sensory 
(visual, haptic, gustatory, olfactory, auditory) or motor area (introspection is also 
included as a modality of experience). PcS differ from perceptual 'images' or 'pictures' 
which might act as representations for a number of reasons. First, PcS are schematic, 
rather than holistic, re-presentations of perception. They do not recreate complete 
neural activations generated by perceiving a particular entity, rather, they are 
attentionally selected elements of that activation: "the symbol formation process selects 
and stores a subset of the active neurons in a perceptual state" (Barsalou, 1999, p.584). 
It follows from this that they can also be indeterminate, providing schematic 
representation rather than having to recreate every detail of a particular concept.
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Second, PcS exist for the elements of a concept, as well as for the whole concept itself. 
These constituent PcS are separate and they make the system componential, 
combinatorial and productive (a necessary capacity for conceptual processing). Third, 
they are activated unconsciously, separating them from conscious imagery (although the 
two may be based in a similar recruitment of sensory and motor areas) and fourth, they 
are dynamic rather than static. PcS do not only stand for specific individual, fixed, 
entities. Whether the PcS designates an individual (a token) or a category of individuals 
(a type) is defined by the context of activation in combination with the PcS perceptually 
based content. Since they are established by dynamic neural activity, their subsequent 
activations can vary depending on context (which may emphasize a particular aspect of 
the symbol's content) or be changed by other PcS that are stored in the same area. In 
order to represent a concept, frames combine related PcS, for example, PcS for various 
components (doors, windows, wheels etc.) come together for the concept 'CAR'. The 
simulations that this frame and its relevant PcS perform constitute a simulator for a 
concept ('CAR'). The simulations themselves are never a comprehensive, complete, 
simulation of the entire concept. Instead, through specific simulations these simulators 
represent whatever aspect of the concept is under focus (e.g. whether I want to think 
about driving a car, washing a car or buying a car). Simulators represent types, and the 
simulations are the tokens.
For semantics, the implication is that on comprehension of a word the relevant simulator 
is accessed (e.g. 'CAR'). This simulator then performs a simulation relevant to the 
sentential context: "As comprehension proceeds, representations of individuals develop, 
as in the perception of a physical scene." (Barsalou, 1999, p.605) For example, "I drove 
the small car up the large hill" would produce a different simulation than "I drove the 
large car up the small hill", or even "I drove my car up that hill", as the simulations of 
'CAR' and 'HILL' would vary depending on the specifications in the sentence.
Barsalou sees the power of language in its effective construction of simulations, 
productively allowing novel and creative situations to be communicated; there is thus no 
difference between the simulations for semantic and conceptual entities. In this sense, 
lexical labels are another access route to the simulation mechanisms that underpin 
human cognition. Representation is decompositional, since different perceptual 
symbols are available for different features of a concept, and it is distributed, being 
realized across different modal areas. In this sense, it can be compared to featural 
theories that contain modality specific features (Vigliocco et al, 2004; Jackendoff,
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2002), although they do not invoke simulation as the central mechanism. As for the 
other embodied theories (Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Pulvermiiller, 2001) we must assume 
that semantic similarity falls out of shared modal content, in this case, defined as shared 
constituent PcS.
I.3.3.5.4. The Immersed Experiencer Framework (Zwaan,
2004)
"Language is a set of cues to the comprehender to construct an experiential... simulation 
of the described situation... the comprehender is an immersed experiencer... and 
comprehension is the vicarious experience of the described situation." (p.36)
The Immersed Experiencer Framework (IEF) is a comprehensive theory of how 
embodied processes might work during language comprehension. As with other 
embodied theories, comprehension involves the simulation of whatever the language 
describes, and this simulation necessarily recruits sensory and motor representations. 
The IEF offers a detailed account of the comprehension process, stressing the 'vicarious 
experience1 that is the product of comprehension. Since comprehension is based on 
experience, it has similar constraints, for example, only one perspective can be taken at 
any one time. The simulated representations are schematic, because language focuses 
on particular aspects of a situation, attentional capacity is limited and comprehenders 
use economy o f processing, i.e. they do not activate more information than is necessary 
for comprehension. There are three stages to comprehension: Activation, Construal and 
Integration. Each stage is part of the incremental process by which a simulation is built, 
moving from individual entities (words), to scenes (clauses or intonation units), to 
extended episodes (connected discourse). The three stages are therefore differentiated 
by the amount of information that they combine and there is a large degree of temporal 
overlap between them.
During Activation, individual words activate functional webs which represent the object, 
action or quality to which the word refers. Representation is achieved because these 
functional webs are active when the referential entity is actually experienced, therefore 
they are necessarily comprised of the sensory and motor input that an entity produces.
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Pulvermiiller’s Word Webs (section 1.3.3.5.2.) are cited as support for these functional 
webs, so it is possible that lexico-semantic representations are similar for these two 
theories. Just as there are many ways to experience an entity, for example I can see one 
object from many view points, several webs are activated by one word. These webs 
map onto each other diffusely and experience biases the base level of activation as more 
common experiences (e.g. canonical viewpoints) have more active webs. When there is 
no bias from experience (e.g. no canonical viewpoint) there is no dominantly active 
web. The webs are constrained by the preceding representations, which act as a context 
into which the webs have to fit (this is similar to the constraint of context on Barsalou’s 
perceptual symbols). The more constraining the context, the stronger the bias for one 
particular web and the higher it's activation. This constraint satisfaction is termed 
'articulation' and it happens during the second stage of comprehension: Construal.
Construal occurs over clausal or intonation units, integrating the webs accessed during 
Activation into coherent event representations. Linguistic cues, such as prepositions 
which specify locations, constrain the activation of different webs to those that are 
consistent with the appropriate perceptual representation. For example, "the teapot is on 
the shelf' would activate a side viewpoint, whereas "the teapot is on the floor" would 
activate a view from above. Construal occurs rapidly, resulting in an articulated 
simulation. Representations can be articulated by previous information, e.g. "the broken 
teapot" and by subsequent information, e.g. "the teapot that I broke". A construal is 
built from several components, each of which is an element of the simulated situation. 
There is a distinct temporal and spatial region; these define, for example, whether the 
event is ongoing and whether it occurs near or far from the immersed experiencer (IE). 
There is a distinct perspective and orientation of the IE relative to the entities (e.g. "I 
looked at the clouds" or "I looked at the clouds through the window"). There is a focal 
entity and a background entity, and a relation between the two (e.g. "The cloud moved 
across the sky"). Where these things are not made explicit by the language, they are 
implied by the entities and their real-world referents. For example, "The woman stared 
at the spider" implies different distances and orientations compared to "The woman 
stared at the skyscraper". Finally, the focal and background entities are further 
articulated by features which can be defined by adjectives (e.g. 'blue', 'slowly' and 
'huge'). If the described situation is dynamic, e.g. "The woman ran away from the 
spider", then the construal is also dynamic.
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Integration is the final, grand, stage of comprehension during which transitions are 
made between the construals produced from connected discourse. The transitions are 
"experientially based" (p.46) in as much as they are constrained by our real experiences 
of situations. Transitions can involve a change in focus, zooming in on a detail or 
zooming out to a wider scene, or they can involve a change in modality, e.g. when the 
IE sees an object and then hears it make a noise. The ease of integration is determined 
by the continuity in space, time and perspective between different construals. If 
subsequent construals jump around with respect to the time, place and perspective of a 
situation, then comprehension will temporarily require more resources. The overlap 
between construals in terms of the number of items, the focal and background entities, 
their features and so on, will also determine how easily transitions are made. Linguistic 
cues, such as the difference between definite ('the') and indefinite ('a') articles, effect 
integration since the former maintains a previous entity ("the bird on the grass") whilst 
the latter activates a new entity ("a bird on the grass").
In sum, the goal of comprehension is to construct a situation model, influenced by the 
perceptual and spatio-temporal characteristics of the referential situation. Perceptual 
and motor representations are necessary since comprehension is proposed to be the 
"reconstruction of an experience with its referent [that requires the] integration and 
sequencing of traces from actual experience cued by the linguistic input" (p.38). At the 
lexico-semantic level, functional webs may be similar to Word Webs (Pulvermiiller, 
2001) so similarity would be defined by the similarity in modal content/cortical areas 
that are recruited. Thus, decomposition is not an important aspect of lexico-semantic 
structure with distributed representations for each word that diffusely map onto one 
another. However, since this theory is primarily concerned with the comprehension of 
sentences and narrative, the focus is shifted away from lexico-semantics. Note that the 
later stages of comprehension (Construal and Integration) have defining parameters (e.g. 
perspective, orientation, overlap) that give comprehension its structure and a method for 
establishing similarity between larger, integrated semantic representations. In line with 
all embodied theories, there is a clear commitment to embodied content that can engage 
in the simulation of experience that is necessary for comprehension. The relationship 
between conceptual and semantic information is left open (but see the discussion in the 
penultimate paragraph of section 1.1.1. about the improbability of deriving embodied, 
simulation semantics from a conceptual level that does not work in the same way).
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I.3.3.5.5. The Indexical Hypothesis (Glenberg & Robertson,
2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003)
The indexical hypothesis seeks to link language, and specifically semantics, to the 
preparation of action within the environment. As with other simulation theories, the 
symbol grounding problem (see Section 1.2.1 above) is invoked as a damning argument 
against abstract symbolic theories, requiring an alternative theory of meaning that does 
not have this problem. In the indexical hypothesis the "mental representations of 
language are the representations of a situation (or the affordances of a situation) rather 
than a mental representation of the language itself1 (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000, 
p.384), that is, a simulation of the situation is performed and this is how comprehension 
is possible. This is therefore similar to the IE framework (Zwaan, 2004) where 
comprehension involves the vicarious experience of the described situation. By taking 
as it's starting point the non-controversial idea that cognition developed to "coordinate 
effective action" (Glenberg & Roberston, 2000, p.383), the theory proposes that "the 
meaning of a situation to an individual consists of set of potential actions available to 
that individual in that situation" (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003, p. 100). The set of 
possible actions is constrained by the body of the actor and the objects that can be acted 
upon (the affordances), the learning history of the individual and the goal of the action. 
The affordances dictate how objects can be acted upon, for example, bicycles afford 
riding by humans but not by fish, and bicycles can be used to get from place to place, 
but not to cook food. The individual's experience (their learning history) introduces 
cultural and social norms into the constraints: I can ride the bicycle that I own, but not 
the one that belongs to a stranger (unless I want to steal it). The goal constrains the 
action for obvious reasons, if I want to get to the shops I will use my bicycle, and I will 
also use my bicycle when I want to do some exercise. I will not use my bicycle when I 
want to cook some food (unless I have no food and have to go to the shops). In order to 
understand a sentence, the Indexical Hypothesis proposes three stages. First, the words 
are Indexed to objects in the environment or to perceptual symbols (Barsalou, 1999), 
which stand for real world objects. Affordances are then derived from the perceptual 
symbols, which lend themselves easily to this since they simulate the situation described 
in the sentence, necessarily recruiting sensory and motor information in a context 
dependent way. The derivation of affordances is based on previous experience and is 
also dependent on the other perceptual symbols already in use (e.g. the actions involved 
in 'riding'). Thus, as for other embodied theories (Barsalou, 1999; Zwaan, 2004) the
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integration of perceptually based representations provides an easy way to sensibly 
constrain semantic interpretation: what is possible in the real world is possible in 
semantics. The Indexical Hypothesis makes the clearest exposition of this point.
Finally, the affordances of the various symbols are then meshed based on the syntax of 
the sentence; for example, "Sarah rode my bike" allows that Sarah (the subject) is acting 
upon the bike (the object). In addition, the use of the verb 'ride' allows that Sarah is 
sitting on the bicycle controlling its movement, rather than carrying it or lying under it. 
Meshing occurs when the potential actions in a situation can be successfully combined 
to accomplish a goal. For example, if'Sarah' was indexed to a boat, rather than a 
person, affordances could not be derived and the sentence would be nonsensical (i.e. 
impossible in the real world and therefore impossible in semantics). The three steps 
(indexing, derivation and meshing) are not strictly ordered, since meshing can influence 
which affordances are derived. The content of semantic representations is decidedly 
embodied, but as for Zwaan (2004) the focus is on sentential and narrative 
comprehension, so lexico-semantic representations are dealt with more briefly.
However, Barsalou’s PcSS (1999) is cited as the basis for lexico-semantics, so we can 
assume that the same theoretical parameters are applied: an isomorphism with concepts, 
decomposition, distributed organization and item-by-item similarity based on shared 
modal content.
1.3.3.5.6. Summary o f  Embodied theories
These theories explicitly build on the embodied approach, applying the ideas to 
semantic representation. In addition, most theories deal in comprehension rather than 
production. Presumably in production, the simulations are active prior to the selection 
of word forms. There are some theories which attempt to provide a structure for 
embodied content within semantic representations, either by drawing on structure within 
perceptual and motor systems and thereby establishing decomposition (Barsalou,, 1999; 
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) or by referring to cortical organisation which gives a loser 
description of semantic structure (Pulvermiiller, 1999). There are also theories that 
focus on the comprehension process and how a meaningful representation is built from 
the language input (Zwaan, 2004; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003). For these theories, more 
structure is provided for the integration of representations into a coherent situation 
model, and other embodied theories are cited as possible implementations of lexico- 
semantic organization; therefore assumptions from those theories are adopted. The
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unifying theme is the necessary inclusion of sensory-motor content in representation 
and the direct modulation of sensory and motor areas by semantic content (in order to 
re-activate perceptual and motor experience). Therefore, in all cases, semantic 
similarity must be established by the similarity in modal content; this is comparable to 
featural theories that allow modality specific features (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991; 
Vigliocco et al, 2004). Embodied theories are very clear about semantic content, so 
another consequence of emphasizing modality specific content is that semantic 
information is probably isomorphic with conceptual information; this is because 
whatever is present in semantic content must be present at the conceptual level too (as 
long as it cannot be confined to language alone, e.g. syntactic markers). Table 1-3 
summarises the embodied theories along the three descriptive parameters of structure, 
decomposition and content.
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1.4 . Key issues in representation
As we have seen, there are several ways to theorize about semantic representation.
1 have used three descriptive parameters: decomposition, structure and content to 
provide a common framework for comparing across theories. Tables 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 
summarise where each theory stands on these three parameters and I will now treat each 
one in turn, ending with content, which provides the motivation for the current work.
1.4.1. Decomposition
The idea of decomposition, that representations can be separated into distinct 
components, came from the symbolic tradition but it has become an essential part of 
many theories of semantics, whether they propose that semantics contains abstract, 
amodal or modality specific representations (Barsalou, 1999; Jackendoff, 2002; McRae, 
de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997). Decompositional theories stand in opposition to holistic 
theories which propose that semantic representations cannot be broken down into 
smaller sub-components (Levelt, 1989; Collins & Loftus, 1975). Decomposition 
implies two things, first, that individual components are represented, and second, that 
the components combine to form ‘higher order’ representations. Featural theories are 
the best example of how decomposition can be applied to semantic representation.
They assume some level of decomposition, for example a dichotomy between 
perceptual/visual and functional features (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Tyler & Moss,
2001) or abstract and visuo-spatial features (Jackendoff, 2002). There are also those 
which are more diverse, with features from all modalities as well as more abstract 
features, such an encyclopedic facts or category labels (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 
1997; Vigliocco et al, 2004). Featural theories concentrate on how the distribution of 
features can explain the structure of the semantic system, for example whether features 
are shared/correlated between items or idiosyncratic (McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg,
1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001; Vigliocco et al, 2004). It is also possible to propose that 
decomposition (features) is present at the conceptual level, being bound into more 
holistic representations at the semantic level (Vigliocco et al, 2004).
Theories that propose holistic representation at both the conceptual and semantic levels 
are less common (Levelt, 1989; Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999; Landauer & Dumais,
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1997) although some of the recent embodied theories appear to be more holistic than 
decompositional. Here, a distributed web of activity is proposed as the semantic 
representation so there little internal structure to the representation beyond that activated 
for a particular context (Zwaan, 2004) or modality (Pulvermiiller, 1999). However, 
these theories do not make an explicit commitment to holism, so later versions may 
specify a method of decomposition as other embodied theories have done (Barsalou, 
1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). The advantage of decomposition for embodied theories 
is that there can be a direct contact between semantic and sensory-motor content. If the 
conceptual level consists of sensory-motor features (i.e. component parts) and semantic 
representation is isomorphic with those conceptual features, then semantic content is 
directly linked to sensory-mo tor information.
Holism implies that semantic representations are independent but connected; therefore 
decomposition allows one to grasp the elements of representation where holistic 
accounts do not. For decompositional theories the relationships between representations 
are given by their internal similarity; for holistic accounts the associations between 
representations provide similarity (with similar concepts being linked together). 
However, these associations are typically defined by what the theorist assumes to be 
similar (e.g. categories such as flowers and vehicles, Quillian, 1968) making their 
definition at bit circular. However, later theories developed ways to extract associations 
from existing corpora (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), providing a better motivation for 
them. At present, the majority of theories subscribe to some level of decomposition, but 
arguments against ‘semantic primitives’ are still used to refute their plausibility (Fodor, 
1987). The argument is that decomposition is difficult to stop in a sensible way, at 
what point does something become a semantic primitive (i.e. no longer divisible)? For 
example, the feature ‘red’ could be a primitive, but it can be applied to many different 
shades or hues -  do these need their own primitives? In addition, typicality effects in 
categorization suggest that the boundaries between concepts are graded and fuzzy 
(Murphy, 2002), therefore clean decomposition is problematic. For some, the benefit of 
decomposition is too valuable in explaining semantic representations (Jackendoff,
2002); the argument is made that semantic primitives may not behave in the same way 
as lexicalized features. For example, the lexicalized feature ‘red’ may well be made up 
of semantic primitives that have a different organization, allowing fuzzy boundaries 
whilst maintaining decomposition. Drawing comparisons with the successful use of 
primitives in phonology, semantic primitives may not be consciously accessible or they
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may not combine in the same way as components at higher levels. For Jackendoff (ibid) 
an important part of the research program into semantics is the progressive refinement 
of decompositional theories so that primitives can be realized.
1.4.2. Structure
Two aspects of structure will be reviewed: first, whether theories are distributed or 
localist (this has close ties to decomposition) and second, how semantic and conceptual 
information is related (this was also dealt with in section 1.1.1 and will be discussed 
briefly here). Beginning with the distributed/localist aspect, featural theories are 
typically distributed. This is because distribution (e.g. shared or individual features) is 
the most important element in establishing semantic similarity and structure when it is 
based on features. Thus, coherent representations emerge from these feature 
distributions. In contrast, holistic theories are typically localist because individual 
representations have to be coherent entities that stand alone in relation to other entities. 
The semantic network has been around since the first computational models (Quillian, 
1968) and the principles of a connected set of nodes has been used in both localist 
(Levelt, Roelofs & Meyer, 1999; Collins & Loftus, 1975) and distributed (Farah & 
McClelland, 1991; McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg, 1997; Tyler & Moss, 2001) models, 
reincarnated for distributed theories through PDP models (Rumelhart, McClelland et al, 
1987). Therefore, localist theories can integrate some form of distribution in higher 
order semantic structure. For example, local entities can be connected by associative 
links so that the global structure of the semantic system is a distributed network of local 
nodes (Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975; Levelt, 1989). Alternatively, the 
distributional relationships between local entities in a large linguistic corpus can be used 
to model semantic similarity (Landauer & Dumais, 1997). However, at the single word 
level decompositional theories are distributed and holistic theories are localist. Early 
theories employed localist representations (Levelt, 1989; Quillian, 1968; Collins & 
Loftus, 1975), but for several reasons distributed representations are currently the most 
popular way to conceive of semantics. Distributed representations are more compatible 
with how the brain appears to work (Pulvermiiller, 1999); they can accommodate higher 
order relationships across the same set of units, allowing the representation of many 
things to emerge from the same ‘space’ (Rogers et al, 2004; Vigliocco et al, 2004; Tyler 
& Moss, 2001); and they also manifest how statistical information about distribution
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can be used in semantic representation (McRae et al, 1997; Landauer & Dumais, 1997). 
A few embodied theories propose an internal structure to lexical semantics based on 
traditional notions of decomposition (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) or 
geographically define structure by the cortical areas that are implicated (Pulvermiiller, 
1999). Embodied theories typically employ distributed representations that are 
grounded in modality specific content; the neural basis of a multi-modal system is 
impossible without distribution. If different geographical areas support individual 
representations, it is nonsensical to say that those representations are locally defined 
(although it might be possible to argue around this by separating functional and neural 
descriptions, as the original Symbolic approach did: Pylyshyn, 1985).
The relationship between semantic and conceptual information is absent in several 
theories because no explicit statements are made. For example, some theories simply 
neglect the distinction by modeling concept or ‘knowledge’ representation through 
linguistic stimuli (Tyler & Moss, 2001; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Farah & 
McClelland, 1991). Some conflate the two by using the terms ‘semantic’ and 
‘conceptual’ interchangeably (Smith, Shoben & Rips, 1974) or by carrying over 
assumptions from a previous theory (Collins & Loftus, 1975) without an explicit 
statement that the two are isomorphic. However, for those theories that do make clear 
assumptions, there is a continuum from a semantic system which is completely separate 
to the conceptual level (e.g. Levelt, 1989) to one that is completely subsumed by it (e.g. 
Jackendoff, 2002; Quillian, 1968). In between there are theories which propose that the 
semantic system does not carry any meaningful content per se, but acts as a mapping 
between conceptual content and symbolic forms such as words and pictures (Rogers et 
al, 2004). The mappings are connected to and influenced by the structure of both the 
symbolic forms and the conceptual content; therefore the relationship is not one of 
complete independence. Vigliocco et al (2004) use similar principles, stating that the 
semantic system captures higher order relationships (i.e. collections of features) over 
conceptual content. However, semantic content is not an abstraction so it is dependent 
on these conceptual features; therefore a closer tie between semantic and conceptual 
information is retained. Moving further along the continuum towards isomorphism, for 
McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg (1997) semantic representations are subsets of conceptual 
knowledge which act as word meanings. This also appears to be the view taken by 
some embodied theories (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) where semantic and 
conceptual access is one and the same. Others concern themselves only with linguistic
64
stimuli (Pulvermiiller, 1999) but hint that conceptual knowledge has the same 
foundations (see section 1.3.3.5.2). To clarify their position I have argued that 
embodied approaches must assume some isomorphism between semantic and 
conceptual content, simply because if semantics are derived from conceptual content, 
they can only lose information relative to the conceptual level (i.e. become amodal) 
rather than gain it (i.e. become modal). The distinction between semantic and 
conceptual knowledge is often neglected despite the fact that is important in 
understanding the formation of semantic representations. In future, it is hoped that 
more theories will be explicit about the assumptions they make on this matter.
1.4.3. Content
The issue of what is actually contained within a semantic representation has recently 
become a hot topic. This is related to the emergence of embodied theories, which 
propose that semantic content is sensory and motor information (e.g. Barsalou, 1999). 
This goes against the symbolic tradition, from which some semantic theories have been 
motivated (e.g. Levelt, 1989); however, it is worth noting that modality specific content 
appeared early (e.g. Quillian, 1968) but was never pushed as the main motivation for 
any particular theory until now. Currently, several theories employ modality specific 
content within semantic representation, without postulating that the content is 
necessarily or directly accessed (Rogers et al, 2004; Jackendoff, 2002; Vigliocco et al, 
2004).
It is interesting to note that the continuum in the above section, detailing how semantic 
and conceptual information are related, is often correlated with the continuum from 
amodal to modal semantic content. There are of course those exceptions where no 
assumptions about modality are made (Tyler & Moss, 2001; McRae, de Sa & 
Seidenberg, 1997) but typically, independence between semantic and conceptual 
content occurs with amodal theories of semantics and isomorphism (or increased 
dependence) occurs with modality specific theories of semantic content. This is not that 
surprising since conceptual information has to have its genesis in sensory and motor 
experience and is therefore more likely to be modality specific and based in sensory and 
motor systems. Thus, semantic representations can only be amodal if they are 
independent of conceptual representations (or if some concepts are themselves amodal,
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Jackendoff, 2002). I would like restate the point that in this investigation we are only 
concerned with word and sentence meaning, and we do not make any assumptions about 
conceptual content.
Figure 1-5: Schematic of where theories lie along the continuum from amodal to modal 
*Collins & Loftus; McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg and Smith, Shoben & Rips not included as no clear 
assertions are made
Levelt, 1989 n■i Rogers et al, 2004 ■! Vigliocco et al, 2004 " Barslou, 1999
Landauer & Dumais, 1997 M Quillian, 1968 !j Jackendoff, 2002 i! Gallese & Lakoff, 2005
■i Farah & McClelland. 1991 !! Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003
■i !• Tyler & Moss. 2001 !! Pulvermuller, 1999
n •i JJ Zwaan, 2004
Label Symbolic/Amodal In term edi ate/S upramodal Analogue/Modal
Relationship to Complete Independent Partial Complete
sensory-motor independence but associated dependence dependence
systems
Figure 1-5 demonstrates where theories lie along on the continuum from amodal to 
modal. At the extreme left there are amodal theories which propose that semantic 
representations are abstract and symbolic, separate from modality specific information 
and therefore independent of sensory-motor systems (Levelt, 1989; Landauer &
Dumais, 1997). Then there are theories which propose a largely symbolic/abstract 
semantic system (Rogers et al, 2004; Quillian, 1968) whilst retaining a close association 
to modality specific information. Moving towards to a closer link between modality 
specific and semantic information, some theories explicitly (Jackendoff, 2002;
Vigliocco et al, 2004) or implicitly (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Tyler & Moss, 2001) 
propose that modality specific conceptual information is important for semantic content. 
In this case modality specific content is contained within semantic representations but it 
does not dictate the structure of the semantic system, therefore there is only a partial 
dependence. Finally we come to embodied theories. Here, sensory and motor systems 
are the primary force in semantic content (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005) or 
an important organizational principle (Pulvermiiller, 1999) and there is a complete 
dependence of semantic representations on sensory and motor systems.
Abstract, amodal theories predict that there should be no direct interaction between 
semantic access and sensori-motor systems, since the two use distinct and separate
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domains. Intermediate theories propose that interactions can occur, depending on the 
task and situation, but that semantic representation is still possible without access to 
sensori-motor information. Embodied theories predict that sensori-motor information is 
a necessary part of semantic representation, so interactions between the two should be 
consistent and prevalent. The following chapter summarises the evidence, both 
behavioural and neuroscientific, for embodied content in semantic representation. Some 
gaps in this literature will be formalized and used to motivate the experiments presented 
here.
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'able 1-1: Summary of Early 'heories according to Structure. Decomoosition and Content
Theory
Reference Section
Isomorphism with 
concepts
None Some Total
Structure
Basis of similarity 
between items
External Internal
Organisation 
Localist Distributed
Decomposition
Componential
Holistic
/ Featural
Content
Supra- Multi-
Amodal
modal Modal
Quillian (1968) 1.3.1.1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Collins &
1.3.1.1
Loftus (1975)
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Smith, S ho ben
1.3.1.2
& Rips (1974)
✓ / ✓ ✓
Levelt (1989) 1.3.1.3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Farah &
McClelland 1.3.1.5 
(1991)
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
?  Indicates that no clear statement was made, therefore the classification within the ta )le is inferred
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Theory
Reference Section
Isomorphism with 
concepts
None Some Total
Structure
Basis of similarity 
between items
External Internal
Organisation 
Localist Distributed
Decomposition
Componential
Holistic
/ Featural
Content
Supra- Multi-
Amodal
modal Modal
Landauer &
Dumais 1.3.3.1 
(1997)
✓ ✓* S ✓
Jackendoff
1.3.3.2
(2002)
✓ s ? S S S \  S
McRae, 
de Sa &
1.3.3.3.1
Seidenberg
(1997)
✓ S s S s i
Tyler &
Moss 1.3.3.3.2 
(2001)
✓ / s s s i  / ?
Rogers et al
1.3.3.3.3
(2004)
✓ S s S I  S 7
Vigliocco
1.3.3.3.4
et al (2004)
✓ ✓ s ✓ s s
?  Indicates that no clear statement was made, therefore the classification within the table is inferred 
* Distributional information across independent, localist items is equivalent to defining similarity externally 
f  CS structure is amodal, SpS structure is supramodal and there are also modality specific features.
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Table 1-3: Summary o f Embodied theories according to Structure. Decomposition and Content
Theory
Reference Section
Isomorphism with 
concepts
None Some Total
Structure
Basis of similarity 
between items
External Internal
Organisation 
Localist Distributed
Decomposition
Holistic Componential
Content
Supra- Multi-
Amodal
modal Modal
Gallese &
Lakoff 1.3.3.5.1 
(2005)
✓ ✓ ✓
Pulvermuller
1.3.3.5.2
(1999)
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ? ✓
Barsalou
1.3.3.5.3
(1999)
✓ ✓ ✓
Zwaan
1.3.3.5.4
(2004)
✓ ?* S ✓ ?* S
Glenberg &
colleagues 1.3.3.5.5 
(2000; 2003)
✓ ?t ✓ s ' ? t S
?  Indicates that no clear statement was made, therefore the classification within the table is inferred 
* Cites Pulvermiiller so is classed similarly 
T Cites Barsalou so is classed similarly
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2. Evidence for Embodied Theories
This chapter is a literature review of the empirical work testing embodied semantics. 
The review is organised by methodology. Individual sections review behavioural and 
neuroscientific evidence, and within behavioural evidence single word and sentence 
studies are separated. This is because different processes underlie single word 
recognition/comprehension and the integrative processes across lexical items that are 
involved in sentence/narrative comprehension. In addition, whereas individual words 
without a sentence context represent types representations (being underspecified), 
sentences present token representations (being specified). This point may have 
consequences for the way in which we interpret the evidence since it means that the 
semantic representation of single words is necessarily schematic and less substantive in 
comparison to that for sentences. Within single word and sentences, the behavioural 
literature is further broken up into modality and task; for example, studies that looked at 
language referring to motor or visual events and studies that used property verification 
tasks (tapping conceptual as well as semantic access). A separate section is devoted to 
eye-movement studies, a method with different assumptions to manual/verbal response 
tasks. To allow ease of exposition, the neuroscientific literature is broken up by 
technique (EEG, TMS, PET/fMRI) and studies with single words and sentences are not 
separated. This is because there were very few studies with sentence stimuli and the 
key finding for all neuroscientific investigations is the activation of sensory or motor 
areas during semantic access. Neuropsychological evidence is not reviewed here as it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (and this investigation) to explore the heterogeneous 
findings from this discipline3. Finally, there is an increasing literature on the embodied 
representation of abstract concepts such as time (e.g. Boroditsky, 2000; 2001).
However, this work will not be reviewed exhaustively as the current investigation 
focuses on language referring to concrete events. There will be coverage of abstract 
language only where it is investigated in conjunction with concrete objects and events 
or where it can be easily integrated with a concrete domain, as in the case of fictive 
motion4.
3 For a critique, see Mahon & Caramazza (2005).
4 Even this marginal treatment of abstract language shows that results are inconsistent (see, for example,
section 2.1.2.2) and whilst it is clear how the processing of concrete language can be interpreted in 
relation to sensory and motor systems, this is not so for abstract language. For an alternative view, see
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The majority of behavioural studies have the following structure: one independent (IV) 
variable manipulates the modality specific content in the presented linguistic items by 
varying their referents. For example, the language may refer to events or objects that 
share a particular sensory or motor ingredient: a type of bodily movement or action, a 
location in space, a sensory quality (colour, orientation, motion) or simply a modal class 
(e.g. visual or motor). A second IV then manipulates the task which assesses the 
behavioural state of the participant. Critically, this behavioural task must tap into the 
relevant sensory or motor systems that the language ought to engage if its content is 
simulated. Another paradigm that is often employed is the congruence or incongruence 
between the semantic and sensory/motor variables. For example, sentences refer to an 
event with a particular direction, towards or away from the participant. If the sentences 
describe an action, e.g. “You closed the drawer” or “You opened the drawer”, a task 
could be used requiring a motor action towards or away from the participant, e.g. 
pressing a button near or far to the body. If the sentences describe an object moving 
towards or away, e.g. “Harry threw you the ball” or “You threw Harry the ball”, a visual 
stimulus that depicts movements towards or away from the participant could be 
displayed. If the sentence and the sensory-motor variable are both ‘towards’ this is a 
congruent condition; if the sentence is ‘towards’ and the sensory-motor variable ‘away’, 
this is an incongruent condition. For neuroscientific evidence, the majority of studies 
look at activity in sensory and motor cortices during language comprehension or 
production. Embodiment provides the clear prediction that semantic access should 
activate the areas that are involved in the experience of the word’s or sentence’s 
referents. Crucially, neuroscientific studies can look for these activations without 
manipulating the sensory or motor domain; if sensory-motor activity is found during 
comprehension or production it supports the strong claim of embodied theories that 
activation is an obligatory part of semantic access.
The strong prediction is the direct engagement hypothesis: to achieve representation, 
semantic content necessarily and directly recruits the sensory and motor systems in a 
simulation of the on-line experience of the referents. A weaker prediction is that 
semantic content recruits sensory and motor systems through association, rather than 
simulation. Here, the recruitment of sensory-motor content may not be necessary but it 
may be still be direct. Interestingly, this still predicts consistent interactions between 
semantic and sensory-motor information. Sensory and motor information may be
Gallese & Lakoff (2005) and Lakoff (1987).
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recruited routinely during semantic access because of intimate ties that develop as a 
result of experience. However, this is a very different proposal to embodied simulation 
(which also has the necessity constraint). The only way to firmly assess the necessity 
constraint is through neuropsychological evidence or directly suppressing sensory or 
motor information (e.g. through TMS). Therefore, the majority of behavioural evidence 
actually explores the directness of the connection. This still allows us to distinguish 
between non-embodied associative connections, which would be open to a great deal of 
mediation, from embodied simulation, which would not. Therefore, the directness of 
the connection still allows us to distinguish someway between stronger and weaker 
versions of embodiment.
2 .1. Behavioural Evidence
2.1.1. Behavioural evidence with single words and objects
2.1.1.1. The motor domain
In these studies, words were presented that referred to particular motor actions or 
objects with particular affordances associated to them. Affordances are potential 
interactions between the body and an object, for example a cup handle on the left of a 
cup has the affordance that I grasp it with my left hand (Tucker & Ellis, 1998). There 
are a variety of tasks that measure how these words engage the motor system.
In a classic study, Tucker & Ellis (1998) presented pictures of objects, with affordances 
on the left or right. Participants judged whether the objects were upright or inverted, and 
used their left or right hand for the different response options. They found that 
responses were faster, and fewer errors were made, when the hand making the ‘upright’ 
response and the affordance were congruent. This supports the inference that simply 
seeing a picture of an object activates the motor actions associated to using it. 
Richardson, Spivey & Cheung (2001) extended this paradigm into semantics by 
presenting participants with a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of 8 pictured 
objects, with left or right affordances, followed by the name of an object. Participants 
had to judge if the named object was or was not in the sequence. In contrast to Tucker
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& Ellis (1998) they found that responses were faster when the hand making the ‘yes’ 
response was opposite to affordance. Again, this supports the inference that name of the 
object activated a representation of the pictured object and the motor affordance that 
was active when it was perceived. The task used in Richardson et al (2001) implicates 
memory processes as the participants have to recall whether the object was presented; 
this was a possible explanation for why Tucker & Ellis obtained congruent facilitation, 
whereas Richardson et al find congruent interference. The modulation of the online 
motor behaviour (response hand) by the affordance associated to the object supports the 
automatic activation of motor actions when object pictures are perceived, but it is not 
clear whether the semantic content of the object name also activates that affordance, or 
whether affordances are only accessed through object perception. Myung, Blumstein & 
Sedivy (2005, Experiment 1) addressed this issue by using an auditory lexical decision 
task in which primes did or did not share affordances (referred to as manipulation 
features) with the target word. For example, a typewriter can be interacted with in a 
similar way to a piano; with fine pressing movements of the fingers. A typewriter does 
not, however, share affordances with a blanket. Lexical decisions were faster when the 
prime shared affordances with the target, supporting the automatic activation of motor 
actions upon semantic access. Siakaluk, Pexman, Aguilera, Owen & Sears (2007) 
provided further support for this with a lexical decision task in which target words had 
been rated on how easy or hard they were to physically interact with using a human 
body, producing a Body-Object Interaction score (BOI). The words were matched for 
various lexical variables so that the only manipulation was whether they had a high BOI 
(i.e. referred to objects that were easy to interact with, e.g. a hammer) or a low BOI (i.e. 
were difficult to interact with, e.g. a planet). The authors hypothesised that high BOI 
words would have a richer semantic representation, as the affordances provide an extra 
modality o f semantic information. A richer semantic representation would result in 
faster lexical decision times as there is more feedback from semantics to orthography 
and phonology. Participants performed either a lexical or phonological decision task 
and results showed that in both tasks, decisions were faster for high BOI words as 
compared to low BOI words. The authors concluded that semantic representation 
includes information about sensori-motor experience, on the assumption that high BOI 
have ‘more’ of this information.
Presenting signed rather than spoken language, Tseng & Bergen (2005) used a response 
box was placed with the buttons aligned perpendicular to the body. This meant that,
74
depending on the button to be pressed, participants had to move their hand towards or 
away from their body when judging if two consecutively presented signs were the same 
or different. The task was completed with both native signers of American Sign 
Language (ASL) and non-signers. In the experimental trials, signs were presented that 
referred to literal towards/away actions (e.g. ‘bowl’ or ‘catch’), metaphorical 
towards/away movement (e.g. ‘tell’ or ‘yesterday’). For both these categories, the hand 
movement that made the form of the sign was also towards/away from the body. A 
critical control group was used where the hand movement was towards/away, but the 
referent did not have any movement; for example ‘girl’ where the hand moves away 
from the face. Signers responses were faster when the response action (towards/away) 
was congruent with the semantic or metaphorical signs, but not for the hand movement 
only signs. Non-signers did not show this effect, having similar response times for all 
signs. Thus, this study provides support for the automatic activity of motor information 
when words referring to motor actions are comprehended. However, Tseng & Bergen 
(2005) collapsed their analysis across signs that referred to literal movements (e.g. 
‘catch’) or metaphorical movements (e.g. ‘tell’), so it is unclear whether literal or 
metaphorical signs behave in the same way, as separate analyses were not conducted. 
The effect across both these groups may have been driven by one group alone. For 
experiments that use sentence comprehension, there is some evidence that literal and 
metaphorical/abstract language do not behave in the same way (see Section 2.1.2.2), so 
collapsing across groups is unwise. Clearer evidence comes from Boulenger, Roy, 
Paulignan, Deprez, Jeannerod & Nazir (2006) who used a lexical decision task in 
French. Verbs referring to hand/arm, leg or mouth/face actions, e.g. paint, cry, and 
nouns referring to non-manipulable concrete objects, e.g. cliff, star, were presented. 
Participants performed the lexical decision by reaching and grasping a cylindrical 
object. The thumb and forefinger were placed on a pad, a go signal was then presented 
on screen and participants left the pad and reached toward the cylindrical object. The 
onset of the movement triggered the appearance of the item for lexical decision; if the 
item was a word participants had to grasp the object, if the item was non-word they had 
to stop reaching and return to the start-pad. Parameters of the movement were recorded 
(reaching time and peak acceleration). Acceleration peaks were smaller and later for 
action verbs than for nouns (experiment 1); acceleration peaks are the result of initial 
muscle contractions during reaching movements so delays in the peak suggest 
interference. In contrast, when the item was presented as the go signal, peak 
acceleration were earlier for action verbs than for nouns (experiment 2). Thus, when the
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lexical decision and reaching movement were made concurrently, there was 
interference. When the lexical decision was made before the reaching movement, there 
was facilitation. The early interference supports comprehension of motor words 
activating motor cortex, and thereby interfering with motor execution. The later 
facilitation also supports the same conclusion, although the authors note that it could be 
due to motor imagery following comprehension. Crucially, the interference appeared 
between 120-210 msec following movement onset, supporting the early activation of 
motor information during comprehension.
The evidence for motor information in lexical semantics supports the activation of 
‘affordances’ or manipulation features associated to an object, when the object’s name 
is heard or seen. The evidence for object names activating their associated motor 
manipulation is quite consistent, although studies have used tasks that implicate 
memory processes (Richardson, Spivey & Cheung, 2001), indirect measures of motor 
manipulation (Siakaluk et al, 2007) or priming between lexical items, rather than 
interactions between comprehension and actual motor action (Myung, Blumstein & 
Sedivy, 2005). However, two studies demonstrate that single-word comprehension of 
action verbs interacts with the motor system (Tseng & Bergen, 2005; Boulanger et al, 
2006). These two studies reinforce the inference that motor information accessed during 
semantic processing is based in the motor system itself. However, the majority of 
studies support only indirect access to motor information5.
2.1.1.2. Visuo-Spatial Information
There are only a few studies that have looked at single word comprehension and visuo- 
spatial location (see Section 2.1.2.2 for similar studies with sentence comprehension). 
Zwaan & Yaxley (2003) presented pairs of words on which speeded similarity 
judgements were made. The critical items were pairs which referred to objects with a 
canonical spatial relation where one is above the other, for example, root-branch or 
floor-ceiling. The visual presentation of the words was either congruent with the 
canonical relation (e.g. root at the bottom and branch at the top) or incongruent (e.g. 
root on the top and branch on the bottom). Reaction times were faster when the 
presentation was congruent with the canonical relation, but not such effect was found
5 For a broad discussion of motor action and simulation with reference to language processing, see 
Fischer & Zwaan (in press).
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when the words were presented horizontally and reading order (left to right) was 
manipulated. Along with some additional evidence which showed that this effect was 
limited to the right hemisphere (i.e. left visual-field presentation) which is more 
involved in visual imagery and therefore more likely to be involved in perceptual 
simulations, the results were taken to support facilitation when the actual location of the 
words was congruent with the simulated location of their referents.
A series of experiments with a similar motivation explored whether visual attention was 
similarly affected by comprehension (Estes, Verges & Barsalou, in press). In two 
experiments, participants were presented with a category word (e.g. cowboy) and a part 
word (e.g. boot or hat) that was located at the top or bottom of the object. Following the 
presentation of the part word, participants identified a target letter presented in the top 
or bottom of the visual; therefore, the location of the target letter was congruent or 
incongruent with the preceding part word’s canonical location. They found that letter 
identification was slower when the target appeared in the congruent location 
(Experiments 1 and 2). This finding was still reliable when part words were presented 
alone, without the preceding context word (Experiment 3). Therefore, words referring 
to concrete nouns with a canonical location impair the allocation of visual attention to 
objects in that location. The authors discussed this result in relation to visual imagery 
evoked by the words. One of the earliest studies of visual imagery showed that 
participants were slower to detect a real image when they were actively imagining a 
similar image in the same location (Perky, 1910). Thus, conscious visual imagery 
interferes with visual perception, presumably because the two involve the same 
substrate (Kosslyn, 1996). Estes et al extend the arguments from conscious visual 
imagery to semantic access, which is a logical leap unless one assumes that either (a) 
conscious visual images are automatically evoked during single word comprehension or 
(b) the processing of semantic representations is very similar to conscious visual 
imagery. It is this latter possibility that is in line with embodied theories since they 
propose that the semantic representation of visual information is based in the visual 
system, as is visual imagery (Kosslyn, 1996). This is not made explicit in the paper 
itself and is in contrast with some embodied theories which explicitly separate 
themselves from visual imagery (Barsalou, 1999). In order to expand on the imagery 
evoked by semantic content, the authors proposed that the interference was due to 
dissimilarity between the target object (an X or O) and the word’s referent (e.g. a hat or 
boot). If the presentation of the word ‘hat’ was followed by a picture of a hat, they
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hypothesized that facilitation would result. This is inconsistent with the original finding 
(Perky, 1910) which showed interference between visually similar target images and 
conscious imagery, but it is consistent with the finding that language quickly indexes 
attention to referents in the environment (e.g. Chambers et al, 2002). In sum, although 
the results present some evidence for embodiment it is not clear exactly what can be 
inferred, since any explanation is inconsistent with either theory or data.
In a different manipulation of visual properties, Pecher, Zeelenberg & Raaijmakers 
(1998) manipulated the relationship between the prime and target in a semantic priming 
task according to the similarity of their referents’ visual form, e.g. pizza-coin or honey- 
glue. In the first experiments, they also included items that were associatively related, 
e.g. start-end or silver-gold. In the first two experiments, only associative priming was 
found for lexical decisions and word naming on the targets. However, in two further 
experiments the lexical decision and naming tasks were preceded by a decision task in 
which all the items were judged on their perceptual form, i.e. whether the word referred 
to an oblong object or not. Under these conditions, a small perceptual form priming 
effect was found for word naming with faster responses when the prime referent shared 
visual form with the target. In a final experiment, the form-judgement task was 
followed by visual lexical decision, this time with the associated pairs removed. 
Perceptual-form priming was found for perceptually related pairs. It was concluded that 
perceptual priming was only found when the perceptual features of the referents had 
been made salient, and associative pairs did not invoke association-checking strategies 
that masked the perceptual-form priming. This was taken to be in line with context 
specific priming effects, where the current context modulates the availability of 
semantic features that are active for a given word.
In summary, there is limited evidence that single words activate visuo-spatial 
information. Object words appear to activate their canonical location, although it is 
unclear what form the location information takes; for example, it could be a cue to shift 
attention to that location or a visual simulation of the referent (or both, Estes et al, in 
press). For objects, the representation of a canonical location interferes with perception 
at that location (Estes et al, in press) and this finding agrees with the evidence from 
sentence comprehension (see Section 2.1.2.2). The apparent conflict between orienting 
towards a congruent location and impaired perception at that location is reconciled by 
arguments about the how consistent the visual object is with the imagined or simulated
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object (Estes et al, in press), although this explanation has its own problems and it 
remains to be tested. If location information is a visual simulation of the referent, it is 
not clear how the location of the words themselves interacts with the simulated location 
of the referents (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), beyond the inference that it helps when they 
are ‘congruent’. For other perceptual information, it appears that the modality has to be 
. made salient before it can affect word to word priming, weakening the idea that these 
features are automatically accessed (but see Kellenbach, Wijers & Mulder, 2000 in 
section 2.2.1). Therefore, the results for visual information are opaque and do not 
provide clear support for visual information in the semantic representation of single 
words. In a similar vein to the findings for single words and the motor domain, it is not 
always clear what form the visual information takes. Therefore, there is no strong 
evidence for a direct connection between visual processes and semantic information.
2.1.1.3. Property Verification
Several studies have used property verification and it is assumed that conceptual 
representations are accessed for this task to be performed. In order to judge if a trees 
have branches I have to access what I know about trees and branches. When the stimuli 
are words, we assume that the semantic representation of the word has to be accessed 
too.
In an on-line task, concept and property words were presented in a sentence like 
structure and participants had to judge as quickly as possible whether the property was 
true o f that concept, e.g. Sheet can be Clean; Leaves can be Rustling (Pecher, 
Zeelenberg & Barsalou, 2003). The critical manipulation was the modality of the 
properties, consecutive properties could either be the same modality, e.g. Blender-Loud 
Leaves-Rustling (both auditory) or of different modalities, e.g. Soap-Perfumed 
Television-Noisy (one gustatory one auditory). Reaction times were faster when the 
current modality was the same as the previous property rather than different. This effect 
was not produced by any associative relationship between consecutive properties, and 
was not dependent on the SOA between the concept and property names appearing.
The authors concluded that this supports simulation during semantic and conceptual 
access, since there is a cost to changing the modal information that is simulated on 
successive trials, similar to the cost of attending to events in different modalities during
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an online task (Spence, Nicholls & Driver, 2001). This result was replicated in 
Portuguese by Marques (2006) who showed that the modality switching cost was 
present even when category (living vs. non-living) was kept constant, but no similar 
switching cost was present when modality was constant but the category was switched; 
indicating that modal rather than category specific organisation supports conceptual 
representation. Extending these findings, Pecher, Zeelenberg & Barsalou (2004) used 
the same task but presented each concept twice, with properties from either the same or 
different modalities. The first presentation, the prime, could be one of two modalities, 
e.g. apple-shiny (visual) or apple-tart (taste). The second presentation, the target, could 
be the same or different to that first presentation, e.g. apple-green (visual). Reaction 
times to the target were faster, and less errors were made, when the same modality was 
used, further supporting the simulation of modality specific information. When the 
same modality is used, that information will be more available to simulation the second 
time. The lag between the first and second presentation was 12, 18, 24 or 100 trials 
with the facilitation present at all lags. However, pairwise comparisons showed that the 
effect was strong at short lags (12-18) but not for long lags (24-100), indicating that 
access to the modal information is mediated by recent experience as well as the current 
context.
In a slightly different approach, Borghi, Glenberg & Kaschak (2004) presented single 
words as properties to be verified for concepts referred to in a previous context 
sentence. The sentences referred to an action that was being performed with the object 
that implied a particular perspective, for example driving a car implies you are inside it; 
filling it with petrol implies that you are near the boot of the car. Reponses were faster 
when the location of the property coincided with the perspective in the sentence. For 
example, participants responded faster to ‘trunk’ than ‘hood’ when the sentence was 
“You are filling a car with petrol”. When the perspective was irrelevant to the location 
of the properties, e.g. being inside the car, no difference in reaction times was observed. 
In a final experiment, sentences were used that did not imply an interaction with the 
object, e.g. ‘There is a doll standing on the table”. Properties were presented that were 
either at the top or the bottom of the object, e.g. hair versus ankle. A button box was 
arranged vertically so that responses were made by moving the hand up or down. When 
the property location was congruent with the end-point of the movement, the response 
time was faster. This effect was removed when no movement was required (i.e. fingers 
were always on the response buttons). From this series of experiments, the authors
80
concluded that accessing semantic/conceptual information necessarily involves 
simulated interaction with the objects; therefore activating motor and spatial 
information congruent with that interaction. Properties that were congruent with these 
simulations, by being in a similar spatial location, were responded to faster as the 
simulation made them more available.
Finally, Solomon & Barsalou (2004) presented a concept word followed by a property 
word and used regression analysis to look at factors that affect reaction times to make 
the verification. A between subjects manipulation used fillers that were false but highly 
associated, e.g. owl-tree, or false but not associated, e.g. owl-wheel. They found that 
when fillers were highly associated more variance of the reaction times was accounted 
for by perceptual variables, especially the size of the property relative to the concept, 
the property ‘nose’ was previously judged to comprise about 5% of a fox, whereas the 
property ‘face’ comprised 15% of the gorilla. The larger the property, the longer the 
reaction time; this was interpreted as larger properties taking longer to simulate. 
However, when the fillers were not associated, little of the variance was accounted for 
by perceptual variables, suggesting that a word-association strategy (not simulation) 
was being employed to solve the task. This was further supported by more variance 
being accounted for by linguistic variables, such as frequency. Further support for the 
word-association strategy was found in a separate group who were told to imagine the 
concept and search their visual image for the property. These subjects always took 
longer and showed the same pattern: when fillers were not associated, less of the 
variance was accounted for by perceptual variables, suggesting that a word-association 
strategy was being employed despite the instruction. The authors concluded that 
simulation is only employed when deep conceptual processing is required, not when 
other strategies (such as word-association) can be used.
The data from property verification is quite consistent, showing effects of the perceptual 
modality and spatial location of the property. Property verification requires conceptual 
as well as semantic access and as noted in Chapter One (section 1.1.1) there are good 
reasons to separate conceptual and semantic knowledge. A weak criticism of this work 
is that the evidence from property verification supports modality specific information 
for conceptual representation, but it is not so easily applied to semantics (unless the two 
are considered isomorphic). A stronger criticism is that all property verification tasks 
may invoke imagery or more conscious processing than is typically required for
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semantic access: participants have to make an explicit judgement. Therefore these tasks 
may not be representative of normal semantic processing. However, for single words, it 
is the best evidence for an automatic connection between semantic and sensory-motor 
information, and it does provide support for a somewhat direct connection.
2.1.1.4. Summary o f  behavioural evidence with single words
The evidence for the motor domain consistently shows that motor information is 
activated during single words comprehension, particularly if that word refers to a 
manipulable object. However, only two studies show direct interactions with motor 
actions, so most of the evidence taps motor processing indirectly. The evidence for 
visual/visuo-spatial information is weaker. Object words appear to activate their 
canonical location but it is not clear whether this is because of the simulation of the 
referent at a particular location or because the word creates expectations that influence 
visuo-spatial attention (e.g. by directing attention to a particular location). The evidence 
from property verification is more consistent and does support the automatic activation 
of modality specific information; however, it requires an explicit judgement from the 
participant and may reflect more effortful conceptual access rather than simple semantic 
activation. As noted at the beginning of this Chapter, single words present type 
information that is necessarily underspecified; effects may be weaker or harder to tap 
because less substantial semantic information is available. The evidence from single 
words does support the automatic activation of some modality specific information but 
it is often indirectly accessed and the precise nature of that information is unclear (e.g. if 
it is actually motor information or associated features, if it is visual information or 
attention). So far, we cannot draw any strong conclusions about the directness of the 
link between semantic and sensory-motor information.
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2 . 1.2 . Behavioural evidence with sentences
2.1.2.1. The Motor Domain
In a series of experiments, Klatzky and colleagues looked at how a symbolic cue to 
prepare a particular hand-shape affected sensibility judgements for sentences describing 
motor actions. In all studies, associations for the symbols were established during a 
training procedure where one of four cues was presented and participants had to make a 
hand shape in response to that cue: pinching with the thumb and forefinger, poking with 
the forefinger, a clenched fist or a flat palm. In the first set of experiments (Klatzky et 
al, 1989) presentation of the cue was followed by a written phrase that described 
possible or impossible interactions with objects, e.g. e.g. “rub your stomach” vs. “climb 
a newspaper”. Each sensible phrase was paired with a cue that mimicked the hand 
shape used in the phrase, e.g. a flat palm for “rub your stomach”, or a clenched fist for 
“squeeze a tomato”. Presentation of a congruent cue primed sensibility judgements for 
the phrase, as seen by faster reaction times. This priming was relative to a neutral 
baseline, i.e. a cue not associated with hand shape. In follow up studies (McClosky, 
Klatzky & Pellegrino, 1992) the same priming effects were found when subjects made a 
button press or verbalised their response for the sensibility judgement. To assess 
whether the cue engaged motor preparation for the hand or motor preparation generally, 
a dual-task method was used. The hand-shape cue was followed with equal probability 
by the sensibility judgement (i.e. a phrase) or a second cue to perform a motor task.
This second task, manipulated between subjects, was to tap out a sequence on the button 
box (hand motor task) or say a sequence of four syllables (verbal motor task). In the 
group whose second task was motor tapping, the hand-shape cue not longer primed 
sensibility judgements. Thus, the possibility of preparing for the tapping task removed 
the effect of preparing the hand-shape. This supports a semantic system that has access 
to effector specific motor information that is relevant to particular referents (in this case, 
phrases describing certain hand actions).
In a set of experiments that looked at the role of on-line motor action during sentence 
comprehension, Glenberg & Kaschak (2004) presented participants with written 
sentences, also for sensibility judgements, that implied action towards or away from the 
participant, e.g. “Open the drawer”. The sentences were imperative (as above), concrete 
transfer (e.g. “Sarah gave you the gift”) or abstract transfer (e.g. “Sarah told you the
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story”) constructions. Participants made their response using a three button box 
arranged linearly away from participant. Participants kept their finger on the middle 
button, and positive responses could be made by pressing the button nearest to them 
(yes-is-near) or furthest from them (yes-is-far). For all sentences describing motion 
towards the body, faster responses were made in the yes-is-near condition as compared 
to the yes-is-far. For away sentences, the yes-is-far condition produced faster responses 
for concrete and abstract transfer sentences, but not imperatives. The priming effect 
was removed when fingers were kept on the near and far buttons, so responses did not 
require an actual movement towards or away from the body. The authors named this 
the Action Sentence Compatibility effect (ACE) and concluded that motor systems are 
active during comprehension of ‘motor’ sentences. Borreggine & Kaschak (2006) 
replicated ACE effect, using a go-no go paradigm in which participants responded to 
auditory sentences only when sensible. Similar to the original study, responses were 
made on keyboard arranged perpendicular to the body, with the P key (away) and Q key 
(towards) as the ‘go’ response keys. Crucially, participants did not know which key to 
press on ‘go’ trials until a cue was presented during the sentence. In a between subjects 
manipulation, the cue was presented at sentence onset or after sentence offset at delays 
of 50, 500 and 1000msec. The ACE effect (i.e. faster responses for movements 
congruent with the sentence) was found for both concrete and abstract transfer sentences 
but only in the sentence onset group; suggesting that preparation of the response has to 
be concurrent with sentence comprehension to get the ACE. Taken together with the 
results from Klatzky and colleagues, it appears that interactions occur when motor 
preparation precedes or is concurrent with comprehension.
Two studies in Italian have manipulated the effector used to respond to sentences 
describing actions with particular effectors, e.g. the hand, foot or mouth. Buccino, 
Riggio, Melli, Binkofski, Gallese & Rizzolatti (2005) presented participants with 
auditory sentences describing hand and foot actions, e.g. “He played the piano” or “He 
kicked the ball” as well as abstract content sentences, e.g. “He hated the sea”. In a go- 
no go paradigm, participants had to respond if the sentence referred to a concrete action 
(i.e. hand or foot sentences) but not if it referred to an abstract event. Response effector 
was manipulated between subjects, with one group pressing a button with the hand and 
the other group using their foot. On critical trials the ‘go’ signal was presented during 
the verb. Reaction times showed that the group responding with their hand were slower 
for hand action sentences whereas the group responding with their foot were slower for
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foot action sentences. Using a similar method, Scorolli & Borghi (2006) presented 
participants with pairs of nouns and verbs that described actions and asked them to 
judge whether the pairing made sense. If the pair did not make sense, they did not make 
a response (a go-no go paradigm). They presented the pairs visually and in blocks that 
comprised hand and mouth actions or hand and foot actions. For example, a mouth 
action would be “to suck” followed by “the sweet” and a hand action would be “to 
unwrap” “the sweet”. For the other block a foot action would be “to kick” and “the 
ball” whereas a hand action would be “to throw” and “the ball”. In this way, the 
manipulated object was constant and comparisons could be made for the same noun 
paired with a different action verb. The hand action pairs were used as a baseline, and 
participants responded by pressing a foot pedal or by making a verbal response. The 
verbal response group were significantly faster for mouth and foot actions compared to 
hand actions, although the difference for the foot actions was smaller. The pedal 
response group were significantly faster for foot versus hand actions, with no difference 
between mouth and hand actions. Both studies therefore show an interaction between 
the response effector and the effector implicated in action sentences. Buccino et al 
(ibid) found interference whereas Scorolli & Borghi (ibid) found facilitation, however, 
in Buccino et al the go-no go signal was presented during the verb whilst in Scorolli & 
Borghi participants made a judgement once the noun was presented (i.e. after the whole 
sentence had been processed). It is possible that the difference between interference and 
facilitation is due to whether the response action is prepared during the sentence or after 
it has finished. It is also likely that different tasks are important. Sensibility 
judgements require attention to the sentence as a whole whereas responding to concrete 
actions but not abstract events requires a focus on the specifics of a described event.
Other experiments have refined the interaction between motor action and 
comprehension further, to the point in the sentence when the motor action becomes 
definite. Zwaan & Taylor (2006) generated sentences which implied manual rotation 
that was clockwise, e.g. “Jane started the car”, or counter-clockwise, e.g. “Eric turned 
down the volume”. Sensibility judgements were made about auditory sentences by 
turning a horizontal knob. Half the subjects turned the knob clockwise to respond 
‘sensible’, and half the subjects turned the knob counter-clockwise; the opposite 
direction was used for a ‘not sensible’ response. Results showed that sensible 
judgements were faster when the direction of manual rotation matched that in the 
sentence (experiment 2). Longer sentences were then generated and used in a self paced
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reading task (experiment 4). This time the knob was turned smoothly in a clockwise 
direction to progress through the sentence, with a turn of 5° presenting the next phrase 
in the sentence. Sentences were split into four regions: preverb (the seven phrases 
preceding verb), target (the verb), postverbal region (the phrase after the verb) and the 
last phrase. For example, clockwise: “Before/the/big race/the driver/took out/his 
key/and/started/the/car” and counter-clockwise: “He/realised/that the/music/was/too 
loud/so he/turned down/the/volume” (slashes indicate phrase boundaries). Reaction 
times were faster when there was congruence between the implied rotation in the 
sentence and the actual rotation made in the task, but only for the target region, i.e. the 
effect was localised to the verb. The authors concluded that an interaction was present 
after sentence offset in Experiment 2 because the sensibility judgement required a re- 
simulation of the sentence which influenced the actual manual rotation, whereas in 
Experiment 4 the manual rotation interacted with the immediate pairing of the verb’s 
orthographic form to its meaning. Other experiments in the same series explored the 
effect of visual rotation on the comprehension of manual rotation sentences. Following 
an experiment in which manual rotation was shown to be slower when incongruent 
visual rotation was perceived (e.g. clockwise visual rotation and counter-clockwise 
manual rotation) (experiment 1), other experiments replaced actual manual rotation with 
manual rotation sentences. Participants monitored a rotating cross for a colour change 
(which only occurred during filler items) whilst making sensibility judgements on 
auditory sentences. Judgements to the manual rotation sentences were faster when the 
visual and implied rotations were congruent (experiment 3). In support of this, a self 
paced reading task showed that the verb region in manual rotation sentences was read 
quicker when a visual stimulus portrayed illusory motion congruent with the rotation in 
the sentence (i.e. clockwise or counter-clockwise). Sentences were presented centrally, 
phrase by phrase, with a surrounding circle of shaded ovals that created the illusion of 
rotating visual motion (experiment 5). In sum, these experiments demonstrate that 
motor as well as visual information can affect the comprehension of sentences with 
implied manual rotation. The authors concluded that ‘motor resonance’ was produced 
by the visual rotation, activating/resonating with the motor programs that would bring 
about the observed visual rotation. This motor resonance was shown to affect not only 
actual manual rotation, but also simulated manual rotation produced during sentence 
comprehension. See Fischer & Zwaan (in press) for an extensive discussion of motor 
resonance in comprehension.
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In sum, there is consistent evidence for an interaction between the comprehension of 
sentences referring to motor actions, and the performance of actions that are congruent 
or incongruent with what the sentence describes. These interactions are 
effector/movement specific and dependent on motor preparation preceding or being 
concurrent with comprehension. In all but one case (Buccino et al, 2005) congruence 
between the implied and actual action leads to speeded responses, and it is clear that the 
timing of the comprehension and motor action is crucial (Borreggine & Kaschak,
2006). The results may be more consistent since sentences present specific 
events/actions (tokens) with an agent performing an action; therefore, the motor content 
is more complete and possibly produces stronger motor activity. However, as there are 
no control groups, facilitation in one condition is not separable from interference in the 
condition used for comparison. That minor criticism aside, the evidence from motor 
sentences is consistent in demonstrating that motor information is automatically 
activated during comprehension; this does support a direct connection between motor 
sentences and motor information.
2.1.2.2. Visuo-Spatial Information
This section reviews evidence for interactions between visuo-spatial processes and 
sentence comprehension. Noordzij, van der Lubbe, Neggers & Postma (2004) used 
sentence-picture or picture-picture verification in combination with a secondary spatial 
tapping or verbal suppression task. Participants were first trained on spatial tapping, 
tapping out the four comers of a horizontal square, or verbal suppression, repeatedly 
counting from one to four. For the verification task, a sentence or a picture was 
presented that provided the relative location of two objects (a circle, square or triangle) 
that was always ‘to the left/right o f. For example, “The circle is to the right of the 
triangle” or a picture depicting that relation. The secondary task was performed during 
the presentation of the first stimulus. A probe picture was then presented which 
displayed the two objects in the correct or the opposing relation. Participants had to 
decide if the probe matched the preceding stimulus. Spatial tapping, but not verbal 
suppression, interfered with sentence-picture verification, resulting in longer reaction 
times. In experiment 1, when participants responded to the verification task manually, 
interference was only found for participants who had used a visuo-spatial strategy -  
translating the sentence into a pictorial format and therefore tapping visuo-spatial
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working memory. Participants were categorised as using a verbal strategy if their 
reaction times were significantly longer for sentence-picture verification as compared to 
picture-picture verification. However, in experiment 2, where participants gave their 
verification response verbally, interference was found across all participants. This study 
provides support for a visuo-spatial representation that is created during comprehension, 
with the caveat that participants can control whether or not this representation is used.
Alternative tests of interactions between comprehension and visuo-spatial processing 
have used experimental sentences that describe motion upwards, downwards, towards or 
away from the observer. Comprehension of these sentences was paired with attention to 
a spatial location or to motion that was congruent or incongruent with the movement 
described in the sentence. Richardson, Spivey, Edelman & Naples (2001) normed 30 
verbs for spatial properties. Ratings were gathered for the axis of motion, and verbs 
were then classed as horizontal (e.g. pull, point, want, offend) and vertical (e.g. sink, 
float, hope, respect). Sentences were then created from these verbs. Concrete sentences 
referred to actual objects moving, for example “The ship sinks in the ocean” whereas 
abstract sentences referred to emotional states or abstract quantities, for example “The 
store owner increases the price” or ‘The girl hopes for a pony”. In one experiment, the 
sentences were presented binaurally and pictures were synchronously displayed that 
depicted the actors in the sentence. For example, e.g. “The balloon floats through the 
window” was accompanied by a picture of a balloon when the word “balloon” was 
heard and so on. During sentence comprehension, pictures were presented centrally. In 
a test phase, two pictures were presented in either a horizontal or vertical arrangement 
and participants had to judge if those pictures had been presented together during 
comprehension. The concrete and abstract sentences were analysed together, and faster 
reaction times were observed for vertically arranged pictures for the ‘vertical’ 
sentences; although the horizontal sentences did not show comparative effects 
(Experiment 2, Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou & McRae, 2003). In addition, post-hoc 
analyses showed that the effect was significant for concrete, but not abstract, sentences 
(see footnote 2).
In another experiment (Experiment 1, ibid), sentences containing these verbs were 
presented binaurally and at sentence offset a shape appeared in the vertical (top/bottom) 
or horizontal (left/right) meridian of the screen; participants had to categorise the shape 
as a circle or square. To compare incongruent and congruent conditions, the analysis
88
was collapsed across top/bottom and left/right location, as well as collapsing across 
concrete and abstract verbs for the sentences. Results showed that when the shape 
location (vertical or horizontal) was congruent with the sentence, categorisation was 
slower than when it was incongruent; this difference was stronger for abstract sentences 
(see footnote 1, ibid). Whilst demonstrating that sentence comprehension can activate 
‘image schemas’ that facilitate memory processes (Experiment 2) but interfere with 
visuo-spatial attention (Experiment 1) there are inconsistent patterns between concrete 
and abstract sentences. However, a recent study has replicated and extended the 
findings from Richardson et al (2003), clarifying the effects for concrete and abstract 
sentences.
Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock & Narayanan (2007) used the visuo-spatial location task, 
where sentence comprehension is followed by categorisation of a shape that appears on 
screen. Recall that the original finding was one of interference when the motion in the 
sentence was congruent with the location of the target, i.e. reaction times were longer 
when a vertical sentence was followed by a shape in the vertical meridian. Bergen et al 
(in press) improved on the previous findings by not collapsing across location or 
sentence type. The vertical dimension was chosen and both verbs that refer to motion 
(upwards or downwards) and nouns that have a canonical spatial location (high or low) 
were used. In the critical trials, the shape for categorisation appeared in the top or 
bottom of the screen; therefore being congruent or incongruent with the sentence. A 
series of experiments investigated whether concrete and abstract sentences containing 
these items would produce congruent interference as observed in Richardson et al 
(2003); e.g. when an ‘up’ sentence is heard and the shape appears at the top of the 
screen. Concrete sentences with verbs referring to intransitive motion, e.g. “The mule 
climbed” or ‘The chair toppled”, were found to produce interference (Experiment 1) as 
were sentences with concrete nouns, e.g. “The ceiling cracked” or “The cellar flooded” 
(Experiment 2). However, sentences that referred to metaphorical motion, e.g. “The 
prices climbed” or abstract motion, e.g. “The percentage increased” did not produce 
interference (Experiments 3 & 4). Both Richardson et al (2003) and Bergen et al (in 
press) discuss the results in terms of the ‘image schema’ or visual imagery that the 
sentence creates (in line with Perky, 1910). It is confusing to implicate imagery over 
and above semantic space or motion, as it implies isomorphism between semantic and 
imaginative representations. As discussed in the section 2.1.1.2, saying that visual 
imagery is evoked during comprehension has two interpretations: either semantic access
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and conscious visual imagery are on a continuum or visual images are always produced 
during semantic access. It is more parsimonious to infer that semantic representations 
of motion and object location, for concrete sentences, are visuo-spatial in nature, i.e. 
grounded in systems that support the perception of motion and location. This would put 
‘visual’ semantic information on a continuum with conscious visual imagery. I find this 
confusing as it appears to conflate automatic semantic activation with more conscious, 
effortful processing. If this is the interpretation, then the relationship between semantic 
processing and conscious visual imagery needs to be defined.
In a study that used actual motion, rather than a spatial or visual approximation,
Kaschak et al (2005) presented sentences aurally whilst black and white graphics were 
displayed. In separate experiments, grammaticality or sensibility judgements were made 
on sentences that described vertical (upwards or downwards) or egocentric motion 
(towards or away). Similarly, the graphics depicted motion in two planes; vertical 
motion that was upwards or downwards and egocentric motion that was towards or 
away from the observer. In a blocked design, several sentences were presented whilst a 
30 second visual display was observed. The sentences were either congruent or 
incongruent with the visual motion, and analysis was collapsed into a comparison 
between congruent and incongruent conditions. Judgements of both kinds were slower 
when the visual display was congruent with the motion in the sentence. The authors 
concluded that the neurons involved in perceiving a particular direction of motion were 
less available to simulate the direction in the sentence, resulting in slower reaction 
times. To reconcile this with other findings that show congruent facilitation, the authors 
proposed that differences in the timing and integratability of the simulated and actual 
events were critical. If simulation of the sentence occurs at the same time as the 
perception of a congruent stimulus, interference will occur. However, if simulation and 
perception are separated in time, facilitation will occur as the perceptual system is 
primed for one event by the other. In addition, if the stimuli closely represent what the 
sentence describes (e.g. pictorially) facilitation is more likely as the two can be more 
easily integrated. However if the stimuli only approximates what the sentence 
describes, as black and white lines for motion or an abstract stimulus, interference is 
more likely as the two cannot be easily integrated by the perceptual systems.
90
In an extension of the original experiment, Kaschak, Zwaan, Aveyard, Yaxley (2006) 
looked at the modality of presentation for both the linguistic and motion stimuli. 
Beginning with the assumption that language processing is a demanding task, the 
authors predicted that if perceptual and linguistic items are presented concurrently but in 
a different modality both can be processed at the same time so interference will result 
when they are congruent. However, when perceptual and linguistic items are presented 
in the same modality they will be processed serially as the two items compete for 
resources. This should then produce faster responses for congruent stimuli as the same 
modal system is primed between each event. Sentences describing egocentric motion 
(towards or away) and vertical motion (up or down) were created that emphasised the 
auditory aspect of the event. For example, ‘The surfer heard the next wave crash 
towards him” or ‘The hawk screeched as it descended on its prey”. Directional auditory 
stimuli were created by filtering white noise. The filtering produced the impression of 
something moving towards or away (similar to the Doppler Effect) and upward or 
downward; stimuli were normed to confirm the subjective effect of the filtering. Using 
the same blocked paradigm as Kaschak et al (2005) a series of sentences were judged 
while a 30 second perceptual stimulus was presented; as before, the sentences could 
either be congruent or incongruent with the motion stimuli. When the sentences were 
presented visually (via RSVP) with the auditory motion stimuli, shorter reaction times 
were found when the two were incongruent. However, when both the sentences and the 
motion stimuli were presented aurally, shorter reaction times were found when the two 
were congruent. This result was confirmed for between and within subjects 
manipulations of the presentation modalities (although it was weaker for the visual 
presentation of the sentences).
Evidence for visuo-spatial qualities (object location or directional motion) is less 
consistent than for motor sentences, but some common findings emerge. When 
sentences describe the directional motion or location of objects, this interferes with the 
categorisation of a shape in the congruent location on a screen (Richardson et al, 2001; 
Bergen et al, in press), although this is only consistently the case for concrete objects 
and events. This supports a visuo-spatial representation built during comprehension that 
interferes with real-time visuo-spatial perception or allocation of attention. The main 
problem for these studies is the ambiguity of the visuo-spatial representation; how 
exactly does it interfere with attending to a particular location? The easiest 
interpretation is that representation is akin to visual imagery, but no studies have yet
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controlled for, or explored, visual imagery during the comprehension of such sentences. 
For visual motion, there is one study showing that incongruence between the sentence 
and percept produces shorter response times for comprehension (Kaschak et al, 2005); 
with the argument that this is a result of the different presentation modalities of the 
stimuli (Kaschak et al, 2006). Visual motion provides a promising avenue for exploring 
non-motor embodied effects, as the perceptual systems involved in motion processing 
are well characterised (Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004) so any interactions between 
perception and comprehension can be understood in terms of those perceptual systems.
2.1.2.3. Picture judgements
A series of experiments, mostly conducted by Zwaan and colleagues, have used picture 
judgements to explore perceptual simulation in language comprehension. All 
experiments present target pictures following the comprehension of sentences. These 
pictures are either congruent or incongruent with an object described in the preceding 
sentence. For example, Stanfield & Zwaan (2001) presented sentences that implied a 
particular orientation for the sentence’s object. For example, “John put the pencil in the 
cup” or “John put the pencil in the drawer”; in the first sentence the pencil is vertical 
(standing in the cup) and in the second it is horizontal (lying in the drawer). After a 
sentence had been read, a line drawing was presented and participants had to judge if 
the pictured object had appeared in the sentence. Filler items had comprehension 
questions to ensure that participants read the sentences accurately. The experimental 
sentences described objects that were vertical or horizontal, and the pictures presented 
objects upright or were rotated 90 ° to present the object horizontally. Thus, the pictures 
were either congruent or incongruent with the implied orientation in the sentence. 
Responses to the picture were faster when the orientations were congruent compared to 
incongruent. A second series of experiments supported these results. Using the same 
method as the previous experiment, sentences were presented that manipulated the 
implied visual form of an object, rather than its orientation. For example, “The ranger 
saw the eagle in the sky” implies that the eagle is flying, so will have outstretched 
wings; conversely, “The ranger saw the eagle in its nest” implies that the eagle is sitting 
with its wings folded. Responses were faster, and participants made fewer errors, when 
the pictures were congruent with the visual form implied in the sentence, rather than 
incongruent (Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002, Experiment 1). In another experiment,
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participants named the pictures rather than judge if they had been in the sentence. This 
removes the explicit comparison between the picture and the sentence, being a more 
implicit test of the congruency effect. In addition, a set of control sentences were use 
that did not imply a particular form, e.g. “The ranger heard the eagle in the forest”. 
Compared to the incongruent condition, naming was faster when visual form was 
congruent between the sentence and picture. Naming latencies for the control sentences 
fell halfway between congruent and incongruent times; being marginally faster than the 
incongruent condition by subjects and not different from the congruent condition (ibid, 
Experiment 2). These results support the inference that, when reading, we represent 
subtle differences in visual form and orientation implied by the text; and that this 
representation is in a visual, rather than propositional, format.
Connell (in press) extended these findings by manipulating the implied colour of the 
object. As in the original method, participants judged if a pictured object had appeared 
in the preceding sentence. For example “John looked at the steak on his plate” implies 
that the steak is cooked and brown; “John looked at the steak in the butcher’s window” 
implies that the steak is raw and red. Pictures were line drawings naturally coloured 
from photographs and could be congruent or incongruent with the implied colour (e.g. a 
red or brown steak). In contrast to previous results, responses to the pictures were 
slower when the colours were congruent as compared to incongruent. This result was 
tentatively explained by colour being a unimodal property that is represented with less 
stability than visual form (which can be perceived by multiple senses). Therefore, when 
the depicted colour is incongruent with the simulation of the sentence, it can be 
effectively ignored (being a unimodal, rather than multimodal, mismatch) and does not 
interfere with the object recognition required to perform the task. However, in the 
congruent condition the neurons already active in perception are additionally needed to 
simulate the sentence, producing interference. Despite the tenuous explanation, this 
data still supports the inference visual information about objects (colour, form and 
orientation) is perceptually simulated during text comprehension.
Finally, similar effects have also been found for auditory comprehension. Sentences 
were presented binaurally, with fillers followed by comprehension questions. On each 
trial the sentence was followed by two pictures, separated by a brief mask, and 
participants had to judge if the second picture was the same as the first. On critical trials
93
the sentences described the motion of a ball towards or away from the comprehender; 
for example, “The pitcher hurled the softball at you” and “You hurled the softball at the 
pitcher”. The pictures were of a similar ball to that described in the sentence (e.g. for 
the above sentences, a softball) and the second picture was slightly smaller or slightly 
larger than the first; thereby approximating the motion of the ball towards (larger) or 
away (smaller). When the motion of the ball in the sentence was congruent with the 
pictured motion, judgements were faster, replicating the congruency effect seen in the 
studies cited above (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley, & Aveyard, 2004).
A key issue with these studies is how important explicit comparison between the 
pictured object and the sentence is in producing these results. The participant has to 
actively recall the sentence, with the implication that it may be this active recall that 
produces the congruency effects rather than the automatic processes involved during 
comprehension. However, the naming (experiment 2, Zwaan, Madden & Yaxley, 2002) 
and picture comparison tasks (Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley & Aveyard, 2004) argue against 
this conclusion, as no explicit comparison is necessary6. In all experiments a large 
number of filler items are used to disguise the experimental manipulations, lending 
further weight to the automatic/implicit activation of visuo-perceptual information 
during sentence comprehension. Picture recognition is not a simple process, requiring 
the perception of the picture and successful mapping to a conceptual representation.
The evidence clearly supports facilitation of such processes when the picture is 
congruent with a particular linguistic description, and the embodied interpretation is that 
the simulation creates a particular visual form for the target object. It is also possible 
that rather than congruent facilitation, incongruent interference drives the results. Only 
one study has used control items (experiment 2, Zwaan, Stanfield, Yaxley, 2002), and 
these did not clearly differentiate between these two options. Whether the effects are 
due to facilitation, interference or both, the strong interpretation places the interaction 
between picture perception and simulation within the visual processing system (because 
simulations are modality specific). However, no evidence has yet been found for 
comprehension affecting early visual processing, e.g. effects that show improvements in 
the detection of visual information. Therefore, it may be later stages of object 
recognition that are influenced rather than the object representation per se. Thus, the
6 The naming paradigm has been successfully used elsewhere; see e.g. Kaup, Ludtke & Zwaan, 2005, for 
an extension of this task to the representation of negated entities and events.
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perceptual systems that are affected, and whether they are facilitated or inhibited, 
remains approximate.
2.1.2.4. Narrative
Situation models are “mental representations of the state of affairs described in text 
rather than of the text itself’ (p. 15, Zwaan, 1999) and there is a rich literature 
demonstrating that the representations built during text comprehension affect the 
availability of particular concepts, supporting the idea that comprehension is a vicarious 
experience of what the text describes (Zwaan, 1999). This version of situation models, 
based in ‘real-world’ perceptual and motor information rather than a propositional or 
associative format, is in line with an embodied account in which simulation underpins 
comprehension. Rather than exhaustively reviewing the literature, I will present a 
selection of studies that demonstrate how situation models are visuo-spatially 
constrained. These studies show how access to information from the narrative is 
modulated in a manner consistent with an embodied model of the narrated events (for 
reviews see Zwaan, 1999 and 2004; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998). However, there is 
also some evidence of interactions between narrative comprehension and sensory 
processes.
Visuo-spatial, but not verbal, memory load has been shown to interfere with narrative 
comprehension. In a between subjects manipulation, participants had to remember a 
low or high load letter string (4 or 6 letters) or a low or high load pattern of black dots 
(3 or 5 dots). These tasks taxed verbal and visuo-spatial working memory respectively. 
Participants were presented with the stimuli to memorise, and then read passages 
sentence by sentence. After they had read the passage they had to recall the memorised 
stimulus. The measure of comprehension was the extent of the Contradiction Effect 
(CE, Albrecht & O’Brien, 1993; cited in Fincher-Keifer, 2001). The CE occurs when 
the final sentence of a passage is not globally coherent with information presented 
earlier. For example, participants read a narrative about Sarah who is a vegetarian and 
is in a restaurant and deciding what to eat. She spends some time deciding on the wine 
and the starter, and then orders a beef-burger for her main course. The CE is evidenced 
by longer reading times for final sentences that contradict the global coherence of the 
narrative (a vegetarian ordering a beef-burger) as compared to consistent sentences (a
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vegetarian ordering vegetable curry). The results showed that the visuo-spatial task, but 
not the verbal task, disrupted the CE; that is, reading times to contradictory sentences 
were shorter when the participant had to memorise a visuo-spatial layout. In addition, 
the CE was significant under low visuo-spatial load (i.e. longer reading times for 
contradictory versus consistent sentences) but not under high visuo-spatial load. These 
results suggest that narrative comprehension requires visuo-spatial working memory in 
order to construct a stable representation of the situation model. If we accept that visuo- 
spatial working memory recruits modality specific systems (a conclusion that is 
reinforced by verbal suppression not having an effect), this data supports the use of 
sensory capacities during comprehension.
Turning to studies which look at the availability of information in situation models, 
Kaup & Zwaan (2003) gave participants narratives in which a protagonist was thinking 
about particular target object (e.g. a dress), in the last sentence a colour term was 
mentioned (e.g. a pink dress). This last sentence mentioned the colour in an affirmative 
(1/2) or negative phrase (3/4); and the colour was (2/3) or was not (1/4) the colour of the 
target object:
(1) Sam wished that Laura was wearing her pink dress
(2) Sam was pleased that Laura was wearing her pink dress
(3) Sam wished that Laura was not wearing her pink dress
(4) Sam was pleased that Laura was not wearing her pink dress
Following the reading of the narratives, a colour term (e.g. pink) was presented as a 
probe and participants had to decide if the probe term had been in the story. When the 
probe was presented 500ms after the last sentence, participants were slower to respond 
following a negative sentence (3/4) (experiment 1). When the probe word was 
presented after 1500ms, participants were faster following sentences in which the colour 
term was the colour of the actual object (2/3) (experiment 2). The authors argued that 
after a short delay, a propositional representation was still active so negation made the 
colour term less accessible, but after a longer delay a situation model with the actual 
object has been created. The authors took this as support for a shift from a propositional 
to situation model where the objects and events are represented.
The effect of spatial distance in narratives has been nicely demonstrated. Participants 
first memorise a layout of rooms and then read sentences describing a protagonist
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moving through those rooms, e.g. a janitor who has to clean particular rooms, or prepare 
a room for an event. Each text has a critical motion sentence that describes the 
protagonist moving from a source room (e.g. the hallway) to a location room (e.g. the 
office). This always requires the protagonist to move through another room, the path 
room, which is never explicitly mentioned. Following the motion sentence is the test 
sentence that refers to an object in one of the rooms. Reading times for the object 
sentence are fester when the object is in the location room (the protagonist’s current 
location) than the path room (which the protagonist has moved through), similarly, 
reading times are faster when the object was in the path room as compared to the source 
room (where the protagonist started). (Rinck, Hahnel, Bower & Glowalla, 1997). This 
finding has been replicated and extended to distance in time as well as space. Rinck & 
Bower (2000) used the same method, but after the motion sentences (where the 
protagonist moves into a different room) there was one sentence describing how the 
protagonist had to do something in the location room (e.g. clean it up), and a second 
temporal sentence describing how long it took (e.g. minutes or hours). Following the 
temporal sentence participants were presented with two probe words that referred to an 
object and a room (e.g. table - office). Participants had to decide if the object was in the 
named room. Objects from the location room were responded to faster than objects in 
the path room, replicating the spatial distance effect found previously. In addition, 
participants took longer to verify the object location when the activity of the protagonist 
took hours rather than minutes. Thus, just as a greater distance reduced the accessibility 
of entities, so did the increased passage of time. These experiments support the idea 
that situation models have a format that mirrors real experience, reflecting real-world 
effects of distance and time. A good demonstration of how situation models reflect real 
world visual experience was provided by Horton & Rapp (2002). Participants read 
stories describing one or two protagonists and their environment (e.g. a man sitting on 
the steps of his house). The fourth sentence of the narrative described a target details 
that were visible to the protagonist (e.g. a post-box and park across the road). The two 
final sentences described an event that occluded a target detail (e.g. a lorry pulling up in 
front of his house) or did not (e.g. a bicycle pulling up). A probe question was then 
presented that referred to the target detail (e.g. “Was there a post-box in front of the 
house?”). Reaction times to this question were significantly longer following an event 
that occluded the target, than one that did not (experiment 1). Crucially, reaction times 
were not longer when the target detail was not occluded by the event (e.g. the park 
rather than the post-box). These results suggest that the situation model includes what
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was visually perceived by the protagonist, supporting the idea that the representation is 
perceptually based. If an object is occluded it is less available, just as in the real world 
when objects are occluded and I cannot see them.
There are several other demonstrations of how situation models are constrained in a 
‘real world’ manner (see Zwaan, 199). Nevertheless, there is only preliminary evidence 
that visuo-spatial processing interferes with narrative comprehension (Fincher-Keifer, 
2001), so whilst it is clear that situation models can be seen as embodied simulations, it 
is still possible to explain the results with an associative network where nodes and links 
represent the relative distances (Rinck & Bower, 2000). Therefore, more evidence is 
needed for the engagement of sensory and motor capacities in situation models.
Stronger evidence for the activation of perceptual information during comprehension 
comes from eye-movement studies (see section 2.1.3).
2.1.2.5. Summary o f  behavioural evidence with sentences/narrative
When taken together the evidence for the automatic activation of sensory and motor 
information during sentence comprehension is compelling. Sentences that refer to 
motor events consistently interact with motor actions; sentences that refer to visuo- 
spatial location affect the allocation of visuo-spatial attention; sentences that refer to 
particular object forms influence the processing of pictures depicted those objects; the 
perception of motion influences the comprehension o f ‘motion’ sentences. This final 
demonstration is crucial since it is one of the few which shows how perceptual 
processing influences the comprehension of sentences that describe perceptual events. 
Whenever language is shown to influence sensory or motor processing, it is possible to 
explain the effects by more indirect means. One of the most immediate consequences 
of comprehension is that it changes attention and the contents of working memory, 
therefore it may be changes to these domain general processes that influence perception, 
rather than a direct effect influence of language on perception or action. When it is 
shown that perception or action affects comprehension, this is stronger evidence for a 
direct connection since perception (a bottom up process) is less likely to have such 
pervasive effects on domain general processes. For narrative comprehension, there are 
nice demonstrations that visuo-spatial information (i.e. objects and distances) are 
represented. However, some authors have accounted for these findings through amodal 
networks (Rinck & Bower, 2000) so they do not necessarily implicate embodied
98
simulation. At least when semantic information is specified (i.e. a token 
representation); the evidence points towards some form of embodiment and the direct 
activation of sensory-motor content.
2.1.3. Eye-Movements
Eye movements have become an increasingly popular method for the study of language 
comprehension. The assumption is that eye-movements provide a measure of where 
attention is located and therefore what immediate object cognitive processes are focused 
on. You can move attention without moving the eyes, but you cannot move the eyes 
without moving attention. Eye movements have good temporal resolution, being able to 
measure the position of the eye to millisecond accuracy, and two dependent variables 
are typically extracted: the time spent fixating somewhere during a trial and the course 
of eye movements across a whole trial.
Laeng & Teodorescu (2002) demonstrated that eye-movements during visual imagery of 
a previously seen display were closely correlated to eye-movements during display 
observation. This was also supported by subjects who were told to fixate during 
observation keeping their eyes fixated during imagery. Eye-movements therefore 
reflect the on-line activity of memory and imagination, but they have also been shown 
to reflect the implied visual scene of narratives. Spivey & Geng (2001) corroborated 
the finding that saccades are made to the location of previously seen objects during 
recall (experiment 2); but they also presented participants with auditory scene 
descriptions that referred to objects and events extending upward, downward, leftward 
or rightward. Each story began with “Imagine..” and then described, for example, a 
downwards scene with the listener on top of a cliff watching some people rappel down 
the cliff face. There were significantly more eye-movements congruent with the 
implied direction of the scene as compared to that same direction for a control story 
with no directional bias (experiment 1). This result was later replicated when 
participants were not instructed to imagine the scene and had their eyes closed. Eye 
movements were inferred from the way the corneal bulge shaped the eye-lid and 
reflected a luminant spot. There were more saccades in the implied direction of a scene 
description than the un-implied directions (Spivey, Richardson, Tyler & Young, 2000). 
In concordance with these findings, eye-movements have also been shown to reflect
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fictive motion as well as the literal location of objects and events. Matlock & 
Richardson (2004) presented participants with simple pictures that depicted a 
horizontally and a vertically extended object, e.g. a shelf and a chord (see Figure 2-1), 
whilst they looking at the pictures they listened to fictive or no-motion sentences, e.g. 
‘The chord runs along the wall” versus “The cord is on the wall”. Participants spent 
significantly more time looking at the relevant object when the sentence contained 
fictive motion; the authors argued that this was because fictive motion is represented 
dynamically via simulation of real motion and eye-movements reflect this dynamic 
representation.
Figure 2-1: Example of visual stimuli used in Matlock & Richardson
Aside from eye-movements being used to track the motion and location of implied 
objects, they also provide evidence that participants map words to their referent objects 
quickly and in accordance with syntactic constraints. For example, Chambers, 
Tanenhaus, Eberhard, Filip & Carlson (2002) had participants manipulate real objects 
according to verbal instructions. Objects were spread out on a grid (experiment 1, 
Figure 2.2) or a circle (experiment 2, Figure 2.3) divided into sections; eye movements 
to different objects were recorded. A theme object to be moved (e.g. a whistle) was 
placed in the centre of the display and different goal objects (e.g. cans or bowls) were 
placed in the surrounding sections. In the first experiment instructions either contained 
the preposition ‘inside’ or ‘below’; e.g. “Put the whistle inside/below the can”. Spatial 
prepositions such as ‘inside’ restrict the goal objects that can be used, as they have to be 
able to contain things. This is in contrast to a preposition like ‘below’, where no 
specific properties of object are necessary. In the critical trials the target goal object
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was container (e.g. a can) and 2 of the 3 distracter objects could be other containers (e.g. 
a bowl and glass, see Figure 2.1) or non-container objects.
Figure 2-2: Example lav out from Chambers et al (2002). Experiment 1.
BOWL
DUCK GLASS
In the condition when distracter objects were also containers, eye-movements to the 
goal object did not reliably diverge from the distracters until 300 - 400ms from the onset 
of the definite article for the goal object (i.e. “.. .inside the can”) compared to 
0-100ms when there was only one container present (the goal object). In contrast, when 
the preposition was “below” eye-movements for the goal object diverged at similar 
times in both conditions. This shows that the preposition was used to identify the target 
when no competitors were present. Supporting evidence of this fast indexing following 
comprehension was found in Experiment 2 where the size of the theme, goal and 
distracter objects was changed. Two possible goal objects were present (e.g. a large and 
a small can) and a unique distracter (e.g. bowl, see Figure 2.2). The theme object was 
also small or large so the instructed action was possible with one or both goal objects 
(e.g. a small cube can fit in both cans whereas a large cube can only fit in a large can). 
Sentences were of the form “Pick up the X, now put it in the/a Y” with a consistent 
manipulation of the definite (“the”) or indefinite (“a”) article for the goal object. When 
the sentence contained a definite article and there was one compatible goal, fixations 
reliably deviated from distracters at 300-400ms. However, when two compatible goals 
were present, fixations deviated at 400-500ms. When the sentence contained the 
indefinite article and there was one compatible goal, fixations deviated at 500 -  600ms, 
whereas with two compatible goals fixations deviated at 200-300ms. These results 
support the argument that that indefinite articles are compatible with multiple 
alternatives (therefore causing slower processing when only one option is present) 
whereas definite articles refer to a specific instance (therefore causing slower processing 
when two options are present).
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Figure 2-3: Example layout for Chambers et al (2002). Experiment 2
Large Can (potential referent)
Smal 
(potential i
Small/Big Cube 
(theme object)
Prepositions were used to decide which physical objects were task relevant, 
demonstrating that linguistic stimuli are quickly indexed to referent objects during 
comprehension (see also Chambers, Tanenhaus & Magnuson, 2004). These results are 
important as they show that eye-movements closely track the integration of linguistic 
stimuli and physical experience. Other studies have used this principle to explore the 
qualities that make distracters effectively compete with a target object.
In one such experiment, participants were presented with a display of four pictures and 
heard the name of a target object. They had to fixate on the picture of the target object 
as quickly as possible. On experimental trials, one picture shared visual features with 
the target object, e.g. if the target was ‘snake’ the distracter was a coiled rope (this was 
called the Strong distracter condition). The important control condition was when the 
original distracter and targets were reversed, e.g. participants heard ‘rope’ and the 
distracter was now the picture of a snake that had originally been the target (this was the 
Weak distracter condition). These conditions differentiate simple visual similarity, e.g. 
between pictures of a rope and a snake, and focus on how similar the distracter picture 
is to a prototypical category member for the target object. For example, the picture of a 
coiled rope is visually similar to a prototypical snake that is coiled. However, the 
picture of a snake with its raised head is not visually similar to a prototypical rope. 
Therefore there is an imbalance between the two pictures in how effectively they act as 
distracters. Results showed that participants fixated more on the visually related 
distracter than on the other pictures and that this effect was more pronounced in the 
strong distracter condition. In this experiment eye-movements showed that visual 
features of the named object were activated upon comprehension (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 
2005), supporting the embodied idea that perceptual information is implicated in
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semantic representation. However, given that the task was to fixate on the correct 
picture it is not surprising that visual similarity had such an effect. The participants had 
to use visual features to identify the picture, so visual features had to be extracted from 
the object name and therefore its referent. It is possible that perceptual or motor 
features are not accessed when the task does not require them.
Support for automatic activation, regardless of task, comes from a similar experiment 
that looked at motor rather than perceptual features. Myung, Blumstein & Sedivy 
(2005, Experiment 2) had presented participants with four pictures and then the name of 
a target object. Participants had to touch the screen location with the picture of the 
target as quickly as possible. Rather than sharing visual features, target and distracter 
items shared manipulation features. For example, a baseball can be manipulated in the 
same way as a grenade: both are grasped and thrown. They found that participants 
fixated on the distracter that shared manipulation features significantly more than 
control items (e.g. ‘leaflet’) between 500 - 800ms after word onset. Therefore, even 
though motor features were not necessary to successfully identify the target picture they 
were still active following comprehension, allowing objects with similar affordances to 
interfere with identification.
In summary, eye-movement data provides some support for sentences and narrative 
comprehension being a simulation of experience: when participants are asked to 
actively imagine or to simply listen to scene descriptions, their eye-movements reflect 
the implied location of events (Spivey & Geng, 2001; Matlock & Richardson, 2004). 
This is in line with an embodied interpretation where the eyes move as if those events 
were being observed. Eye-movements also provide evidence that perceptual and motor 
features of individual words are active during comprehension (Dahan & Tanenhaus, 
2005; Myung, Blumstein & Sedivy, 2005). This provides support for perceptual and 
motor features being a part of semantic representation. Eye-movements are an 
increasingly useful tool to explore comprehension (see, for example, Henderson & 
Ferreira, 2004) and through the use of inventive methodologies, they are also supporting 
the role of perceptual and motor information in semantic representations. One small 
caveat is that eye-movements may not be a veridical mirror of the mind, directly 
reflecting the immediate contents of cognitive processing. The mechanisms which 
influence oculo-motor movements, such as attention, imagination and task-demands,
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need to be very well understood before eye-movement evidence for embodiment is 
solid.
2.1.4. Summary of behavioural evidence
For the motor modality, the combined evidence supports the activation of manipulation 
features for objects (Myung et al, 2005; Richardson et al, 2001; Siakaluk et al, 2007) 
and motor procedures for actions. The evidence for actions is cogent as studies 
typically combine comprehension with a motor response (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; 
Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Boulanger et al, 2006; Buccino et al, 2005; Tseng & 
Bergen, 2005), thereby demonstrating an interaction between specific motor actions and 
comprehension. However, what applies in the motor domain may not apply to sensory 
modalities since efferent and afferent modes of experience may be distinct in how they 
respond to top-down influences (such as language). The mechanisms that control the 
motor system may be more open to influence since they are self-initiated and primarily 
controlled by top-down plans for action. In contrast, perceptual processing may be less 
open to manipulation and more dependent on bottom-up processes involved in stimulus 
perception. This is a speculative point, especially since perception and action 
representations appear to be ever more similar (e.g. Eckstein et al, 2007), however, this 
does not necessarily mean they respond to top-down influences in the same way. It is 
also true that the senses may respond more variably to semantic information since there 
is increasing evidence that the visual system routinely integrates irrelevant information 
in a task-dependent manner (e.g. Watanabe et al, 2001, Seitz & Watanabe, 2003); 
therefore, semantic information may also be integrated in a similar, variable, way.
For the visuo-spatial domain, there is evidence that semantic representations contain 
information about the location and motion of objects and events (Bergen et al, in press; 
Estes et al, in press; Kaschak et al, 2005, 2006; Matlock & Richardson, 2004; 
Richardson et al, 2003; Rinck & Bower, 2000; Spivey & Geng, 2001; Zwaan & Yaxley,
2003). There is also increasing evidence that perceptual information related to an 
object’s visual form is activated during comprehension (Connell, in press; Pecher, 
Zeelenberg & Raaijmakers, 1998; Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Zwaan et al, 2002, 2004). 
The key problem for demonstrations involving the visual modality is that the tasks used
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to assess the interaction between comprehension and perception are indirect. 
Categorisation at a particular location or picture judgements do not clearly define the 
visual processes that are involved. For example, does the visual information activated 
during comprehension effect early stages of visual processing, as we might expect from 
a strong formulation of embodiment, or are the effects the result of integration between 
visual and semantic information outside early visual processes. Studies that show the 
modulation of oculo-motor responses during comprehension (e.g. Matlock & 
Richardson, 2004; Spivey & Geng, 2001) are only supportive of embodiment if 
particular assumptions are made; i.e. that eye-movements are a necessary part of 
embodied representation and reflect the on-line processing of sensory-motor 
information present in cognitive states. So far, the clearest demonstration for this 
domain comes from one study which has shown that the perception of visual motion 
affects the comprehension of sentences referring to motion (Kaschak et al, 2005, see 
also 2006 for an extension). Overall, evidence for single words is weaker than that for 
sentences; this may be because of the nature of the representation that they activate. 
Single words provide only schematic, type representations of their referents so we might 
expect their effects to be weak or transient. In contrast, sentences (and particularly 
narratives) provide coherent, token representations, so we might expect a stronger 
influence of semantic representations (since they are more substantial and more defined) 
on sensory-motor processes. These differences may matter more for language that 
refers to a visual event, aggregating several perceptual features (e.g. colour, form, 
motion, brightness) in comparison to the motor domain which does not (i.e. it is 
primarily made up of action/motor content). Single words like ‘kick’ may be able to 
evoke sufficient motor content to influence motor action, whereas words like ‘rise’ may 
require more specification (i.e. a sentence context) to evoke sufficient visual 
information to influence perception.
A large variety of tasks show that sensory and motor information is routinely accessed 
by semantic representations. The evidence also indicates that this information is 
accessed automatically, supporting a direct connection between semantic and sensory- 
motor content. However, comprehension/production may influence many levels of 
cognitive processing, from domain general (e.g. attention and working memory) to low 
level, modality specific processes (e.g. the processing of visual signals or the execution 
of motor actions). Interactions may therefore result from the influence of 
comprehension on low level sensory-motor processing (as predicted by strong
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embodiment) or they could be a more trivial result of comprehension influencing 
domain general processes which then influence sensory-motor systems (i.e. indirect 
effects). Tasks which tap specific perceptual processes will help to clarify where 
interactions take place. It is increasingly clear that methodological parameters, such as 
the timing between comprehension and sensory/motor tasks or the modality of language 
presentation, are critical in how interactions are manifest (e.g. Borreggine & Kaschak, 
2006; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), therefore it is no less important that sensory and motor 
tasks be clearly interpretable so that interactions can be nailed down to particular 
cognitive processes. Similarly, few behavioural studies use a control group (a notable 
exception being Zwaan, Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002, Experiment 2) and reaction times 
differences in experimental conditions cannot be compared to a baseline. It is therefore 
unclear whether results indicate facilitation in one condition or interference in another. 
This is equally important for interpreting the nature of interactions.
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2 .2 . Neuroscientific evidence
There is a long standing idea in neuroscience that the structure of semantic memory for 
objects, and possibly actions, reflects the sensory and motor experience of those objects 
and events. In this view, concepts are defined by sensory and motor attributes that arise 
from experience, when we see, hear, touch and manipulate things in the environment. 
Distributed feature networks of sensory and motor attributes will be reflected in sensory 
and motor cortices of the brain; for example the ventral occipital cortex (fusiform gyrus) 
supports knowledge about object form and the lateral temporal cortex (MT) supports 
knowledge about object motion (Martin & Chao, 2001). Embodied theories strengthen 
this idea by proposing that the sensory and motor cortices utilised during real 
experience also support conceptual and semantic knowledge (e.g. Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005), rather than, for example, knowledge being represented by areas linked to primary 
sensory and motor areas (Rogers et al, 2004). This section reviews evidence that 
language production and comprehension does activate primary sensory and motor areas, 
when the language refers to sensori-motor objects and events. To that end, when 
reviewing studies I will not report activations for ‘typical’ language areas such as the 
Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus which is active in naming (e.g. Grabowski, Damasio & 
Damasio, 1998), or Superior Temporal areas that are active during semantic processing 
(e.g. Damasio, Tranel, Grabowski, Adolphs, & Damasio, 2004). Instead, I will only 
report activity that reflects the modal distribution of information and therefore 
implicates sensory or motor areas. Different techniques measure neural activity in 
different ways, therefore the literature is sub-divided according to method: 
Electroencephalography (EEG), which measure electrical activity arising from neuronal 
firing; Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS), which directly influences cortical 
activity in a particular area; functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and 
Positron Emission Tomography (PET), which measure the brain’s blood flow through 
magnetic resonance or radioactive markers respectively.
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2 .2 . 1. EEG
Two studies in German have used EEG to explore the representation of action verbs. 
Speeded lexical decisions were made to visually presented action words corresponding 
to arm, face and leg actions. In the first study, the C-line and FC-line electrodes were 
isolated as a Region of Interest (ROI) since they lie above the motor and premotor strip 
of the cortex respectively. Current source densities were calculated, which reflect the 
contribution of cortical activity close the electrode. Differences between verb 
categories at these sites emerged 240ms after word onset and were absent after 400ms, 
supporting the argument that the difference reflect early lexico-semantic processing. In 
comparison to Arm words, Leg words resulted in more activity (as measured by ingoing 
currents) at the electrode Cz (positioned on the midline), corresponding to the dorsal 
and medial leg area of the motor cortex. Face words produced more activity at C5, 
corresponding to dorso-lateral frontal sites previously identified with the face area of the 
motor and somatosensory cortices. The activity for Arm words may have been 
conflated with the manual lexical decision response that participants had to make, but 
increased activity was seen at premotor sites, as recorded by FC electrodes on the left 
hemisphere (Pulvermiiller, Harle & Hummel, 2000). A following study confirmed these 
results. Again, action verbs related to the face/articulators (face words), hand/arms (arm 
words) and feet/legs (leg words) were used. Similar to the first study, CSD estimates 
showed topographical differences around 250ms at electrode Cz and C5. Face words 
produced an increased negativity at C5, and Leg words produced an increased 
negativity at Cz. Cortical difference maps were also constructed for each word class, by 
subtracting the CSD at time-window 240-260ms from each other. This confirmed the 
differing topography for leg (dorsal), arm (superior) and face (inferior lateral) words. 
The three electrodes positioned at relevant points over the motor strip were compared; 
Cz = leg, C5 = face (left hemisphere) and C6 = arm (right hemisphere). At Cz the was a 
greater negativity for leg words compared to arm words and at C5 there was a greater 
negativity for face as compared to arm words. The results show somatotopic 
differentiation of the different word types. For Current Source Densities these 
differences appeared early, at around 200-300ms (Pulvermiiller, Hummel & Harle 2001)
Using a different approach and a different language, Dutch, Kellenbach, Wijers, Mulder 
(2000) presented concrete nouns referring to inanimate objects. A lexical decision task 
was used but target items were paired with a visual-perceptual prime, i.e. a word whose
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referent shared visual-form with the target referent, or an unrelated prime. No effect on 
reaction times were found for visual-perceptual primes, but ERPs showed that the N400 
was attenuated when targets were preceded by visual-perceptual primes as compared to 
unrelated primes. The N400 is an ERP component, a negative going peak 
approximately 400msec after stimulus onset, that is increased when two items are 
unrelated, and reduced (attenuated) when two items are related (e.g. Holcomb, 1993). It 
is thought to reflect the ease of semantic integration between items. When two semantic 
representations are similar they are more easily integrated, thereby reducing the 
amplitude of the N400 response. This data therefore supports the activation of visual- 
form information during semantic access, as this was the only relation between the 
words. The authors explained the presence of a difference in ERPs without a difference 
in reaction times by the sensitivity of the two measures. The N400 showed that there 
was an overlap between semantic representations of the items related in visual-form, 
whereas response times are only sensitive to the degree of overlap between active 
features. This conclusion is supported by studies in which semantic priming between 
perceptually related pairs was seen only after tasks which made visual form salient 
during comprehension (Pecher, Zeelenberg & Raaijmakers, 1998; see Section 2.1.1.2).
2.2.2. TMS
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation studies have focused on words that refer to motor 
actions for two reasons. First, the somatotopic organisation of the motor strip means 
that selective stimulation can be applied to cortical areas that correspond to different 
effectors. Second, the consequences of TMS at effector specific cortical sites can be 
measured using Motor Evoked Potentials (MEP) at the muscles of specific effectors.
For example, TMS applied to the hand area produces an MEP (an increase in electrical 
activity) in muscles of the hand. Modulations of the MEP response provide information 
about the state of the cortex when TMS was applied, tapping directly into local cortical 
activity. Increased MEPs indicate greater activity at the cortical site, whereas lower 
MEPs indicate reduced activity at the cortical site.
Pulvermiiller, Hauk, Nikulin & Ilmoniemi (2005) applied TMS to effector specific sites 
in the primary motor cortex. If motor words activate the motor cortex then activity in 
the motor cortex should influence comprehension of single words referring to motor 
actions. Participants performed a speeded lexical decision by making brief lip
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movements, so that motor activity related to manual responses did not confound results. 
The experimental words related to leg and arm actions, e.g. fold, beat, kick, hike.
Stimuli were presented for 100ms and single pulse was applied 150ms after stimulus 
onset. TMS was applied to two different sites, an arm site and a leg site. There was an 
interaction between leg and arm words and the leg or arm TMS site. When TMS was 
applied to the congruent site, lexical decisions were faster. However, this was only true 
for the left hemisphere sites, not for right hemisphere or sham TMS sites; this 
supporting the lateralisation of cortical areas involved in language, even when those 
areas are modality specific. This study provides some of the most direct evidence that 
modality specific cortical areas play a role in single word processing, rather than these 
areas being activated as a secondary consequence of semantic access.
Further evidence that the motor cortex plays a role in semantic processing comes from 
production, rather than comprehension. Paired pulse TMS was used, in which a sub­
threshold conditioning stimulus (CS) that does not elicit an MEP is followed by a supra- 
threshold test stimulus (TS) that does elicit an MEP. When the ISI between the CS and 
TS is low (e.g. 1 ms), this inhibits the cortical response, producing lower MEPs. A 
longer ISI (e.g. 10ms) facilitates the cortical response, producing higher MEPs. TMS 
was applied to the left motor cortex, on a site that produced the optimal MEP response 
in a particular muscle of the right hand. Participants were presented with nouns and 
verbs associated with motor actions, e.g. the axe, the pen, to kick, to rub, and control 
nouns and verbs without such associations, e.g. the planet, to hate. Nouns and verbs 
were presented in their citation form (the X / to Y), and 250ms after word onset a cue 
was presented that instructed participants to produce the item with a particular 
morphological inflection. For the nouns, this was the singular or plural inflection; for 
the verbs, this was the third person singular or plural. Paired pulse TMS was applied 
500ms after stimulus onset (250ms after the production cue), and when the ISI of the 
pulses was long (10 ms) MEPs were greater for action associated nouns and verbs, but 
not the control items. No effect of grammatical class was found, supporting semantic 
over syntactic distinctions for representation at the motor cortex (Oliveri, Finocchiaro, 
Shapiro, Gangitano, Caramazza, Pascual-Leone, 2004). The same technique has been 
applied to sentence comprehension. Buccino, Riggio, Melli, Binkofski, Gallese & 
Rizzolatti (2005) asked Italian participants to listen to hand action sentences, e.g. “He 
turned the key”, foot action sentences, e.g. “He kicked the chair” and sentences with 
abstract content as a control, e.g. “He liked the apple”. A single TMS pulse was
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presented during the verb. In two sessions, in which participants heard the same 
sentences, TMS was applied to the hand or foot area of the motor cortex and MEPs 
were recorded from the hand or foot muscles respectively. MEP amplitude was 
significantly smaller for the hand muscles when listening to hand action sentences, and 
smaller for the foot muscles when listening to foot action sentences. These results 
contrast to those of Oliveri et al (2004) who found increased MEPs for the production of 
single words with motor associations; however in that study TMS was applied after 
stimulus onset. When TMS is applied after comprehension, MEPs are facilitated and 
one can infer that motor activity caused by the sentence facilitates subsequent 
activations of the motor cortex. In contrast, when TMS is applied during 
comprehension (presumably at the same time as motor activity resulting from the 
sentence) the two interfere with each other, reducing MEPs.
These studies provide converging evidence that lexical items with motor associations 
activate motor areas of the cortex (Oliveri et al, 2004) and localised motor cortical areas 
corresponding to the specific effector of an action (Pulvermiiller et al, 2005; Buccino et 
al, 2005). The timing of the TMS, early in the time-course of comprehension and 
production, supports the argument that modality specific activations are part of the early 
lexico-semantic processes. However, there is one caveat. TMS activates the site of 
immediate application, but it also effects well connected but cortically distant areas by 
the passage of activity along white-matter connections. Therefore, it is possible that the 
effect of TMS at these distant but connected areas is the causal factor, especially given 
that semantic representations may be built by associative connections to sensory and 
motor sites rather than directly engaging them. Semantic access may ‘prime’ these 
connections and produce the effects of TMS that we see here. For this reason, 
stimulation at these distant sites is a necessary control, although identification of these 
sites is difficult and labour intensive (requiring TMS and fMRI). Despite this concern, 
TMS studies provide good evidence for the direct involvement of motor areas in the 
representation of motor words.
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2.2.3. PET/fMRI
By far the most abundant neuroscientific evidence comes from PET and fMRI studies 
with single words and a handful of sentence comprehension studies. Table 2-1 
summarises the findings for production and Table 2-2 summarises the findings for 
comprehension. The relatively large number of studies is a result of comprehension and 
production being consistently investigated since techniques with fine spatial resolution 
became available. Brain regions associated to different categories of words, usually 
concrete objects or actions, are explored. If modality specific areas, for example 
sensory or motor cortices, are found to be active during semantic processing, this is 
support for embodied views of semantic representation. The majority of studies look at 
the motor cortex and the representation of motor actions or manipulable objects. 
However, there is some evidence for other modality specific areas, those involved in 
visual and sensory processing, being active for objects and actions with salient sensory 
qualities.
Vigliocco, Warren, Arcuili, Siri, Scott & Wise (2005) used PET to compare sensory and 
motor nouns and verbs, e.g. darken, darkness, depart and descend. Italian was used as 
this allows single word presentation for nouns and verbs, morphological marking 
distinguishes the two grammatical classes. Words were presented aurally in a passive 
comprehension task. Words with motor associations activated the premotor cortex 
(specifically the Left Precentral Gyrus and Central Sulcus) and sensory words activated 
anterior temporal areas, close to the fusiform area. There were no differences for 
grammatical class, supporting semantic (rather than grammatical) distinctions as the 
organisational principle for the lexicon. The key finding is even in passive 
comprehension areas are activated that correspond to sensory or motor representation. 
Further support for the motor cortex in motor action semantics was found when actions 
differing in the implicated effector were compared (Hauk, Johnsrude & Pulvermiiller,
2004). Words referring to actions with the leg, face and arm were presented in a passive 
reading task during fMRI, the baseline was strings of hash marks matched to the words 
for length. After the reading task, participants were asked to move their foot, index 
finger and tongue so that the areas active during movement were localised. When all 
words were compared to the baseline, activity in the left Fusiform, Inferior Frontal 
Gyrus, the bidirectional Precentral Gyrus (motor cortex) and the Right Superior 
Posterior Middle Frontal Gyrus (premotor cortex) was found. Leg words specifically
112
activated the Dorsal Pre and Postcentral Gyri and the Dorsal Premotor cortex on the 
midline; this overlapped with the localised foot movement area in the Dorsal frontal 
gyrus and left Pre and Postcentral gyri. Arm words activated the Middle Frontal Gyrus 
bidirectionally and the left Precentral Gyrus; this overlapped with the localised fmger 
movement area in the right Middle Frontal Gyrus and the left Precentral Gyrus . Face 
words activated the bidirectional Inferior-Frontal Premotor cortex; the tongue 
movement area was posterior to this location in the Premotor cortex. This provides 
good evidence for somatotopically organised semantic representation for words that 
refer to motor actions. These results are complemented by two studies, both in Italian, 
that have looked at the comprehension of action sentences. In one study, participants 
heard sentences from four conditions, mouth actions (“I bite an apple”), hand actions (“I 
grasp the knife”), leg actions (“I kick the ball”) and abstract events/states (“I appreciate 
sincerity”). They found activation foci in the Premotor cortex related to each of three 
motor sentences. These foci corresponded to areas identified with those specific 
effectors, i.e. mouth, hand and leg. As in other studies (e.g. Pulvermiiller and 
colleagues, 2000, 2001, 2004) leg actions were represented dorsally, followed by hand 
actions and then mouth actions laterally. The authors argued that a left lateralised 
fronto-parieto-temporal network, similar to that for action execution and observation, 
was involved in the semantic representation of body action sentences (Tettamanti, 
Buccino, Saccuman, Gallese et al, 2005). In a study which localised effector specific 
areas more directly, Aziz-Zadeh, Wilson, Rizzolatti & Iacoboni (2006) had participants 
read sentences that described literal or metaphorical mouth, hand and foot actions. 
Participants then viewed actions performed with the mouth, hand and foot. For example, 
a literal sentence took the form “biting the peach” or “grasping the pen”. Metaphorical 
sentences took the form “biting off more than you can chew” or “kicking off the year”. 
Individual analysis for each participant identified the strongest responding voxels for 
action observation with each effector; these voxels were then examined for responses to 
the linguistic stimuli. This Voxel Of Interest (VOI) analysis showed that left 
hemisphere VOIs responded maximally to the congruent literal effector specific 
phrases. Metaphorical sentences did not show such effector specific interactions. Thus, 
studies with sentence stimuli reinforce the evidence with single words that show general 
and effector specific motor activation during the comprehension of language that refers 
to motor actions.
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Activity in the motor cortex has also been observed during conceptual and semantic 
access for manipulable objects as well as motor actions. Grabowski, Damasio & 
Damasio (1998) contrasted picture naming for tools, animals and famous people 
(experiment 1) with a baseline task of verbally reporting the orientation of unknown 
faces. Premotor and Frontal regions were active across all three categories, but the 
activations for tools extended to the Inferior Frontal Sulcus and Premotor Sulcus. In 
another experiment participants named tool pictures and generated verbs to tool 
pictures. A region of interest (ROI) at the superior end of a large activation area along 
the Precentral sulcus was taken from the first experiment. Activity in this ROI was 
higher for verb generation than tool naming, but was still present for both (experiment 
2). Looking only at tool objects, rather than objects and actions, Chao & Martin (2000) 
presented photographs for viewing (experiment 1) and silent naming (experiment 2) 
during fMRI. Activations were compared for tools relative to animals, faces and 
houses. A baseline task presented scrambled versions of the same photographs. Voxels 
responding to objects compared to scrambled images were analysed further for tools.
For both viewing and silent naming, activity in the left Ventral Premotor and Posterior 
Parietal cortices were observed for tools compared to all other objects and for tools 
versus animals. Gerlach, Law & Paulson (2002) used PET to look at areas associated to 
manipulable objects per se, rather than tools. Pictures were presented and participants 
had to decide of the objects were natural or man made; conjunction analyses were 
performed for areas common to manipulable objects (vegetables, fruit and clothes) 
compared to non-manipulable objects (animals and buildings) and Premotor activation 
was found. The authors discussed these results in relation to a visuo-motor network, 
including the Medial Temporal area (MT), which is involved in representing goal 
directed actions. As we will see in other studies, MT, an area implicated in motion 
processing (e.g. Britten, Shadlen, Newsome & Movshon, 1993; Silvanto, Lavie & 
Walsh, 2005), is often observed during the semantic processing of actions and tools.
Starting with the assumption that differentiating animals relies on subtle visual features 
(e.g. size, form) whereas tools rely on function (i.e. how they are used); Martin, Wiggs, 
Ungerleider & Haxby (1996) had participants identify line drawings whilst undergoing 
PET. Separate scans looked at silent versus audible naming, in order to collect naming 
latency and error data. Tool and animal names were equated for frequency and category 
typicality. In comparison to nonsense objects, tools and animals activated the 
bidirectional Fusiform Gyri, bidirectional Medial Cerebellum, Left Anterior
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insula/Inferior Frontal region (Broca’s area) and the Ventral Temporal lobes. When 
compared to nonsense objects, animals activated the Calcarine Sulcus (Primary Visual 
Cortex) and tools activated the left Middle Temporal Gyrus (MT) and the left Premotor 
area. These activations were also present when animals and tools were directly 
contrasted with each other. A further study presented the objects in silhouette to rule 
out stimulus complexity in the visual activation for animals: activity in the Occipital 
cortex and MT/Premotor areas were still seen for animals and tools respectively. The 
authors hypothesised that the Occipital activation corresponds to making distinctions 
between animals based on subtle visual stimuli, the MT activation for tools is associated 
to patterns of visual motion associated to tool use and the Premotor activity reflects 
knowledge about how tools are used. Semantic “representations [are] stored close to the 
tissue that is active when perceiving motion and using objects” (p.651, ibid) and they 
depend on reactivation of previously acquired knowledge about physical and functional 
attributes that is dependent on the “intrinsic properties of the object to be identified” 
(p.652, ibid). These conclusions are embodied in flavour, although they stop short of 
simulation (and therefore strong embodiment). Instead, areas proximal to those used 
during actual experience are implicated in representation; this is in line with weak 
embodied theories7.
Turning to a multi-modal dimension of experience, space, one study has looked at 
naming spatial relations, as well as tools, tool actions (e.g. stir, draw) and body actions 
(e.g. run, crawl). In a between subjects design using PET, one group named pictures of 
tool actions, body actions and tools and the other group named spatial relations between 
concrete entities, abstract shapes and tools. The control task for the action naming 
group was reporting the orientation of a face whilst for the spatial relation group the 
same task was responded to positively or negatively (‘yes’ for upright faces, ‘no’ for 
upside down faces). Bidirectional activity in the MT was seen for tool actions 
compared to tools and body actions, as well as activity in the left MT for all actions 
compared to spatial relations. In comparison to the control task, Motor and Premotor 
activations were found for tool and body actions; however, these were removed for tool 
actions when contrasted to naming concrete objects. Activity in the left Supramarginal 
Gyrus (Parietal cortex) was found for spatial relations compared to tool naming and in 
the right Supramarginal Gyrus for abstract shape spatial relations compared to concrete
7 It is interesting to note that the neuroscientific literature has long held views that are in line with 
embodiment, following a somewhat separate tradition to canonical symbolic cognitive theories.
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object spatial relations; this was explained as a purer reflection of spatial relation 
processing (Damasio, Grabowski, Tranel, Ponto, Hichwa, Damasio; 2001). Thus, there 
is more evidence for Motor and MT activity in tools and action naming, as well as the 
area most implicated in spatial processing (the Parietal lobe) being active during the 
naming of spatial relations. However, this task does not separate the semantic 
representation of spatial prepositions and phrases (e.g. ‘besides’, ‘in front o f , ‘to the 
left o f)  from the perception of the spatial relations themselves, making this Parietal 
activation slightly ambiguous. Comprehension of such language would be a clearer 
demonstration of the semantic representation of space.
Returning to tools in comparison to other objects, Phillips, Noppeney, Humphreys,
Price (2002) looked at the retrieval of action versus perceptual (size) knowledge for 
tools, fruit and vegetables. Participants were presented with words and pictures and had 
to make constrained decisions about actions and perceptual qualities, for example, “Can 
you peel this by hand?” or “Is this tool longer than a paintbrush?”. The baseline task 
was a decision about the relative size of the picture/word to a line presented underneath. 
Both tasks (action and size knowledge) produced fusiform activation, reinforcing the 
role of this area in accessing object knowledge. Retrieving action knowledge produced 
activity in the left Posterior MT (LPMT) and the Cerebellum. When tools were 
compared to fruit, the Supplementary Motor Area (SMA) and LPMT were active. 
Therefore, activations for action knowledge overlapped with that for tools in the LPMT. 
There was a trend for action knowledge to activate the left Premotor area, but only with 
a low threshold, making it unreliable. Retrieval of size knowledge compared to action 
knowledge and the baseline produced activations in the PreSMA. There were no 
reliable activations for fruit alone, with activity in the left Anterior MT only when 
thresholds were uncorrected. These results are in contrast to Gerlach et al (2002) who 
found Premotor activity for fruits and vegetables, but it is possible that the contrast with 
tools in Phillips et al (2002) masked any motor activity for fruit. Whilst supporting 
Motor and MT activity for tools and tool actions, these results do not support the 
modality specific semantic representation of fruit. The authors hypothesised that the 
representation of fruit requires the conjunction and integration of various semantic 
features; therefore no modality specific areas were seen8. Martin et al (1996) provided 
evidence that a category whose salient properties are visual (animals) correlates with
8 The activity in the PreSMA and Cerebellum were explained as task effects, resulting from the retrieval 
and online maintenance of information
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activity in the visual cortices, so it is possible that fruits present a category where no one 
modality of information is dominant (for a similar argument, see Rogers et al, 2004).
It is self-evident that modality specific areas, e.g. the motor or visual cortex, are not the 
same as areas implicated in the conjunction of different sensory features, e.g. the 
fusiform gyrus or temporal lobes. Strong embodiment predicts the concurrent activity 
of separate modality specific systems (like the Motor cortex and MT for tools), rather 
than areas that represent the conjunction of modality specific features. These areas can 
be nominally considered amodal or supramodal but the bottom line is that they are not 
modality specific as embodied, multi-modal systems require (e.g. Gallese & Lakoff, 
2005). It is clear that the dominance of one modal class for a given category (e.g. motor 
information for tool actions) plays an important role in the observed cortical 
topography, but this does not necessarily support embodiment or simulation. More 
evidence is needed for entities associated with the sensory, rather than motor, 
modalities.
Words referring to colour have been used to investigate sensory information and 
modality specific regions. Martin, Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider (1995) 
presented participants with achromatic line drawings (experiment 1) or the names 
(experiment 2) of objects during PET. Participants produced the name of a colour word 
for the object, an action/verb associated with the object or the object name itself, e.g. for 
‘pencil’ they would say ‘yellow’, ‘write’ or ‘pencil’. For colour word generation 
bidirectional activity was found in the Fusiform area (with stronger activity in the left 
hemisphere), an area implicated in colour processing. The specific site of activity was 
slightly anterior to previous PET studies reporting on colour perception. Verb 
generation produced activity in left Posterior MT and the Cerebellum; MT activity was 
slightly anterior to previous PET studies looking at motion processing9. In a study 
which directly compared colour words to abstract form words (e.g. blonde versus 
square), participants passively read words from these categories, as well as a large 
number of fillers, during fMRI (Pulvermiiller & Hauk, 2006). The baseline was a string 
of hash marks matched to the words in length. On the basis of previous studies, six 
ROIs were identified: the Fusiform Gyrus, Parahippocampal Gyrus, MT, Premotor 
cortex, Inferior-Frontal and Dorsolateral Prefrontal areas; these were then compared for
9 The lack of motor activity for actions/verbs was explained by the items not being heavily motor in 
nature, e.g. sleep, see, and fly. The authors hypothesized that if they had used objects whose actions 
involved reaching, grasping and manipulating, they would expect Motor and Parietal activation (see 
footnote 26, p. 105).
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the colour and form words. Colour words activated the Parahippocampal Gyrus; the 
authors interpreted this as corresponding to an area involved in visual feature 
conjunction as it is near to the Fusiform and higher visual association areas. They 
extended this argument further, hypothesising that this area binds different tones and 
luminances for an 'abstract' representation of colour. Form words activated the Inferior 
Frontal and Fusiform Gyri as well as MT. This was explained as areas that calculate the 
conjunction and disjunction of concrete actions related to acting on objects. Further 
support for the Fusiform Gyrus in the processing of object knowledge has been found 
when a property verification task was administered during fMRI. Kan, Barsalou, 
Solomon, Minor & Thompson-Schill (2003) had participants perform a concept- 
property verification task with pairs of words, e.g. Rose -  Thom. Participants had to 
respond if the property was true or false for the concept. In a between subjects 
manipulation, filler trials consisted of unassociated pairs (e.g. Stapler -  Vegetable) 
making the experimental trials easy in comparison or associated pairs (e.g. Stapler- 
Paper) making all trials more demanding. The baseline was a letter verification task in 
which participants decided if a single letter was part of string. A ROI analysis was used 
to isolate the Fusiform, as it is implicated in object processing. Left Fusiform activity 
was found, but only when fillers were associated. A whole brain analysis confirmed 
this finding, with an area of activation slightly superior to the ROI co-ordinates. The 
authors concluded that when the task was easy it could be performed using only word- 
word associations, whereas when it was hard participants had to access conceptual- 
semantic information (activating the fusiform); the increase in task difficultly was 
confirmed by longer reactions times when fillers were associated. In sum, there is 
mixed evidence for Fusiform activity in the semantic representation of colour, but it 
does appear to be consistently active for object processing generally. Whether or not 
this corresponds to a modality specific or embodied representation is equivocal.
In one of the rare studies to move outside of object or action processing, Wallentin, 
Lund, Ostergaard, Ostergaard & Roepstorff (2005) presented Danish participants with 
auditory sentences that referred to fictive and factive motion. Factive motion sentences 
used animate subjects and motion verbs, e.g. “The man goes into the house” whereas 
fictive motion sentences used inanimate subjects, e.g. “The pipe goes into the house”. 
These were compared to sentences with static animate and inanimate subjects; for 
example, “The man lies in the house” and “The pipe lies in the house”. Activity for 
both factive and fictive motion was seen in the left Posterior MT, anterior to MT/V5
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which is implicated in motion processing. This study provides the only neuroscientific 
test, to my knowledge, of language that specifically refers to motion.
Finally, there is limited evidence that words with emotional content are associated to the 
emotional circuits of the brain. Using PET, participants were presented with threat 
words (e.g. evil, stab, assault) and neutral words (e.g. list, candle, wash). Participants 
had to name the colour in which the word was presented, a modified Stroop task. 
Bidirectional Amygdala, left Parahippocampal and left Premotor activation was found 
for threat versus neutral words. The authors interpreted this as the Amygdala 
modulating the visual stream for threat words, resulting in enhanced semantic encoding 
(Isenberg, Silbersweig, Engelien, Emmerich, Malavade, Beattie, Leon & Stem, 1999). 
The embodied interpretation is that the Amygdala is essential for fear responses; 
therefore it also plays a role in the semantic representation of words that are associated 
with fearful situations.
2.2.4. Summary of Neuroscientific Evidence
The strength of the neuroscientific evidence for embodiment depends on modality. The 
premotor and motor cortices are consistently activated across studies and methods. 
These cortical areas are not only seen for language referring to body actions (Vigliocco 
et al, 2005; Pulvermiiller and colleagues, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2005; Tettamanti et al,
2005; Aziz-Zadeh et al, 2006), but also for tool actions and tools/manipulable objects 
(Chao & Martin, 2000; Gerlach et al, 2002; Grabowski et al, 1998). For most studies, 
the motor activation is left lateralised, although there is some evidence that the right 
hemisphere is implicated for tool action generation (e.g. Damasio et al, 2001). This 
strongly suggests that the motor cortex plays a role in the semantic representation of 
objects and actions with salient motor associations. This is in line with strong and weak 
embodied theories where motor features could be represented via associations with the 
motor cortex. Simulation during comprehension is supported by effector specific 
manipulations (e.g. Aziz-Zadeh et al, 2006; Pulvermiiller et al, 2005) which suggest that 
the motor cortex is selectively recruited depending on the content of the language. 
Alongside the motor cortex, MT activity is also repeatedly seen for body and tool 
actions as well as tool objects (Damasio et al, 2001; Martin et al, 1995, 1996; Phillips et 
al, 2002; Tettamanti et al, 2005); there is also some evidence that it is active during
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comprehension of words referring to fruit or an object’s form (Pulvermiiller & Hauk, 
2006; Phillips et al, 2002).
Table 2-1: Sensory and Motor areas found in studies using fMRI or PET and language 
production.
Condition Stimulus Material Area Study
Action/Verb
generation Pictures & W ords
L MT
L Sup Tem poral Gyrus 
R Lat cerebellum
Martin e t al (1995) 
Martin e t al (1995)
Body Action Pictures R Motor & Prem otor Dam asio e t al (2001)
Tool action 
generation Pictures
L Prem otor
R Motor & Prem otor 
L & R M T
Grabowski et al 
(1998)
D am asio e t al (2001) 
Dam asio e t al (2001)
L Insula 
L P ost Parietal
Chao & Martin (2000)
L & R Fusiform 
L Inf Tem poral Gyrus
Martin et al (1996)
Tool Naming Pictures L Prem otor 
R Med Cerebellum
Martin et al (1996) 
Grabowski et al 
(1998)
C hao & Martin (2000) 
Martin e t al (1996)
Animal Naming Pictures
L & R Fusiform 
Med Occipital 
C alcarine Sulcus
Martin e t al (1996)
Spatial Relations Pictures L Supram arginal G yrus (parietal)
D am asio e t al (2001)
Colour Pictures and W ords L & R Fusiform R Pulvinar
Martin e t al (1995)
L = Left
Post = Posterior 
Lat = Lateral
R = Right 
Sup = Superior 
Med = Medial
Inf = Inferior
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Table 2-2: Sensory and Motor areas found in studies using fMRI or PET and language 
comprehension
Condition Stimulus
Material
Area Study
General Sensory Spoken words L Ant Inf Tem poral Gyrus
Vigliocco e t al (2005)
Colour Written W ords
L Cerebellum  
L Fusiform
L Parahippocam pal gyrus
Pulvermiiller & Hauk 
(2006)
Motion Spoken S en ten ces L P ost MT Wallentin et al (2005)
Size knowledge Written W ords & Pictures
P re  Supplem entary Motor 
A rea (SMA)
Phillips e t al (2002)
Shape/Form Written W ords
L Precentral Gyrus 
L Fusiform 
L MT
Pulvermiiller & Hauk 
(2006)
Object property 
verification Written words
L Fusiform Kan e t al (2003)
Fruit Written W ords & Pictures L MT Phillips e t al (2002)
Tools
Pictures
Written W ords & 
Pictures
L Prem otor 
L P ost Parietal
L MT 
R SMA
C hao & Martin 
(2000)
Phillips e t al (2002)
Manipulable
Objects Pictures
L Prem otor G erlach e t al (2002)
Threat Written words L & R Amygdala Isenberg e t al (1999)
L = Left R = Right
P o s t  = Posterior A nt = Anterior 
Inf = Inferior
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Table 2-3 continued: Sensory and Motor areas found in studies using fMRI or PET and
language comprehension
Condition Stimulus Material Area Study
Action knowledge Written words & Pictures
R Cerebellum  
L MT
Phillips e t al (2002)
Motor Action
Written words L & R Precentral Gyrus Hauk, Johnsrude & 
Pulvermiiller (2004)
Spoken words L Central Sulcus 
L Precentral Gyrus
Vigliocco e t al (2005)
Face Written words L & R Inf Frontal Gyrus Hauk, Johnsrude & 
Pulvermiiller (2004)
Mouth Spoken sen ten ces L Inf Frontal Gyrus 
L Med Tem poral Gyrus 
(MTG)
Tettam anti e t al 
(2005)
Arm Written words L Middle Frontal Gyrus 
L Precentral Gyrus
Hauk, Johnsrude & 
Pulvermiiller (2004)
Hand Spoken sen ten c es L Motor 
L & R MTG
L Posterior Intraparietal 
Sulcus (IPS)
L Ant IPS
Tettam anti e t al 
(2005)
Leg Written sen ten ces L Motor Aziz-Zadeh et al 
(2006)
Foot Written words L P re & P ost Central Gyrus 
R Sup Frontal Gyrus 
L Dorso-M ed Frontal Region
Hauk, Johnsrude & 
Pulvermiiller (2004)
Spoken sen ten ces L Sup Frontal Sulcus 
L Ant & Posterior IPS 
L MTG
Tettam anti e t al 
(2005)
L = Left R = Right
M ed = Medial A nt = Anterior
Inf = Inferior S u p  = Superior
When activity in this area is observed for tools and tool actions, it is usually explained 
as a reflection of knowledge about the movement of objects during their use (e.g. 
Phillips et al, 2002). This is also in line with accounts that propose modality specific 
areas (in this case, those processing visual motion) are implicated in the representation 
of knowledge from that modality.
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Despite the fact that MT is typically understood as a motion processing area, there is 
only one study that has used motion sentences (both literal and fictive). However, the 
active area in this case was proximal, but not isomorphic, with MT (Wallentin et al, 
2005). It is therefore unclear whether the MT itself is implicated in the representation 
of semantic motion. It is of course crucial whether the cortical areas implicated in 
semantic representation are isomorphic with the cortical areas involved in experience, 
since this is the strong version of embodied simulation when it is applied to neural 
structures. Aside from the motor cortices, the Amygdala is the only other brain area 
that supports ‘modality’ specific representation, being active for threat words (Isenberg 
et al, 1999).
Beyond body actions, tool actions and tools, the evidence is considerably less coherent. 
The Fusiform Gyrus is documented as playing in role in the representation of object 
form (e.g. Chao, Martin & Haxby, 1999; Vuilleumier, Henson, Driver & Dolan, 2002) 
and different areas of the fusiform have been implicated for different categories, i.e. 
lateral fusiform for animals and medial fusiform for tools (Martin & Chao, 2001). In 
the current review, fusiform activity was observed for tool and animal names relative to 
a nonsense object baseline (Martin et al, 1996), for conceptual access during property 
verification for objects (Kan et al, 2003) and for words related to form and colour 
(Pulvermiiller & Hauk, 2006; Martin et al, 1995). For sensory words in general (e.g. 
darken, darkness), an area proximal to the fusiform was observed (Vigliocco et al,
2005). These results support the role of the fusiform in representing the visual attributes 
of known objects, and more generally this area of the cortex as involved in higher order 
visual association; combining features from different modalities (Vigliocco et al, 2005). 
As regards embodiment, fusiform activation is not that informative. It can be taken as a 
predominantly visual area, therefore supporting modality specificity, but its role as an 
area that represents objects regardless of idiosyncratic variations in appearance (e.g. 
Vuilleumier et al, 2002) suggests that it responds to combinations of features or 
attributes to provide a more abstract representation of objects. As mentioned above, 
higher order association areas are slightly problematic for embodiment, which predicts 
the concurrent activation of different modality specific areas rather than concentrated 
activity in one area that is connected to these modal systems. It is an open question 
whether heteromodal areas that combine information across modalities still constitute 
embodied representations, or whether they indicate a progression from modality specific 
to modality invariant (and ultimately modality independent) representations.
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It is clear that language referring to objects and actions with a salient modality (e.g. 
tools or body actions) activate cortical areas involved in the experience of that modality. 
However, this can be taken as support for weaker versions of embodied theories that do 
not necessitate simulation, or full embodiment. It is always possible that sensory and 
motor cortices become active in a secondary manner, incidental to necessary processing 
in semantics; however, the evidence from TMS and EEG speaks against this conclusion 
(e.g. Pulvermuller et al, 2001; 2005). The isomorphism between the cortical areas used 
during real-world experience and semantic representation is supported for the motor 
cortex, but it is less clear what the literature shows for non-motor information. Again, it 
is worth noting that the motor cortex has a special status as an efferent area, therefore 
what applies there may not apply for afferent sensory areas.
2 .3 . Conclusions
As stated in the introductory paragraph, the strong prediction from embodied theories of 
semantic representation is the direct engagement hypothesis: to achieve representation, 
semantic content necessarily and directly recruits the sensory and motor systems used 
during experience. The necessity condition states that without the support of sensory 
and motor systems, semantic representation for concrete objects and events is impaired. 
The directness condition states that sensory and motor systems are engaged during 
semantic access without being mediated by other cognitive processes. So, what can be 
concluded about the necessity and direct engagement of sensory and motor systems in 
semantic representation?
Neuropsychological evidence is the most intuitive test of the necessity constraint, since 
impairments in sensory and motor systems should result in impaired semantic and 
conceptual knowledge (e.g. Mahon & Caramazza, 2005). Thus, most empirical work 
with healthy adults informs only the directness condition. However, one possible 
correlate of necessity is speed: the faster the access to sensory and motor information, 
the more likely it is to be a typical and elemental part of semantic processing 
(Pulvermuller, 2001). There is evidence of fast access to motor information during 
comprehension (i.e. around 200ms following word presentation, Boulenger et al, 2006;
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Pulvermuller et al, 2000, 2001) and behavioural studies for the motor domain do 
support timing as a crucial element (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006; Zwaan & Taylor,
2006). TMS studies also speak to the necessity constraint, providing evidence that 
direct activation of the motor system affects the comprehension of motor words 
(Pulvermuller et al, 2005). Outside the motor domain, the only clear behavioural 
evidence comes from one study which shows that the perception of motion affects the 
comprehension of motion sentences (Kaschak et al, 2005). As noted above, effects of 
perception on comprehension are less easily explained by domain general processes. 
Neuroscientific evidence reliably shows motor cortex activation for tools, tool actions 
and body actions (e.g. Tettamanti et al, 2005; Gerlach et al, 2002), but the evidence for 
other domains is less consistent (e.g. Vigliocco et al, 2005; Pulvermuller & Hauk,
2005). However, brain activity (particularly in fMRI/PET) is always correlational 
rather than causal. Sensory and motor activity could be result of the high association 
between particular semantic domains and particular modalities, rather than the result of 
direct engagement in representation.
Turning to the directness constraint, there are an increasing number of studies that 
demonstrate the automatic activation of sensory-motor information during semantic 
access; evidence comes from both behavioural and neuroscientific evidence. 
Automaticity suggests directness, but unless low level processes are directly tapped (as 
they are in the motor domain through the manipulation of motor responses) it could still 
reflect domain general mediation. Sensory and motor behaviour could be modulated by 
these mediating mechanisms, not because of direct engagement. However, if sensory or 
motor activity is shown to affect comprehension, it is harder to explain away these 
effects by mediating processes. Such evidence is available for the motor domain (e.g. 
Pulvermuller et al, 2005; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003; Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) but 
evidence is limited for the senses (Kaschak et al, 2005, 2006). It is also unclear how 
different visual processes (e.g. visuo-spatial attention or motion perception) would be 
influenced by the same semantic content. Non-embodied theories would predict more 
variability since the connections between semantic and visual domains are indirect and 
therefore entirely task dependent; in contrast, strong embodiment would predict some 
continuity since the simulation of visual information in the visual system should have 
consistent consequences for perception.
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In sum, the motor domain provides the most coherent support for embodied cognition. 
As mentioned above, the motor and sensory domains are not directly comparable, so 
embodiment in the motor system may be the exception rather than the rule. Outside this 
domain, questions remain about exactly what sensory processes are being engaged by 
particular tasks (e.g. visuo-spatial attention or picture judgements). In order to clarify 
where and how interactions arise between comprehension and perception, we need to 
know what perceptual processes are implicated. In a similar vein, these interactions 
cannot be well characterised unless a control condition is present as a baseline. 
Neuroscientific evidence usually includes a control, due to the use of contrasts, but 
behavioural evidence is typically without them.
If embodied theories of semantics are to advance, the extent and nature of embodied 
effects has to be systematically addressed. This requires more evidence from the 
sensory, rather than the motor, domain, and well characterised tasks with appropriate 
baselines so that the location and direction of interactions can be observed. The plan for 
the current investigation is motivated by these conclusions, and it is outlined in the next 
chapter.
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3. Structure of the Investigation
In this chapter a plan of the investigation will be provided. I will give a summary of the 
theoretical background and the key questions we want to address, establishing vision as 
the sensory domain to be investigated. General predictions from strong and weak 
versions of embodied theories are given and then specific questions for the domain we 
will be testing (visual perception). In line with the majority of behavioural work in 
embodiment the key manipulation is the congruence between semantic and sensory 
events. However, we will use a control condition so that congruence effects are always 
evaluated against a baseline.
3 .1. Strong versus Weak embodiment
The strong prediction from embodied theories of semantic representation is what I will 
refer to as the direct engagement hypothesis: to achieve representation, semantic content 
necessarily and directly recruits the sensory and motor systems used during experience. 
The necessity condition states that sensory and motor systems are essential for the 
semantic representation for concrete objects and events. The directness condition states 
that sensory and motor systems are engaged during semantic access without being 
mediated by other cognitive processes. One important idea here is modulation; 
semantic representation modulates activity in sensory or motor areas because those 
areas simulate the experience of the referent. Since the two share a common substrate, 
effects should be observed bidirectionally, from language to perception/action and vice- 
versa. See Figure 3-1.
Figure 3-1: A schematic of direct engagement
Sensory/Motor
System
Semantic
Content
Of the embodied theories summarised in Chapter 1, there are five which subscribe to 
strong embodiment (see Figure 3-3). The most extreme of these is Gallese & Lakoff 
(2005) for whom most (if not all) cognitive functions are carried out within modal
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systems. Everything that is needed for representation (e.g. decomposition or 
abstraction) is already present in sensory-motor systems and simulations within these 
modal systems underpin semantic representation. Pulvermuller (1999; 2000) also 
begins with the neural mechanisms that might underlie cognition and proposes that 
Hebbian learning produces embodied content: activity related to a word form occurs 
alongside sensory-motor activity corresponding to the word’s referent, therefore the two 
become associated. In this way, these sensory-motor activations can become the 
semantic representation for a particular word. Barsalou (1999) presents a 
comprehensive theory of representation-as-simulation. Here, a more traditional 
cognitive model is presented where representations are schematic re-enactments of 
sensory and motor experience. However, the central tenet is the same with simulations 
taking place within the sensory and motor systems themselves. Finally, Glenberg and 
colleagues (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003) and Zwaan 
(2004) refer to the theories of Barsalou (1999) and Pulvermuller (1999) respectively 
when fleshing out their own theories of sentence/narrative comprehension, therefore 
taking on the same strong assumptions about embodiment that are present in these 
theories. Since these theories also take in sentence level representation, simulation at all 
levels is proposed (single word, sentence and narrative) and details of the integration of 
individual words, syntactic structures and the existing context are provided. All of these 
theories subscribe to the following two predictions:
Strong Predictions:
(i) Semantic representation engages areas in sensory and motor systems used in direct 
experience so low level sensory and motor systems are recruited.
(ii) Semantic representation necessarily recruits these low level processes (modulation) 
so effects should be consistent across tasks.
A weaker version of embodied theories is what I will call the indirect engagement 
hypothesis. There are several possible formulations of this hypothesis, but in terms of 
necessity and directness it can be summarised as follows: to achieve representation, 
semantic content requires close contact to sensory and motor systems but it is not 
dependent on those systems. The nonessential condition states that sensory and motor 
systems are implicated in semantic processing because of stable associative 
relationships between the semantic representation for concrete objects and events and 
the experience of those events. However, sensory and motor content is not necessary
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for semantic representation (at least once semantic representations are stable). The 
indirect condition states that sensory and motor systems are engaged during semantic 
access in a task dependent manner, being mediated by cognitive processes such as 
attention or perceptual learning. An important idea here is mediation: the impact of 
semantic representation is equivalent to an external system influencing activity in 
sensory or motor areas. Mediation means that bidirectional effects will not always be 
present since the connection between semantic and sensory-motor systems is variable. 
See Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2: A schematic of indirect engagement
Sensory/Motor
System
Semantic 
Content '
There are a number of theories that adopt (or could adopt) some weak version of 
embodiment. Vigliocco et al (2004) make a clear statement about the modal content of 
conceptual and therefore semantic representation; semantic features which correspond 
to modal information are linked to modality specific systems. Jackendoff (2002) also 
proposes that modality specific features are grounded in their respective modal systems 
whilst maintaining that much of language processing is based in an abstract, amodal 
conceptual structure. Other featural theories could subscribe to embodiment if their 
‘visual’ and ‘functional’ features were grounded in the visual and motor system 
respectively (Farah & McClelland, 1991; Tyler & Moss, 2001). These theories propose 
partial dependence; although the precise mechanism is ambivalent between modulation 
and a strong form of mediation (see Figure 3-3). One further step away from 
embodiment are theories which propose an amodal, abstract semantics with associations 
to sensory-motor content (Rogers et al, 2004; Quillian, 1968). Rogers et al (2004) are 
explicit that semantic representations do not carry any content at all, but act as links to 
the relevant conceptual information. Quillian (1968) is included here as he does make a 
brief reference to a common representational level between semantic and perceptual 
information, but his theory is also one the paradigmatic amodal semantic networks. 
These theories propose an independent but associative relationship where mediation is 
the only mechanism by which semantic and sensory-motor content can interact. For
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example, modality specific information could be recruited by association areas that 
integrate the modal information and therefore have access to it. All of these theories 
subscribe to the weak predictions:
Weak Predictions:
(i) Semantic representation engages areas in sensory and motor systems but low level 
sensory and motor systems are not necessarily recruited.
(ii) The effects of semantic representation are mediated so effects will vary across tasks.
Figure 3-3: Schematic of where theories lie along the continuum from amodal to modal
* McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg and Smith, Shoben & Rips not included as no clear assertions are made
j Levelt, 1989 Rogers et al, 2004 !| Vigliocco et al, 2004 * Barslou, 1999
i Landauer & Dumais, 1997 Quillian, 1968 !; Jackendoff, 2002 ! Gallese & Lakoff, 2005
I Collins & Loftus, 1975 jj Farah & McClelland, 1991 
j! Tyler & Moss, 2001
I Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003 
| Pulvermuller, 1999
■i | Zwaan, 2004
Label Symbolic/Amodal Inteimediate/Supramodal Analogue/Modal
Relationship to 
sensory-motor 
systems
Complete
independence
Independent 
but associated
Partial
dependence
Complete
dependence
Explanation of 
interactions
indirect mediation modulation direct
weak em bodim ent
--------- 'y -----
strong embodiment
J
Finally there are theories which propose a completely independent semantic store 
(Levelt, 1989; Landauer & Dumais, 1997; Collins & Loftus, 1975). The link between 
sensory-motor and semantic content is outside the semantic system, produced by 
designation processes (see section 1.2.1). Here, interactions would be explained via 
indirect mechanisms (coming via other cognitive processes such as working memory or 
attention) or produced by the connection between semantic representations and the level 
at which designation occurs (i.e. a theoretically opaque process). Figure 3-3 
summarises where all these theories lie on the continuum from modal to amodal and 
which fall under weak or strong embodiment, it is an open question whether sensory
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and motor information is implicated in semantics because of strong embodiment (i.e. 
direct engagement that modulates activity in sensory-motor systems) or weak 
embodiment (i.e. indirect engagement that mediates activity in sensory-motor systems).
3 .2 . Questions to be addressed
The investigation will focus on the recruitment of visual perception during language 
comprehension; this was chosen for a number of reasons. The evidence for embodied 
effects on visual processing is less coherent than that for the motor domain even though 
embodied simulation implicates all modalities. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 2 
(section 2.1.4), we control our actions through the motor system so it may be more open 
to influence from language or other cognitive processes that we use to guide action; it is 
an efferent system. When comprehension is combined with the motor system, this 
places one system which typically responds to the environment (motor actions) with 
some information from that environment (language). In contrast, perceptual processing 
is afferent and tuned to the reception of information, the effect of language may 
therefore be more indirect (i.e. typically exploited to guide attention and action rather 
than directly modulate what is perceived). When comprehension is combined with 
perception, this places two afferent systems together. However, recent evidence 
suggests a close relationship between perception and action (e.g. Fischer & Zwaan, in 
press); a fuzzy boundary between these two systems means that both may be equally 
malleable since they are already integrated. Turning to the available literature, a variety 
of visual processes are implicated in experiments that use, for example, picture 
judgements (e.g. low level signal processing, visual object recognition, concept 
retrieval) so the main aim of this investigation is to isolate specific, low level visual 
processes. By localising a particular level of visual processing we can make clearer 
inferences about where semantics and vision interact. There is a large literature on 
visual perception, particularly as it relates to motion processing (e.g. Blake, Sekuler, & 
Grossman, 2004). Therefore when specific visual processes are identified through 
established perceptual tasks (e.g. motion detection with random dot kinematograms, 
ibid) interactions can be interpreted within the context of what is known about those 
processes. Finally, the visual domain allows us to see if interactions are similar for 
different processes when the same linguistic stimuli are presented. This will inform 
both where interactions take place and hopefully refine the quality of those interactions.
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For example, if we find similar effects across different processes, the influence of 
language will appear pervasive and more global in character. This supports a more 
general influence of language on perception and goes against strong embodiment. On 
the other hand, if different processes in the same domain show different effects, the 
influence of language will appear localised and more specific. This supports a subtle 
but close integration between semantic content and particular visual processes. We will 
look at visuo-spatial attention (which we can motivate from Richardson et al, 2003) and 
motion perception (for which there is limited, but suggestive, evidence, Kaschak et al,
2005).
3.2.1. Question 1: Are embodied effects present for single
words and sentences?
The literature on visual processing focuses on sentence comprehension, it is not clear 
whether single words can produce similar effects to those seen for sentences. Single 
words without a sentence context present schematic information (a type representation) 
whereas sentences specify a full event, giving more constrained and specific 
information (a token representation). Any differences between the two might be due to 
this difference in the quality of semantic content that is accessed. Embodied theories 
predict that semantic representation is based in simulation; therefore both single words 
and sentences have embodied content. The difference between type and token 
representation is articulated in Zwaan (2004), where the embodied content of single 
words is more general (a number of different simulated webs are activated) and is 
constrained only when a sentence context allows (one web is selected). Since the visual 
domain combines several perceptual features (e.g. colour, form, motion, brightness) in 
comparison to the motor domain which does not (i.e. it is primarily made up of 
action/motor content), single words like ‘kick’ may be able to evoke sufficient motor 
content to influence motor action, whereas words like ‘rise’ may require more 
specification (i.e. a sentence context) to evoke sufficient visual information to influence 
perception. An alternative possibility is that the specific information in sentences 
constrains the interpretation to such a degree that broader influences are lost: a sentence 
may shift the focus onto a particular dimension and away from the perceptual property 
of interest. For example, the sentence “The man climbed the tower” may focus more on
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the and less on the upwards motion involved in climbing. In this case, single 
w0fA ^omld be expected to show more consistent effects than sentences, particularly if 
they presented in semantically coherent blocks (e.g. 20 ‘up’ words presented 
seqt^t^sly). We will use verbs that refer to upwards and downwards motion as the 
s in ^  ^«rd stimuli and sentences derived from those verbs. Therefore the single words 
and *fcPtwice refer to the same target event (vertical motion) and effects across them can 
be °^jtivl>red.
2 Question 2: Are low level visual processes implicated
in interactions between comprehension and perception?
As in the previous chapter, the motor domain produces the strongest converging
ev i& i^ fb r embodiment in language comprehension. The comprehension of sentences 
rcf#t$agito visual percepts has been shown to affect visuo-spatial attention (e.g.
et al, 2003) and picture judgements (e.g. Zwaan, Madden, Yaxley &
2004). The perception of motion has been shown to affect the comprehension 
of ^ Itfcnces referring to motion events (Kaschak et al, 2005). These studies implicate 
Sof% fe e l of visual processing but it is not clear whether the effects are due to low 
Jeve| v%i»al processes (i.e. visual signal processing) or effects at later stages (i.e. 
de%i^liand response processing). By localising visual processes involved in motion 
pefc^Ptim we can isolate low level visual perception (i.e. visual signal processing).
Question 3: Are visuo-spatial attention and motion 
perception affected in the same way by comprehension?
different visual processes (i.e. visuo-spatial attention and motion perception) are 
with comprehension, they appear to be affected in different ways. For 
for visuo-spatial attention, detection of a target object is slower when the 
and perceptual stimuli are congruent (e.g. a sentence referring to upwards 
and an object at the top of the visual field). In contrast, pictures that 
af Pbftiinnate the motion of an object are judged more quickly under congruent 
cdnv$**®is (Zwaan et al, 2004). This suggests motion processing and visuo-spatial
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attention are affected in different ways. However, this difference is evident across 
different visual manipulations (top and bottom screen location, apparent motion towards 
or away from the observer) and different linguistic stimuli. A better test of this 
difference between visual processes it to use the same linguistic stimuli in combination 
with comparable visual manipulations (e.g. top and bottom screen location, upwards and 
downwards motion).
3.2.4. Question 4: For visual motion, are comparable effects
found for comprehension on perception and perception on 
comprehension?
As summarised above, there is evidence that the perception of motion interferes with the 
comprehension of motion sentences when the two are in the same direction (Kaschak et 
al, 2005). There is evidence that the comprehension of motion sentences facilitates 
judgements of pictured motion when the two are in the same direction (Zwaan et al, 
2004). However, dynamic motion stimuli have only been used to explore the effect of 
perception on comprehension (Kaschak et al, 2005) so it is an open question whether 
comprehension will impede or facilitate the perception of dynamic motion stimuli.
In the final chapter these four questions will be restated and discussed, alongside the 
general predictions from strong and weak embodiment. Table 3-1 details the structure of 
the experiments exploring comprehension on visuo-spatial attention and motion 
perception and Table 3-2 details the experiments exploring the bidirectional influence of 
comprehension on perception and perception on comprehension. Within the cells of 
each table the number of the experiments addressing this comparison is given.
Table 3-1: The experiments which address comprehension on different visual processes
L inguistic  S tim uli
V isual Pr<
Visuo-spatial attention
D cess
Motion Perception
Single Words 5.1 & 5.2
6.1a, 6.2, 6.3, 
6.5 & 7.1
Sentences 5.3 & 5.4 6.1b & 6.4
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Table 3-2: The experiments which address comprehension on motion perception and
motion perception on comprehension
L inguistic  Stim uli
D irection
Comprehension on 
Motion Perception
of Influence
Motion Perception on 
Comprehension
Single Words 6.1a, 6.2, 6.3, 
6.5 & 7.1
8.1a & 8.3
Sentences 6.1b & 6.4 8.1b & 8.2
3 .3 . Visual processes to be manipulated
As noted above, by exploring different processes we can refine what we know about 
how language and visual perception interact.
3.3.1. Visuo-spatial Attention
There is some consistent evidence that visuo-spatial attention is influenced by the 
comprehension of complete motion events. Categorisation of a shape in the top or 
bottom of the visual field is slower when participants comprehend a sentence that refers 
to motion in the same direction as the target location. In contrast with initial results for 
abstract sentences (Richardson et al, 2003) other experiments have shown that motion 
events have to be concrete in order to influence visuo-spatial attention (Bergen et al, in 
press). The first set of experiments will explore how strong a linguistic context is 
needed to affect visuo-spatial attention. The current evidence suggests that only 
sentences referring to concrete events influence the allocation of attention, this suggests 
that a substantial linguistic context is needed. We will explore the amount of linguistic 
context by looking at both single word and sentence comprehension and manipulating 
the presentation of linguistic stimuli in relation to the presentation of target visual 
stimuli. Specific hypotheses are given in Chapter 5.
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3.3.2. Motion Perception
For words and sentences that refer to motion, dynamic motion stimuli provide a better 
match between semantic and perceptual content. There is evidence that motion 
perception influences the comprehension of motion sentences (Kaschak et al, 2005) and 
that the comprehension of motion sentences influences the perception of pictures 
depicting motion (Zwaan et al, 2004). However, low level motion perception has not 
been manipulated (for example, in motion detection tasks). The visual perception of 
motion has been extensively investigated (e.g. Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004) 
therefore we can carefully manipulate visual processing as well as comprehension. For 
that reason interactions between comprehension and perception will be explored from 
both directions. Experiments are designed to look at the influence of comprehension 
and perception and vice-versa. As for visuo-spatial attention, both single words and 
sentences will be used. Specific hypotheses are given in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.
3 .4 . Experimental Design
The bulk of evidence for the embodied content of language exploits the congruence 
between linguistic and perceptual/motor events. All experiments in this investigation 
will follow the same design (see Table 3-3 for a schematic of the design). However, 
unlike the majority of studies we will also use a set of control words and sentences to 
act as a baseline. In this way, effects of congruence can be interpreted as facilitation or 
interference (or no change) relative to the control condition. This will further clarify the 
direction of effects and whether or not these effects are similar across experiments.
Table 3-3: Summary of Experimental Design|
V isual Stim uli Ling
Up
u is tic  Stim i
Down
jli
Control
Top/Upwards Match Mismatch Control
Bottom/Downwards Mismatch Match Control
Experimental items are selected that refer to upwards or downwards motion. The visual 
stimuli will be manipulated along the same axis; presenting stimuli in the top or bottom
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of the visual field (visuo-spatial attention) or upwards/downwards motion (motion 
perception). When combined with the linguistic stimuli this produces Match 
(congruent), Mismatch (incongruent) and Control (control) conditions. The Match 
condition occurs when Up linguistic stimuli are presented with visual stimuli at the top 
of the visual field or stimuli moving upwards and when Down linguistic stimuli are 
presented with visual stimuli at the bottom of the visual field or stimuli moving 
downwards. The Mismatch condition occurs when Up linguistic stimuli are presented 
with visual stimuli at the bottom of the visual field or stimuli moving downwards and 
when Down linguistic stimuli are presented with visual stimuli at the top of the visual 
field of stimuli moving upwards (see Table 3-3). The Control condition occurs when 
control linguistic stimuli are presented with any visual stimuli. Chapter 4 details the 
creation of linguistic stimuli to fit these conditions.
3.4.1. Statistical Conventions
Repeated measures ANOVAs are used to compare results by Subjects (FI) and mixed 
effects ANOVAs are used to compare results by Items (F2). In the by Items analysis, 
Sentence/Word Category (Match, Mismatch, Control) is manipulated as a between 
subjects variable (i.e. between items). All effects are significant at the p<0.05 level, 
with exact p values reported for marginal effects. The critical test is whether 
congruency effects will appear in comparisons between levels in the factor of 
Word/Sentence Category, therefore, planned comparisons between each level (Match, 
Mismatch and Control) will be performed. These planned comparisons will use the 
p<0.05 significance value. As an additional measure of effect size, partial eta-squared 
(p-r|2) values will be provided for each F-test. This details the percentage of variance 
accounted for by a particular factor, independently of other factors (i.e. as if it was the 
only variable) in the comparison. Raw error scores will be analysed using appropriate 
non-parametric tests (i.e. repeated measures by Subjects and ‘between subjects’ by 
Items).
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4. Item Norming, Selection and Generation
4 .1. Rebus Norming
The aim of this initial large scale study was to establish sets of verbs with consistent 
semantic properties that could then be used in on-line behavioural experiments. The 
conceptual properties we chose to focus on were movement, specifically the axis (e.g. 
vertical or horizontal) and direction of motion (e.g. upwards or downwards) in the 
event. The items reported in this section are those selected for use in the experiments, 
rather than arbitrary examples.
4.1.1. Participants
A total of 96 native English speakers participated, 32 rated each list. 2 participants had 
to be excluded for mistakenly filling out the booklets.
4.1.2. Method
4.1.2.1. Experimental materials
The method is adapted from Richardson, Spivey, Edelman & Naples (2001), in which 
norming was completed using a forced choice task, with verbs placed within ‘rebus’ 
sentences. Rebus sentences contain shapes as the subject and object of the sentence, 
with a written verb between the two (see Figure 4-1).
Figure 4-1: Example of a Rebus Sentence
respected
We adapted this forced choice task so that the sentences presented for judgement took 
the form “ ‘circle’ verbs ‘square’ it was decided to use words and not rebus sentences
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as in Richardson et al. (2001) in case this produced a bias in picture selection. In rebus 
sentences the circle is always left most as it is in the subject position of the sentence, 
and the square right most as it is in the object position; the pictures that were presented 
for selection balanced left and right positioning of the circle (subject) and square 
(object) so could have been susceptible to a bias produced by presenting rebus 
sentences. Present tense was chosen to make the activity involved in the verb more 
salient. Verbs that would require a preposition to accommodate an object were 
presented in intransitive form (e.g. “ ‘circle’ runs ” rather than “ ‘circle’ runs to ‘square’ 
”). This was done as prepositions such as ‘to’ and ‘at’ communicate a lot of spatial 
information which would be confounded with the information given in the verb alone.
Participants had to choose between several options but they were allowed to express a 
preference. Thus, if no picture was preferred, participants would select more pictures 
with a random order of preference, whereas if one picture was strongly preferred, only it 
would be selected with the highest order of preference. Sixteen pictures were 
generated, eight of which corresponded to transitive events (a circle and a square) and 
eight to intransitive events (just a circle). The pictures incorporated two axes, vertical 
and horizontal, and two directions for the event to occur, towards or away from the 
subject/circle. The pictures also balanced the positioning of the circle and square (left, 
right, top and bottom). For each sentence, eight pictures were presented for the 
participant to choose from. Transitive sentences were presented with ‘transitive’ 
pictures and intransitive sentences were presented with ‘intransitive’ pictures. The 
pictures were presented in two rows of four, each row had pictures with either a vertical 
or horizontal axis. There were two possible orders of presentation for the pictures within 
each row, to control for order effects. In the top left hand comer of each picture was a 
small box which the participants were instructed to use when marking their choice (see 
Appendix la).
A list of 281 verbs was compiled, mostly taken from Levin (1993). Verbs were selected 
for their probable spatial qualities (e.g. verbs of inherent direction such as to leave, to 
fall and calibratable change of state verbs such as to decline, to surge) or as controls 
with no probable spatial qualities (e.g. to finish, to know and to laugh).
It was decided that 14 of the verbs would be judged in both their transitive and 
intransitive form, this raised the total number of verbs to be normed to 295. These 14 
verbs were all equally usable in a transitive or intransitive form (e.g. to decrease, to
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drop), and it was therefore necessary to have both possibilities realised in the norming 
so that future use would not be constrained (see Appendix lb for a complete list).
The verbs were then quasi-randomly divided up into 3 lists (two lists of 98 and one of 
99) such that each verb only appeared once in a list. It was felt that these smaller lists 
would be more manageable for participants to norm.
4.1.2.2. Apparatus
A5 booklets were created for each participant. Each page had a verb placed in a 
sentence (outlined above) below which were eight pictures. Participants filled in their 
choices of pictures using pencils/pens (see Appendix la).
4.1.2.3. Design
A quasi within subjects design was used as each participant normed a third of the total 
set of verbs. The order of verbs in the booklet was randomised for each participant.
The independent variable was the verb being judged and the dependent variables were 
the consistent elements across the choice of pictures (axis of motion, direction of 
motion, motion towards or away from the circle/square).
4.1.2.4. Procedure
Participants were given an instruction sheet that described the stimuli they were going 
to see. They were instructed to choose a minimum of one picture for each sentence and 
a maximum of however many they felt were applicable for the event described in the 
sentence. Participants were also instructed to give their choices an order of preference, 
with 1 being the most preferred, 2 the next and so on. It was decided that order of 
preference would be enforced so that agreement across participants could be better 
assessed. Participants were also told that it was a subjective judgement task and that 
responses should be based on whatever they felt was correct. Once it was clear that the 
participant understood the nature of the task, they were given the booklets to fill in (see 
Appendix la for complete instructions).
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4.1.2.5. Analysis
The choices were scored by weighting the first choices (as established by order of 
preferences) heavier than the last. Points were allocated to each picture on the basis of 
how many pictures each participant had chosen over all, and the order of preference 
given to each picture choice. Points were allocated in descending magnitude with the 
order of preference. For the scoring system it was only necessary to stay faithful to the 
order of preference, so the number of points allocated is essentially arbitrary. We used 
the following logic: For each sentence, there was a minimum choice of one picture and 
a maximum choice of eight pictures. Initial surveys of the data showed that most 
participants chose somewhere between one and four pictures, for this reason the scoring 
system was based around four picture choices and modified accordingly. Thus, for one 
to four picture choices, the first choice is given 4 points, and the rest are scored in 
descending magnitude such that the fourth choice receives one point. For more than 
four picture choices, the initially preferred pictures are scored more equally. See Table 1 
for the scoring system.
The advantage of using this scoring system is that the more pictures are chosen for each 
sentence, the more scores are distributed equally across pictures; for example when 
eight pictures are chosen, each pair of preferences (1 & 2, 3 & 4, etc.) are weighted 
equally. This reduces the variability inherent in a forced order of preference, whilst still 
remaining faithful to the chosen order. It is logical to assume that the fewer pictures 
that are chosen, the more relevant and important are the attributes of the chosen pictures 
and the higher weighting they should receive. In contrast, the more pictures that are 
chosen the less relevant are the attributes of any one picture and so the weighting should 
be more equally distributed. This is what our scoring system achieved in a simple 
manner.
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Table 4-1: Scoring System used for picture choices*
No. of
picture
choices
Order of preference as chosen by participant
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 to 4 4 3 2 1
5 4 4 3 2 1
6 4 4 3 3 2 1
7 4 4 3 3 2 2 1
8 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1
*the cell values in italics are the points allocated to each picture choice in the scoring procedure.
For each verb, the final scores for each picture were averaged across participants (the 
sum of all the points for that picture, divided by the total number of participants). This 
allowed us to see which pictures were most preferred for each verb. For each attribute, 
scores were summed across pictures with that attribute, e.g. horizontal or vertical axis, 
upwards or downwards arrow. For example, for the vertical axis there were four 
pictures (two up and two down), whereas for upwards motion there were two pictures. 
The maximum score for one picture was 4, if every participant selected it as their first 
preference. This meant that summing across pictures produced scores above 4 for 
strongly selected attributes, and below 1 or 2 for weakly selected attributes. The main 
aspects of interest were verbs that had strong agreement on the vertical axis and 
directionality of motion (upwards or downwards).
4 .2 . Item Selection
For each table, scores along the relevant attribute are provided as well as scores for the 
opposite spatial attribute; i.e. scores along the upward and downward dimension, and 
scores along the horizontal and vertical dimension. This is to illustrate the variability 
and range of the scores.
The results are split into two sections, section 4.2.1. summarises the initial set of items 
selected. These were chosen on the basis of the normed scores and previous 
experimental literature. After the completion of preliminary experiments, it was 
apparent that the initial selection may have been problematic. A second set of items
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was then compiled, to give a larger item set and concentrate on more concrete verbs. 
These are summarised in section 4.2.2. In both cases, three categories of verbs had to 
be created: Down verbs, Up verbs and Control verbs. Therefore, they are items selected 
as having strong downwards motion, strong upwards motion and no particular direction 
of motion respectively.
4.2.1. Item Set One
4.2.1.1. Single Words
During the initial selection process, the focus was on a set of strongly directional verbs. 
The directional items (Up and Down categories) were selected with three constraints. 
First, and most importantly for the Up and Down categories, items had normed scores 
that had a relevant dominant direction. The experimenter’s intuition was also used to 
narrow selection to verbs whose referents were felt to be clearly restricted to one 
direction, this excluded verbs such as “wither” and “support”. Second, to select items 
that were unambiguously Up or Down, the dominant direction had to be complemented 
by a low score for the opposite dimension (e.g. a high ‘Up’ score and a low ‘Down’ 
score). A high score was defined as above 3, and a low score as below 1.5. One item 
(“hang”) had a low score of 1.7 in the non-dominant direction, but as it was only 0.2 
higher than the cut-off, it was decided that this exception would not be problematic.
This criteria excluded items such as ‘bounce’ which were strongly vertical (Vertical 
score = 6.02), but were equally distributed for upwards (2.75) and downwards (3.27) 
direction. Third, the Up and Down groups had to be matched for frequency and length.
As can be seen in Table 3.2, the Up category has an average Up score of 4.5, and an 
average down score of 0.47. The group is also dominantly vertical, with an average 
Horizontal score of 0.92, and an average Vertical score of 4.98. The Down category has 
an average Up score of 0.33 and an average Down score of 4.69. This group is also 
dominantly vertical, with an average Horizontal score of 0.66 and an average Vertical 
score of 5.03.
143
Table 4-2: Item Set One - Up Category Verbs
Verb Up S co re Down S co re H orizontal
Vertical
Ascend 5.17 0.18 0.13 5.35
Climb 5.05 0.10 0.20 5.15
Delight 3.23 0.80 2.03 4.03
Fly 4.47 0.47 1.23 4.93
Grow 5.27 0.17 0.70 5.43
Hoist 3.72 1.13 0.53 4.84
Honour 3.31 0.66 2.25 3.97
Hop 4.23 0.90 1.37 5.13
Hope 3.96 0.57 1.71 4.53
Increase 4.15 0.42 1.61 4.57
Jum p 5.00 1.27 0.40 6.27
Leap 4.70 0.43 1.33 5.13
Lift 4.27 0.50 0.10 4.77
Raise 4.84 0.22 0.09 5.06
Rejoice 5.13 0.13 0.57 5.27
Rise 6.34 0.00 0.00 6.34
Sprout 4.57 0.27 1.00 4.83
Worship 3.67 0.33 1.37 4.00
average 4.50 0.47 0.92 4.98
Table 4-3: Item Set One - Down Category Verbs
Verb Up S co re Down S core H orizontal
Vertical
Crush 0.30 3.93 1.57 4.23
Decay 0.10 5.33 0.90 5.43
Decline 0.20 4.63 1.17 4.83
D ecrease 0.15 4.67 1.42 4.82
D epress 0.30 3.70 1.33 4.00
Descend 0.28 4.95 0.25 5.23
Dig 0.43 3.80 0.50 4.23
Drain 0.80 3.63 1.03 4.43
Drip 0.22 4.03 0.50 4.25
Drop 0.00 5.15 0.05 5.15
Fall 0.00 6.10 0.00 6.10
Hang 1.70 3.22 0.05 4.92
Lower 0.63 4.28 0.28 4.91
Plummet 0.31 6.28 0.09 6.59
Plunge 0.19 6.13 0.28 6.31
Pour 0.10 3.77 1.33 3.87
Sink 0.24 5.21 0.24 5.45
Tumble 0.06 5.63 0.88 5.69
average 0.33 4.69 0.66 5.03
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Table 4-4: Item Set One - Control Category
Verb Up S co re Down S core Horizontal
Vertical
Bum 2.60 1.80 1.07 4.40
Deny 0.67 1.77 4.07 2.43
Exhale 1.23 2.03 3.53 3.27
Exist 2.19 1.41 3.13 3.59
Fear 1.10 2.47 3.33 3.57
Hear
Inherit 1.06 2.44 3.94 3.50
Inject 1.07 2.60 3.57 3.67
Kick 0.84 1.97 4.69 2.81
Promise 1.67 1.23 4.00 2.90
Provoke 1.40 1.83 4.77 3.23
Regret 1.37 1.93 2.43 3.30
Sell 0.43 1.30 4.30 1.73
Speak 2.09 0.94 3.88 3.03
Thank 0.93 0.83 4.83 1.77
Tug 1.47 1.59 4.88 3.06
Vault 2.10 1.17 1.77 3.27
Warn 0.93 1.80 4.17 2.73
average 1.36 1.71 3.67 3.07
The control category is equally distributed for Up (1.36) and Down (1.71) scores. The 
group has slightly higher Horizontal (3.67) as compared to Vertical scores (3.07), but 
this difference was not significant (t(16)=1.539, p>0.1).
Three measures of frequency were used. As the planned experiments were all to use 
auditory presentation, two of these frequency measures were for spoken items only. All 
three groups were matched for Brown Verbal frequency (Coltheart, 1981), Celex 
Spoken frequency per million and Combined Written and Spoken frequency per million 
(Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995) (all comparisons t<1.7, p>0.1). Two 
measures of length were used, length in letters and in syllables. All three groups were
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also matched for these variables (all comparisons t<1.0, p>0.1); see Table 3.5 for the 
means.
Table 4-5: Item Set One Verbs - Mean values for each matched variable*
Lexical Variable Category
Control Down
Up
Frequency Brown Verbal 10.39(4.66) 2.50 (0.72) 3.78(1.91)
Celex Spoken 15.17(7.43) 10.00(4.48) 6.06 (2.89)
Celex Combined 9.44 (3.07) 13.61 (5.71) 7.11 (2.07)
Length Letter 5.00 (0.29) 5.28 (0.34) 5.11 (0.35)
Syllables 1.50 (0.15) 1.44(0.12) 1.33 (0.11)
* Standard deviation in brackets
4.2.1.2. Sentences
Sentences were also generated from the normed verbs, as far as possible the same verbs 
selected for Verb Item Set One were used in the sentences. For the Control Category, 3 
items were shared; for the Down Category, 13 items were shared and for the Up 
Category, 15 items were shared. Sentences were designed so that each one had three 
parts, Subject, Verb and Object/Adverbial phrases. The active/simple past tense was 
used because it allowed a homogeneous and easily comprehensible set of sentences.
The progressive tense necessitates the use of auxiliaries and the ‘mg’ form (‘The man is 
digging') and sentences in the simple present imply habitual action for most of the verbs 
in the set (‘She digs (every day)’). Sentences were created so that the subject and 
object were not repeated between sentences, and the sentence was as well-formed as 
possible. For this reason, several of the sentences expressed abstract events (e.g. “The 
situation deteriorated quickly”). An initial set of 19 Up and 19 Down sentences were 
generated, along with 38 Control sentences. A pilot experiment was then used to 
establish the sentences’ acceptability. Sentences were played to participants over 
headphones and participants were asked to judge the sensibility of the sentences. 
Nonsense sentences were also created and included (see below). The mean accuracy of 
judging sentences correctly (as sensible) was then used as a measure of validity. From 
this pilot experiment, 3 Down sentences were rejected as their accuracy was below 
70%, this necessitated the removal of 3 Up sentences, in order to balance the item 
numbers across groups; 3 Control sentences were also rejected. This left 16 Up and 16 
Down sentences, for which 16 Control sentences were selected from the remaining 35.
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The groups were matched for length in letters and syllables (all comparisons, t<1.7, 
p>0.1), see Table 3.6.
As can be seen, the sentences cover a large variety of event types, from abstract events 
such as emotional and financial state changes, to concrete events, primarily consisting 
of bodies in motion.
4.2.2. Item Set Two
Following the completion of initial experiments at the Science Museum (e.g. 
experiment 6.1) it was decided that the item set was problematic for two reasons. First, 
there were both concrete and abstract items in the set, which may have reduced effects 
of the concrete words by when analysed as a group. Although the abstract words had 
also been normed and selected on the basis of dominant vertical motion, without a 
concrete referent, we could not be sure what motion representation was being accessed 
during comprehension. In addition, new data was available that showed null effects for 
abstract sentences (Bergen et al, in press) confirming the decision to focus on concrete 
items. Second, the item set was still fairly limited in number and the verbs used for the 
sentences were not identical with the single verb set. For these reasons, it was decided 
that only verbs which could refer to concrete events would be used. In addition, the 
item set would be expanded to include as many verbs as possible, this led to the 
inclusion of verbs such as “wither” and “inflate”. Complimentary sentences, 
emphasising concrete events, would then be generated from the verb set.
4.2.2.1. Sim le Words
The constraints for selecting directional verbs remained the same as for Item Set One, 
except that all verbs had to refer to concrete events and the emphasis was on selecting 
the greatest number of items to increase power. This broadened the scope of which 
verbs were included, since if they were normed with a dominant direction and referred 
to a concrete event, they were included. This led to the inclusion of verbs such as 
“wither”, “crumble” “support” and “inflate”. In addition, Control verbs were now also 
selected for their concrete referents. Verbs referring to mental or emotional states were
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excluded as far as possible, with the exception of “distract” in the Control group. For 
each group, 30 verbs were selected.
Table 4-6: Item Set One Sentences
Category
Sentence
Control The woman accepted the gift
The couple adopted a child
The noise alarm ed the dog
The girl craved chocolate cake
The ship endured the storm
The student feared failure
The box-office held the tickets
The doctor injected the insulin
The hypnotist m esm erised his audience
The sportsm en obeyed the rules
The ghost scared the children
The m other spoke to her child
The cat stayed indoors in winter
The siren warned us of danger
The baby grabbed the toy
The criminal robbed the bank
Down The cook crushed the fruit
The crime rate decreased last year
The house depreciated in value
The book depressed everybody
The lady descended the staircase
The situation deteriorated quickly
The farm er drained the pond
The paint dripped onto the floor
The postm an dropped the parcels
The villagers dug a  well
The coconuts fell from the palm-trees
The stagehand lowered the curtain
The tem perature plummeted to sub-zero
The lifeguard plunged into the water
The pebbles sunk into the stream
The child tumbled out of bed
Up The walkers ascended  the mountain
The cat climbed up the tree
The film delighted the critics
The rocket flew to the moon
The corn grew tall in the field
The sailor hoisted the anchor
The crowd honoured the athlete
The rabbit hopped really high
The jackpot increased each  week
The woman jum ped for joy
The horse leapt over the fence
The builder lifted the bricks
The m anager raised w ages
The student rejoiced at her results
The balloon rose into the air
The bird soared high in the sky
148
Table 4-7: Item Set Two - Up Category Verbs
Verb Up S co re Down S co re H orizontal
Vertical
arise 6.33 0.42 1.00 6.75
ascend 5.17 0.18 0.13 5.35
boost 5.67 0.83 1.58 6.50
climb 5.05 0.10 0.20 5.15
elevate 3.38 0.72 1.28 4.10
em erge 4.50 0.30 2.07 4.80
erect 3.92 0.50 3.00 4.42
escalate 5.75 0.92 1.08 6.67
expand 2.83 0.50 4.58 3.33
float 3.87 0.43 2.83 4.30
fly 4.47 0.47 1.23 4.93
grow 5.27 0.17 0.70 5.43
heighten 4.08 0.75 1.42 4.83
hoist 3.72 1.13 0.53 4.84
hop 4.23 0.90 1.37 5.13
increase 4.15 0.42 1.61 4.57
inflate 2.83 0.58 4.17 3.42
jump 5.00 1.27 0.40 6.27
launch 0.17 3.92 4.08 4.08
leap 4.70 0.43 1.33 5.13
lift 4.27 0.50 0.10 4.77
raise 4.84 0.22 0.09 5.06
rise 6.34 0.00 0.00 6.34
soar 5.56 0.31 1.25 5.88
spring 4.50 0.75 2.17 5.25
sprout 4.57 0.27 1.00 4.83
stack 2.72 1.84 1.63 4.56
support 3.38 1.28 1.78 4.66
surge 3.53 0.81 2.91 4.34
tower 0.93 0.83 4.83 1.77
average 4.19 0.73 1.68 4.92
The Up category has a mean Up score of 4.19, and an average down score of 0.73. The 
group is also dominantly vertical, with an average Horizontal score of 1.68, and an 
average Vertical score of 4.92. There are two anomalous items that need some 
comment. “Launch” has a normed Up score of 0.17, a Down score of 3.92 and a 
Horizontal score of 4.08. The nature of the norming task meant that the majority of 
participants selected a picture with a downwards facing arrow, as this represented the 
downwards thrust of the object as it launched. The variance of this items norming is 
also illustrated by the high horizontal score, since objects can also launch horizontally. 
However, we assumed that the central referent of the verb was an object taking off,
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therefore referring to upwards motion despite the normed score. “Tower” has a normed 
Up score of 0.93, a Down score of 0.83 and a Horizontal score of 4.83. Although the 
verb does not refer to upwards motion, it does refer to a tall object in relation to other 
smaller objects, implying height and an ‘upward’ central reference point. In addition, 
“expand” and “inflate” also had Horizontal scores above 4.0; this is clearly due to their 
referent events occurring along all axes. However, these items were included as it was 
felt that they would not distort the group statistics, and were still appropriately ‘upward’ 
in nature. See Table 3.7 for the verbs and their normed scores.
Table 4-8: Item Set Two - Down Category Verbs
Verb Up Score Down Score Horizontal
Vertical
bomb 0.21 3.69 1.14 3.90
cascade 1.08 5.25 1.50 6.33
collapse 0.33 6.00 2.08 6.33
crumble 0.33 5.25 2.33 5.58
crush 0.30 3.93 1.57 4.23
decline 0.20 4.63 1.17 4.83
d ecrease 0.15 4.67 1.42 4.82
deflate 0.83 5.58 2.50 6.42
demolish 0.41 3.69 1.88 4.09
depress 0.30 3.70 1.33 4.00
descend 0.28 4.95 0.25 5.23
deteriorate 0.00 5.27 1.40 5.27
dig 0.43 3.80 0.50 4.23
dive 0.33 6.17 2.33 6.50
drain 0.80 3.63 1.03 4.43
drip 0.22 4.03 0.50 4.25
drop 0.00 5.15 0.05 5.15
dump 0.17 3.75 3.67 3.92
fall 0.00 6.10 0.00 6.10
hang 1.70 3.22 0.05 4.92
lapse 0.17 3.92 4.08 4.08
lower 0.63 4.28 0.28 4.91
plummet 0.31 6.28 0.09 6.59
plunge 0.19 6.13 0.28 6.31
pour 0.10 3.77 1.33 3.87
rot 0.33 4.40 1.40 4.73
sink 0.24 5.21 0.24 5.45
slump 0.17 5.83 1.92 6.00
tumble 0.06 5.63 0.88 5.69
wither 0.40 4.50 1.27 4.90
average 0.36 4.75 1.28 5.10
The Down category has an average Up score of 0.36 and an average Down score of 
4.75. This group is also dominantly vertical, with an average Horizontal score of 1.28 
and an average Vertical score of 5.10. As can be seen in Table 3.8, the Down verbs
150
make up a more homogeneous set than the Up verbs, with no anomalous items (i.e. all 
have a Down score above 3.0 and an Up score of 1.7 or below). “Lapse” and “dump” 
have Horizontal scores above 3.5, due to the fact that their referent events are not 
strictly limited to the vertical dimension.
Control verbs were selected so that they matched the Down and Up Categories for 
frequency and length. As stated above, they also had to refer to concrete events, so that 
the contrast between them and the directional verbs was based on motion rather than 
abstraction. The same measures of length were used here (letters and syllables), with 
Celex combined and spoken frequency per million used as the frequency measures. It 
was decided that it was unnecessary to have two measures of verbal frequency, so 
Brown Verbal frequency was not used (it being based on older corpora than Celex).
Table 4-9: Item Set Two - Control Category Verbs
Verb Up S co re Down S co re H orizontal
Vertical
attack 1.66 2.81 3.72 4.47
bum 2.60 1.80 1.07 4.40
catch 1.47 2.37 3.17 3.83
chase 1.40 0.87 5.60 2.27
cross 0.63 0.80 5.60 1.43
depart 1.57 1.42 5.03 2.98
distract 1.09 1.34 5.50 2.44
drag 0.90 0.97 6.37 1.87
eat 1.25 2.00 3.78 3.25
eject 2.10 2.17 3.73 4.27
enter 2.50 2.25 3.44 4.75
exchange 0.78 0.91 5.50 1.69
exhale 1.23 2.03 3.53 3.27
glide 0.73 0.63 6.07 1.37
jog 0.97 0.23 5.77 1.20
kick 0.84 1.97 4.69 2.81
pull 1.91 1.66 4.84 3.56
quit 1.20 2.00 4.50 3.20
race 0.67 0.30 5.10 0.97
retrieve 1.03 1.77 4.03 2.80
reward 1.97 2.37 3.63 4.33
rust 0.43 2.80 2.47 3.23
snatch 1.23 1.03 4.57 2.27
sneeze 0.90 0.83 4.90 1.73
stagger 0.50 1.27 5.03 1.77
sweep 0.59 1.41 5.22 2.00
swim 1.10 0.93 6.23 2.03
tremble 0.70 1.93 3.47 2.63
tunnel 1.10 3.50 3.10 4.60
wash 0.30 2.23 4.80 2.53
average 1.18 1.62 4.48 2.80
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The Control group had an Up score of 1.18 and a Down score of 1.62, this difference 
was significant (t(29)=2.917, p<0.01) but small given the size of the differences present 
for the Up and Down groups (Control mean difference = 0.44; Up mean difference = 
3.46; Down mean difference = 4.39). The mean horizontal score was high (4.48), 
bolstered by several verbs which refer to concrete motion events that typically involve 
horizontal motion, e.g. “chase”, “swim” and “drag”.
The Control group was matched to the Up and Down groups for both frequency 
measures and all length measures (all comparisons t<1.2). In addition, because the 
items were to be presented as auditory stimuli, the groups were matched for number of 
phonemes (all comparisons t < 1) and phonological neighbourhood size (all 
comparisons t < 1.2) (Pisoni, D; Hernandez, L. et al, 2007). The Up and Down groups 
were matched for all measures except Celex Combined Frequency (Baayen, 
Piepenbrock & Gulikers, 1995), for which Up verbs were slightly more frequent 
(t(58)=2.081, p<0.05); see Table 4.10.
Table 4-10: Item Set Two Verbs - Mean values for each matched variable*
Lexical Variable Category
Control Down
Up
Frequency Celex Spoken 4.07 (8.62) 3.17(7.69) 5.60 (9.68)
Celex Combined 6.27 (10.49) 3.63 (6.58) 10.17(15.88)
Phonological
Neighbourhood
Luce’s N 2.63 (5.14) 1.77 (6.72) 2.24 (4.40)
Length Letters 5.23(1.41) 5.63 (1.85) 5.37 (1.38)
Syllables 1.37 (0.49) 1.60 (0.86) 1.43 (0.63)
Phonemes 4.37(1.38) 4.47 (2.03) 4.03(1.10)
♦Standard deviation in brackets
4.2.2.2. Sentences
The major constraints were to have one sentence created for each of the verbs and for 
the sentences to refer to concrete events. The sentences were created with the same 
structural constraints as Item Set One, being three part constructions with Subject, Verb 
and Object/Adverbial phrases. Sentences were also created to maximise the concrete 
aspects of any event by having a concrete subject and, where possible, a concrete direct
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object. Where this was not possible, the sentence was created ambiguously so that it 
could refer to a concrete event (e.g. “The quantity decreased over time”).
Table 4-11: Item Set Two -  Control Sentences
Verb
Sentence
attack The army attacked before sunrise
burn The bonfire burned brightly
catch The boy caught the base-ball
chase The cat chased  the m ouse
cross The woman crossed the road
depart The train departed  a t 2 o'clock
distract The noise distracted the dog
drag The dogs dragged the sled
eat The wom an ate  her breakfast
eject The hi-fi ejected the CD
enter The wom an entered the room
exchange The family exchanged Christmas presents
exhale The m an exhaled cigarette sm oke
glide The skater glided on the ice
jog The m an jogged for 20 minutes
kick The girl kicked the football
pull The horses pulled the carriage
quit The m an quit his job yesterday
race The cars raced around the track
retrieve The dog retrieved the stick
reward The lecturer rewarded his students
rust The car rusted in the garage
snatch The child snatched the lolli-pop
sneeze The man sneezed  loudly
stagger The m an staggered towards hom e
sw eep The caretaker swept the floor
swim The girl swam for an hour
tremble The ground trembled under foot
tunnel The mole tunnelled in the garden
wash The woman w ashed her clothes
To provide variety, specific subjects and objects were not repeated across sentences; 
some repetition of the subjects was necessary, but these were only for generic terms 
such as ‘boy’, ‘woman’ and so on. Table 4.11 lists the Control sentences, Table 4.12 
lists the Up sentences and Table 4.13 lists the Down sentences. The sentences were 
matched for length in number of words and syllables (all comparisons, t<1.3).
153
Table 4-12: Item Set Two - Up Sentences
Verb
Sentence
arise The woman arose from bed
ascend The walkers ascended  the mountain
boost The jet boosted for take-off
climb The boy climbed the rope
elevate The nurse elevated the m an 's leg
em erge The shoots em erged from the soil
erect The m en erected  the platform
escalate The am ount escalated  rapidly
expand His chest expanded with pride
float The kite floated on the wind
fly The rocket flew to the moon
grow The corn grew quickly
heighten The builders heightened the ceiling
hoist The sailor hoisted the anchor
hop The frog hopped really high
increase The ladder increased in height
inflate The g as  inflated the balloon
jump The girl jum ped onto the wall
launch The helicopter launched from it's base
leap The horse leapt over the fence
lift The builder lifted the bricks
raise The wom an raised the curtain
rise The sm oke rose into the air
soar The bird soared in the sky
spring The boy sprang to his feet
sprout The plants sprouted in the garden
stack The m an stacked the boxes
support The walls supported the roof
surge The w aves surged against the cliffs
tower The church towered over the town
The constraint that sentences should refer to concrete events resulted in some slightly 
atypical uses for verbs whose canonical context was with abstract subjects or objects, 
even though they do not necessarily refer to an abstract event; specifically “lapse” and 
“heighten”. Following a pilot experiment in which 29 subjects made sensibility 
judgements about the sentences, three sentences (one from each Item Group) were 
found to have acceptability ratings substantially lower than the group mean. 
Acceptability is measured as the percentage of time each sentence was judged as 
‘sensible’ rather than ‘nonsense’. Unacceptable sentences were as follows: Control 
“The army attacked before sunrise” (64%), Down “The bridge lapsed into disrepair” 
(40%) and Up “The builders heightened the ceiling” (62%). The overall group mean 
was 86% (standard deviation = 9.4%). Following this, these sentences were not 
included in experimental analyses, leaving 29 items in each group.
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Table 4-13: Item Set Two - Down Sentences
Verb
Sentence
bomb The planes bombed the city
cascade The w ater cascaded  onto the rocks
collapse The wall collapsed completely
crumble The castle crumbled to dust
crush The ham m er crushed the g lass
decline The path declined steeply
decrease The quantity decreased over time
deflate The dingy deflated slowly
demolish The work-men demolished the chimney
depress His finger depressed the button
descend The woman descended the stairs
deteriorate The level deteriorated quickly
dig The villagers dug a well
dive The eag le dived into the valley
drain The farm er drained the pond
drip The paint dripped onto the floor
drop The postm an dropped the parcels
dump The lorry dumped the rubbish
fall The fruit fell from the tree
hang The clothes hung from the line
lapse The bridge lapsed into disrepair
lower The m en lowered the bridge
plummet The m eteor plummeted to earth
plunge The lifeguard plunged into the water
pour The water poured from the tap
rot The leaves rotted into the soil
sink The pebbles sunk into the stream
slump The boy slumped in his sea t
tumble The child tumbled out of bed
wither The plant withered in the heat
4 .3 . Single Word Norming
After Item Set Two had been generated and established as the final item set, these items 
were normed in a Single Word context, rather than the Rebus Sentence context used 
initially. During experiments, items were going to be presented both within and without 
a sentence, and it was possible that the Rebus norming procedure biased the scores 
towards a sentence context so that they would not reflect the interpretation of the 
individually presented item. In the Rebus context all items are unambiguously verbs, 
whereas individual presentation allows wider interpretation, e.g. as a noun which does 
not retain the verb meaning (e.g. ‘to fly’ versus ‘the fly’).
The single word norming was an adaptation of the original procedure, with verbs 
presented in their uninflected bare stem forms, with four arrows (up, down, left and 
right) alongside the verb. 24 Native English speakers were asked to select a minimum 
of one and a maximum of four arrows that best represent the event described by the 
verb. The ratings were scored using the same scale as for the Rebus Norming, with 
higher preference given larger weighting than lower preference selections. The scores 
for each arrow were then averaged across subjects to provide a normed score for each 
direction, the higher the normed score, the stronger the rating for that direction (with a 
maximum value of 4). For vertical and horizontal directions, the scores for the two 
vertical and horizontal arrows were summed, respectively. See Appendix lc for the 
norming materials.
Statistical comparisons were used to compare the Rebus and Single Word Normed 
scores for four dimensions: upwards, downwards, horizontal (summed across left and 
right arrows) and vertical (summed across upwards and downwards arrows), for each 
Item Group (Up, Down and Control). A 2 (Rebus vs. Single Word Norming 
procedures) by 4 (Upwards, Downwards, Horizontal and Vertical Direction) by 3 
(Control, Up and Down Item Groups) mixed effects ANOVA, with Item Group between 
subjects, was used to compare the Single Word and Rebus normed scores. The 
interaction between Norming procedure and Direction was significant (F(3,261)=5.287) 
as was the interaction between Norming and Item Group (F(2,87)=l6.087). Both of 
these interactions were driven by lower scores overall for the Single Word norming (m 
= 2.316, SE = 0.021) as compared the Rebus norming (m = 2.775, SE = 0.043), 
reflecting the difference between the number of pictures in the two procedures.
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For the Rebus norming the vertical direction was calculated by summing the scores for 
the 4 pictures with vertical arrows, whereas for the Single Word procedure, there were 
only 2 pictures with vertical arrows to sum across. Thus, on average, scores for the 
Rebus procedure were higher than scores for the Single Word procedure.
The three way interaction between Norming, Direction and Group was also significant 
(F(6,261)=9.938, p<0.001), reflecting the fact that within some Item Groups, for some 
Directions, there was a greater difference between the lower Single Word scores and 
higher Rebus scores (See Figure 4.2). Despite the overall finding that Single Word 
scores were numerically lower than Rebus scores, there were very strong correlations 
between the two normed scores for each Direction (all Pearson coefficients > 0.74, 
p<0.001). Figure 3.2 illustrates the close correlation for each Item Group across each 
Direction; it is clear that the distribution of scores is similar for each Item Group. In 
sum, the single word norming backed up the Rebus norming completed previously.
4 .4 . Item Preparation & Filler Items
4.4.1. Soundfile preparation
To prepare items for auditory presentation, single words and sentences were recorded as 
WAV files using the Anechoic Chamber at University College London. This produces 
very high quality voice recordings, with no background noise. Files were recorded at a 
sampling rate of 44.1 kHz, 16 bit rate, mono. The files were then edited using Audacity 
software (http://audacity.sourceforge.net) so that the WAV files began at item onset and 
ended as item offset.
For each experiment, it will be made clear which Item Set was used in the experiment: 
Item Set One Single Word, Item Set One Sentences, Item Set Two Single Word or Item 
Set Two Sentences. Item Set One was used only in preliminary experiments, and Item 
Set Two was used in the majority of experiments.
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4.4.2. Filler Words and Sentences
4.4.2.1. Non-words for Lexical Decision
103 nonsense words were created for lexical decision experiments. Words were 
generated from the ARC Nonword Database (Rastle, Harrington & Coltheart, 2002). 
Words were generated that had 3-8 letters, with only orthographically existing onsets 
and bodies. In addition, they had to be pronounceable but not a homophone of any 
existing English word. A full list can be found in Appendix Id.
4.4.2.2. Nonsense Sentences for sensibility iud2ements
60 nonsense sentences were constructed for experiments that used sentence sensibility 
judgements, for example “The woman decorated in mice” or “the laughter infected the 
jam-jar”. A pilot experiment showed that the nonsense sentences were judged as 
nonsensical over 90% of the time. A complete list can be found in Appendix le.
4.4.2.3. Filler words and sentences for active comprehension
For experiments that used active comprehension, filler words and sentences had to be
created that could be followed by comprehension questions.
60 filler words were selected that could be followed by comprehension questions of the 
form “Was the word related to X?”. Probe items (X) were chosen to be associated to 
the target filler for ‘yes’ responses. Several methods were used to select associated 
words. Some were selected from the University of South Florida association norms 
(Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) e.g. “blush” for “embarrass”. Synonyms were 
used, e.g. “compatible” for “agree” and some were judged intuitively by the 
experimenter to be related to the target, e.g. “clay” for “sculpt”. For the ‘no’ responses, 
these same words were randomly re-paired with unassociated targets. 18 fillers that 
could not be paired with a strongly associated target were left as additional items to be 
used when needed (e.g. to produce blocks with the same number of trials so the
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computer programmes could run smoothly). See Appendix If  for a complete list of 
these words and their associated probes.
45 filler sentences were created that were followed by comprehension questions of the 
form “Did the X verb the Y?”. Questions requiring a positive response were identical to 
the previously presented sentence. Questions requiring a negative response had a 
different subject noun (X), verb or object noun (Y). For example, the filler sentence 
“The man regretted his behaviour” had the question “Did the man regret his haircut?”.
In all cases the altered lexical item was chosen to be a plausible alternative. See 
Appendix lg for a complete list of the sentences and their comprehension questions that 
required a negative response (i.e. that differ from the original sentence).
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5. Comprehension on Visuo-Spatial Attention
In this section four experiments are reported which investigate the effect of 
comprehension on visuo-spatial attention. All experiments are adaptations and 
extensions of the method used by Richardson et al (2004). Participants comprehend 
sentences or single words that refer to motion events and then categorise a shape (a 
circle or a square) that appears in the top or bottom of the visual field. In the following 
experiments, we presented participants with single words (experiments 1 & 2) and 
sentences (experiments 3 & 4), varying the synchronisation between the presentation of 
the linguistic and visual stimuli. Comprehension was passive in Experiment 1, and 
active in Experiments 2, 3 & 4, when participants had to answer questions about the 
linguistic stimuli. We varied the linguistic context to address how much linguistic 
information is necessary to effect visuo-spatial attention. In Experiment 1 participants 
heard blocks of single words unsynchronised with categorisation trials. In Experiment 2 
single words were presented in a random order with categorisation synchronised to 
word offset. In Experiment 3 sentences were presented with categorisation at sentence 
offset and in Experiment 4 with categorisation at verb offset.
5 .1. Blocked Word Comprehension & Shape Categorisation
Whilst passively comprehending the words, participants performed a categorisation task 
for shapes that appeared in the top or bottom parts of the visual field. This experiment 
was run at the Science Museum as part of their Live Science initiative. The time taken 
to complete the experiments had to be brief so that volunteers from the general public 
did not have to commit too much of their museum visiting time. This experiment 
presented blocks of single words from each category (Control, Up, Down) as well as a 
Mixed block (half Up and half Down items). We hypothesised that blocked 
presentation would create a consistent linguistic context, in addition it allowed passive 
comprehension of the stimuli (as they are irrelevant to the task). The hypothesis is that 
if directional words influence visuo-spatial attention there should be effects of 
congruency on reaction times for detecting stimuli in the top or bottom of the visual 
field. In line with previous experiments (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press), 
we expect congruent interference, such that reaction times are longer when the words 
and location are matched (e.g. up words and items at the top of the visual field).
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5.1.1. Participants
52 native English Speakers (25 female) took part in the experiment. The mean age was 
29.12 years (SD = 9.54). All had normal or corrected to normal vision.
5.1.1. Method
5.1.1.1. Design
A 2x4 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were the screen 
Position of the object (top or bottom) and the Word Category by block (Control, Mixed, 
Match and Mismatch). The dependent variables were the reaction time (ms) and errors 
for categorising the shape. There were a total of 4 blocks, each of which contained 20 
object categorisation trials. Each block contained an equal number of shape (square or
circle) and shape location (top or bottom) trials. The presentation order of blocks and
trials was fully randomised.
5.1.1.2. Materials
Item Set One Single Words was used. For each Word Category (Control, Up, Down 
and Mixed) four different random orders of items were created. The Mixed block was 
created by combing 9 Up items with 9 Down items; 2 random orders contained one half 
of the Up and Down items and the other 2 random orders contained the other half of the 
Up and Down items. Individual audio files for each random order were concatenated 
into a single continuous WAV sound file. The concatenated sound files were 20 
seconds long, with 2 seconds of silence followed by one word presented every second. 
During each Word Category block two continuous files were consecutively presented, 
each with a different ordering of items. Files for the Mixed blocks were selected so that 
all the Up and Down items were heard once. Therefore, participants heard each 
directional item 5 times across the whole experiment.
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5.1.1.3. Graphic Display
The circle and square objects subtended 0.66° of visual angle. The upper object was 
presented at 6.5 0 above the location of the central fixation cross, and the lower object 
was presented at 6.5 ° below fixation.
5.1.1.4. Apparatus
The experiment was run using PC computers (Intel Pentium III) using E-Prime 1.0 
Software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). A standard CRT monitor was 
used with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants responded using standard ‘qwertyuiop’ 
keyboards. Chin rests were also used to minimise head movements, these were placed 
at a distance of 57cm from the computer screen.
5.1.1.5. Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond to the shape as quickly and accurately as 
possible by pressing the “square” key if it was a square, and the “circle” key if it was a 
circle (square or circle shaped stickers were placed over the A and L keys); allocation of 
response keys was balanced across participants. Participants wore stereo closed 
headphones and placed their chin on the rest. Participants were given 10 practice trials 
without words, they then completed 4 experimental blocks. The first WAV file began 
playing at the block onset, therefore the first word was heard 2000ms after the start of 
the block. The second WAV file began playing after the 10th categorisation trial (half 
way through the block). A fixation cross was presented for 1500ms at the start of each 
WAV file so that categorisation trials were not completed when no words were heard. 
Each categorisation trial began with a fixation cross for a random duration between 
1000-1200ms in 50ms steps, a shape presented in the top or bottom of the visual field 
for 200ms and then a fixation cross until the response or a to a timeout of 2500ms.
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5.1.2. Results
5.1.2.1. Analysis
6 participants were removed as their categorisation accuracy was under 80%. Reaction 
times below 100 and above 1000 milliseconds for correct trials were excluded, this 
removed 3.3% of the data. Errors were analysed separately.
5.1.2.2. Reaction Time Data
A 2x4 repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Word Category 
(F(3,45) = 5.771, partial-r|2 = 0.114), no other effects reached significance. Planned 
comparisons showed that the Control category had significantly shorter reaction times 
than the Mixed (F(l,45) = 15.478, p-if = 0.256) and Mismatch categories (F(l,45) =
11.176, p-r|2 = 0.199). The difference between the Match and Mismatch categories was 
marginal (F(l,45) = 3.303, p-r|2 = 0.068), with shorter reaction times for Match. As 
there was no significant main effect or interaction for Position, Figure 5-1 presents the 
reaction times by Word Category collapsed across Position.
Figure 5-1: Reaction times for shape categorisation bv Word Category collapsed across 
Position*
350.00 -i-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
g* 325.00
<x>£
p  300.00 c  o
0
1  275.00
250.00
control mixed m atch mismatch
Word Category
♦Error bars are one standard error of the mean
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A follow up analysis compared reaction times for the first half of each block (the first 
10 trials) with reaction times for the second half of each block (the second 10 trials).
This comparison showed a main effect of Word Category that was weaker than the 
effect when whole blocks were analysed (F(3,45) = 3.910, p-rj2 = 0.08). There was also 
a significant main effect of Block Half, with reaction times in the first half an average of 
13.57 milliseconds (SE = 4.337) faster than reaction times for the second half (F(l,45) = 
9.796, p-rj2 = 0.179). Although there was no interaction between Word Category and 
Block Half, Table 5-1 illustrates that the increase in reaction times was predominantly 
for the Mixed, Match and Mismatch conditions. See Table 5-2 for mean reaction times 
for each condition.
5.1.2.3. Errors
The four conditions were summed across Position and a Friedmann test was used to 
compare the four conditions for number of errors; there was no significant difference 
across Word Category (X2 = 6.92, p = 0.075). The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test was 
then used to compare errors in each condition (Control, Mixed, Match and Mismatch) 
for the Top and Bottom screen position. The difference for these locations approached 
significance for the Mixed block, with more errors when shapes were presented in the 
bottom than the top of the visual field (Z = -1.909, p = 0.056).
Table 5-1: Mean Reaction Times (ms) for Word Category bv Block Half*
W ord C ategory
Blocl
First
(H a lf
Second
D ifference
Control 304.41 (96.72) 304.48 (69.08) 0.06
Mixed 313.37 (84.96) 334.30 (79.80) 20.92
Match 305.55 (90.40) 321.75 (83.38) 16.194
Mismatch 314.81 (89.56) 331.92 (82.11) 17.11
* Standard deviation in brackets
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5.1.3. Discussion
The results show a main effect of Word Category, with Mismatch and Mixed blocks 
producing longer reaction times than Control blocks. Therefore, when the direction of 
the words is incongruent, or inconsistent, with the location of the shape, people take 
longer to categorise the shape compared to when no directional words are presented. 
However, when the direction of the words is congruent with the location of the shape 
(Match) participants are no faster than when no direction (Control) or inconsistent 
direction (the Mixed block) words are presented. There was a trend for participants to 
be faster when the words were congruent rather than incongruent with the location. 
These results are not in line with the hypothesis, which predicted congruent 
interference. Instead, the data show an incongruent interference effect. When the word 
direction is congruent with location this is not significantly different from the Control 
condition, so congruence does not slow categorisation relative to the baseline. The data 
is in contrast to previous findings which show that congruence produces interference 
relative to incongruence (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press), but both these 
experiments used sentences rather than single words. In addition, the blocked 
presentation means that participants were aware of the directional content of the words; 
a few participants reported this to the experimenter following the experiment. This 
could have influenced the direction of the observed effects, since strategies could 
change task performance. The comparison across block halves showed that reaction 
times were significantly longer in the second block half than that first, and that this 
increase in reaction times was predominantly for conditions where direction words were 
presented. It appears that the interference from the direction words builds up over the 
course of the block, supporting the inference that it is the context created by blocked 
presentation that is effective, rather than the individual words. To assess whether the 
directional content of single words is enough to influence visuo-spatial attention, the 
next experiment presented individual words in a randomised order
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5.2 . Single Word Comprehension & Shape Categorisation
Participants were presented with single words over headphones; after the presentation of 
a word they performed a categorisation task for shapes appearing in the top or bottom of 
the visual field. On filler trials, participants answered comprehension questions about 
the words. Blocked single word presentation influenced categorisation but it is not clear 
whether single words will produce a similar effect. The hypothesis is that if single 
words are sufficient to effect categorisation, similar effects of congruency will be found 
to Experiment 5.1; when words are incongruent to the shape location, reaction times 
will be longer.
5.2.1. P a rtic ip a n ts
20 undergraduate students (14 female) volunteered as part of an opportunity sample.
The mean age was 21.4 years (SD = 1.90). All subjects were Native English speakers 
and had normal or corrected vision.
5.2.2. M ethod
5.2.2.1. Desizn
A 3x2 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were the screen 
Position of the object (top or bottom) and the Word Category (Control, Match and 
Mismatch). The dependent variables were the reaction time and errors for categorising 
the shape (ms). There were two halves to the experiment, with each word presented 
once in each half. In each half, 6 blocks of 28 trials quasi-randomly sorted to include 15 
experimental and 13 filler items. In the first half each item was followed by a shape in 
one location (Top or Bottom), in the second half each item was followed by a shape in 
the other location. Comprehension questions followed filler items, each filler item was 
followed by one question during the experiment; 5 comprehension questions were asked 
per block. Each block contained an equal number of shape (square or circle) and shape 
location (top or bottom) trials; shape was kept constant across both presentations of the 
item.
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5.2.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Single Words was used.
78 filler words were selected from the set created for this purpose; 60 were followed by 
comprehension questions of the form “Was the word related to X?”, requiring a yes/no 
answer. Two lists were created. In list 1, all the experimental words appeared once with 
the circle or square appearing at the top or bottom of the screen. In list 2, the words 
appeared once with the shape appearing at the opposite location. The shape for each 
sentence was kept constant across lists, as was the randomised interval before shape 
presentation. For the filler words, the shape was kept constant across lists, but the 
interval was not. This was to create extra variation between verb offset and shape onset, 
preventing expectations of shape onset. In addition, in list 1, half the filler words were 
followed by a comprehension question; in list 2, the other half of the filler words were 
followed by a comprehension question. Across each half, there were an equal number 
o f ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses to the comprehension questions. Thus, comprehension 
questions occurred in 18% of trials.
5.2.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus
These were the same as Experiment 1, with the exception that participants did not place 
their chin on a rest and the monitor refresh rate was set to 75Hz.
5.2.2.4. Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond to the shape as quickly and accurately as 
possible by pressing the X key if it was a square and the Z key if it was a circle. 
Participants were also told that on some trials, following the shape categorisation, they 
would be asked a question about the word that they had just heard. The response 
options were displayed underneath the question with NO on the left and YES on the 
right. Participants were instructed to respond using the same keys as in the 
experimental trials, pressing the key that corresponded to the side their chosen answer 
was displayed i.e. Z for yes and X for no. Participants were given 18 practice trials, 8 of 
which were followed by comprehension questions. They were given feedback on their
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performance for the questions. They then completed 12 experimental blocks. During a 
trial, a fixation cross appeared for 1000ms and stayed on screen whilst the word was 
presented aurally. There was then an ISI of between 27 -  95 ms (in 13ms steps, chosen 
to match the refresh rate of the monitor). The shape then appeared for 100ms followed 
by a fixation cross until the response, or to a timeout of 3000ms. On filler trials, 
comprehension questions were presented until a response or to a timeout of 5000ms.
5.2.3. Results
5.2.3.1. Analysis
One participant was removed as their accuracy for the comprehension questions was 
less than 75%. Correct trials with reaction times between 100ms and 1000ms were 
analysed, this removed 3.7% of the data. Errors were analysed separately.
5.2.3.2. Reaction Times
3x2 repeated measures ANOVA showed no significant differences in the by Subjects 
analysis. The by Items analysis showed a significant main effect of Position (F2(l,87) 
= 9.733, p-q2 = 0.101), with mean reaction times to shapes in the bottom of the visual 
field 14.39ms (SE = 4.61) faster than reaction times to the top of the visual field. See 
Table 5-2 for mean reaction times for each condition.
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Table 5-2: Mean Reaction Times (ms) bv Condition for Experiments 5.1-5.41
E xperim ent Control 
Top | Bottom
C ondi
Match 
Top | Bottom
tion
Mismatch 
Top | Bottom
Mixed 
Top | Bottom
5.1
Blocked 
Single Word
Category
Mean
299.99 303.99 
(72.04) (75.14)
301.99 (73.23)
311.76 317.20 
(79.55) (78.32)
314.47(78.55)
318.78 328.96 
(78.68) (79.41)
323.87 (78.76)*
324.98 324.11 
(64.33) (77.05)
324.55 (70.59)*
5.2
Single Word
Category
Mean
497.82 490.65 
(113.13) (128.31) 
494.23 (119.37)
504.82 488.08 
(117.65) (126.05) 
496.45 (120.57)
500.54 494.72 
(112.63) (114.24) 
497.63 (111.93)
5.3
Full
S entence
Category
Mean
436.50 422.34 
(65.69) (81.82)
429.42 (73.63)
416.36 420.85 
(80.43) (65.40)
418.60 (72.44)
436.30 451.88 
(72.98) (80.19)
444.09 (76.14)*
5.4
Partial
Sentence
Category
Mean
894.37 899.47 
(96.81) (88.83)
896.92 (91.37)
862.44 836.19 
(78.96) (93.15)
849.31 (84.97)*
828.62 860.31 
(85.89) (86.31)
844.46 (83.77)*
|  Standard deviation in brackets
♦Significantly different to Control condition, p<0.05
5.2.3.3. Errors
The Friedman test showed no significant difference for errors between Word Categories 
by Subjects (X21 < 1) or by Items (X22 < 2.1). The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed 
no significant differences for any of the conditions (Control, Match or Mismatch) for 
the two screen locations by Subjects. By Items, the Mismatch condition had more 
errors for the Bottom screen location (Z2 = -2.120).
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5.2.4. Discussion
There was no significant effect of Word Category. When words were synchronised to 
the presentation of the shape, but presented in a randomised order, there was no effect 
of congruence. There is some evidence that nouns activate the canonical spatial 
location of their referent (e.g. attic vs. cellar) (Estes et al, submitted). However, our 
stimuli are verbs and they refer to a direction of motion rather than a specific location. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that blocked presentation of single words provides enough 
context to affect visuo-spatial attention, blocked presentation develops a context over­
time that can bias attention, producing incongruent interference but not congruent 
facilitation. In the case of Experiment 2, single words that refer to a general direction 
do not influence visuo-spatial attention. For the sake of argument we can assume that 
comprehension of single concrete nouns does activate a spatial representation of a 
particular location, or bias attention towards that location. Single verbs that contain 
directional information may not be concrete enough to actively effect visuo-spatial 
attention, as they specify general motion rather than a specific location.
There was a trend, by items, for faster responses to the bottom of the visual field. There 
is evidence that the lower visual field (equivalent to the Bottom location for the shape) 
is more sensitive to fine discrimination for objects that are close to the observer (Previc, 
1990). Therefore, this trend that we see in the data for faster categorisation in the lower 
hemi-field may be a reflection of this specialisation.
There was a trend, significant by Items but not by Subjects, for more errors in the 
bottom screen location for the Mismatch condition. This means that Up words 
produced more errors for shapes in the Bottom screen location. This provides limited 
support for incongruence producing interference, as seen by errors, but it not a reliable 
finding. The next set of experiments present full sentences, therefore the location (e.g. 
the endpoint of the object’s motion) is specified. If a concrete location is essential in 
influencing visuo-spatial attention, we should replicate the finding from Richardson et 
al (2003) and Bergen et al (in press).
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5 .3. Full Sentence Comprehension & Shape Categorisation
The experiment was the same as Experiment 2 except that participants were presented 
with sentences rather than single words. The shape for categorisation was presented at 
sentence offset. In line with previous findings (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in 
press), the hypothesis is that when sentences describe motion that congruent with the 
target location, reaction times to categorise the shape will be longer.
5.3.1. P a rtic ip a n ts
21 undergraduate students (17 female) took part in the experiment as part of a course 
requirement. The mean age was 18.9 (SD = 0.58). All subjects were monolingual 
Native English speakers and had normal or corrected to normal vision.
5.3.2. M ethod
5.3.2.1. Design
The design was the same as Experiment 5-2. There were a total of 36 blocks (18 in 
each half) of 6,7 or 8 trials. Each block contained an equal number of shape (square or 
circle) and shape location (top or bottom) trials. Within each block there were 5 
sentences from the experimental conditions and 1, 2 or 3 filler sentences, of which 0,1 
or 2 were followed by comprehension questions; there were questions on 14% of trials. 
Presentation of blocks was fully randomised within each half of the experiment. There 
were two halves to the experiment, with each word presented once in each half. In the 
first half each item was followed by a shape in one location (Top or Bottom), in the 
second half each item was followed by a shape in the other location; the shape was 
constant for both presentations of the same item. See Materials (section 5.2.2.2) for 
details of how items were ordered in each block.
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5.3.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Sentences was used. 36 filler sentences were selected from a set created 
for that purpose, each was paired with a comprehension question of the form “Did the X 
verb the Y?” and required a yes/no answer. Filler sentences that were followed by a 
comprehension question in one presentation were not followed by a question in the 
other presentation. Two lists were created, once for each half of the experiment. Within 
each list, items were quasi-randomly sorted into 18 block lists, so that each contained 5 
sentences made up of 1 or 2 from each experimental category and 1, 2 or 3 filler 
sentences. Within each block, the first item was always a filler sentence, sentences 
were otherwise randomly ordered. These two lists were then quasi-randomly resorted 
into two new lists (lb and 2b) so that the items appeared with different accompanying 
items in each block, whilst maintaining the structure described above. By combining 
these lists, four grand lists were created for the experiment as follows: la/2a, lb/2b,
2a/lb, 2b/la. These were then used for ordering items in the experiment.
5.3.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus
These were the same as for Experiment 5-2, except that the programme was run using 
DMDX Software (Forster & Forster, 2003) and the monitor refresh rate was set to 
60Hz.
5.3.2.4. Procedure
The instructions were the same as for Experiment 5-2 but were adapted for sentence 
presentation. Participants completed 9 practice trials, 4 of which were followed by 
comprehension questions. They then completed the experimental blocks. Each trial 
began with a fixation cross for 1000ms and remained on screen whilst the sentence was 
presented aurally. At sentence offset the fixation cross remained for an ISI between 50 
-  250ms (in 50ms steps), and the shape was then presented for 100ms. The fixation 
cross was presented until a response, or to a time out of 3000ms. Comprehension 
questions were presented until the participant responded, or to a time out of 6000ms. 
Feedback for the answer given to the question was then presented for 1500ms.
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5.3.3. Results
5.3.3.1. Analysis
All participants scored above 80% accuracy for correctly categorising the object, and 
for answering the comprehension questions. Correct trials with reaction times between 
100ms and 1000ms were analysed, this removed 4% of the data. Errors were analysed 
separately.
5.3.3.2. Reaction Times
A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Sentence 
Category both by Subjects (Fl(2,40) = 11.930, p-q2 = 0.374) and by Items (F2(2,84) = 
3.858, p-rf = 0.084). 2x2 ANOVAs were then used to compare each Sentence Category 
to each other. The Mismatch category had significantly longer reaction times than 
Control (FI(1,20) = 7.287, p-rf = 0.267; F2(l,56) = 4.394, p-q2 = 0.073) and Match 
categories (Fl(l,20) = 31.841, p-q2 = 0.614; F2(l,56) = 6.174, p-q2 = 0.099). Mismatch 
RTs were on average 14.67ms (SE = 5.43) longer than those for Control and 25.48ms 
(SE = 4.52) longer than those for Match. The main effect between Control and Match 
conditions approached significance by Subjects (FI(1,20) = 3.696, p = 0.069, p-q2 =
0.156), but not by Items (F2 < 2, p>0.2); the trend was for Match sentences to produce 
shorter reaction times than Control sentences. The interaction between Sentence 
Category and Position for Control and Mismatch conditions approached significance by 
Subjects (FI(1,20) = 3.616, p = 0.072, p-q2 = 0.153) but not by Items; the trend was for 
the Control sentences to produce longer reaction times for shapes appearing in the top of 
the visual field, and for Mismatch sentences to produce longer reaction times for shapes 
in the bottom of the visual field. Figure 5-2 displays the mean RTs for each Sentence 
Category, see Table 5-2 for mean reaction times for each condition.
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5.3.3.3. Errors
The Friedman test showed no significant differences for Sentence Category By Subjects 
(X21 < 2) or By Items (X22 < 1). The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test showed more errors 
for the Bottom shape location for the Match condition, both By Subjects (Z1 = -2.250) 
and By Items (Z2 = -2.304).
Figure 5-2: Mean reaction times (ms) for shape categorisation bv Sentence Category 
and Position*
475
control match m ismatch
Sentence Category
*Error bars are one standard error of the mean
5.3.4. D iscussion
The results showed a clear interference effect for shape categorisation, when the 
sentences described motion incongruent with the location of the shape, participants were 
slower to make the categorisation judgement. When the sentence described motion that 
was congruent with the location of the shape, there was trend for participants to be 
faster at categorisation than in the Control condition, where no directional information 
was present in the sentences. This goes against the hypothesis, which was motivated by 
previous findings, but corroborates what was found in Experiment 5-1, where 
incongruence between the direction of words, presented in blocks, and the shape 
location also resulted in slower categorisation. The results are therefore also in contrast 
to the findings that motivated the hypotheses (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in
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press), where congruence between the direction/location of objects in sentences 
produced interference. It is unclear why the results should be in the opposite direction 
but note that it does agree with studies which show that the eyes go in the same 
direction as events described by linguistic stimuli (e.g. Spivey et al, 2000). Therefore 
the results are in line with a conflict when the eyes have to attend to a location that is in 
conflict with described events. I will return to this important matter in the discussion. 
These results show that when a concrete location is specified by the sentence, a 
congruent location speeds categorisation and an incongruent location slows 
categorisation. This is in support of the idea that attention is influenced by location 
information, rather than just motion information. The following experiment tests this 
further by presenting categorisation during the sentence, here, motion information is 
available but location information is not. Therefore, if location is the important element 
we should not see the same pattern in reaction times.
The error data showed no differences between the Sentence Categories, but the Match 
condition showed more errors for the bottom shape location than the top. In other 
words, Down sentences produced more errors for shapes presented in the lower visual 
field. This was a reliable difference and is apparently in conflict with the incongruent 
interference, which would predict more errors at the bottom screen location following 
Up sentences. However, across the three experiments the only significant differences 
have been for the Bottom screen location, for the Mixed block in Experiment 1, for Up 
words in Experiment 2 (although this was not seen by Subjects) and for Down sentences 
in Experiment 3. Given that there are hypothesised differences between visual 
processes in the upper and lower visual fields, with the lower visual field more 
specialised for fine-grained spatial distinctions (Previc, 1990), it is possible that it is 
more sensitive to errors overall.
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5 .4 . Partial Sentence Comprehension & Shape 
Categorisation
This experiment was the same as Experiment 3 except that the shape categorisation task 
was performed during sentence comprehension, with the shape appearing at verb offset. 
This was to test whether the entire sentence, and all the information it conveys, has to be 
comprehended to produce the interference effect demonstrated in Experiment 3. It is 
possible that after comprehending the subject noun and the verb this would be enough to 
interact with visuo-spatial processing. In contrast, the whole event (and therefore the 
location of the described object) may be necessary to affect visuo-spatial processing.
The hypothesis is that if the verb drives the incongruent interference effect, longer 
reaction times should be produced when the sentences and the shape location are 
incongruent. If the whole sentence is necessary to produce interference, there should be 
no effects of congruence.
5.4.1. P a rtic ip a n ts
20 undergraduate students (14 female) volunteered as part of an opportunity sample. 
The mean age was 20.9 years (SD =1.12). All subjects were Native English speakers 
and had normal or corrected vision.
5.4.2. M ethod
5.4.2.1. Design
The design was the same as for Experiment 2. There were a total of 18 blocks (9 in each 
half), each of which contained 15 trials. Across the experiment there were an equal 
number of circles and squares and an equal number of shape appearances in the top or 
bottom of the screen. Within each block, sentences were selected randomly from 90 
experimental and 45 filler sentences. Each filler item was followed by a comprehension 
question once during the experiment, thus there were questions on 16% of trials. For 
experimental sentences, the shape was presented at verb offset. For the filler sentences,
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the shape was presented at various points throughout the sentence from the subject noun 
phrase offset up to sentence offset.
5.4.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Sentences was used. 45 filler sentences were selected from the set created 
for that purpose, paired with comprehension questions of the same form as Experiment 
3. There were an equal number of questions requiring ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses. Two 
lists were created. In list 1, all the experimental sentences appeared once with the circle 
or square appearing at the top or bottom of the screen. In list 2, the sentences appeared 
once with the shape appearing at the opposite location. The shape for each sentence 
was kept constant across lists, as was the presentation time for the shape (verb offset). 
For the filler sentences, the shape was kept constant across lists, but the presentation 
time was not. In list 1, half the filler sentences were followed by a comprehension 
question; in list 2, the other half of the sentences were followed by a comprehension 
question. Filler sentences never had shapes appearing at verb offset, instead, shapes 
were presented at the offset of the subject, preposition/article offset following the verb, 
direct object/adverb offset or sentence offset. The offset time was altered between the 
two presentations of each sentence. This was to stop participants recognising that the 
shape presentation always followed the verb. Offset times were established by editing 
the sentences at verb offset (or other location) and then measuring the length of the 
created sentence fragment using a bespoke E-Prime programme that recorded onset and 
offset times for the fragments. Onset times were subtracted from offset times to 
establish clip length.
5.4.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus 
These were the same as for Experiment 2.
5.4.2.4. Procedure
Instructions were the same as for Experiment 2, adapted for sentences. Participants 
completed 8 practice trials 4 of which were followed by comprehension questions with
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feedback for the response. They then completed the experimental blocks. Each trial 
began with a central fixation cross for 500ms, the sentence was then presented 
binaurally over headphones. The fixation cross stayed on screen until a specified time,
i.e. verb offset for experimental items, various times for filler sentences. The shape was 
then presented for 100ms at the top or bottom of the screen followed by a central 
fixation cross until a response or to a time out of 2000ms. On 50% of filler trials the 
comprehension question followed the categorisation response and was displayed until 
the participant responded or to a time out of4000ms.
5.4.3. Results
5.4.3.1. Analysis
One participant was removed for having low accuracy on the comprehension questions 
(<70%). Correct trials with reaction times between 100ms and 1250ms were analysed, 
this removed 6.7% of the data10. Errors were analysed separately.
5.4.3.2. Reaction Times
A 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of Sentence 
Category by Subjects (Fl(2,36) = 54.844, p-q2 = 0.753) but not by Items (F2 < 1.2). 
There was also a significant interaction between Sentence Category and Shape Position 
by Subjects (F(2,36) = 13.008, p-q2 = 0.419) but not by Items (F2 < 1). This interaction 
was driven by Down sentences producing mean reaction times that were 28.97 ms faster 
than the Up sentences. An interaction resulted when these were analysed as Match and 
Mismatch categories11 so it will not be analysed further. Planned comparisons showed 
that the Control category had mean reaction times that were 47.61ms longer than the 
Match category (F l(l, 18) = 55.287, p-r|2 = 0.754) and 52.46ms longer than the 
Mismatch Category (Fl(l, 18) = 89.335, p-q2 = 0.832). As the interaction between 
Sentence Category and shape Position was driven by differences for the Down and Up
10 The 1000ms upper cut off was not used in this experiment as this removed 26% of the data, indicating
that participants were taking longer to categorise the shape than in previous experiments.
11 The data was re-analysed with the 3 level factor Sentence Category set as Control, Down and Up. A
significant main effect of Sentence Category was found by Subjects (Fl(2,36) = 54.916, p-rf = 0.753) 
but not by Items (F2 < 1); follow up comparisons showed all Sentence Categories were significantly 
different from each other (all FIs > 23). Mean reaction times for Control sentences was 896.92ms 
(SE = 21.03), for Down sentences was 832.40ms (SE = 20.30) and for Up sentences was 861.37ms 
(SE= 18.72).
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sentences, and therefore not informative for the critical congruence comparison, Figure
5-3 presents the mean reaction times collapsed across Position. See Table 5-2 for the 
mean reaction times for individual conditions.
Figure 5-3: Mean reaction times for Sentence Category 
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5.4.3.3. Errors
The Friedman test showed no significant differences between Sentence Categories by 
Subjects (X2 = 1.3) or by Items (X2 < 1.5). The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed 
significant differences for all Sentence Categories by Subjects and by Items, with more 
errors for shapes appearing at the Bottom screen location for Control (Z1 = -1.991; Z2 
= -2.249), Match (Z1 = -2.746; Z2 = -3.492) and Mismatch (Z1 = -2.315 ;Z2 = -3.082) 
conditions.
5.4.4. D iscussion
The results showed facilitation for shape categorisation following directional verbs as 
compared to non-directional verbs in the Control group. When contrasted with the 
results from 5.3, where incongruent interference was found, this result suggests that the 
whole sentence has to be comprehended in order for it to influence visuo-spatial 
attention and show effects of congruence. However, there were also significant
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differences between the Down and Up sentences, when not collapsed into Match and 
Mismatch conditions. The critical difference between the method used here and that in 
Experiment 3 was that the shape appeared at verb offset, immediately following the 
comprehension of the verb and during the comprehension of the remainder of the 
sentence. This made the task harder, as evidenced by reaction times being 400ms 
longer for this task when compared to making the categorisation after sentence offset 
(see Table 5-2). Therefore, the reaction time differences may be the result of particular 
sentence properties rather than the spatial and directional information to which the 
sentences refer. For example, control sentences may have been harder to comprehend 
and therefore interfered more with the categorisation task than directional sentences. 
Comparing the directional sentences, Up sentences may have been easier to comprehend 
than Down sentences producing the same result. Another alternative explanation is that 
directional verbs provided an implicit cue for the shape appearing at verb offset, 
priming responses to the categorisation task. Filler sentences and Control sentences had 
no consistent verb qualities which could be used as cues, and the Fillers ensured that 
target appearance was not guaranteed after verb offset. Only for the directional 
sentences was there a stable relationship between semantic content (upwards or 
downwards ‘semantic’ motion) and target appearance (at verb offset). It is possible that 
strategies sensitive to this relationship were established during the experiment, speeding 
categorisation of the target for directional sentences. These two alternative explanations 
make it unlikely that sentences with directional content provide some general 
facilitation for the categorisation task, regardless of congruence. The (embodied) 
explanation of general facilitation relies on the presence of a directional verb giving a 
preparatory benefit to the allocation of visuo-spatial attention along the axis of motion 
implicated by the verb (in this case, vertical). Without the comparison with the 
horizontal axis (as in Richardson et al, 2003), we cannot establish whether this 
explanation is correct.
There were significantly more errors for shapes presented in the bottom of the screen for 
all Sentence Categories. This is in line with the mixed results from the other 
experiments which show more errors for the bottom location in varying conditions. It 
supports the inference that the bottom of the visual field is more prone to errors in this 
task; perhaps as a result of specialisation in the lower visual field that makes it more 
open to disruption (Previc, 1990).
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5 .5 . General Discussion
The experiments demonstrated that both single word and sentence comprehension can 
influence the allocation of visuo-spatial attention. The first two experiments used single 
words, presented randomly or in blocks. The third and fourth experiments presented 
sentences with the categorisation task at sentence offset or verb offset respectively. I 
will first discuss the single word experiments, then the sentence experiments and finally 
the conclusions that can be drawn from all four. Table 5-3 summarises the results.
Table 5-3: Descriptive summary of results
Linguistic Stimuli Results
Blocked single word presentation Interference from Mismatch and Mixed conditions
Single word presentation in random 
order
No significant effects
Full sen tence com prehension Interference from Mismatch conditions and a  trend for 
facilitation in Match conditions
Partial sen tence com prehension Facilitation from both Match and Mismatch conditions
The single word experiments showed that single word comprehension does influence 
visuo-spatial attention when a strong context is created, through presentation of the 
words in semantically coherent blocks. Participants were slower to categorise a briefly 
presented shape when they heard a block of single words all referring to a motion 
direction incongruent with the location of the shape; e.g. when they heard ‘down’ words 
and categorised a shape in the upper visual field. The interference was similar in 
magnitude to that produced by blocks of directionally inconsistent items (the Mixed 
block). When words were presented in a random order with categorisation after verb 
offset, the directional content of the words made no difference to the speed of 
categorisation for different visual field locations. This shows that the presentation of 
single words referring to a direction of motion is not enough to influence visuo-spatial 
attention, in comparison to the literature which has used nouns referring to objects with 
a canonical location (Zwaan & Taylor, 2003; Estes et al, in press). Zwaan & Yaxley 
(2003) found that pairs of words (e.g. attic -  basement) were judged more quickly when 
their spatial relation was congruent with their referents typical location, e.g. attic 
displayed above basement, than when the spatial relation was incongruent, e.g. 
basement displayed above attic. Therefore, there was a facilitation when the spatial 
relation of two concrete referents matched the presentation of their labels; this can also
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be interpreted as interference when the labels are presented in the ‘wrong’ relation. The 
authors concluded that the words activate an embodied representation of their referents 
that is facilitated by the congruent presentation of the words. More closely related to 
the method used in these experiments, the comprehension of single words which refer to 
objects in a particular location impairs the identification of targets in the congruent 
location (Estes et al, submitted); for example, reading ‘foot’ subsequently slowed letter 
identification for targets at the bottom of the screen. These stimuli refer to concrete 
objects with locations associated to those objects that are also concrete. In contrast, 
words referring to motion require an object to produce a concrete referent, the motion 
itself is abstract without a moving subject. As demonstrated by Bergen et al, 
intransitive motion sentences which contain only a motion verb and a moving subject do 
affect visuo-spatial attention, producing congruent interference; e.g. when the sentence 
refers to the upwards motion of an object, participants are slower to categorist an object 
in the upper visual field. The fact that a concrete event is necessary to affect visuo- 
spatial attention also supports Bergen et al, as they found no effect of congruence for 
abstract and metaphorical motion events (e.g. “The prices rose” or “Her temper rose”). 
Therefore, when the semantic representation refers to concrete events that have real- 
world physical correlates, it can influence the allocation of attention to a visuo-spatial 
location.
In contrast to the single word presentation, blocked presentation produced incongruent 
interference. The blocked presentation makes it probable that participants were aware 
of their directional content, and this in turn would affect conscious and unconscious 
strategic processes. Therefore, it is not possible to say that the effects are an automatic 
consequence of single word comprehension. However, it is still interesting to discuss 
the results as the effect was one of incongruent interference, contrasting with the 
existing literature which shows congruent interference (Estes et al, submitted; Bergen et 
al, in press). For blocked word presentation, the incongruent interference was 
equivalent to the interference when the directional information was inconsistent, during 
mixed blocks. Thus, having directional information opposed to the visuo-spatial 
location is no more problematic then when that directional information is 
unreliable/inconsistent. When the directional information was congruent to the visuo- 
spatial location, this did not interfere with categorisation more than words with no 
directional content, but it did not interfere less than incongruent or inconsistent 
directional content. These effects built up over the course of the block so attention was
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biased over time, rather than by individual words. So, when directional content is 
consistently in opposition to the location of a target object, or inconsistent and therefore 
either unreliable or confusing, the allocation of visuo-spatial attention is impaired.
The third experiment showed that incongruent interference was also present when 
categorisation followed sentence comprehension. This is in line with the above 
conclusion, that a concrete referent is necessary for comprehension to affect visuo- 
spatial attention. It also reinforces the finding of incongruent interference for 
Experiment 1, and is in contrast to the existing literature. Both Richardson et al (2003) 
and Bergen et al (in press) found that the comprehension of sentences referring to a 
direction of object motion, or to objects with a canonical location, interfered with the 
categorisation of a target in a congruent visuo-spatial location. This effect had been 
explained by the ‘image schema’ or visual imagery produced by comprehension, which 
interferes with target detection in the same way as conscious visual imagery (Perky, 
1910), through the direct engagement of visual processing systems. It has also been 
argued that the similarity between the detected object and the referent object makes a 
difference (Estes et al, submitted). If the objects are not similar, e.g. the word ‘head’ 
and then detection of a letter X in the upper visual field, interference will result. 
However, if the word ‘head’ was followed by detection of a head-like object in the 
upper visual field, facilitation would result. This has yet to be tested. However, our 
data show that it is the incongruent condition that produces interference and thus these 
findings do not fit with explanations from visual imagery or object similarity. Our data 
is more easily accounted for by comprehension influencing the allocation of attention to 
a location in space, for example through influencing eye-movements, rather than 
affecting the perception of the visual scene. In line with this, there is some evidence 
that narratives describing events in a particular dimension (up, down, left and right) 
elicit eye-movements in the congruent direction (Spivey & Geng, 2001; Spivey et al, 
2000). If language directs attention to particular locations (e.g. Richardson & Spivey, 
2000), then the intuitive prediction is that performing a task at a different location 
should be impaired; this is what we find. It is unclear why our results differ from the 
previous literature, however, these studies did not use a control condition, so it is 
unclear what the baseline performance is during the task. A good starting point would 
be a within subjects experiment that combines the sentence stimuli from all available 
studies that have used the shape categorisation task. It is still possible that the
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construction of sentences contributes to the different results, although it is not clear 
what variables would produce opposing results, since all were created to be directional.
The fourth experiment presented the object for categorisation at verb offset; both 
congruent and incongruent directional sentences were faster than the control condition. 
It is possible that differences in the ease of comprehending Down and Up sentences as 
compared to Control sentences produced these changes. It is notable that reaction times 
for Experiment 4 were almost twice as long as those for the other experiments, 
supporting the increased difficulty of active comprehension concurrently with target 
detection. It is also possible that directional verbs facilitated categorisation, due to the 
consistent relationship between a directional verb and the appearance of a target at verb 
offset. Further experiments would need to be carried out to establish whether 
directional verbs provide an advantage over control verbs because of implicit cuing, or 
because of directional content priming a general axis of motion. The same experiment 
could be completed with filler items that have target appearance at verb offset, meaning 
there is no ambiguity in the time of target appearance. Any differences that emerge 
between Control and directional sentences could then be more securely attributed to 
influences of directional verbs on the allocation of visuo-spatial attention. In order to 
establish whether a general direction of motion can be primed, there would need to be a 
comparison between targets presented on the vertical and horizontal axis (Richardson et 
al, 2003). If we account for this result through effects on the allocation of attention or 
eye-movements, we can hypothesise that facilitation for a broad dimension may be 
present before specific information about a complete concrete motion event can 
interfere with attention. One clear prediction would be for an eye-movement study: we 
would expect to find differing effects on the latency of saccades to a target following 
the comprehension of partial or complete sentences.
Taken together, the results show that influences of comprehension on visuo-spatial 
attention are subtle and variable. The tentative conclusion is that concrete spatial 
information is needed before language can affect visuo-spatial attention, in line with 
previous findings (Bergen et al, in press). When language has a visual-physical 
referent, semantic representations that are activated upon comprehension engage with 
the visuo-motor system sufficiently to influence the allocation of attention in visual 
space. Crucially, the allocation of attention is modulated according to the location and 
motion of the physical referent. In contrast to previous findings, but in line with
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predictions from eye-movement studies, our data show that target categorisation at 
incongruent locations is slowed. This supports the inference that directional language 
directs attention to congruent locations. However, our data also shows that processing 
at congruent locations is not facilitated; at least as measured by reaction times. 
Experiments which make the central task harder (e.g. presenting object detection rather 
than categorisation) and allow other measures to be extracted (e.g. d’ and c, see 
Appendix 2) would make the level of influence clearer.
These results are in line with both strong and weak versions of embodiment, although 
since the results can be explained through mechanisms which direct attention they can 
be partially accounted for by strategic or higher order influences. The experiments 
tapped visuo-spatial attention implicitly (the task was categorisation of the target rather 
than judgement about where it appeared) so any influence of language was automatic. 
Blocked single words were able to interfere with attention over time but sentences 
produced immediate influences, specifying a concrete location/axis that impacted upon 
visuo-spatial attention. Thus, at the very least, when semantic information is available 
and informative it is automatically recruited during the direction of attention. Since the 
data is in conflict with previous results, it does not support the interpretation that the 
object was visually simulated, resulting in congruent interference. Therefore, they go 
against this particular explanation from strong embodied theories. Instead, the results 
support the subtle integration of semantic information into visuo-spatial attention. This 
can be explained by indirect top-down influences. For example, language could bias 
covert expectations towards the motion of an object in a particular direction. In order 
for this to be the case, the expectations used by attention are biased by particular 
qualities of semantic content (e.g. a concrete location) as well as being more globally 
influenced by general semantic content (e.g. a general direction). In essence, this still 
means that visuo-spatial attention is implicitly and automatically manipulated by the 
specific contents of semantic representations. The results are in line with weak 
embodiment where connections between semantic and perceptual processes are direct 
but mediated, in this case by whether or not semantic content specifies information that 
is potentially (but not always) useful for attention.
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6. Comprehension on Visual Motion
In this chapter several experiments are presented which look at the comprehension of 
sentences and single words on the perception of visual motion. The previous 
experiments (see Chapter 5) used the upper or lower visual field as the perceptual 
independent variable and the visual stimuli were static. The linguistic stimuli describe 
motion so visual field location approximates the destination of moving objects, but does 
not tap motion processing. As already discussed (see Section 5.5) these experiments 
allow inferences about the effect of comprehension on the allocation of visuo-spatial 
attention; it is not entirely clear what perceptual processes are affected by the linguistic 
stimuli. By using dynamic stimuli we can look at how comprehension of linguistic 
stimuli describing motion affects the perception of visual motion. Aside from the better 
match between the linguistic and perceptual stimuli, motion processing has been 
extensively studied (e.g. Raymond, 2000; Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004), therefore 
we can use established perceptual stimuli and make inferences about specific perceptual 
processes. Random Dot Kinematograms (RDKs) were chosen as the dynamic stimuli; 
they present first-order motion by animating white/grey dots on a black background. 
First order motion results from a change of energy in the visual field, such as that 
produced by a moving object. A percentage of the dots move randomly and some move 
coherently (i.e. in one direction). The percentage of dots moving coherently varies the 
strength of perceived coherent motion. They are a well established tool used widely in 
visual perception research to access low level motion perception (e.g. Braddick, 1973, 
1980; Britten, Shadlen, Newsome & Movshon, 1993; Raymond, 2000); as such they 
have a sound base from which to interpret the effects that are found with their use.
In Pilot Experiments (section 6.1), blocks of words or sentences were presented to 
participants making speeded judgments about the direction of a dynamic pattern of dots. 
However, as participants were making a directional judgment, the perception of motion 
was conflated with the preparation of a response. Following this, experiments used 
motion detection, a standard psychophysical task in which participants judge whether an 
RDK has random or coherent motion. Critically, the coherent motion is at the 
participant’s threshold of conscious perception so the task is difficult. This allows us to 
use Signal Detection Theory to analyse the results; extracting measures of perceptual 
sensitivity (d’), internal decision criterion (c) and response bias (p) given a particular 
criterion. These measures separate the low level perception of motion (d’) from the
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higher level decision and response processes (c, p), allowing a clearer interpretation of 
where and how comprehension of language referring to motion affects motion 
perception. For a brief review of the principles of Signal Detection Theory see 
Appendix 2.
6 .1. Pilot Experiments
In these experiments, participants were presented with blocks of single words (Pilot a) 
or sentences (Pilot b) for passive comprehension whilst they judged the direction of a 
moving dot pattern. Blocked presentation of single words and sentences that refer to the 
same direction of motion should create a powerful directional context. These studies 
were completed at the Science Museum, therefore they had to be kept short 
(approximately 5 minutes). The hypothesis is that if the meaning of the words and 
sentences effects the perception of visual motion, we should see effects of congruency 
on reaction times and error rates. The hypothesis is non-directional since the literature 
shows mixed results. For example, studies using picture judgments have found faster 
reaction times when linguistic and perceptual information is congruent (e.g. see Section 
2.1.1.3 or 2.1.2.2). However, when motion is presented simultaneously with sentences, 
faster reaction times to judge sentences were found for incongruent rather than 
congruent conditions (Kaschak et al, 2005). Therefore it is unclear whether results will 
be in line with the majority of effects found for comprehension on perception 
(congruent facilitation) or the limited evidence found for perception on comprehension 
(incongruent facilitation).
6.1.1. P a rtic ip a n ts
Pilot a: 56 native English speakers took part in the experiment voluntarily. Participants 
run at University College London were paid for their time. There were 23 females. The 
mean (standard deviation) age was 27.6 years (10.7).
Pilot b: 37 participants took part, 16 female and 21 male. Mean age was 32.4 years (SD 
= 11.34).
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6.1.2. Method
6.1.2.1. Design
A 2x4 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were the 
direction of motion of the random dot kinematograms (upwards, downwards), hereafter 
RDKs; and the Word (Pilot a) or Sentence (Pilot b) Category by block (Up, Down, 
Mixed and Control). The dependent variables were the reaction time and errors for 
categorising the direction of motion of the RDKs (ms). There were a total of 4 blocks, 
each of which contained 24 RDK motion categorisation trials for Experiment 1 and 52 
RDK trials for Experiment 2. Within each block there were an equal number of up and 
down motion RDKs. The presentation of blocks and of up or down RDKs within the 
blocks was fully randomised.
6.1.1.1. Materials
Pilot a: Item Set One Single Words. The same soundfiles as used in Experiment 5.1.
Pilot b: Item Set One Sentences. To avoid order effects, four orders for each group
(Up, Down and Control) were produced and concatenated into a single WAV sound file 
(16 bitrate, mono, 44khz sampling rate). Four mixed groups were created by randomly 
selecting half the items from the up group and half from the down group and then 
concatenating them into a single sound file, such that across all the mixed groups each 
item appeared twice. The concatenated sound files were 44 seconds long, with two 
second of silence at the beginning of the soundfile followed by one sentence every 2625 
ms.
During each experimental block 2 continuous files were consecutively presented, each 
with a different ordering of items. Files for the Mixed blocks were selected so that all 
the Up and Down items were heard once. Therefore, participants heard each directional 
item 5 times across the whole experiment.
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6.1.1.2. Graphic Display
Each RDK consisted of 150 white dots (width = 0.067° visual angle) against a black 
background covering a square area (width = 5°) centred at fixation point. During each 
trial, a randomly chosen subset of 100 dots were vertically displaced up or down by 
0.67° steps in 5 consecutive frames (total motion time= 85ms; speed = 4 °/s). A small 
number of frames and short duration has been used successfully elsewhere in the motion 
detection literature (e.g. Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 2005). The rest of the dots were 
repositioned randomly from one frame to the next. To prevent participants becoming 
familiar with the sequences, 15 up and 15 down sequences of 5 frames were generated. 
They were selected and presented randomly within each block.
6.1.1.3. Apparatus
The experiment was run using PC computers (Intel Pentium II) using E-Prime 1.0 
Software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). A standard CRT monitor was 
used with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Participants responded using standard ‘qwertyuiop’ 
keyboards. Chin rests were also used to minimise head movements, these were placed 
at a distance of 57cm from the computer screen.
6.1.1.4. Procedure
Participants were instructed to respond to the RDK as quickly and accurately as possible 
by pressing the “up” key if the motion was up, and the “down” key if the motion was 
down (stickers were placed over the A and L keys that showed an upwards or 
downwards arrow). Assigned response keys were balanced across participants. 
Participants completed 20 practice trials of the motion direction judgement without 
words/sentences played over the headphones. They were told to ignore the 
words/sentences presented over the headphones during the experimental blocks. 
Presentation order for the WAV files (Up, Down, Control and Mixed) was fully 
randomised.
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The WAV file lasted for 18 seconds (Pilot a) or 44 seconds (Pilot b). It was repeated 
once in each block so the total playing time was 36 seconds (Pilot a) or 88 seconds 
(Pilot b). The first WAV file began playing at the block onset, therefore the first item 
was heard 2000ms after the start of the block. The second WAV file began playing half 
way through the block after the 12 * (Pilot a) or 26th (Pilot b) categorisation trial and 
after the first WAV file had finished. At the beginning of each block a blank screen was 
presented for 1000ms followed by a central fixation cross presented for 1000ms.
During each trial, a central fixation cross appeared for a randomised delay of between 
800-1000 ms (with 50ms increments in between). An RDK was then presented for 
85ms at the centre of the screen. A blank screen was presented until a response, or to a 
time out of 3000ms. At the end of each block a grey screen was presented instructing 
the participant to take an optional break.
6.1.2.2. Analysis
Pilot a: Participants who scored lower than 85% accuracy for correctly categorising the 
RDK motion were excluded from the analysis; this removed 27 people from the analysis 
who were replaced with participants from the UCL subject pool. Reaction times above 
50ms and below 800ms were excluded from the analysis, this removed 9.2% of the data. 
Errors were analysed separately.
Pilot b: Participants who scored lower than 80% accuracy for correctly categorising the 
RDK motion were excluded, this removed 5 participants. Reaction times above 100ms 
and below 800ms were excluded, this removed 9.7% of the data. Errors were analysed 
separately.
6.1.3. Results
6.1.3.1. Reaction Times
A 2 x 4 repeated measures ANOVA compared reaction times for the Control, Mixed, 
Match and Mismatch blocks across motion directions (upwards and downwards). Table
6-1 presents the reaction times for both pilot experiments.
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Pilot a: There was no significant main effect of Word Category. Planned comparisons 
showed that the Mismatch block was marginally slower than the Mixed block (F(l,55)
= 3.560, p = 0.068, p-r\2 = 0.061) and significantly slower than the Match block (F(l,55) 
= 5.094, p-rj2 = 0.085). As there was no significant main effect or interaction for 
Motion Direction, Figure 6-1 presents the reaction time data collapsed across Upwards 
and Downwards motion.
Figure 6-1: Mean reaction times for Pilot a for each Word Category
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Pilot b: There was no significant main effect of Sentence Category or differences in 
the planned comparisons. There was a marginally significant main effect of Motion 
Direction, with Upwards motion producing longer reaction times than Downwards 
motion (F(l,30) = 4.104, p = 0.052, p-rf = 0.120).
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Table 6-1: Mean reaction times for both Pilot experiments for each condition 
(Standard deviation in brackets)
E xperim ent Control 
Down | Up
Com
Match 
Down | Up
ition
Mismatch 
Down | Up
Mixed 
Down | Up
Pilot a
Blocked Single 
Word
Category
Mean
292.85 302.96 
(133.33) (162.29)
297.91 (147.93)
290.59 284.63 
(123.34) (142.54)
287.61 (132.72)
296.45 298.47 
(140.61) (131.71)
297.46 (135.62)*
282.83 288.75 
(132.80) (137.56)
285.79 (134.62)
Pilot b
Blocked
Sentence
Category
Mean
265.56 285.35 
(75.37) (82.14)
274.28 (79.80)
262.50 275.34 
(74.61) (103.98)
267.39 (90.60)
272.64 268.51 
(98.76) (73.85)
267.93 (86.62)
261.87 265.87 
(75.92) (79.92)
260.47 (79.20)
♦Significantly different to Match condition, p<0.05
6.1.3.2. Errors
Pilot a: There were no differences in Error rates.
Pilot b: The Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Tests showed that the Control condition had 
marginally more errors for Downwards motion as compared to Upwards motion (z = - 
1.854, p = 0.064).
6.1.4. Discussion of Pilot Results
The pilot experiments showed that blocked single word comprehension affected the 
judgement of motion direction. Words congruent to the direction of motion produced 
shorter reaction times than words that were incongruent with the visual motion. Thus, 
the blocked presentation of single words referring to motion in a particular direction 
creates a linguistic context that is powerful enough to affect reaction times for direction 
judgements. In Experiment 5.1 (which looked at visuo-spatial attention), both 
Mismatched and Mixed blocks produced longer reaction times for shape categorisation 
relative to Control (but not Match) blocks. In this experiment, direction judgements in 
Mixed and Match blocks had faster reaction times relative to the Mismatch condition. 
The results are not clear cut across all conditions, in particular it is difficult to sensibly 
interpret what is happening in the Mixed blocks, however, the data suggest facilitation
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during Matched and Mixed conditions for blocked single word presentation. Thus, 
when directional semantic information agrees, or partially agrees, with the location of a 
visuo-spatial target, participants are slightly faster to categorise the target object.
Conversely, blocked sentence presentation did not produce any consistent effect on 
reaction times, indicating that it failed to produce a consistent context. It is probable 
that each sentence, although describing motion events in the same direction, were still 
divergent enough that a consistent context was not created. Each sentence described 
idiosyncratic situations (e.g. ‘The woman raised the curtain’, ‘The rocket flew to the 
moon’) and the comprehension of each sentence most likely removed the effects of 
comprehending the previous sentence since they did not form a connected narrative. 
Thus the motion events described in the sentences were not continuous, being an 
isolated event described by each sentence. Given that presentation of the RDKs was 
unsynchronised to the presentation of the sentences, appearing at various points during a 
sentence (e.g. during the Subject, Verb or Object), it is perhaps not surprising that 
blocked presentation of disjointed sentences did not produce any consistent effects on 
direction judgements. It is possible that if RDKs were synchronised to the verb in a 
sentence we would have seen some congruency effect; elsewhere it has been shown that 
effects of motion information are localised to this region (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006).
The main methodological problem with this task is that participants made explicit 
judgements about the direction of motion, therefore response options were ‘up’ or 
‘down’. It is not possible to separate effects on perception from effects on response.
The linguistic context may be influencing the ease with which directional motion is 
perceived, as predicted by embodied theories, or it may be affecting the speed with 
which participants can prepare and execute a response once perception is complete.
This is a more trivial explanation and fits with stimulus response compatability 
phenomena such as the Simon effect, in which incongruence between a stimulus 
location and response hand (e.g. left location and right response) produce longer 
reaction times than congruence (e.g. left location and left hand). Simon effects have 
been found for stationary targets, like RDKs, with incongruent or congruent (i.e. 
leftward or rightward) motion within them (Bosbach, Prinz & Kerzel, 2004). Therefore, 
it is entirely possible that the motion words acted as interfering stimuli during response 
preparation. In addition, because the single word stimuli are blocked it is possible that 
participants are aware of the semantic content of the words. The observed effects could
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be mediated or caused by particular strategies or conscious processes, rather than an 
elementary effect of semantic content on visual processes. To avoid these problems, 
subsequent experiments turned to psychophysical methods and motion detection 
paradigms.
6.1.5. Motion Detection
Psychophysical methods used to explore motion perception are of special interest for a 
number of reasons. First, we can manipulate the direction of motion independently of 
response. Rather than making directional judgements participants judge if coherent 
motion is present or absent (motion detection). This reduces the likelihood that Simon- 
effect like influences on response preparation and execution are confounded with the 
dependent measures. Second, these methods have been extensively used in 
psychophysics to explore specific aspects of visual motion processing. Random Dot 
Kinematograms are known to engage a set of well characterised processes in first order 
motion perception. These stimuli have been shown to activate specific cortical areas, 
typically the MT+ complex, and in using them we focus on direction selective motion 
processing (e.g. Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004). Third, by employing 
psychophysical thresholding techniques we can explore where effects of comprehension 
on motion perception are manifest. Analysis using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) 
allows us to separate early perceptual sensitivity (as measured by d’), decision processes 
(c and p) and overall response (reaction times) (see Appendix 2). In other words, by 
using these stimuli we can localise a specific visual process and interpret at what level 
comprehension of motion words affects the perception of visual motion. Finally, by 
using motion detection we avoid some of the immediate problems of strategic 
processing possible with blocked word presentation. If motion words affect only 
decision or response preparation we should not see effects on low level perception as 
measured by d’.
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6 .2 . Blocked Word Comprehension & Motion Detection
Participants performed a coherent motion detection task with stimuli at their threshold 
coherence level. RDKs displayed coherent motion upwards or downwards or incoherent 
(random) motion. Whilst performing this task, participants heard blocks of single words 
over headphones. Two experiments have shown that blocked single word presentation 
creates an effective directional context (5.1 and 6.1). We used SDT to assess whether 
and at which level language comprehension affects motion perception. This analysis 
allowed us to separate the effects of comprehension into (i) those at the perceptual level 
(Sensitivity); (ii) those at the decision level (Criterion); and (iii) those at the overall 
response level (Reaction Time). If language comprehension only acts upon higher order 
processes we would predict some change in the decision variables, but not in sensitivity. 
If comprehension activates representations that permeate to the earliest stages of 
sensory processes, we would predict a change in sensitivity. In both cases we would 
predict reaction time changes that reflect both influences, and may also reflect 
conscious and strategic processing of the linguistic input. The hypothesis is non 
directional, although based on our previous experiments we might expect interference 
effects when the semantic and perceptual motion are incongruent (i.e. lower accuracy, 
longer response times).
6.2.1. Participants
20 Native English speakers (8 male) with a mean age of 25.6yrs (SD = 6yrs) were 
recruited from the UCL Psychology Department Subject Pool in return for monetary 
compensation of £6 per hour. All had normal or corrected to normal vision.
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6.2.2. Method
6.2.2.1. Design
A 2x3 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were the 
direction of motion of the RDK (upwards or downwards), and the Word Category 
(Control, Match and Mismatch). The dependent measures were the accuracy of 
detecting motion on each trial, and the reaction time (milliseconds) to make the 
judgement. Participants attended two sessions separated by 3-7 days. Within each 
session, direction of detected motion (upwards or downwards) was kept constant with a 
balanced order across participants. Participants first completed a threshold estimation 
routine that established the percentage coherence at which the participant detected 
motion with 81% accuracy (see Threshold Estimation for details).
For the Motion Detection task there were 2 runs of 16 blocks of 20 motion 
detection trials comprised of 10 coherent motion and 10 random noise trials presented in 
randomized order. Each run started with 4 practise blocks with no words followed by 12 
word-blocks during which participants heard words presented over the headphones.
The 12 blocks consisted of 4 different item orders for the 3 Word Categories; 
presentation order was pseudo-randomised using a latin squares design so that the same 
Category was not presented in consecutive blocks.
6.2.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Single Words was used. There were three wordblock conditions: 
Up, Down, and Control. Four item orders for each group were produced and 
concatenated into a single WAV sound file. The sound files were 32 seconds long, a 2 
second silence at the beginning followed by one word onset every second.
6.2.2.3. Graphic Display
Each RDK consisted of 1000 grey dots (width = 0.04° visual angle) against a 
black background covering a square area (width = 8°) centred at fixation point. During
197
each trial, a randomly chosen subset of the dots were vertically displaced up or down by 
0.25 degree steps in 13 consecutive frames (total motion time= 150ms; speed = 21 °/s). 
The rest of the dots were repositioned randomly from one frame to the next. Coherently 
moving dots reaching either end of the display area were repositioned on the other side 
for the next frame. A central fixation square (width = 0.2 deg) was displayed throughout 
the experiment. Stimuli were generated using Cogent toolbox
(www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/) for MATLAB (Mathworks, Inc) and presented at 60Hz 
using a TFT display (resolution = 800x600, 15’ NEC Multiscan LCD1510+).
6.2.2.4. Apparatus
Stereo closed headphones were used to present the audio files. The experiment was 
conducted in a sound attenuated booth. Participants placed their chin on a rest 53cm 
from the computer screen.
6.2.2.5. Procedure
Threshold Estimation
Motion detection thresholds were estimated for each participant using constant stimuli 
and a 2-interval forced choice (2-IFC) design. In each trial, 2 RDKs - one containing a 
varying percentage of coherent motion and the other random noise only - were 
sequentially presented and the participant indicated which interval contained coherent 
motion. Participants pressed the left-arrow key for the first pattern, and the right arrow 
key for the second pattern. The coherent motion signal strength varied between 0.1- 
20% in 9 equal steps with each step repeated twice per block. There were 16 practise 
blocks, comprised of 20 trials, followed by 8 experimental blocks. In each trial, after a 
random delay between 500- 1000ms, the first RDK was presented for 150ms, followed 
by a random interval between 500-1000ms, and the second RDK also for 150ms. There 
was no time out for response. Performance was quantified by fitting a Wiebull function 
to the behavioural data using the psignif i t  toolbox version 2.5.6 for Matlab 
(http://bootstrap-software.org/psignifit/) which implemented the maximum-likelihood 
method described by Wichmann and Hill (2001). Threshold for detection was defined as 
the percentage of coherent motion for which the fitted psychometric function predicted
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81% accuracy (50% being "chance level" performance in a 2-interval forced choice 
task). In each session, threshold estimation was completed at the beginning of each run. 
If the second threshold did not agree with the first, the lower of the two was used for the 
second run unless participants reported that they were experiencing significant trouble 
or fatigue
Motion Detection
Participants were instructed to ignore the words and concentrate on detecting the 
motion in the RDK patterns. WAV files began playing at the start of each experimental 
block and a fixation cross was presented for 2000ms (so that words were not presented 
before motion detection trials). In each motion detection trial, after a random delay of 
500-1000ms, an RDK was displayed for 150ms followed by a time out of 1500ms for 
the response. Participants detected the presence of coherent motion in the RDKs by 
pressing the left arrow key for coherent motion and the right arrow key for random 
noise.
6.2.2.6. Analysis
The presentation of words and RDKs was unsynchronised and we expected 
semantic effects to build up over the block (e.g. Vigliocco, Vinson, Damian & Levelt, 
2002), therefore the first two RDK trials from each block were removed from the 
analysis. Results for each condition were collapsed across runs. Reaction time data was 
only analysed for correctly detected coherent motion trials; values over 3 standard 
deviations from the mean were removed for each participant, removing 1.5% of the 
data. For SDT analysis, the percentage of correct detections on motion trials (hits) and 
incorrect detections on random motion trials (false alarms) were calculated. These 
values were used to calculate a measure of sensitivity (d'), and a measure of internal 
response criterion (c). Other SDT measures were calculated (e.g. P) but did not show 
significant changes, so are not reported here. Calculations were performed in Excel 
using equations taken from Stanislaw & Todorov (1999). 2x3 Analyses of Variance 
with planned tests for simple effects were then carried out on reaction times and SDT 
statistics.
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6.2.3. Results
6.2.3.1. £
Perceptual sensitivity for motion detection was significantly modulated by 
comprehended words. There was a significant main effect of condition (F(2, 19) = 
4.539, p-if = 0.193). Tests of simple effects revealed a marginal difference between 
Control and Mismatch conditions (F(l, 19) = 3.761, p = .067, p-r|2 = 0.165) and a 
significant difference between Match and Mismatch (F(l, 19) = 7.851, p-rj2 =0.292), 
such that d’ was lower when the motion direction and wordblock were incongruent (see 
Figure 6-2 & Table 6-2).
6.2.3.2. Criterion
Tests of simple effects revealed a marginal difference between Control and Match 
(F(l, 19) = 3.250, p = .087, p-r|2 = 0.146) and a significant difference between Match 
and Mismatch (F(l,19) = 5.145, p-r|2 = 0.213). Criterion was lower when the 
wordblock and motion direction were congruent (see Figure 6-3 & Table 6-3).
6.2.3.3. Reaction Times
There was a significant interaction between condition and RDK Motion (F(2 19) = 
4.927, p-r|2 = 0.206). Tests of simple interactions showed a significant interaction 
between Control and Mismatch (F( 1,19) = 6.861, p-r|2 = .265) and Match and 
Mismatch (F(l, 19) = 7.372, p-r|2 = .280), in the Mismatch condition RTs were raised
1 “7for upwards motion and lowered for downwards motion . See Table 6-5.
12 A 2x2 ANOVA comparing Word Category (Down, Up) and Motion Direction (Upwards, Downwards) 
showed a significant difference between Down and Up words, such that reaction times were 13ms 
faster for Down words as compared to Up words (F(l, 19) = 7.372, p-r^ 2 = 0.280).
Figure 6-2: (a) Mean d’ and (b) C bv Word Category and Motion Direction.
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6.2.4. Discussion
The results showed that listening to motion words affected people’s sensitivity to 
motion, their internal decision criterion and speed when performing a motion detection 
task. A decrease in d’ indicates impaired sensory level stimulus processing resulting in 
a diminished separation of signal and noise distributions, hence, poorer perceptual 
sensitivity (Wickens, 2002). Here, we found that sensitivity was worse when the motion 
direction and word block were incongruent. However, when listening to non-motion 
words (Control) or motion words congruent with the detected motion, participants did 
not show any significant changes in sensitivity. Therefore, the representation that is 
activated upon comprehension creates specific noise and interferes with the detection of 
the incongruent motion signal, reducing sensitivity. When the motion signal and 
wordblock are congruent, no such interference occurs and the motion can be detected as 
well as in the control condition. This provides clear support for semantic processing 
penetrating to low-level sensory perception, and is also in line with semantic content 
that is a perceptually grounded representation of motion.
We also found that participants’ Criterion (as measured by c but not Beta) was 
differentially modulated by word blocks such that a lower Criterion was adopted by the 
participants in blocks where the motion direction and word block were congruent. 
Criterion is a measure of the internal decision threshold set by the participant, if a 
stimulus is above threshold the participant will respond positively (that they perceive 
coherent motion), if a stimulus is below threshold the participant will respond 
negatively (random motion). By shifting the Criterion downwards, the participant is 
being less conservative. Thus, participants were more likely to decide that coherent 
motion was present when the detected motion and the word block were congruent. This 
effect looks like response priming; in which congruence between stimuli and response 
facilitate decision and response processes. This is in partial agreement with Pilot 6-la, 
in which congruent (or partially congruent) conditions reduced reaction times.
However, in this experiment facilitation did not however extend to reaction times 
(probably because of the response required to the target, see section 9.3), instead 
reaction times were raised for upwards motion and lowered for downwards motion. It is 
possible that downwards motion facilitated the pushing down of buttons, a weak version 
of the Simon effects discussed above (see section 6.1.4). Therefore, there is a 
separation between the effects that the words have on perceptual sensitivity (d’), in
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which we see interference during incongruent conditions; decision processes (making 
decisions less conservative under congruent conditions) and response 
preparation/execution (making motor responses faster when the hand action is 
congruent with the direction of the words).
Table 6-2: d prime data for experiment 6.2- 6.5 bv Condition (Control. Match. 
Mismatch) and Motion Direction (Down. Up')
(Standard deviation in brackets)_________________________________________________________
Experiment Control 
Down Up
Condition
Match 
Down Up
Mismatch 
Down Up
6.2 1.14 1.08 1.12 1.16 0.97 1.00
Blocked Word (0.43) (0.44) (0.49) (0.50) (0.38) (0.55)
Category Mean 1.11 (0.43) 1.13(0.47) 0.98(0.47)*
6.3 0.93 0.70 0.82 0.64 0.87 0.65
Single Word (0.36) (0.24) (0.27) (0.31) (0.36) (0.28)
Category Mean 0.82 (0.26) t 0.73 (0.23) t 0.76 (0.23)
6.4 1.11 0.94 1.29 0.95 1.16 1.07
Sentences (0.55) (0.41) (0.54) (0.49) (0.59 (0.37)
Category Mean 1.03 (0.35) f 1.12(0.39) f 1.11 (0.41)
6.5 0.85 0.78 0.84 0.85 0.66 0.90
Blocked Single Word (0.48) (0.40) (0.40) (0.37) (0.44) (0.54)
Category Mean 0.81 (0.35) 0.84 (0.32) 0.78 (0.43)
* significant main effect driven by this condition being different to the other two 
f  significant difference between these two conditions in planned comparisons
This task has shown that language comprehension can influence several levels of task 
performance. Neither of the observed SDT patterns registered in the reaction time 
data, which reflect the whole of processing from perception, through decision to 
response execution. In contrast, SDT measures separate the levels in a decision process 
and provide a better foundation for discussing the origin of observed effects. It is not 
surprising that comprehension affected task completion in selective but varied ways. 
However, the finding that different levels are affected in different ways raises two 
important questions. First, it makes it harder to relate the findings here to previous 
studies that show effects in reaction times. Second, there are two possible 
interpretations. The different levels could be affected because language has a ‘global’ 
influence on processing that is manifest in different effects because each level of 
processing operates with different mechanisms. Under this description, the results are
203
not necessarily due to the direct engagement of sensory areas by semantic access, and 
the effects on d’ could be due to top-down effects that ultimately filter down to the 
lowest levels of processing. Alternatively, language could have separable effects at 
different levels, with each effect somewhat independent of the others. In this case, 
semantic access does engage directly with low level processes (d’), decision processes 
(c) and response preparation/execution (reaction times).
The blocked presentation (even when passively comprehended) does not rule out 
strategic processes. Participants may well have been aware that each block contained 
‘up’ or ‘down’ words. Therefore, having demonstrated effects with blocked single word 
presentation it is crucial to show similar effects following randomised trial-by-trial 
effects where the linguistic manipulations are hidden from the participant. The 
Criterion shift indicates that the comprehension of these words affected processing at a 
higher level than sensitivity. Therefore the first interpretation, a ‘global’ effect of 
comprehension, is not ruled out by this first experiment. Although the effects at each 
level were in different directions, the observed effects could be entirely contextual; the 
product of semantic representations modulating specific top-down processes (such as 
attention) which in turn affect early perceptual processes (e.g. Yantis, 2005). The 
changes in sensitivity could come via higher-order decision processes, rather than being 
an elementary consequence of semantic activation (i.e. direct engagement). It is 
important to note that this account does not make any claims about the semantic system; 
it simply offers a mechanism for the observed interaction, via task relevant expectations 
and draws on findings from the visual perception literature in which top-down feedback 
is able to alter early visual processing (e.g. Yantis, 2005). A central reason for using 
RDK stimuli and SDT analysis was to base the results on a sound literature in visual 
perception, therefore interpretation and explanation must consider what is known about 
the perceptual system. The other interpretation, that different levels are affected 
independently, is an intriguing possibility since it speaks of complex integration 
processes between comprehension and different levels in visual perception. However, it 
would require effects on perceptual sensitivity (d’) without effects on decision 
thresholds (c and P) or similar effects on reaction times.
In the next experiments items were presented in a randomized order rather than blocked. 
This is essential in order to rule out consciously mediated strategic effects. When items 
are randomized participants should no longer be aware of the directional content of the
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words. In addition, single words and sentences are used to see if a fuller event (i.e. a 
sentence) produces different results.
6 .3. Single Word Comprehension & Motion Detection
Participants performed a coherent motion detection task with stimuli at their threshold 
coherence level. RDKs displayed coherent motion upwards or downwards or incoherent 
(random) motion. Each RDK was preceded by a single word presented over 
headphones. On filler trials, participants answered comprehension questions about the 
word they had just heard, making comprehension active but without the salient 
directional context that may have driven the effects in 6.2. SDT separated the effects of 
comprehension into (i) those at the perceptual level (Sensitivity); (ii) those at the 
decision level (Criterion); and (iii) those at the overall response level (Reaction Time). 
We found that single words referring to motion were not able to influence visuo-spatial 
attention, however, they may be sufficient to influence motion processing. The 
hypothesis is that if single words tap the same mechanisms as blocked presentation, we 
should see the same pattern of results as that found for Experiment 6.2: (i) d’ will be 
lower when the words and the motion are incongruent (ii) Criterion (and Beta) will be 
reduced when the words and the motion are congruent and (iii) Reaction Times will not 
show any significant effects of congruency.
6.3.1. Participants
23 Native English speakers (6 male) with a mean age of 23.52yrs (SD = 9.9yrs) were 
recruited from the UCL Psychology Department Subject Pool in return for monetary 
compensation of £6 per hour. All had normal or corrected to normal vision.
6.3.2. Method
6.3.2.1. Design
The Design was the same as Experiment 6.2 except that after Threshold 
Estimation participants completed 30 practice trials of the motion detection task without 
hearing any words and Motion Detection was split into 3 runs of 16 blocks of 17 motion
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detection trials. At the beginning of each run, participants completed 20 practise trials 
with words presented auditorally and 50% of these practice trials were followed by a 
comprehension question. Each run was split into two halves, with each item presented 
once in each half (8 blocks, 136 trials). Therefore, across the experiment there were a 
total of 816 trials, and the participant heard each word 6 times. Across each run there 
were an equal number of coherent and random motion trials.
6.3.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Single Words was used and individual WAV files for each word were 
presented.
29 filler words were selected from the set created for that purpose, all could be followed 
by a comprehension question of the form “Was the word related to X?”. An additional 
17 filler items were selected that were not followed by comprehension questions.
Two lists were created, one for each half of an experimental run. The lists were identical 
except that in List la each word was presented with one type of visual motion (coherent 
or random) and in List lb each item was presented with the other type. The program for 
the experiment was designed so that it randomly selected items for presentation in each 
block, but presented one list in the first half-run of the experiment and the other list in 
the second half-run. In this way the repetition of items was kept as far apart as possible 
whilst maintaining randomization. For filler items, Lists la and lb were duplicated 
(Lists 2a/2b). Items were duplicated in each list, but in List 1 half the items were 
followed by a comprehension question and half the items were not. In List 2, the items 
followed by a comprehension question were reversed. Therefore there were two 
possible lists for an experimental run, with different comprehension questions. The 
participants completed three runs of the experiment. For the first run, List 1 or 2 was 
presented. In the second run, the other list was presented. In the third run, the list 
presented on the first run was presented again. There was a minimum of 272 trials 
between participants receiving the same comprehension question, which was considered 
sufficient to maintain concentration and not produce automated responses. The 
presentation order of lists was balanced across participants.
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6.3.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus
The Graphic Display and Apparatus were identical to Experiment 6.2 except that the 
monitor was a CRT display set to 75Hz (resolution = 800x600, 17’ DELL P793). A 
side-light facing the wall behind the participant was used to provide lighting, this 
ensured that the motion stimuli were easy to discriminate but participants’ eyes did not 
become fatigued.
6.3.2.4. Procedure 
Threshold Estimation
This was identical to Experiment 6.2 except that there were 4 practice blocks and it was 
completed only once before the motion detection phase.
Motion Detection
This was the same as Experiment 6.2 except that motion detection trials were 
synchronised to single word presentation. In each trial, participants heard a word which 
was followed by an RDK. During experimental trials, RDKs were presented after an 
ISI between 27- 93ms, in 13ms steps. The delay was kept constant for each item. On 
filler trials, RDKs appeared at different offset delays each time the filler word was 
presented. Participants were instructed to listen to the words and also detect the motion 
in the RDK patterns. They were told that on some trials, following the RDK, they 
would be asked a question about the word they just heard. In each run 11% of the filler 
trials were followed by a comprehension question. Comprehension questions always 
appeared with the response options underneath, “yes” always appearing on the left and 
“no” on the right. Participants responded to the questions by pressing the left arrow key 
for ‘yes’ and the right arrow key for ‘no’. There was a 1500ms timeout for responding 
to the RDKs and a 4000ms timeout for responding to the comprehension questions.
6.3.2.5. Analysis
2 subjects were removed as they did not complete the Threshold Estimation task 
properly, so reliable values for their threshold could not be established. 4 further
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subjects were removed as they were not true Native English speakers (being trilingual 
and from countries where English is not the national language); this was established by 
more detailed questioning after the experiment. The analysis was similar to Experiment 
6.2 with Word Category analysed as Control, Match and Mismatch across Motion 
Directions (upwards and downwards). All trials with a valid response were analysed 
and entered into by Subjects/by Items analyses for SDT measures. Reaction time data 
for Hits only was extracted and times above 2 standard deviations for each subject were 
excluded, this removed 5.34% of the data.
6.3.3. Results
6.3.3.1. £
There was a main effect of Motion Direction, with d’ for downwards motion 0.207 units 
greater than upwards motion (Fl(l,16) = 6.828, p-r|2 = 0.299; F2(l,87) = 23.853, p-q2 
= 0.215). The main effect of Word Category approached significance by Subjects 
(F(2,32) = 3.160, p = 0.056, peta = 0.165; F2(2,87) = 1.459, p>0.2, peta = 0.032). 
Planned comparisons showed that the Control condition had d’ values significantly 
higher than the Match condition (Fl(l,26) = 5.449, peta = 0.254; F2(l,58) = 2.6, p>0.1, 
peta = 0.043) and marginally higher than the Mismatch condition (F 1(1,16) = 3.635, p = 
0.075, peta = 0.185; F2 < 1). See Table 6-2.
6.3.3.2. Criterion
There were no significant differences (See Table 6-3 for Word Category by Motion 
Direction mean values).
6.3.3.3. Beta
There were no significant differences (See Table 6-4 for Word Category by Motion 
Direction mean values).
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Table 6-3: Criterion (c) data for experiments 6.2- 6.5 bv Condition (Control. Match. 
Mismatch") and Motion Direction (Down. Up)
(Standard deviation in brackets)________________________________________________________
Experiment Control 
Down Up
Condition
Match 
Down Up
Mismatch 
Down Up
6.2 0.1 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.14
Blocked Word (0.35) (0.097) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.34)
Category Mean 0.11 (0.35) 0.027 (0.27Y 0.13(0.31)
6.3 -0.005 0.027 0.002 -0.04 0.045 0.022
Single Word (0.38) (0.38) (0.37) (0.41) (0.41) (0.43)
Category Mean 0.11 (0.35) -0.019 (0.36) 0.33 (0.38)
6.4 -0.15 -0.04 -0.14 -0.14 -0.10 -0.08
Sentences (0.32) (0.33) (0.33) (0.28) (0.37) (0.34)
Category Mean -0.10(0.27) -0.14(0.26) -0.09 (0.29)
6.5 0.02 -0.07 0.002 -0.013 0.121 -0.05
Blocked Single Word (0.31) (0.31) (0.26) (0.35) (0.32) (0.22)
Category Mean -0.024 (0.28) -0.006 (0.26) 0.036 (0.23)
*main effect driven by this condition being significantly different to both other conditions 
t  significant difference between these two conditions in planned comparisons
6.3.3.4. Reaction Times
There was a significant main effect of Motion Direction by Items (F2 < 1.3; F2(l,87) = 
43.857, peta = 0.335) and a significant interaction between Word Category and Motion 
Direction by Subjects (Fl(2,32) = 5.248, peta = 0.247; F2 < 1.4). Reaction times for 
Upwards motion were on average 23ms faster than reaction times to Downwards 
motion. The interaction was driven by this difference being smaller in the Mismatch 
condition (9ms) as compared to the Match (24ms) and Control (34ms) conditions.
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6.3.4. Discussion
The results showed that perceptual sensitivity (d’) was higher for downwards motion as 
compared to upwards motion. Reaction times were longer for downwards motion as 
compared to upwards motion. Therefore it looks as though upwards motion suffered 
from a speed-accuracy trade-off, with participants responding more quickly and making 
more errors as a result. Aside from the effect of direction, the main effect of Word 
Category was significant, with d’ lower in Match and Mismatch conditions as compared 
to the Control. Therefore directional words of all kinds impaired perceptual sensitivity. 
In this experiment there was no consistent directional context and single words preceded 
RDK onset (although a variable ISI meant RDK onset was not entirely predictable).
The immediate semantic processing of each word was more than likely over before the 
presentation of the motion pattern. However, comprehension was active as participants 
had to answer questions about the semantic content of the words in filler trials. It is 
possible that because the participants had to maintain the semantic content of the word 
during RDK presentation (in order to answer the occasional filler question), when the 
content was directional this interfered with motion detection. When the semantic 
content was non-directional, it did not affect motion detection. This suggests that there 
was a general demand on motion processing systems during the maintenance of 
semantic motion information, but the demand was not specific enough to produce 
congruency effects (congruent conditions produced slightly lower d’ values, but this 
difference was not reliable). However, under this explanation we might expect the 
maintenance of directional semantic content to affect decision thresholds or reaction 
times, but it did not. These two dependent measures, which correspond to later/higher 
stages in decision and response processes, showed no effects of directional words in 
general or in terms of congruence. This suggests that the effect of directional words 
was via a close connection between semantic and perceptual systems, rather than a more 
global effect of maintenance on all stages of task execution. This demonstrates that 
effects on d’ are independent of those at higher levels, however, given the temporal 
relationship between the word and the RDK, it is not safe to infer that the effects are a 
result of primary semantic access (i.e. the immediate semantic activation whilst the 
word was comprehended). These effects could be due to processes that maintain a 
word’s meaning in memory, producing a general tax on resources in the motion 
processing system and reducing sensitivity. Therefore it is not clear how truthfully they 
reflect ‘normal’ semantic activity; in order to make safer interpretations about primary
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semantic activity and visual processing, closer temporal contiguity between the 
linguistic and visual stimuli is needed.
The results from this experiment suggest that the consistent context created through 
blocked presentation was a major factor in producing reliable congruency effects as 
seen in Experiment 6.2. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that the semantic content 
of isolated single words may be too short-lived and the activation too weak to show 
similar behavioural effects -  especially when the presentation of the words and the 
RDK were separate temporal events. In the next experiment, we looked at the effects 
when the same single words were presented as verbs within a sentence context. 
Sentences refer to complete events, therefore we might expect their more substantial 
semantic representations to influence motion detection. However, sentences constrain 
the interpretation of the verb, which may or may not influence the impact of semantic 
motion on perception, particularly if it shifts the focus away from the motion event (e.g. 
onto the object location). For example, each verb can now be indexed to an object and 
the representation of the motion event should be more concrete. In Chapter 5, visual 
stimuli were presented a sentence offset and we found effects on visuo-spatial attention. 
As discussed above, in order to make inferences about primary semantic access and 
motion perception the presentation of motion stimuli has to be contiguous with the 
comprehended items. Therefore, RDKs will be presented after the verb, but during the 
remainder of the sentence. Although the critical lexical item and motion pattern are 
separate temporal events, sentence comprehension -  and by extension the activation of 
semantic representations - is still in progress.
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6 .4 . Sentence Comprehension & Motion Detection
Participants performed a coherent motion detection task with stimuli at their threshold 
coherence level. RDKs displayed coherent motion upwards or downwards or incoherent 
(random) motion. Sentences were presented over headphones and in experimental trials 
RDKs were presented following verb offset. On filler trials, participants answered 
comprehension questions about the sentence they had just heard, making 
comprehension active. SDT separated the effects of comprehension into (i) those at the 
perceptual level (Sensitivity); (ii) those at the decision level (Criterion); and (iii) those 
at the overall response level (Reaction Time). We found that single words referring to 
motion did not show strong effects on motion processing; sentences may therefore 
provide a more substantial representation. If verbs within a sentence context tap the 
same mechanisms as blocked presentation, we should see the same pattern of results as 
that found for Experiment 6.2: (i) d’ will be lower when the words and the motion are 
incongruent (ii) Criterion (and Beta) will be reduced when the words and the motion are 
congruent and (iii) Reaction Times will not show any significant effects of congruency.
6.4.1. Participants
22 Native English speakers (11 female) with a mean age of 25.77yrs (SD = 12.0yrs) 
were recruited from the UCL Psychology Department Subject Pool in return for 
monetary compensation of £6 per hour. All had normal or corrected to normal vision.
6.4.2. Method
6.4.2.1. Design
The Design was identical to Experiment 6.3 except that the Motion Detection 
was split into 2 runs of 20 blocks of 13 motion detection trials. At the beginning of 
each run participants completed 10 practise trials with sentences, 50% of which were 
followed by comprehension questions. Each run was split into two halves, with each 
item presented once in each half (130 trials, 40 of which were filler trials). Across the 
experiment there were a total of 520 trials, and the participant heard each sentence 4 
times.
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6.4.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Sentences was used. 40 comprehension questions were selected from the 
set created for this purpose (followed by questions of the form “Did X verb Y?”, 
requiring a yes/no answer). Item presentation was randomised according to the list 
structure used in Experiment 5.4. Offset times for Experimental and Filler sentences 
were established for Experiment 5.4 and were re-used here.
6.4.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus 
There were identical to Experiment 6.3.
6.4.2.4. Procedure
Threshold Estimation
This was identical to Experiment 6.3
Motion Detection
This was the same as Experiment 6.3 except that motion detection trials were 
synchronised to verb offset in experimental trials, and varied sentence positions in filler 
trials. In each trial, participants heard a sentence and judged an RDK. Participants were 
instructed to listen to the sentences and also detect the motion in the RDK patterns.
They were told that on some trials, following the sentence and RDK, they would be 
asked a question about the sentence they just heard. In each run 15% of the filler trials 
were followed by a comprehension question. Question presentation, response keys and 
time-outs were the same as for Experiment 6.3
6.4.2.5. Analysis
3 participants were removed as they did not complete the Threshold Estimation 
correctly. Analysis was identical to Experiment 6.3. Reaction Times above 3 standard 
deviations for each participant were removed; this affected 1.34% of the data.
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6.4.3. Results
6.4.3.1. £
There was a significant main effect of Motion Direction by Items (FI < 1.9; F2(l,84) = 
16.226, p-rj2 = 0.162), with Upwards motion 0.173 units lower than Downwards 
motion. Planned comparisons showed that the Match condition had higher d’ values 
compared to Control by Subjects (F l(l, 18) = 6.107, p-r|2 = 0.253; F2(l,56) = 2.396, p = 
0.127, p-r|2 = 0.041). There was also a significant interaction between Motion 
Direction and Word Category when the Match and Mismatch condition were compared 
(F l(l,18) = 6.261, p-r|2 = 0.258; F2(l,56) = 4.424, p-x\2 = 0.073): there was a smaller 
difference in d’ between Upwards and Downwards motion in the Mismatch condition as 
compared to the Match condition (0.082 vs. 0.342) (See Table 6-2).
6.4.3.2. Criterion
There was a significant main effect of Word Category by Subjects that approached 
significance by Items (Fl(2,36) = 3.866, p-r|2 = 0.177; F2(2,84) = 2.518, p = 0.087, p-r|2 
= 0.057). Planned comparisons showed that the Match condition had lower Criterion 
values than the Control condition (Fl(l,18) = 7.173, p-rj2 = 0.285; F2(l,56) = 3.399, p 
= 0.071, p-ri2 = 0.057) and the Mismatch condition (F 1(1,18) = 7.842, p-rj2 = 0.303; 
F2(l,56) = 5.042, p-r|2 = 0.083). There was also a significant interaction between 
Motion Direction and Word Category when the Match condition was compared to the 
Control condition (Fl(l,18) = 5.162, p-if = 0.223; F2(l,56) = 4.005, p-rf = 0.067); 
this was driven by a difference in mean Criterion values for Upwards and Downwards 
motion in the Control condition that was not present in the Match condition (0.107 vs 0) 
(See Table 6-3).
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Table 6-4: Beta data for experiment 6.2- 6.5 bv Condition (Control. Match. Mismatch) 
and Motion Direction (Down. Up)
E xperim ent Control 
Down Up
C ondition
Match 
Down Up
Mismatch 
Down Up
6.2 1.31 1.25 1.02 1.16 1.18 1.27
Blocked Word (1.15) (0.59) (0.32) (0.80) (0.38) (0.74)
Category Mean 1.28 (0.87) 1.09 (0.56) 1.23 (0.56)
6.3 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.06 1.1
Single Word (0.35) (0.24) (0.27) (0.25) (0.32) (0.29)
Category Mean 1.06 (0.28) 1.05 (0.24) 1.08(0.21)
6.4 0.86 1.11 0.87 0.98 1.02 1.00
Sentences (0.27) (0.68) (0.36) (0.42) (0.37) (0.41)
Category Mean 0.99 (0.41) 0.93 (0.33) f 1.01 (0.33)
6.5 1.08 1.05 1.21 1.15 1.35 0.99
Blocked Single Word (0.30) (0.26) (0.38) (0.59) (0.77) (0.18)
Category Mean 1.06 (0.24) 1.14(0.40) 1.17 (0.42)
t  by Items difference between this and the other two conditions in planned comparisons
6.4.3.3. Beta
There was a significant interaction between Motion Direction and Word Category by 
Subjects (Fl(2,36) = 3.656, p-rf = 0.169; F2 < 1.6) and a marginal main effect of Word 
Category by Items (FI < 1.9; F2(2,84) = 3.015, p = 0.054, p-rf = 0.067). Planned 
comparisons showed a trend for lower Beta values in the Match condition as compared 
to the Control (Fl(l,18) = 2.288, p = 0.148, p-rf = 0.113; F2(l,56) = 5.444, p-tf = 
0.089) and Mismatch conditions (F l(l, 18) = 6.937, p-r|2 = 0.278; F2(l,56) = 2.793, p = 
0.1, p-T|2 = 0.048). When the Control and Mismatch conditions were compared, there 
was a significant interaction between Motion Direction and Word Category by Subjects 
(F l(l, 18) = 4.971, p-rj2 = 0.216; F2 < 1.6); this was driven by a difference in mean Beta 
values for Upwards and Downwards motion in the Control condition that was not 
present in the Mismatch condition (0.2481 vs 0.0187). There was also a main effect of 
Motion Direction with higher Beta values for Upwards motion (FI < 1.15; F2(l,56) = 
4.936, p-rf = 0.081) (See Table 6-4).
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6.4.3.4. Reaction Times
There was a significant main effect of Motion Direction by Items (FI < 1; F2(l,84) = 
5.560, p-r|2 = 0.062), with reaction times for Upwards motion 21.32ms longer than for 
Downwards motion. Planned comparisons showed that reaction times in the Match 
condition were approximately 10ms faster than the Control, this difference approached 
significance by Subjects (F l(l, 18) = 4.135, p = 0.057, p-rf = 0.187; F2 < 1). See Table 
6-5, which also illustrates that reaction times in this experiment were longer than those 
in other experiments by approximately 100ms.
Table 6-5: Reaction Time data for experiment 6.2- 6.5 bv Condition (Control. Match. 
Mismatch) and Motion Direction (Down. Up)
Standard Deviation in Brackets
E xperim ent Control 
Down Up
C o n d itio n
Match 
Down Up
Mismatch 
Down Up
6.2 670.56 667.74 669.01 661.74 682.62 648.61
Blocked Word (98.41) (100.03) (85.13) (90.42) (100.69) (92.61)
Category Mean 669.16(94.56) 665.38(87.78) 665.62 (96.65)
6.3 645.50 622.25 636.50 612.50 633.63 624.63
Single Word (125.01) (79.60) (117.60) (93.40) (109.40) (84.35)
Category Mean 628.38 (93.70) 624.49 (99.01) 629.13(87.99)
6.4 744.68 753.08 734.19 743.78 744.06 747.80
Sentences (145.76) (131.10) (145.27) (121.30) (148.50) (135.00)
Category Mean 748.88 (130.77) * 738.97 (123.85) * 745.93 (131.37)
6.5 579.83 609.57 637.45 615.31 639.91 631.40
Blocked Single Word (158.51) (110.34) (118.14) (92.92) (116.17) (103.39)
Category Mean 594.70(107.93) 626.38 (95.38) 635.66 (98.75)
*marginal difference between these two conditions in planned comparisons.
6.4.4. Discussion
The d’ results showed higher values for Downwards motion as compared to Upwards 
motion. Reaction time data also showed a difference for motion direction, with slower 
times for Upwards motion as compared to Downwards motion. Upwards motion was 
responded to more slowly and less accurately than Downwards motion. In addition, 
Beta showed higher values (i.e. more conservative responding) for Upwards as
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compared to Downwards motion. Overall this pattern of results suggests that Upwards 
motion is harder to detect than downwards motion. Participants were slower, less 
accurate and they raised decision thresholds to avoid false alarms, indicating that 
upwards motion was less salient and therefore less easy to detect.
There was a signficiant interaction between Sentence Category and Motion Direction, 
when d’ was compared between Match and Mismatch conditions. The Mismatch 
condition had a smaller difference between Downwards and Upwards motion than the 
Match condition. In a similar fashion, differences between criterion values for different 
motion directions is greater in the Control condition (when no directional words are 
present) than in directional conditions (Match or Mismatch). Therefore, measures of 
perceptual sensitivity show that incongruent words reduce the criterion disparity 
between different motion directions, possibly because they create more equal conditions 
between motion directions. Decision thresholds showed differences between motion 
directions in the control condition that were reduced in both directional conditions 
(Match and Mismatch). Therefore at the decision level directional words in general 
created a more equal response to different motion directions. It is not easy to interpret 
these changes, and it is not clear why directional words should ‘equalise’ response to 
different motion directions. However, it does provide some limited evidence for 
effective manipulation of congruent/directional semantics.
Most importantly, there was a trend for sensitivity to be higher in Match as compared to 
Control conditions, this was not due to a speed accuracy trade-off since reaction times 
also tended to be faster for Match as compared to Control conditions. This is in line 
with previous experiments which show speeded responses to visual stimuli following 
comprehension of congruent sentences (see Section 2.1.2.3). Therefore there was a 
weak but beneficial effect of congruence on perceptual sensitivity and response time. 
Turning to measures of decision processes, both c and p showed lower values (i.e. more 
liberal decision thresholds) for congruent conditions as compared to both incongruent 
and control conditions. This is in line with Expeirment 6.2 and supports ‘decision 
priming’ under congruent conditions. Therefore, congruence improved perceptual 
sensitivity, lowered decision thresholds and facilitated response times.
Directional sentences created a directional context that was sufficient to affect all levels 
of motion detection. The RDK was perceived whilst the post-verbal parts of the 
sentence were being comprehended, recall that this experiment also used active
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comprehension. Therefore, in Match or Mismatch conditions motion detection occurred 
during the construction of a semantic representation of a directional motion event. A 
congruent context was beneficial to all levels of task processing, supporting the 
sentence as a more substantial linguistic manipulation than single words. It is 
interesting that all effects were found in congruent conditions, this suggests that the 
meaning of the sentence was used to the benefit of task performance whenever possible. 
Sentence onset cued the appearance of the RDK at some point during that sentence, so it 
is possible that congruent semantic content primed motion detection -  producing faster 
response times, lower decision thresholds and greater sensitivity. Rather than 
supporting a localised connection between semantic and perceptual content (as for 
Experiment 6.3), these results support integration of semantic and perceptual 
information in order to benefit task performance at every level. At this point we have 
three experiments, each of which show a different direction of effects on perceptual 
sensitivity. It is important that across all three we have seen effects on d’, since this is a 
measure of low level visual processes. Perceptual sensitivity can be routinely 
modulated by semantic content, but that modulation appears to be complex and task 
dependent.
So far, we have tested a strong single word context unsynchronised but overlapping 
with RDK presentation, a weak single word context synchronised but temporally 
separate to RDK presentation and a sentence context in which RDK presentation was 
temporally separate to the critical lexical item but during the remainder of the sentence. 
The results for Criterion are consistent in two experiments (6.2 and 6.4), suggesting that 
something like decision priming (less conservative decision thresholds) is present in 
congruent conditions when there is a strong enough linguistic context. This supports 
the criterion effects as based in strategic processing, integrating congruent information 
to try and benefit perception. It is not straightforward to explain the mechanisms behind 
criterion effects (Wickens, 2002), so we will return to these in the final chapter for 
further discussion.
The most interesting effects are those found for sensitivity, since it is here that strong 
predictions about embodiment are tested. According to the embodied direct 
engagement hypothesis, the semantic representation of motion words is within motion 
processing systems, therefore effects on sensitivity (which are thought to reflect these 
low level visual systems) are expected. As we have seen, blocked single words produce
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reduce d’ under incongruent conditions, whereas randomised single words reduce d’ 
whenever directional words are present. It is therefore of interest whether the more 
selective results for experiment 6.2 were entirely due to the blocked presentation and 
some top-down modulation of motion processing that increased over the course of the 
block. This would be more in line with weak embodiment which predicts task 
dependent changes in the connection between semantic and perceptual information.
On the other hand, the results could have been because semantic activation occurred 
during RDK perception; words were unsynchronised, but overlapping, with RDK 
presentation. This would result in a more immediate, and therefore stronger, influence 
of semantic access on motion processing and congruency effects have been shown in 
the two experiments where linguistic items did overlap with visual stimuli. This is in 
line with strong embodiment where interactions are always present but dependent on the 
temporal overlap between semantic and sensory-motor activity (e.g. Borreggine & 
Kaschak, 2006). To explore whether temporal contiguity or blocked context is the 
critical factor in producing effects on d’ from single words, the final experiment 
presents RDKs in synchrony and contiguity with blocked single words.
6 .5. Blocked Single Word Comprehension Synchronised 
to Motion Detection
Participants performed a coherent motion detection task with stimuli at their threshold 
coherence level. RDKs displayed coherent motion upwards or downwards or incoherent 
(random) motion. Single words were presented over headphones and RDKs were 
presented during the presentation of each word, timed to end with word offset. Words 
were presented in blocks (Up, Down, Control) therefore producing a salient directional 
context. Comprehension was passive. SDT separates the effects of comprehension into 
(i) those at the perceptual level (Sensitivity); (ii) those at the decision level (Criterion); 
and (iii) those at the overall response level (Reaction Time). Statistical analyses will be 
completed by dividing each block into thirds (1st, 2nd, 3rd) to look at the changes in 
dependent measures over the course of the block. This is to explore whether blocked 
presentation enhances effects that are already present for individual trials, or whether 
blocked presentation is the only condition under which these effects are seen. 
Descriptive analyses will look at the change in dependent measures over each trial in the 
block. The hypothesis is that if the semantic content of single words is sufficient to
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influence detection, effects of congruency should be present across all trials and 
enhanced by blocked presentation (i.e. greater at the end of the block than at the 
beginning). In contrast, if blocked presentation is important in producing consistent 
effects there should be no stable effects of congruency but emerging differences over 
the course of the block. The same pattern as seen in 6.2 should be observed: (i) d’ will 
be lower when the words and the motion are incongruent (ii) Criterion (and Beta) will 
be reduced when the words and the motion are congruent and (iii) Reaction Times will 
not show any significant effects of congruency.
6.5.1. Participants
26 Native English speakers (16 female) with a mean age of 25.38yrs (SD = 6.6yrs) 
were recruited from the UCL Psychology Department Subject Pool in return for 
monetary compensation of £6 per hour. All had normal or corrected to normal vision.
6.5.2. Method
6.5.2.1. Design
The Design was the same as Experiment 6.2 except that after Threshold 
Estimation participants completed 8 practice trials of the motion detection task at an 
easy level (50% coherence) and then as much practice as they wanted (in blocks of 10 
trials) at their threshold level. Motion Detection was split into 3 runs of 6 blocks of 30 
motion detection trials. At the beginning of each run, participants completed 16 practise 
trials with filler words presented binaurally. Each run was split into two halves, with 
each item presented once in each half (3 blocks, 90 trials). Therefore, across the 
experiment there were a total of 540 trials, and the participant heard each word 6 times. 
Across each block there were an equal number of coherent and random motion trials.
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6.5.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Single Words was used. Each half-run had 3 blocks that presented each 
Word Category (Up, Down and Control) in a pseudo-randomised order so that across 
the run the same Word Category was not presented consecutively. Two lists were 
created, one for each half of a run; in each list each word appeared once with coherent 
motion and once with random motion. The order of presentation was randomised 
within each Word Category.
6.5.2.3. Graphic Display & Apparatus 
These were identical to Experiment 6.3.
6.5.2.4. Procedure
Threshold Estimation
This was identical to Experiment 6.3
Motion Detection
This was the similar to Experiment 6.3 except that there were no comprehension 
questions.
On each trial, stimuli were presented so that offset of the RDK and the WAV file 
coincided. By using this method, there was a different onset of the RDK from trial to 
trial whilst ensuring that it was never displayed outside the duration of the word. The 
RDK onset time was established by subtracting 150ms (the duration of the RDK) from 
the word’s duration. This had been previously established using a custom made 
programme that recorded the onset and offset time for each item’s WAV file; duration 
was then established by subtracting the onset from the offset time.
6.5.2.5. Analysis
3 subjects were removed as they did not complete the Threshold Estimation task 
properly, so reliable values for their threshold could not be established. One subject 
was removed as they did not complete the task properly (with over 70% of responses
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being errors). Two subjects were removed as they were too fatigued to complete the 
task properly. Reaction time data above 3 standard deviations for each subject were 
excluded, this removed 4.77% of the data. Within each Word Category, by Subjects, 
data was collapsed across runs for each trial (1 to 30). This was statistically analysed by 
further collapsing trials into Block Sections, made up of epochs of 10 trials. Trials 1-10 
made up the first Block Section, trials 11-20 made up the second Block Section and 
trials 21-30 made up the third Block Section. This was entered into a 3x3x2 repeated 
measures ANOVA comparing Word Category (Control, Match, Mismatch), Block 
Section (first, second, third) and Motion Direction (Upwards, Downwards). However, 
collapsing into Block Sections may not present a true picture of changes across 
individual trials (being an average), therefore to illustrate the change in dependent 
measures in more detail, graphs are presented which show data on a trial by trial basis 
for each Word Category by Subjects. A by Items analysis was not possible as each 
word had not appeared in each possible trial location (1-30) in a balanced fashion, being 
randomly determined in each block.
6.5.3. Results
6 .5 .3 . 1. di
There was a small but significant interaction between Word Category and Block Section 
(F(4,76) = 2.7, p-r|2 = 0.124). The Control condition had a mean value of 0.850 in the 
first Section, 0.852 in the second Section and dropped to 0.738 in the third Section. The 
Mismatch condition had a mean value of 0.881 in the first Section, dropping to 0.762 in 
the second and then 0.704 in the third Section. The Match condition had a value of 
0.777 in the first Section, rising to 0.828 in the second Section and 0.918 in the third 
Section (See Figure 6-3 and Table 6-2). The interaction was significant when the Match 
condition was compared to the Control (F(2,38) = 3.172, p = 0.053, p-rj2 = 0.143) and 
Mismatch conditions (F(2,38) = 5.015, p-T|2 = 0.209); however, when Mismatch and 
Control conditions were compared there was no longer a significant interaction, but a 
marginal main effect of Block Section (F(2,38) = 2.991, p = 0.062, p-rf = 0.136). 
Overall there was also a marginal interaction between Motion Direction and Block 
Section (F(2,38) = 3.140, p = 0.055, p-rf = 0.142). Upwards motion had slightly lower 
d’ values than Downwards motion in the first and second Sections (a mean difference of
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0.1 and 0.2 respectively), this difference was removed in the third Section (a mean 
difference of 0.02). (See Table 6-2 and Figure 6-3).
Table 6-6: The mean difference in Criterion and Beta for each Motion Direction by
Word Category
Standard deviation in brackets.
Experiment Control 
Down | Up
Condition
Match 
Down | Up
Mismatch 
Down | Up
Criterion C
Mean difference
0.02 -0.07 
(0.31) (0.31)
0.09 (0.31)
0.002 -0.013 
(0.26) (0.35)
0.015(0.31)
0.121 -0.05 
(0.32) (0.22)
0.126(0.27)
Beta
Mean difference
1.08 1.05 
(0.30) (0.26)
0.03 (0.28)
1.21 1.15 
(0.38) (0.59)
0.06 (0.49)
1.35 0.99 
(0.77) (0.18)
0.36 (0.48)*
’"The mean difference in the Mismatch condition produced a significant interaction between 
Word Category and Motion Direction.
6.5.3.2. Criterion
There were no significant differences, but the pattern was similar to that seen for Beta 
(See Table 6-3 and 6-6).
6.5.3.3. Beta
There was a significant interaction between Word Category and Motion Direction 
(F(2,38) = 4.211, peta = 0.181). The values for Upwards and Downwards motion were 
similar in the Control and Match conditions, but diverged in the Mismatch condition, 
with Upwards motion having values 0.353 units lower than Downwards motion (See 
Table 6-4 & 6-6 and Figure 6-4).
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Figure 6-5: Reaction Time (ms) bv Block Section fa) and Trial Number (b)
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6.5.3.4. Reaction Times
There was a significant main effect of Block Section (F(2,38) = 5.952, p-rj2 = 0.239), 
with faster reaction times in the second (mean = 605.97) as compared to the first (mean 
= 624.11, F(l,19) = 14.119, peta = 0.426) and third (mean = 626.65, F(l,19) = 8.509, p- 
r\2 = 0.309) Sections. There was also a significant main effect of Word Category 
(F(2,38) = 5.952, p-r)2 = 0.239); the Control condition had the shortest reaction times 
(mean = 594.70), followed by times in the Match condition (mean = 626.38) and the 
longest reaction times were produced in the Mismatch condition (mean = 635.66). The 
Control condition was marginally faster than the Match condition (F(l,19) = 3.325, p = 
0.084, p-rj2 = 0.149) and significantly faster than the Mismatch condition (F(l,19) = 
4.905, p-xf = 0.205) (See Figure 6-5 and Table 6-5).
6.5.3.5. Descriptive Analysis
To explore the detailed time-course of changes in dependent measures across the course 
of the block, the data for each Trial (1-30) was collapsed across Subjects for each Word 
Category and illustrated in Figures 6-3b to 6-5b. Dashed vertical lines represent the 
epochs (first, second and third Block Section) which were used for the statistical 
analysis. Dependent measures that showed significant differences in the above Block 
Section comparison were chosen for this descriptive analysis. What is clear across all 
three graphs is that the mean changes seen in the statistical analysis were not a product 
of steady differences between Word Categories. Rather, data from trial to trial are 
highly variable.
Figure 6-3b illustrates the changes in d \  for which the statistical analysis showed a 
significant interaction between Word Category and Block Section (see Figure 6-3a). In 
the first Section (Trial Number 1-10), the Match condition was on average slightly 
lower than the Control and Mismatch conditions. The Match condition had the lowest 
data points on most trials, but on trials 3,7 and 10 the Match condition had mean values 
that were higher than both the Control and Mismatch conditions. The Control and 
Mismatch conditions are broadly similar, although towards the end of the first section 
they diverge (trials 8-10). The Mismatch condition having one very high data point in 
trial 9 (above 1.0) followed by a lower data point at trial 10 (below 0.6). The Control 
condition on the other hand decreases steadily from trials 8-10. In the second Section, 
all Word Categories were similar although the Mismatch condition was on average
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slightly lower than the other two. In partial agreement with this, all Categories are 
broadly similar across Trials 11-20, although the Mismatch condition does not show 
consistently lower d’ values, with nearly half the data points higher than Control and 
Match conditions (trials 12, 14, 17 and 19). Finally, in the third Section, the Match 
condition was higher than the Control and Mismatch condition. This pattern does not 
emerge until the final 4 trials (27-30), in which the Match condition is consistently 
higher than the other two. The Control condition shows broadly similar values across 
trials 21-30, whilst the Mismatch condition again shows greater variance. In the final 
epoch (the third Block Section) the Mismatch condition shows an almost sinusoidal 
pattern, with peaks (trials 22 and 26) followed by troughs (trials 25 and 29).
Although Beta did not show significant differences between different Word Categories 
across Block Sections, the descriptive analysis is still informative and is worth 
exploring the trial-to-trial changes in decision threshold. Beta has been chosen since it 
showed significant differences elsewhere so any other trends should also be clearer. 
Figure 6-4a showed the values of Beta averaged across Block Section, and Figure 6-4b 
shows values on a trial to trial basis. There is a trend for the Mismatch condition to 
have higher values than the Control condition (this can also be seen in Table 6-4). The 
descriptive analysis shows that this is due to several high data points across the block 
(e.g. at trials 2,9 and 17) for the Mismatch condition which would have raised the 
average value for each section. The trial-to-trial changes in the Match condition follow 
the averaged values (Figure 6-4b) quite faithfully; with lower values in the first 10 trials 
that then remain stable over the remaining 20 trials. However, one peak data point (trial 
26) in the final Section pulls the average above that for the Control condition. On the 
whole, the Control condition had the lowest values (Figure 6-4a). This was due to low 
data points (trials 1,12 and 19) that pulled averages down as the majority of trials were 
comparable to Match and Mismatch conditions. In sum, decision threshold was similar 
across all Word Categories with the occasional peak/outlier trial pulling averaged values 
apart.
Figure 6-5b illustrates changes in reaction times on a trial by trial basis. The averaged 
values (6-5a) show that the Mismatch condition has longer reaction times than the 
Control condition. The trial-to-trial data shows that each condition it quite variable in 
the first Block Section. For the Mismatch condition, no trials fall below 600ms and 
peak values pull the average of the Mismatch condition up (trials 1 and 8). The Match
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condition shows a similar pattern with the majority of trials falling between 600-650ms 
and two peak trials pulling the average up (trials 1 and 9). The Control condition has 
low values at trials 8 & 6 which pull the average down, otherwise the majority of values 
are between 600-650ms. In the second Block Section the conditions diverge more 
clearly. The Control condition shows consistently lower values except for trials 14 &
15 which peak around 650ms. The Match condition peaks at trial 13 (650ms) and then 
falls to a relatively stable level across the course of the block, at approximately 600ms. 
The Mismatch condition starts with high values on trials 11-14 and then drops off 
towards the end of the block, with a trough at trial 19 (approximately 575ms). In 
comparison to the first block, the second Block Section therefore shows stable decreases 
for all conditions, as reflected in the averages. In the final section, the Control condition 
is on a par with the other two conditions and then drops off considerably towards the 
end, with trial 30 coming close to 550ms. The Match condition is quite stable, with no 
peaks or troughs. The Mismatch condition shows more variation, with high values at 
trials 21, 26 and 27. The averaged (and significant) difference between the Mismatch 
and Control conditions is reflected in the trial-to-trial data although there is still 
considerable overlap in each Block Section.
6.5.4. Discussion
There were no overall differences between conditions for perceptual sensitivity (d’), 
however, across the course of the block there was a significant difference in the way 
sensitivity changed for each condition. Under congruent conditions perceptual 
sensitivity increased, under incongruent conditions sensitivity decreased and under 
control conditions sensitivity was stable and then dropped towards the end of the block. 
Experiment 6.2 showed a drop in perceptual sensitivity under incongruent conditions, 
similar to that found here. However, whereas 6.2 showed no difference between 
congruent and control conditions, here the congruent condition showed an increase in 
perceptual sensitivity relative to the incongruent and control conditions. The 
incongruent condition did not show a significantly different pattern compared to the 
control, but it did show a sharper decrease in sensitivity (see Figure 6-3a). This was 
expressed in the stronger interaction between the congruent and incongruent conditions
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as compared to the interaction between congruent and control conditions. A closer 
inspection of the changes from trial to trial show that the patterns seen in the statistical 
analyses were not supported by stable differences between Word Categories, e.g. the 
incongruent conditions being consistently lower than the congruent condition in the 
third block section. The descriptive analysis showed that there was considerable and 
regular overlap between Categories, but for the congruent condition the data did show a 
consistently elevated d’ level towards the end of the block. Taken together these results 
strongly suggest that blocked presentation is essential for producing semantically 
modulated changes in sensitivity following single word comprehension. In other words, 
there has to be a consistent directional context for congruence effects on d’ levels. In
6.2, when the words were unsynchronised to RDK onset, incongruent interference 
occurred. In this experiment when the words do predict RDK onset, congruent 
facilitation is seen. In the experiment where word and RDK onset were unsynchronised 
and RDK onset was unpredictable (6.2), semantic information cannot be used to 
enhance task performance, but it is able to impair performance. In contrast, when word 
onset predicts RDK onset, it is possible that semantic information can be used to 
improve perception, similar to the perceptual learning seen elsewhere in vision. When 
irrelevant motion patterns are presented and one particular direction is paired with target 
trials on a focal task, sensitivity is only increased to the direction of motion that predicts 
(or is associated with) target trials (Seitz & Watanabe, 2003; Watanabe, Nanez &
Sasaki, 2001). These findings indicate that learning takes place for irrelevant stimuli 
that are positively correlated with target trials (Seitz & Watanabe, 2003). The important 
point to take from these studies is that the visual system selectively integrates 
‘irrelevant’ information that is associated with target presentation. In our experiment 
we have presentation of irrelevant, but predictive and contextually congruent, stimuli 
that increase performance in the central task. In congruent blocks, words which are in 
the same direction as the motion being detected cue experimental trials. Over time, this 
improves perception of that motion direction, sensitising the visual system. Crucially, it 
is not simply the presentation of a word (i.e. sound) that provides an effective cue to 
target onset, thereby increasing sensitivity. An improvement in performance is only 
seen when all the words in a block refer to the same direction as the motion being 
detected. In contrast, when the semantic information in the words does not create a 
consistent context (the control condition) or creates a directional context that is 
incongruent with the visual motion, sensitivity drops over the course of the trial. The 
visual system is always flexibly responding to semantic information, and when that
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information is congruent with the target information, perception improves. When that 
information is incongruent or uninformative, perception declines, as if the information 
was being integrated automatically but this time to the detriment of perception. As 
demonstrated above, perception is also impaired by incongruent information when RDK 
onset is unpredictable and the semantic information cannot be used for perceptual 
learning (Experiment 6.2). The effects on perceptual sensitivity are task dependent, 
with integration working to the benefit of task performance when semantic information 
is congruent and reliable. Note that the perceptual learning mechanisms that could 
produce such effects are widely thought to operate at low levels of visual processing 
(e.g. Seitz & Watanabe, 2003); therefore they can be combined with strong embodied 
explanations which predict that semantic access necessarily effects low level perception.
There were no significant differences for either measure of decision threshold. The 
descriptive analysis for Beta showed a trend for incongruent conditions to have higher 
values than control conditions, indicating more conservative decision making.
However, a lack of significant effects precludes any firm conclusions. So, whilst the 
words have a selective effect on perceptual sensitivity, decision thresholds do not 
change. Therefore, the integration of semantic and perceptual information does not 
come via top-down mechanisms such as attention. As stated above, if effects on 
perceptual sensitivity come independently of similar (i.e. congruence) effects on 
decision thresholds or reaction times, this supports a separate mechanism. The 
modulation of d’ appears to be a product of a more direct link between semantic and 
visual systems. Interestingly, although they showed the same pattern in d’ (a decrease 
in sensitivity) the incongruent and control conditions did differ in reaction times. 
Participants produced the slowest reaction times under incongruent conditions as 
compared to the control condition. Longer reaction times support the conclusion that 
incongruent blocks were more disruptive than control blocks at some level, slowing the 
response. Experiment 6.2 did not show congruency effects on reaction times so it is 
interesting to fmd them here. In fact, this is the only experiment to show a clear 
congruency effect in reaction times. It is perhaps due to the tighter relationship between 
linguistic and motion stimuli, since the semantic processing of the word is arguably still 
in process during RDK presentation and therefore more able to directly interfere with 
the preparation and execution of a response. Reaction times also showed a main effect 
of block section, with participants speeding up during the middle of each block and 
slowing again towards the end. This is best interpreted as acceleration in response
231
execution with practice, followed by fatigue effects (or anticipation of the end of the 
block).
6 .6 . General Discussion
The pilot experiments used a motion direction judgement to explore the influence of 
comprehension on perception; however, this conflated the perception of directional 
motion with response preparation. To avoid these problems, the rest of the experiments 
used a motion detection task, Table 6-7 gives a descriptive summary of the results. In 
this task participants detected coherent motion and SDT analysis allowed us to separate 
level of processing. In particular, we were interested in whether comprehension would 
influence d’. This dependent measure represents the strength of the signal as detected 
by the participant, being directly proportional to the separation of distributions of signal 
and noise in a detector during a 2-altemative forced choice task. In this task it is 
therefore equated to low level visual processes that detect directional motion.
Table 6-7: Descriptive summary of results
Linguistic Stimuli Results
Blocked single word presentation 
unsynchronised to target
d ’: Interference from Mismatch conditions 
criterion: Facilitation from Match conditions 
RT: No congruence effects
Blocked single word presentation 
synchronised to target
d ’: Facilitation from Match ac ross block
criterion: No significant changes
RT: Interference from Mismatch conditions
Single word presentation in random  
order
d ’: Interference from Match and Mismatch conditions 
criterion: No congruence effects 
RT: No congruence effects
Partial sen tence com prehension d ’: Facilitation from Match conditions 
criterion: Facilitation from Match conditions 
RT: Trend for facilitation from Match conditions
The direct engagement hypothesis of embodied theories states that it is just such 
processes that should be recruited by semantic representation; those sensory areas which 
are used to perceive motion are recruited in the representation of semantic motion. The 
four experiments manipulated the strength of linguistic context and the concurrence 
between linguistic and motion stimuli. First, effects of congruency will be reviewed 
and then I will briefly discuss effects of motion direction, before concluding.
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6.6.1. Congruency
In the first experiment (6.2), blocked single words were presented for passive 
comprehension and were unsynchronized to the presentation of the motion stimuli. The 
results showed that d’ was reduced for incongruent conditions. In the second 
experiment (6.3), a randomly selected single word preceded each motion stimulus. In 
this case there was a trend for d’ to be lower for all directional words regardless of 
congruence. In the third experiment (6.4), motion stimuli were presented within a 
sentence context at verb offset, perceived during the remainder of the sentence. Results 
showed a trend for higher d’ in congruent as compared to control conditions. Finally, in 
the fourth experiment (6.5), motion stimuli were presented to coincide with word offset, 
and words were passively comprehended in semantically coherent blocks. Over the 
course of the block, d’ increased in congruent conditions and decreased in incongruent 
and control conditions.
Therefore we have 4 experiments which show effects of motion words on d’, a low level 
visual process. What is intriguing is that the effects on d’ often diverge from those for 
decision threshold and reaction times; converging in one experiment out of four (6.4). 
Therefore, the most important conclusion is that comprehension reliably influences low 
level visual processes, affecting perceptual sensitivity to motion. The relationship 
between semantic representation and perceptual information is automatic, close and 
direct, since it operates independently of other decision and response mechanisms. This 
supports strong embodiment which predicts that interactions between comprehension 
and perception occur at low levels of perception and that these interactions are always 
present.
However, the direction of effects changes across experiments so despite the fact that 
low level interactions are always present, they are more in line with a weaker version of 
embodiment (i.e indirect engagement that mediates activity in sensory-motor systems). 
There is a pattern (3 out of 4 experiments) for incongruent reduction or congruent 
improvement in perceptual sensitivity. In the one experiment where semantic access 
did not overlap with RDK presentation (6.3) there was a general interference effect from 
directional words, reducing d’ as compared to the control condition. So, congruency 
effects occur when there is contiguity between primary semantic activation (i.e. 
immediately following comprehension) and motion stimuli. To try and better 
understand what this pattern means, it is worth noting what we have not found. We do
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not see a situation where incongruent conditions improve perceptual sensitivity (relative 
to the congruent or control conditions). We also do not see a situation where semantic 
and perceptual information are contiguous and congruent conditions reduce perceptual 
sensitivity. Congruent interference has been evidenced elsewhere and explained as 
competition for the same resources (Kaschak et al, 2005; 2006; Bergen et al, in press). 
As in the experiments that looked at visuo-spatial attention, our results do not support 
this explanation from strong embodiment. However, congruent facilitation and 
incongruent interference can be explained by a common mechanism. In the motion 
detection tasks we use, the RDK stimuli present ambiguous evidence for coherent 
motion to the visual system. A decision has to be made about whether the dots move in 
a given direction or not, i.e. whether a particular motion event has occurred. The 
experimental lexical items access or activate semantic information which in essence 
refers to a motion event. When the referenced motion event is the same as the motion 
event to be detected, the visual system improves. The semantic information primes the 
visual system and therefore facilitates processing of the motion signal. When the 
referenced motion event conflicts with the target event, the semantic information may 
prime the visual system in the ‘wrong’ direction and therefore impede processing of the 
motion signal. This happens when the semantic information is currently active as a 
consequence of immediate comprehension. This process results in incongruent 
interference when there is no predictive relationship between the stimuli, so it interferes 
with processing. However, perceptual learning may take place when there is a 
predictive relationship (experiment 6.5), with semantic content priming perception. It’s 
possible that the effects from semantics are short lived and not comparable to re­
activation of that same semantic content if a word meaning has to be maintained or 
indexed to answer comprehension questions (as is the case in 6.3).
The crucial question is whether the priming of the visual system occurs without a 
motion detection task. This would support direct engagement as it implies that the 
motion system is necessarily affected following comprehension. Conversely, if effects 
are not seen this implies that the visual system has to be engaged by a motion task in 
order to be affected by semantic motion. It would be possible to test this by using a 
contrast judgment with moving gratings, here the task is to judge which of two patterns 
are brighter and so it does not involve attention to motion. If participants are exposed to 
one direction of motion, they consequently show a higher contrast threshold for that 
direction, since directionally selective neurons have been fatigued (Levinson & Sekuler,
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1975; 1976; 1980). An interesting experiment would be to assess whether exposure to 
motion words affects contrast sensitivity to congruent or incongruent motion signals. If 
motion words could influence the perceptual sensitivity to the contrast of moving 
gratings, this would support a direct effect of motion words on motion processing areas. 
Crucially, it would remove the possibility that attention to motion (or whatever target 
perceptual event) is necessary for an interaction between semantic and perceptual 
motion to occur13.
In two experiments there is congruent facilitation of d’, and in one experiment 
incongruent interference. The changes in d’ are not consistent across tasks (i.e. always 
in the same conditions) so it is interesting to look at how the visual system integrates 
perceptual information during tasks. Learning mechanisms within the visual system 
may be playing an essential role; at best selectively integrating any information that can 
benefit task performance and at worst unable to counteract information that conflicts 
with perception14. We found that when words were unsynchronised to RDK onset, 
incongruent interference occurred (6.2). In contrast, when the linguistic stimuli do 
predict RDK onset, congruent facilitation is found (6.4 and 6.5). When word onset 
predicts RDK onset, semantic information can be used for perceptual learning. The 
visual system selectively integrates ‘irrelevant’ information that is associated with target 
presentation (Seitz & Watanabe, 2003; Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, 2001) and a 
predictive relationship (contiguity) allows congruent information to be exploited for the 
benefit of perception. A non-predictive relationship means that congruent information 
cannot be exploited, but that incongruent information interferes. In the attention 
literature, target detection (d’) improves when the location of the target is cued and 
declines when the target is preceded by an invalid cue (Hawkins et al, 1990). The 
results for criterion are less consistent, but it has been suggested that attentional affects 
such as these increase the salience of information at attended locations, resulting in 
more accurate processing and a lower criterion (Hawkins, et al, 1990; Blaser, Sperling 
& Lu, 1999). Thus, external cues that are relevant for target detection are able to 
influence low level visual processes so it is possible that congruent and incongruent 
semantic information acts in a similar way, modulating detection in a top-down manner 
by increasing the salience of a particular motion direction. This is not to say that the 
effects of comprehension are isomorphic with attention (i.e. they affect attention which
13 My thanks to Professor Alan Johnston for suggesting this task.
14 As noted above, a key question is whether these learning mechanisms are causing the influence of the
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then affects perception), but they may operate in a similar manner that is not a product 
of direct engagement. However, perceptual learning mechanisms that operate on low 
level motion processes could combine with the embodied simulation of motion to 
produce the effects we have seen. Therefore, it is even more critical to see if the 
influences on motion are tied to motion detection; if they are not, this is very strong 
evidence for strong embodiment.
Moving on to measures of decision threshold (c and P), in two experiments (6.3 and 6.5) 
there were no effects on criterion. It is not clear what conditions produce no stable 
effects on criterion and it is possible that trends in these experiments were not reliable 
due to a lack of power. For example, effects on criterion may only be seen when the 
linguistic manipulation is strong enough; they are found for blocked single word 
presentation when RDK presentation is unpredictable and partial sentence 
comprehension. It is not surprising that randomly ordered single words that are 
temporally separate to RDKs (6.3) do not affect criterion and it may be that the blocked 
single words synchronized to RDK presentation (6.5) is also not a strong enough 
context. Note that the d’ effects we found in 6.5 did not show main effects between 
conditions, but only changes over the course of a block; suggesting that the linguistic 
context was weaker than in 6.2. In two experiments, effects for criterion were 
consistent (6.2 and 6.4), with congruent conditions producing reduced criterion values. 
In 6.4 (sentences) the p results corroborated the patterns for c with reduced values for 
congruent conditions. This again appears similar to what has been found in the 
attention literature. There is some evidence that when a location is cued, criterion is 
lowered for that location relative to a neutral or invalid cue (e.g. Hawkins et al, 1990).
If we apply this logic to our experiment, the congruent context provides a similar 
benefit for motion detection, with a criterion shift that reflects less effortful processing. 
This suggests that congruent conditions produce something like decision priming. A 
lowered decision threshold means that target events have to breach a lower value to be 
detected, so decisions are biased towards a positive response. It may be that under 
congruent conditions less sensory evidence is needed to make a decision so criterion 
values are lowered (e.g. Sperling, 1984). This is supported in experiment 6.4 since 
there was also a tendency for reaction times to be faster under congruent conditions, 
indicating that less time was needed to decide that a target appeared (i.e. less evidence 
needed to be collected). It is interesting to note that these kinds of decision biases may
semantic information on the visual system or mediating effects that are independently present.
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produce the facilitation that is seen in reaction times studies elsewhere (see Section 
2.1.2.3). This point will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter.
Finally, we turn to reaction time. This measure reflects how long it takes for all 
processes from perception to response. It could therefore reflect incremental 
increases/decreases across all decision levels or substantial increases/decreases in one 
condition, or a combination of these. Thus, reaction times measure overall task 
difficulty. Changes in response preparation/execution may affect reaction times more 
strongly than changes in the ease of perceptual/decision processes but the reaction times 
do not consistently mirror the congruency effects in d’ or criterion (doing so in only one 
experiment, 6.4). However, reaction times do show effects of motion direction (6.3,
6.4) which were also present in other measures; therefore we can say that reaction times 
do reflect strong effects at perception/decision stages but are more noisy when it comes 
to the weaker congruency effects. This is probably due to the response 
preparation/execution stage that is influenced by other factors. For example, in 6.2 
reaction times were faster to Down words, this has been tentatively interpreted as Down 
words priming the downward pressing of buttons. The alternative explanation is that 
Down words were less interfering that Up words, although it is not clear why this 
should be the case. In experiment 6.4 there was a tendency for congruent conditions to 
be faster than control conditions and in 6.5 the control condition was faster than 
incongruent conditions. Similar to the pattern in d’, reaction times show interference 
from conflicting information and facilitation from concordant information. In 6.4 
congruence effects were present at all stages (perceptual sensitivity, criterion and 
reaction times). In 6.5 reaction times showed a divergence where d’ (and criterion 
measures) did not. Participants were faster during the control condition than in 
incongruent conditions, however there were no differences in d’ and a weak trend in 
criterion. Responses may have been slowed down to avoid making mistakes, i.e. to 
counteract the incongruent words. In contrast, no such compensation is needed in the 
control condition so response times were faster. This would be a strategic manipulation 
of response times for the benefit of task performance, and one that did not result in 
better accuracy. As incongruent or neutral information could not be used to the benefit 
of perception this did not result in improved accuracy for incongruent conditions (i.e. 
similar to the speed-accuracy trade-off seen in 6.3, see below). Alternatively, it may 
have taken longer to prepare and execute a response in incongruent conditions because 
the participant was responding that one direction of motion was present whilst the
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words referred to the opposite direction. This would be a similar result to the pilot 
experiments where incongruent conditions extended response times, i.e. the Simon 
effect. The most important point is that reaction times do not consistently show effects 
that are similar to those found for d’ or criterion. Where reaction times do show similar 
effects it is not safe to interpret them as direct reflections of lower processing levels; 
especially since other explanations, that take into account the response stage, do just as 
well.
In conclusion, the results can only be explained by some form of embodiment, 
interactions between comprehension and low level motion processing are consistent 
across all experiments. This supports strong embodiment and suggests that the 
connection between semantic and perceptual content is based at this low level. Effects 
on criterion and reaction time were more variable and dependent on stronger linguistic 
contexts. However, some aspects of the results are best interpreted by task based 
processes such as perceptual learning; this is in line with both weak and strong versions 
of embodiment as perceptual learning operates at low levels of visual processing. It is 
easier to explain the results with an automatic and low level connection between 
semantics and perception than to invoke top-down factors which should have also 
affected criterion and reaction time measures more consistently.
6.6.2. Motion Direction
In experiments 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 (see Figure 6-3) there were effects motion direction on 
d’; in all cases the pattern was for downwards motion to have higher d’ values than 
upwards motion. It appears that at least in one case this (6.3) this may have been due to 
a speed accuracy trade-off, participants were faster to respond to Upwards motion and 
less accurate as a result. However, in two other experiments the tendency for Upwards 
motion to have lower d’ cannot be explained by a strategic trade-off with response 
speed. In one experiment (6.4) upwards motion also had higher p values in two out of 
three conditions (with this difference attenuated in the Control condition), suggesting 
that it was less salient. Criterion was raised as more information was needed to 
establish that upwards motion was present. The picture that is emerging shows that 
Upwards motion is harder to perceive and there is limited evidence that participants are 
more conservative when they respond to it. Elsewhere in the visual perception literature 
there is no supporting evidence for a difference between Upwards and Downwards
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motion, so the effects may be a product of the dual-task methods we use. Dual-task 
methods necessarily split attention and processing resources across different tasks; when 
fewer resources are available, latent differences could turn into processing advantages. 
Downwards motion is more ecologically frequent than upwards motion, since gravity 
causes things to fall. This increased exposure to downwards motion may result in a 
greater sensitivity to it, in line with perceptual learning following practice (Gold, 
Sekuler & Bennett, 2004). At low coherence, upwards motion may appear more 
‘random’ than downwards motion and participants would therefore be less sensitive and 
more conservative during detection (See Chapter 7 for additional evidence for this 
argument).
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7. Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation
The RDK stimuli that we use engage a set of well characterised processes in first order 
visual motion processing and are also known to activate particular cortical areas (Blake, 
Sekuler & Grossman; 2004). The area V5/MT+ is the principle cortical area implicated 
in motion processing (e.g. Zeki et al, 1991). For example, the activity of V5/MT+ 
increases as the level of coherence of an RDK increases (Rees, Friston & Koch, 2000); 
this supports its role as the primary area responsible for detecting coherent motion 
signals. As stated already, the direct engagement hypothesis of strong embodied 
theories proposes that sensory and motor areas are recruited for semantic representation. 
As V5/MT+ is the cortical area widely held to be responsible for early motion 
processing, the prediction from strong embodiment is that the semantic representation of 
motion words is based in V5/MT+ (e.g. see similar arguments about the involvement of 
the primary motor strip in words and sentences that refer to motor actions; Pulvermuller, 
2001). As d’ measures perceptual sensitivity, it implicates early motion processes like 
those at V5/MT+. For example, double pulse TMS at V5/MT+ has been shown to 
reduce d’ for motion detection with RDK stimuli (Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 2005). 
Therefore, effects of comprehension on d’ are effects of semantic content on early 
motion processes, possibly including those at V5/MT+. In the previous chapter, 
experiment 6.2 demonstrated that the passive comprehension of blocked single words 
produced a decrease in d’ when the direction of the words was incongruent to the 
direction of visual motion. The experiment reported here sought to replicate that 
experiment with the addition of TMS at V5/MT+. In this way, the direct involvement 
of the cortical region involved in motion processing could be assessed. The general 
hypothesis was that if the semantic content of motion words has some direct effect on 
motion processing areas, the interference in motion processing (reduced d’) caused by 
TMS should interact with the interference during incongruent blocks that was observed 
in 6.2. The specific hypotheses are spelt out in more detail below. A few changes were 
made to the methodology so it was more amenable to TMS, in particular a shorter RDK 
duration (e.g. Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 2005; Beckers & Zeki, 1995) and presentation 
of the motion stimuli only in the right hemi-field with TMS stimulation only to the left 
hemisphere V5/MT+ (e.g. Beckers & Zeki, 1995). Right hemi-filed presentation is 
consistent with the lateralisation of language in the left hemisphere (for most right 
handed people), therefore effects of language on perception are more likely to be 
observed for stimuli in the right hemi-field (Gilbert, Regier, Kay, & Ivry, 2006; 2007).
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7 .1. TMS during Motion Detection and Passive 
Comprehension of Blocked Single Words
As demonstrated in 6.2, passive comprehension of motion words impaired perceptual 
sensitivity during incongruent blocks (Meteyard et al, in press). This experiment used 
the same methodology as 6.2 with the addition of double pulse TMS time-locked to 
RDK presentation, on alternating blocks. NoTMS blocks (in which sham stimulation 
was applied) were used as a control. In line with previous findings we expect TMS to 
reduce d’ for motion detection (Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 2005) and there are three 
possible ways that this direct manipulation of activity at V5/MT+ could interact with the 
incongruent interference (reduced d’) produced by comprehension: (i) The interfering 
effect of incongruent motion words is increased relative to the Control and congruent 
conditions. This would suggest that the motion words primary effect is outside 
V5/MT+ as the influence of the words is greater when V5/MT+ is disrupted, (ii) The 
interference of incongruent words is decreased. This would support an effect of 
comprehension that does involve V5/MT+, as this effect is attenuated when activity at 
V5/MT+ is disrupted, (iii) There is no change and the interference effect is of the same 
magnitude with or without TMS. This would also support an effect of comprehension 
that is outside V5/MT+, since direct changes in activity at this location do not change 
the effect of comprehension. It is not clear what effect TMS will have on decision 
processes (as measured by c and p). Experiment 6.2 showed that C was lower for 
congruent conditions, we expect to replicate this finding in the NoTMS blocks. In the 
TMS blocks, changes in criterion measures will shed light on how changes at low levels 
of perception affect decision processes.
7.1.1. Participants
14 Native English speakers (5 female) with a mean age of 28.8yrs (SD = 8.6yrs) were 
recruited from the UCL Psychology Department Subject Pool in return for monetary 
compensation of £7.50 per hour. All were right handed and had normal or corrected to 
normal vision. 12 participants attended both experimental sessions and 2 participants 
attended the first session only.
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7.1.2. Method
7.1.2.1. Design
A 2x3x2 repeated measures design was adapted from Experiment 6.2. The 
independent variables were the direction of motion of the RDK (upwards or 
downwards), the Word Category (Control, Match and Mismatch) and the application of 
TMS (TMS, no TMS). The dependent measures were the accuracy of detecting motion 
on each trial, and the reaction time (milliseconds) to make the judgement. Participants 
attended two sessions separated by 3-7 days. Within each session, direction of detected 
motion (upwards or downwards) was kept constant with a balanced order across 
participants.
Participants completed the Phosphene Threshold Estimation, Motion Threshold 
Estimation and Motion Detection tasks in that order. During Motion Detection, 
participants completed 2 blocks of 20 RDKs (10 coherent and 10 random motion) set at 
an easy high coherence of 50-70%. They were then given as many practice trials as 
they needed (in blocks of 6) with the RDK at their threshold value. For the Motion 
Detection task there were 2 runs of 12 blocks of 20 motion detection trials comprised of 
10 coherent motion and 10 random noise trials presented in randomized order. The 12 
blocks consisted of 4 different item orders for the 3 Word Categories. Presentation 
order was pseudo-randomised using a Latin squares design so that the same Category 
was not presented in consecutive blocks and TMS was applied to each word Category in 
a balanced manner.
7.1.2.2. Materials 
These were identical to Experiment 6.2
7.1.2.3. Graphic Display
Stimuli were identical to Experiment 6.2 except that the duration was 5 
consecutive frames (total motion time= 60ms; speed = 21 °/s) and they were centred 5° 
to the right of the central fixation point. Viewing distance was 50cm. Stimuli were
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generated using Cogent toolbox www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/CogentA for MATLAB 
(Mathworks, Inc) and presented at 85Hz using a CRT display (resolution = 800x600,
14’ Sony Multiscan 110ES).
7.1.2.4. Procedure & Apparatus
TMS stimulation and location parameters
The stimulator was a Medtronic MagPro Model X I00 (Medtronic A/S, Tonsbakken, 
Denmark) machine delivering current to a MC-B70 figure-of-eight coil (diameter = 
70mm). In TMS blocks, the coil was fixed tangential to the skull with the handle 
pointing anteriorly at -90 degrees to the axis of the neck. In the sham blocks, the TMS 
coil was rotated 90 degrees and its far edge was left touching the MT spot in order to 
mimic the auditory and somatic sensation of TMS without delivering any magnetic 
stimulus to the brain
We localized MT using a functional method (e.g. Silvanto et al. 2006). A 3x3 grid of 
potential target points (centre-to-centre distance = 1.0cm) was centered at 3 cm dorsal 
and 5cm left lateral from the inion. TMS was delivered to the left hemisphere only. 
Double pulse TMS (intensity = 70% machine output) was delivered over each of the 
nine points sequentially to determine the site most reliably giving rise to large visual 
phosphenes in the contra-lateral hemifield, which we then chose, as the stimulation site 
for the experiment. Functional localization is valid as it takes into account the variation 
in extent and location of V5/MT+ across human participants (Malikovic et al., 2007) 
and has been supported by studies that show comparable TMS disruption of motion 
perception following fMRI motion localizers (Sack et al., 2006) or functional 
localization (Silvanto et al. 2005) of V5/MT+. The use of double pulse TMS allowed us 
to increase the chances of disruptive TMS effects (compared to single pulse) while still 
maintaining good temporal resolution (O’Shea et al, 2004). In each Experimental trial, 
double pulse TMS with an inter pulse interval 50ms was applied 100ms from motion 
onset (i.e. one pulse at 100ms and one pulse at 150ms following stimulus onset).
Phosphene Threshold Estimation
Once V5/MT+ was functionally localized, participants then went through a staircase 
procedure to determine their phosphene threshold to be used as the baseline for TMS 
pulse intensity in Experimental trials. Double pulse TMS was applied and participants
reported the presence or absence of a phosphene. TMS intensity was raised following a 
negative response and lowered following a positive response. The threshold was taken 
as the TMS intensity that induced V5/MT+ phosphenes in the absence of concurrent 
visual stimuli on 50% of stimulation trials. On experimental trials, double pulse TMS 
was delivered at 110% of participant-specific phosphene threshold. The average 
Phosphene Threshold was 39.6% (SD = 8.9) of the maximum output intensity. To 
ensure that stimulation was effective, intensity was set to 35% of maximum output if a 
participant’s Phosphene Threshold resulted in a 110% value that was less than 35% (this 
was the case for 2 participants in both sessions, and 3 participants in one session only).
Eye movement control
Horizontal eye movements were recorded using infrared light transducers in the Skalar 
IRIS 6500 system attached to the head rest (IRIS; Skalar Medical, Delft, the 
Netherlands; sampling rate: 1000 Hz - Analog-to-digital converter card Type PCM- 
DAS 16d/12, Computerboards, Pittsburgh, PA) and analyzed offline with DASYLab 5.0 
(DATALOG, Monchengladbach, Germany). Eye traces were recorded for -200 to 
200ms peri-stimulus time on every trial and the equipment was recalibrated between 
blocks. Online monitoring during the experiment ensured that in > 90% trials 
participants maintained fixation. A break of fixation was defined as > 2 degrees 
deviation from fixation point or a blink artifact in the critical (+/-200 ms) period.
Motion Threshold Estimation
This was identical to Experiment 6.2 except that the RDKs were 60ms duration and 
centred 5 ° to the right of fixation (see Graphic Display).
Motion Detection
During practice trials a tone sounded if they judged the RDK coherence wrongly. 
Experimental blocks were identical to Experiment 6.2 except that on alternating blocks 
double pulse TMS or Sham TMS was applied in synchrony with the presentation of the 
RDKs (see TMS stimulation and location parameters). The alternation of TMS and No 
TMS blocks was randomly selected for each run. To minimise fatigue, participants had
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short breaks at the end of each block and refreshments during the gap between the 2 
runs of 12 blocks.
7.1.2.5. Analysis
2 subjects did not complete the second session so they were not included in the overall 
analysis. However, they were included in the post-hoc analysis of Session 1 effects 
only (see Results below). Analysis was identical to Experiment 6.2 except that values 
were entered into a 2 (TMS or No TMS) x 2 (upwards or downwards motion direction) 
x 3 (control, match or mismatch condition) repeated measures ANOVA. Reaction 
Times above 2 standard deviations for each participant were removed; this affected 
2.36% of the data. There were no significant differences in criterion (as measured by c 
or Beta) and no significant differences in reaction times so the values are not reported.
7.1.3. Results
7.1.3.1. dl
There was a significant main effect of Motion Direction (F(l,l 1) = 8.327, p-rj2 = 0.431, 
with Downwards motion having mean d’ values 0.313 units higher than Upwards 
motion.
There was also a significant main effect of Word Category (F(2,22) = 4.723, p-r|2 = 
0.300), planned comparisons showed that this was driven by the Control condition 
having d’ values 0.171 units higher than the Match condition (F(l,l 1) = 11.636, p-rf = 
0.514). Figure 7-1 illustrates this main effect across TMS Application and testing 
Session.
There was no main effect of TMS. To find out whether TMS was ineffective or 
variable across testing sessions, we compared the d’ values for TMS and No TMS 
blocks across the First and Second testing session. This showed that there was a 
significant interaction between TMS and Session (F(l,l 1) = 14.280, p-rj2 = 0.565). As 
compared to the No TMS condition, d’ values were lowered by the application of TMS 
in the first session, but raised in the second session. The interaction is principally
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driven by the change in d’ for No TMS, rather than TMS, blocks. In the first session, 
participants mean d’ value in No TMS conditions is 1.304, in the second session it falls 
to 0.976 (t(l 1) = 2.098, p=0.058). In contrast, mean d’ in TMS conditions is 1.129 in 
session 1 and 1.205 in session 2, see Table 7-1.
Table 7-1: Mean d' values by TMS Application and Session*
S e s s io n TMS Ap
TMS
plication
No TMS
Difference
First /1 1.129 (0.68) 1 .304(0 .78) 0.175 (0.73)
S e c o n d / 2 1.20 (0.60) 0.976 (0.49) -0.224 (0.55)
Difference 0.071 (0.64) 0.331 (0 .64)t
♦Standard deviation in brackets
t  this difference drove the interaction between TMS and Session
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We then performed follow up comparisons comparing TMS and NoTMS blocks within 
session. In Session 1, the main effect of TMS was not significant (F(l,l 1) = 3.316, p = 
0.096, p-r|2 = 0.232) although there was a trend for TMS blocks to have mean d’ values 
0.175 units lower than No TMS blocks. In Session 2, the main effect of TMS was 
significant (F(l, 11) = 13.821, p<0.005, p-rj2 = 0.557), with TMS blocks on average 
0.229 units higher than No TMS blocks. Figure 7-1 shows TMS and NoTMS blocks 
across Control, Match and Mismatch conditions, for Session 1 (a) and 2 (b). A post- 
hoc analysis on d’ values for Session 1 only (including the 2 extra participants who had 
only completed one session) showed trends, but no significant differences. The main 
effect of TMS approached significance for an uncorrected p value of 0.05 (F(l,13) = 
3.511, p = 0.084, p-rj2 = 0.213) as did the main effect of Word Category (F(2,26) = 
2.596, p = 0.094, p-r)2 = 0.175). These results are likely produced by a lack of power 
since half the data set was excluded for most participants.
7.1.3.2. Criterion. Beta and Reaction Times 
There were no significant differences.
7.1.3.3. Threshold Values
To explore why participants baseline d’ values varied between Session 1 and Session 2, 
the individual threshold values (expressed as the percentage of dots moving in one 
direction) were compared using a paired samples t-test. There was a significant 
difference between mean coherence thresholds for Session 1 at 18.5% and Session 2 at 
14.4% (t(l l) = 4.041, p<0.005); participants coherence thresholds dropped by 4.1% 
between the first and second testing sessions. There was no difference in thresholds 
between upwards and downwards motion (t < 1).
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Table 7-2: Mean coherence thresholds (%) bv Session and Motion Direction for
Exi?erim en t 6.2 - 7.2
C ond tion
E x p erim en t S ession  
1 2
Direction 
Up Down
6.2 6.1 7.5 7.6 6.0
Blocked W ord (1-9) (3.0) (3.1) (1.6)
Mean Difference 1.47(3.0)* 1.51 (3.0)*
6.3 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.3
Single Word (2.4) (2.2) (2.3) (2.2)
Mean Difference 0.12(3.5) 0.84 (3.4)
6.4 7.5 7.4 7.9 7.0
S en ten ces (2.2) (3.7) (3.7) (2.1)
Mean Difference 0.12(3.5) 0.84 (3.4)
6.5 6 .9  6.3 7.0 6.2
Blocked Single W ord (2.5) (1.4) (2.4) (1.5)
Mean Difference 0.5 (2.5) 0.8 (2.4)
7.1 18.5 14.4 16.0 17.0
TMS Blocked W ord (7.1) (4.9) (7.4) (5.3)
Mean Difference 4.1 (3.5)* 1.0 (5.4)
To check whether this pattern held for other Experiments, the thresholds for Session 1 
were compared to session 2, and the thresholds for Upwards motion were compared to 
Downwards motion, using paired sample t-tests. See Table 7-2 for the results. These 
showed that changes in threshold levels only occurred for Experiment 6.2 (i.e. the 
experiment we sought to replicate here). In that experiment participants’ thresholds 
were on average higher in session 2 than session 1 (by approximately 1.5%), and 
thresholds for upwards motion were on average higher than thresholds for downwards 
motion (again by approximately 1.5%). Therefore there is no tendency across 
experiments for participant’s thresholds to drop between session 1 and 2.
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7.1.4. Discussion
There was a significant main effect of Motion Direction, with Downwards motion 
having higher d’ values than Upwards motion. This is a pattern evidenced in experiment
6.3 and 6.4, and supports the increased salience of downwards motion in the motion 
detection task (see Section 6.6 for a tentative explanation of this finding). There was 
also a significant main effect of Word Category, with congruent conditions producing 
decreased sensitivity (d’) compared to Control conditions.
Both of the main effects were independent of TMS application. Based on the previous 
literature, we expected the application of TMS to reduce perceptual sensitivity to 
motion (as evidenced by lower d’ values) (Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004). 
However, we found that TMS marginally reduced sensitivity in the first testing session, 
but increased sensitivity in the second testing session. This produced a significant 
interaction between TMS Application and Session. Curiously, the interaction was 
driven by lower d’ values in the baseline No TMS condition when Session 1 was 
compared to Session 2 (mean difference = 0.331). In support of this difference in 
baseline performance across Sessions, participants coherence thresholds were 
significantly lower in Session 2, falling by 4.1%. It is worth pointing out that because 
RDK stimuli were presented peripherally, both the motion thresholding and detection 
tasks were harder. It is difficult to maintain attention at a location other than fixation 
and some participants did report that it was hard to fixate on the centre whilst attending 
to the periphery. The reduction in threshold values is probably due to a practice effect 
across the two sessions, such that participants improved at attending to the periphery 
and had lower coherence thresholds in Session 2. The comparative nature of the motion 
thresholding task is different to the singular judgement required during motion 
detection; therefore better performance (lower coherence thresholds) in motion 
thresholding may make motion detection harder. A weak coherent signal that can be 
discriminated in comparison to a noise pattern may not be as easily detectable when it 
has to be extracted without comparison. In motion detection, the participant has to infer 
what a random pattern looks like and judge the perceived stimulus against an inferred, 
rather than a visible, alternative. It is possible that the lower threshold values in Session 
2 produced worse performance in the baseline detection task, and in line with this the 
data shows a drop in baseline (NoTMS) performance. In contrast, values in the TMS 
condition were raised by a mean of 0.071 between Session 1 and 2. Thus, the
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application of TMS resulted in broadly similar levels of sensitivity across both Sessions. 
Given that TMS introduces noise into cortical processing, the interaction between TMS 
and Session can be explained by Stochastic Resonance (Moss et al, 2004).
Stochastic resonance refers to the sometimes beneficial effect of noise during the 
processing of signal information, therefore being directly applicable to the perception of 
sensory signals (Moss et al, 2004). The focused magnetic field of TMS creates non­
specific electrical activity in the cortical surface underneath it, essentially introducing 
noise to the activity of a particular cortical area (Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004). In 
both Sessions, introduced noise (TMS) produced similar levels of sensitivity (d’) during 
motion perception. However, because of the changes in the No TMS baseline 
conditions, this was evidenced as a decrease (Session 1) or increase (Session 2) in 
sensitivity. In both Session 1 and Session 2, participant thresholds corresponded to 81% 
accuracy on the thresholding task. However, in Session 2 participants were better at 
discriminating signal from noise during thresholding, leading to reduced coherence 
thresholds. This was likely due to practice effects with peripheral presentation; due to 
the stochastic nature of sensory systems, thresholds are not absolute or fixed (Moss et 
al, 2004).
As summarised above, a reduced signal during detection of a single event is more 
detrimental since there is no direct comparison. Therefore, in Session 1, participants’ 
performance detecting signals around their threshold was reduced by the introduction of 
noise from the TMS pulse. In this case, the signal was at threshold so the TMS noise 
reduced sensitivity. Conversely, in Session 2, the signal was sub-threshold so the 
introduction of noise from the TMS pulse improved performance. According to 
Stochastic Resonance Theory a moderate amount of noise acts to amplify the signal as 
well as the noise, pushing it above the perceptual threshold. Conversely, smaller 
amounts of noise do not effectively amplify the signal and greater amounts of noise 
instead disrupt signal processing (as it swamps the signal). This creates an inverted ‘U’ 
function where, within a particular range, additional noise is actually beneficial to signal 
processing (see Figure 7-2).
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Figure 7-2: Inverted U noise detection graph produced from a model of stochastic 
resonance. Moderate amounts of summated noise maximise sensitivity (from Moss et al, 2004)
jo
co
CO
£
s
■j* 0.5
CO
3  3  
2
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
N oise  in tensity
For example, Kitajo et al (2003) found that participants’ accuracy in monitoring the 
changing grey level of a visual stimulus in one hemi-field was improved by the addition 
of Gaussian noise in visual stimuli presented to the contra or ipsi-lateral hemi-field.
The grey level stimulus was sub-threshold, therefore supporting beneficial role of 
stochastic resonance in detecting sub-threshold stimuli. Stochastic resonance occurs 
when there is a threshold, a sub-threshold stimulus and noise. In dynamic systems (like 
the natural world) the sub-threshold stimulus does not have a fixed value, varying over 
time in how close it comes to the threshold value, but never breaching it. The crucial 
finding is that the addition of moderate noise allows the signal to breach the threshold, 
for example at those time points when the distance between the sub-threshold signal and 
threshold are reduced. With moderate noise, threshold breaches are not random but 
constrained by the signal; therefore, signal information is preserved and improved 
detection of the sub-threshold stimulus is possible. In contrast, small amounts of noise 
do not increase power sufficiently so that the signal breaches the threshold level and 
large amounts of noise swamp the signal so that threshold breaches are essentially 
random (see Figure 7-3).
The use of two sessions (one for each motion direction) created unforeseen problems for 
the application of Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation. The tentative explanation is that 
practice effects which improved performance in the Thresholding task resulted in 
reduced performance during the Detection task. The moderate noise created by TMS 
then interacted with the sub-threshold signal in Session 2. The original hypothesis was 
that the application of TMS to the motion processing area V5/MT+ would provide some
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insight into the interactions between the comprehension of motion words and the 
perception of visual motion.
Figure 7-3: An illustration of low (a), moderate (b) and high fc) noise added to a sub­
threshold stimulus
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Figure 7-3 (adapted from Moss et al, 2004): The dashed line represents the threshold, the curved black 
line the sub-threshold stimulus and the vertical grey lines the noise (a) When small amounts of noise are 
added the sub-threshold stimulus does not breach the threshold (b) When moderate noise is added, the 
sub-threshold stimulus is able to breach the threshold whilst preserving characteristics (e.g. the phase) of 
the original signal, allowing better detection (c) When large amounts of noise are added the threshold is 
breached, but now little signal information is preserved and threshold breaches are essentially random and 
uninformative.
As the critical manipulation (TMS versus NoTMS) was ineffective we are unable to 
draw any firm conclusions about how TMS affected the interactions. However, 
regardless of TMS application and whether it reduced or increased d’, there was a 
significant main effect of Word Category; congruent conditions produced lower 
perceptual sensitivity. The effect of words would appear to be independent of direct 
stimulation on V5/MT+, and therefore independent of different levels of cortical 
activity at the area responsible for processing the coherent motion signals present in the
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RDKs (Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004). The semantic modulation of sensitivity 
could be outside the low level motion processing areas, such as V5/MT+, but pervasive 
enough to affect d’ (rather than obligatorily affecting both sensitivity and decision 
processes). The interaction between Word Category and TMS never approached 
significance and Figure 7-1 illustrates that the main effect of Word Category was fairly 
consistent. Whilst the pattern suggests that the influence of directional words is 
independent of TMS, it is possible that the effects are additive at V5/MT+, such that 
motion words do directly engage V5/MT+ and the noise from TMS is summated on to 
the semantic effect. With different TMS parameters, perhaps causing more severe 
disruption of V5/MT+ processes, we may have seen an interaction between the two.
The explanation of stochastic interference supports the fact that the TMS noise was 
moderate. Theoretically, if V5/MT+ processing is disrupted through catastrophic levels 
of noise, rather than impaired through moderate noise, the motion words should not be 
able to modulate V5/MT+ activity at all. If congruency effects are found on sensitivity 
when more disruptive TMS parameters are used, this would present quite strong 
evidence for their effects originating outside V5/MT+.
The main effect of Word Category contrasted with previous results: blocked word 
presentation produced effects on d’, however, the effect is in a different condition to that 
found in Experiment 6.2. There, the Mismatch condition had lower d’ values compared 
to the Match and Control conditions. In this experiment, the Mismatch condition was 
not significantly different from the Match or Control conditions, falling in between the 
two, but the Match condition had reduced sensitivity relative to the Control. There were 
two methodological differences between the original method in 6.2 and it’s adaptation 
to TMS. First, the motion patterns were 60ms long (rather than 150ms) and they were 
presented in the right visual hemi-field (rather than centrally). Both changes increased 
the difficulty of the task, as demonstrated by the increased thresholds for this 
experiment, as compared to those for Experiments 6.2-6.5 (see Table 7-2). Either of 
these two changes in method could have produced the different congruency effects.
It is unlikely that shortening the motion pattern would produce this difference in 
conditions. The unsynchronised presentation of words means that their influence across 
the block is continuous and therefore it should affect perception of RDKs regardless of 
their length. However, since presentation was unsynchronised the very short duration 
means that RDKs may have been less likely to overlap with the presented words;
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making the paradigm more like consecutive presentation than concurrent presentation.
In this case, we might expect congruency effects to appear in different conditions. 
Elsewhere it has been proposed that congruent visual motion interferes with 
comprehension when the two are presented simultaneously, but facilitates 
comprehension when the two are presented consecutively (Kaschak et al, 2006). During 
simultaneous presentation congruent semantic and perceptual information compete for 
the same resources (i.e. direction selective neurons in motion processing areas), whereas 
consecutive presentation produces priming since semantic and perceptual information 
are temporally separate and access the same resource in turn. This explanation should 
also hold for comprehension interfering with motion, since the resources are the same. 
Here we find incongruent interference in one experiment (6.2) and congruent 
interference in another (the present experiment). Therefore the pattern is always 
interference, but the condition changes. It is not clear why this should be case and it is 
not straightforward to apply the same logic as that used in Kaschak et al (2006). If the 
shorter RDK patterns had produced something similar to consecutive presentation we 
should see some facilitation (congruent or incongruent) if the priming account is to be 
adopted. In sum, the shorter RDK presentation does not provide a straightforward 
account of the different congruency effects.
The major change in method, and the one that most likely led to the TMS x Session 
interaction, was peripheral presentation. It is thought that the neural representation of 
peripheral motion is different to central motion. In the monkey MT (the analogue to the 
human motion processing area V5/MT+), larger receptive field sizes are present with 
increased eccentricity (Blake, Sekuler & Grossman, 2004). It is assumed that the same 
is true for the human V5/MT+ (it has been found for human VI; Kastner et al, 2001). 
Neurones respond to motion across larger areas of peripheral vision than they do for 
central vision, therefore central motion is at a higher resolution relative to peripheral 
motion. Given the reduced visual acuity in the periphery, it is sensible that motion 
signals are collated across larger visual regions: when information is not perceived in as 
much detail it is pooled across larger areas. Therefore, it is possible that the influence 
of motion words on peripheral visual motion is different to the influence of motion 
words on central visual motion, due to differences in the neural representation of visual 
motion by eccentricity. Central motion is at a greater resolution so may be disrupted by 
incongruent semantic information (but not congruent information). When the visual 
signal is more detailed (central presentation) it may be less open to disruption from
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semantic/contextual information so we only see a reduction when semantic information 
is opposed to the visual direction. In contrast, peripheral motion is at a lower resolution 
so may be disrupted by both congruent and incongruent semantic information; the signal 
has less detail so any extraneous direction information may affect processing. Note that 
although the incongruent condition was not significantly different to congruent or 
control conditions, as shown in Figure 7-1 there was a trend for the Mismatch condition 
to pattern with the Match condition (as in 6.3).
Thus, these results cannot be used to inform the original hypotheses. However, an 
important result was that there were no significant effects on measures of decision 
threshold or reaction times. Therefore, the selective influence of semantic content on 
perception was localised to low level visual perception. This supports the effect of 
motion words on low level visual processes independently of higher order decision or 
response processes. This finding is in line with other experiments that have shown 
effects on d’ without effects on decision processes (6.5) or without effects on either 
decision processes or reaction times (6.3). As discussed previously, Signal Detection 
Theory treats measures of criterion (c and P) as independent of perceptual sensitivity 
(d’); however, it is possible that the influence of motion words operates pervasively on 
attention, decision threshold, response speed and perceptual sensitivity. By finding that 
d’ can be influenced without any other changes in dependent measures, the effect of 
motion words on perception is decoupled from effects on higher order processes. This 
provides further evidence for a direct and automatic connection between semantic 
motion and the perception of motion.
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8. Perception of visual motion on comprehension
As we have seen, the comprehension of motion words can influence low levels of visual 
perception. However, those influences are variable across small changes in task 
parameters, in particular, the strength of the linguistic context and the temporal 
relationship between lexical items and visual motion. The previous experiments have 
also shown that language affects different levels of task performance in different ways. 
This highlights the fact that whenever influences of comprehension upon perception are 
found, it is difficult to exclude other top-down mechanisms on perception that have 
themselves been affected by comprehension. The influences of comprehension on 
perception may be mediated, coming from changes in attention or working memory, 
rather than from the direct engagement of perceptual systems during semantic access. 
Language is instrumental in modulating attention and the content of working memory; 
these are two of the most ordinary consequences of comprehension. Stronger evidence 
for embodiment comes from influences of perception on comprehension. In this case, 
irrelevant perceptual stimuli influence linguistic tasks (such as lexical decision or 
sentence judgements) in a semantically modulated manner. Here, it is less likely that 
uncontrolled top-down mechanisms mediate the interaction between perception and 
comprehension. If motion perception, which activates particular perceptual processes, 
interacts with comprehension this is more likely to be because those perceptual 
processes have directly influenced semantic access. This is because higher-order 
cognitive processes such as attention and working memory are canonically held to 
modulate perceptual processes (e.g. Yantis, 2005) rather than be modulated by them. 
Therefore, in this chapter a number of experiments are presented which explore the 
influence of motion perception on the comprehension of words and sentences that refer 
to motion.
The first two experiments (8.1) were designed as an extension of Kaschak et al (2005), 
in which visual motion was perceived in blocks whilst sentences were judged for 
sensibility and grammaticality. To avoid problems that might occur when visual motion 
was blocked (in particular, the motion after effect) we presented perceptual and lexical 
stimuli on a trial by trial basis. In addition, we adapted the paradigm for use with both 
single words (lexical decision) and sentences (sensibility judgements). The final two 
experiments presented sentences (8.2) and words (8.3) visually rather than aurally. This 
was to counter uncontrolled linguistic variables that may have been covering effects for
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experiments 8.1; this method of presentation also ensured participants perceived the 
visual motion. If single words and sentences referring to motion automatically engage 
the perceptual systems involved in motion processing, the reaction times and error rates 
forjudging stimuli should differ (1) in comparison to the control condition in which 
linguistic stimuli do not refer to motion and (2) depending on whether the visual and 
semantic motion are congruent or incongruent.
8 .1. Trial by Trial perception of motion on
single word and sentence comprehension
Participants were presented with single words for lexical decision (8.1a) or sentences 
for sensibility judgements (8. lb). Visual motion began before item onset and ended 
shortly after offset, therefore covering the duration of the item without needing blocked 
presentation. The motion animations were RDKs, rather than black and white lines, 
with 60% coherent motion. These stimuli were used for two reasons, first, to further 
reduce the chance that the MAE would be produced by presenting salient but not 
overwhelming visual motion and second, to make the stimuli comparable to the motion 
used in experiments covered in Chapters 6 and 7. In line with the finding from Kaschak 
et al (2005) the hypotheses are as follows: when the semantic and visual motion are 
congruent, participants will be slower to judge the words or sentences (as compared to 
congruent and control conditions).
8.1.1. Participants
8.1a) 33 native English speakers took part in return for payment. Mean age was 25.7 
years (standard deviation = 10.6 years), there were 19 females.
8.1b) 33 native English speakers took part in return for payment. Mean age was 24.6 
years (standard deviation =8.1 years), there were 22 females.
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8.1.2. Method
8.1.2.1. Design
A 3 x 2 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were 
Word/Sentence Category (Up, Down and Control) and Dot Motion (Upwards, 
Downwards). The dependent variables were the reaction time (ms) and error rates for 
lexical decision/sentence judgement. The experiment was divided into 2 parts, the first 
part comprised the first presentation of each item, and the second part comprised the 
second presentation of each item. Each item was presented with both upwards and 
downwards motion. Presentation of parts, blocks and trials was fully randomised.
8.1a) Each half contained 10 blocks, each block contained 21 lexical decision trials, 
making a total of 420 trials.
8.1b) Each half contained 10 blocks, each block contained 15 sentence judgement trials, 
making a total of 300 trials.
8.1.2.2. Materials
8.1a) Item Set Two Single Words was used. 103 nonsense words were selected from 
the set created for this purpose.
8.1b) Item Set Two Sentences was used. 60 nonsense sentences were selected from the 
set created for this purposes.
Two lists were created, one which paired each item with one direction of motion and 
one which paired each item with the other direction of motion. One list was presented 
in the first half of each experiments and the other list was presented in the second half.
8.1.2.3. Graphic Display
The motion display was created by displaying a sequence of 70 bitmap files as frames, 
which were displayed for 16 ms each. The sequence was created so that it could repeat
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smoothly and give the impression of continuous motion; one complete cycle of the 70 
frames took 1.12seconds. Moving dots which left the frame area along the y-axis were 
replaced. Each frame subtended 9.9 x 9.9° of visual angle, and contained 225 white 
dots on a black background. Each dot subtended 0.14°, all dots covered less than 0.05% 
of the total area. 135 of the dots (60%) were displaced in one direction by 9°/s, the 
remaining dots were displaced to random locations between each frame. A fixation 
cross presented centrally (0.42°) was presented throughout.
8.1.2.4. Avvaratus
Experiments were presented using E-Prime 1.1 software (Schneider, Eschman & 
Zuccolotto; 2002). The experiment was run on PC computers (Intel Pentium II), using 
15” flat screen LCD monitors. Chin rests were placed at a distance of 57cm from the 
computer screen. Stereo closed headphones were used to present the audio files 
binaurally.
8.1.2.5. Procedure
Participants were seated in a sound attenuated booth, and instructed to press the ‘M* key 
if the word/sentence they heard was a real meaningful word/sensible sentence, and the 
‘N* key if the it was a non-word/nonsense sentence. Participants were seated in front of 
the computer screen and rested their chins on a chin rest which minimized head 
movements and placed their eyes level with the centre of the computer screen.
On each trial a blue fixation cross presented for 1000 ms to signal the beginning of each 
trial, the motion animation was displayed for 1100 ms before the word (8.2a)/sentence 
(8.2b) was presented and continued playing for 1100/2200ms during the presentation of 
the word/sentence. A red fixation cross was then presented for 1000ms. There was a 
3000/5000ms time out following the offset of the word/sentence.
8.1.2.6. Analysis
To reduce the influence of sentence/word length on response times, the length of the 
word or sentence was subtracted from the reaction time measured from sentence onset; 
this produced reaction times that were relative to sentence offset.
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8.1a) Two subjects were removed from the analysis as their accuracy rates were below 
60%, all other subjects had accuracy rates above 90%. Reaction times below 0 ms 
(before word offset), above 2 standard deviations per subject or above 1500ms were 
excluded. This removed 5.9% of the data. Errors were analysed separately.
8.1b) Four subjects were removed from the analysis as their accuracy rates were below 
70%, all other subjects had accuracy rates above this cut-off. Reaction times below 
-200ms (200ms before sentence offset), above 2 standard deviations per subject or 
above 1000ms were removed. This removed 3.34% of the data. Errors were analysed 
separately.
8.1.3. Results
8.1.3.1. Reaction Times
8.1a) There was a significant main effect of Word Category by Subjects (FI (2,60) = 
8.877, p-rj2 = 0.228; F2 < 1.9) and the main effect of Motion Direction also approached 
significance by Subjects (Fl(l,30) = 3.536, p = 0.07, p-rj2 = 0.105; F2 < 1). The mean 
reaction time for Control words was 409ms, for the Mismatch condition 391ms and for 
the Match condition 374ms. Planned comparisons showed that the Control condition 
had significantly longer reaction times than the Mismatch (FI(1,30) = 6.866, p-rj2 = 
0.186; F2 < 1) and Match conditions (Fl(l,30) = 18.779, p-if = 0.385; F2(l,58) = 
3.362, p = 0.072, p-r|2 = 0.055). There was also a significant interaction between Word 
Category and Motion Direction (FI(2,60) = 11.374, p-rj2 = 0.275; F2(2,87) = 2.315, p = 
0.105, p-rj2 = 0.051). Upwards motion produced reaction times that were around 11ms 
faster than Downwards motion in the Control and Match conditions; however, in the 
Mismatch condition Downwards motion was 27ms faster than Upwards motion. The 
interaction between Word Category and Motion Direction was significant when the 
Mismatch condition was compared to the Control (FI(1,30) = 9.247, p-r|2 = 0.236; 
F2(l,58) = 2.580, p = 0.114, p-rj2 = 0.043) and Match conditions (Fl(l,30) = 19.646, p- 
ri2 = 0.396; F2(l,58) = 3.144, p = 0.081, p-rf = 0.051)15. See Table 8-1 and Figure 8- 
la.
15 When a 2x2 repeated measures ANOVA was used to compare Word Category (Down and Up) by
261
8.1b) There was a significant main effect of Sentence Category (FI (2,56) = 39.647, p-rf 
= 0.596; F2(2,84) = 7.345, p-rj2 = 0.149). Planned comparisons showed that the Control 
condition had reaction times 66ms faster than the Match condition (FI(1,28) = 54.520, 
p-r]2 = 0.661; F2(l,56) = 9.987, p-r|2 = 0.151) and 61ms faster than the Mismatch 
condition (Fl(l,28) = 59.584, p-rj2 = 0.680; F2(l,56) = 7.240, p-rj2 = 0.114). There was 
also a significant interaction between Sentence Category and Motion Direction 
(Fl(2,56) = 4.2, p-rj2 = 0.130; F2 < 1). In the Control condition, Downwards motion 
was 22ms slower than Upwards motion; this in contrast to the Match (FI(1,28) = 5.192, 
p-T)2 = 0.156; F2 < 1) and Mismatch condition (FI(1,28) = 6.118, p-if = 0.179; F2 <
1.7) for which Downwards motion was 15ms faster than Upwards motion. See Table 
8-1 and Figure 8-lb.
8.1.3.2. Errors
8.1a) A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed there were more errors for the Mismatch 
condition when words were paired with Upwards motion (z = -2.109, p < 0.05); this 
difference was reliable by Subjects only.
8.1b) There was a significant difference in error rates between the Control, Match and 
Mismatch conditions (Friedman test by Subjects X 2= 14.150, df = 2; Kruskal Wallis by 
Items X2 = 5.917, df = 2, p = 0.052). There were significantly more errors in the Match 
(mean = 8.7; zl = -2.778, z2 = -5.484) and Mismatch conditions (m = 8.0; zl = -2.431, 
z2 = -5.030) in comparison to the Control condition (m = 6.4).
8.1.4. Discussion
Control words produced significantly longer reaction times as compared to directional 
words. In addition, Down words were found to have longer reaction times than Up 
words. This set of items was matched for length in phonemes and phonological 
neighbourhood size, in an attempt to reduce the variability in lexical decision times. 
However, there are still differences between Word Categories that produce different 
reaction times regardless of visual motion. The fact that most comparisons were
Motion Direction (Downwards and Upwards), a significant main effect of Word Category (F(l,30) = 
19.646, p<0.0001, p-r\2 = 0.396) was found, with Up words faster than Down words by a mean of
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significant by Subjects but not by Items supports the inference that there were 
uncontrolled factors on an item-by-item basis that increased the overall variance. 
Differences between Word Categories (Control, Down and Up) could be due to 
uncontrolled variables that affect spoken words recognition.
Table 8-1: Mean Response Time for Sentence Judgement in Experiment 8.1b and 8.2b 
(Standard deviation in brackets)
Experiment Condition
Control Match Mismatch
Downwards Upwards Downwards Upwards Downwards Upwards
Exp 8.1a
Single
Words
Trial dot
motion
Mean
417.80 399.29 
(94.09) (113.41)
408.54 (103.76)*
394.59 353.54 
(86.81) (103.67)
374.07 (97.06)
376.91 404.08 
(119.34) (103.29)
390.50 (111.53)
Exp 8.1b 
Sentences 
Trial dot 
motion
Mean
252.76 230.96 
(74.45) (60.89)
241.86 (68.30)*
303.78 312.48 
(81.64) (82.16)
308.13(81.30)
293.18 313.26 
(78.20) (77.00)
303.22 (77.59)
* Significantly different to the other two conditions, p<0.05
For example, auditory lexical decision is sensitive to phonotactic probability (Vitevich 
et al, 1999), with higher probabilities (i.e. more frequent phonemes and sequences of 
phonemes) producing faster reaction times. Another factor that is known to influence 
auditory lexical decision times is the unique recognition point of each word. RTs were 
calculated relative to word offset, however, there was likely considerable variability in 
the recognition points for each word that would increase variability across items (for a 
review see Goldinger, 1996). This increases the noise in the data and may mask any 
congruency effects.
As the central task was to judge words presented aurally, it is possible that the visual 
motion was not consistently viewed (at least for the lexical decision experiment, where 
motion patterns were of a shorter duration than for sentence judgements, see below). 
When single words were presented, there were some effects of motion direction that 
interacted with congruency, however these were driven by differences between Down 
and Up categories rather than by strong effects of visual motion. There are a number of 
ways in which this problem could be counteracted. First, eye-movements could be 
monitored to ensure fixation. Second, a dual task method could be employed so that
34ms. Therefore when collapsed into Match versus Mismatch conditions an interaction emerges.
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attendance to the visual display was necessary (e.g. Zwaan & Taylor, 2006, Experiment 
3). Finally, visual presentation of the linguistic stimuli could be used so that they are 
overlaid on RDK motion. In this case, perception of the motion is passive but 
guaranteed during the lexical decision task; this was the approach taken in Experiment
8.3.
Reaction times for sentence judgements also showed differences between the Control 
and directional items, such that Control sentences were judged more quickly than 
directional sentences. In addition, error rates were higher for directional sentences, so a 
speed-accuracy trade-off was not responsible for the reaction time differences (which 
would have produced more errors for the Control condition as compared to directional 
sentences). Therefore directional sentences were responded to more slowly and with 
more errors, regardless of congruence. In addition, the mean response times for each 
direction of motion differed between Control and directional sentences. In the Control 
condition, upwards motion produced faster responses than downwards motion; the 
opposite was true for directional sentences with faster responses when downwards 
motion was perceived. This indicates that the motion patterns were being perceived and 
it reinforces the conclusion that directional sentences behaved differently to the control 
sentences. However, it is not possible to interpret the interaction itself in a sensible or 
motivated manner, therefore it will not be discussed any further. Although there was no 
effect of congruence, it is possible that this result is based on the influence of visual 
motion on the comprehension of motion sentences. We could make a tentative 
inference of general interference caused by the perception of visual motion on the 
comprehension of directional sentences. This is against the original findings of 
Kaschak et al (2005) as the interference is not modulated by congruency. Recall that in 
that experiment, congruence led to longer reaction times. Our results instead support 
more difficult comprehension of sentences referring to vertical motion whenever the 
visual system perceives vertical motion. Kaschak et al (2005) presented a 30 second 
motion animation whilst a number of aurally presented sentences were judged; therefore 
the motion patterns lasted much longer. There are two possibilities: First, the longer 
motion duration in Kaschak et al (ibid) produced qualitatively different motion 
processing than the shorter animations we presented. Exposure to strong motion for 
durations of around 30 seconds produces the motion after effect, demonstrating that 
directionally selective neurones have become fatigued (Levinson & Sekuler, 1976). 
Thus, congruency effects may only appear when motion processing is heavily taxed.
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Directionally selective neurones may be able to process visual and semantic motion 
reasonably well (producing general interference for any semantic motion, congruent or 
incongruent) unless one task demands substantially more resources for directionally 
selective processes (when congruence effects emerge). This would also be in line with 
the results from our motion detection experiments, in which directionally selective 
processes are heavily taxed through the presentation o f ambiguous (i.e. difficult) motion 
stimuli.
Figure 8-1: Reaction Times to judge stimuli for 8.1(a) Lexical Decision 
and 8.1(b) Sentence sensibility
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Under this explanation, we should find congruency effects with longer durations of 
motion (similar to Kaschak et al, ibid) but not for shorter durations (in which we should 
replicate our current results)16. Second, a more trivial explanation is that in Kaschak et 
al (ibid) the longer motion duration could mean that participants were more likely to 
consistently perceive motion, producing congruency effects. In our experiment, the 
shorter motion duration (operating on a trial by trial basis) may have led to less 
consistent viewing of the motion patterns and a general interference from motion (since 
the visual motion signal was weaker due to inattention). This explanation means that if 
we monitored eye-movements or ensured participants were viewing the patterns, we 
would also find congruency effects. This second explanation was tested in Experiment
8.2, in which a self-paced reading task was used to ensure that motion was consistently 
perceived.
In sum, the first set of experiments show some consistent effects of motion perception 
on comprehension for sentences, but not for single words. For auditory lexical decision, 
congruency effects may be masked by uncontrolled lexical variables and/or inconsistent 
motion perception. For auditory sentence comprehension, the general interference for 
motion sentences (in contrast to Kaschak et al, 2005) may be due to the shorter motion 
animations or inconsistent motion perception. The next two experiments sought to 
counter the main problem, that visual motion may not have been viewed consistently 
enough to produce congruency effects. Visual rather than auditory presentation was 
used to guarantee the perception of motion during comprehension (just as auditory 
presentation had guaranteed comprehension during motion perception for experiments 
presented in Chapter 6 & 7). There are differences in the effects found for auditory and 
visual presentation of linguistic items (e.g. Goldinger, 1996). However, both forms 
should access the same semantic representation, and congruency effects should be 
observed.
16 See Appendix 3 for an attempted replication and extension of Kaschak et al (2005)
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8 .2 . Self-paced reading with motion perception
Participants were presented with sentences (phrase by phrase) in a self-paced reading 
task. Behind the box in which phrases were displayed, upwards or downwards motion 
was presented in the form of black and white lines. Self paced reading was used for two 
reasons. First, it is hoped that visual presentation will remove some of the variation in 
response times present with auditory comprehension. Second, as the participants have 
to read the sentences they also have to perceive the visual motion present in the 
periphery. It has been previously demonstrated that illusory rotational motion 
influences the reading times for sentences referring to rotation (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). 
In line with their findings, one hypothesis is that when the visual and semantic motion 
are congruent, reading times will be faster in comparison to incongruent visual motion 
and the control condition (in which the sentences do not refer to a consistent direction of 
motion). They found that only reading times for the verb (which implied rotation) were 
facilitated, therefore the addition to the main hypothesis is that faster reading times will 
only be present for the verb, rather than the subject or object phrase. However, since 
Zwaan & Taylor (2006) used sentences that described manual rotation (so the visual 
motion was implied rather than directly described), results may be different for 
sentences that explicitly describe visual motion. Thus, a second hypothesis is that we 
may replicate in reading times what Kaschak et al (2005) found for auditory sentence 
judgement: congruent conditions increase reaction times as the semantic and visual 
motion compete for the same resources. Finally, an alternative to these congruency 
effects is the hypothesis that we will replicate the general interference from motion 
found for experiment 8.1b; this would support the inference that trial-by-trial motion 
perception has a different effect on comprehension as compared to blocked motion 
perception (see discussion of experiment 8. lb above).
8.2.1. Participants
38 native English speakers (20 female) took part in return for payment. Mean age was 
22.45 years (standard deviation = 7.95 years).
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8.2.2. Method
8.2.2.1. Pesi2n
A 3 x 3 x 2 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were 
Sentence Category (Up, Down and Control), Sentence Phrase (First, Second or Third) 
and Motion Direction (Upwards, Downwards). The dependent variable was the reaction 
time to read each Phrase (milliseconds). The experiment was divided into 2 parts, each 
containing 9 blocks of 15 trials, making a total of 270 sentence judgement trials. The 
first part of the experiment comprised the first presentation of each item; the second part 
comprised the second presentation of each item. Each sentence was presented whilst 
the participant viewed upwards or downwards motion. Presentation of parts, blocks and 
trials was fully randomised.
8.2.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Sentences was used. 45 Filler items (followed by yes/no comprehension 
questions of the form “Did the X verb the Y?”) were selected from the set created for 
' that purpose.
For the purposes of presentation, all sentences were broken down into three phrases: 1. 
subject phrase, 2. verb phrase, and 3. prepositional/ object phrase (e.g. 1. the man 2. 
walked 3. to the river). Two lists were created for each half of the experiment, pairing 
each sentence with each direction of motion. Each filler item was followed by a 
comprehension question in one list only, resulting in comprehension questions on 17% 
of trials.
8.2.2.3. Graphic Display
Motion stimuli were created by displaying a sequence of 8 bitmap files as frames, each 
displayed for 100ms. The sequence was created so that it could repeat smoothly and 
give the impression of continuous motion. Each file filled the screen; presenting 24 thin 
black lines (approx 0.115°) separated by thicker white lines (approx 1°). The lines
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moved at around 1.152 °/s. The sentences were presented on a white frame overlaying 
the lines, centred at fixation (approximately 18 x 14° visual angle). The first and second 
phrases were usually located on the same line directly above the third phrase. Thus, 
behind the central white frame and filling the rest of the screen were horizontal lines 
that moved either upward or downwards
8.2.2.4. Apparatus
The experiment was carried out using E-Prime 1.0 software on Intel Pentium III 
computers. The display was presented on a 15” LCD monitor with a refresh rate of 
75Hz. Participants responded using a standard ‘qwerty’ keyboard and sat approximately 
50cm from the screen during presentations
8.2.2.5. Procedure
Participants were instructed to press the spacebar to make each part of the sentence 
appear (first, second and third phrase) and to read them at their own pace. On some 
trials, they would be required to answer questions about the sentence they had just read, 
pressing Y for ‘yes’ and N for ‘no’. During each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 
500ms. A sentence was then presented with all letters and punctuation (e.g. 
apostrophes) replaced by the capital letter X. On the first press the first phrase appeared 
whilst all other letters/phrases were still replaced by Xs. Upon each press the previous 
phrase was again replaced with Xs and the next phrase appeared. When the spacebar 
was pressed after presentation of the third (and final) phrase, the screen was replaced by 
a fixation cross for 500ms. On filler trials a comprehension question then appeared, 
with 6000ms time out for responses. After each block participants were given an 
optional break.
8.2.2.6. Analysis
Three participants were eliminated from the study for having accuracy scores lower than 
85%. The reaction times were measured from the time taken to press the space bar after 
the appearance of each phrase. Invalid trials were removed (when a double press had 
occurred and reaction times were therefore recorded as negative). Reaction times below
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100ms and above 1000ms were removed as well as times over 2 standard deviations 
from each participant’s mean response time. This removed 5.39% of the data. 
Remaining response times were analysed using a 3 (phrase) x 3 (sentence category) x 2 
(motion direction) ANOVA by-subjects and by-items. Planned simple comparisons 
were then performed for Sentence Category x Motion Direction within each Phrase.
8.2.3. Results
There was a significant main effect of Phrase (FI (2,68) = 24.782, p-r|2 = 0.422; 
F2(2,168) = 641.890, p-r|2 = 0.884). Reading times for Phrase 1 (mean = 409ms) and 
Phrase 2 (414ms) were significantly faster than Phrase 3 (525ms). There was also a 
significant interaction between Phrase and Motion Direction (F(2,68) = 3.507, p-rf = 
0.093; F2 <1.3). For Phrase 1 and 2, upwards motion produced faster reading times 
than downwards motion; this pattern was reversed for Phrase 3. There was also a 
significant 3-way interaction between Phrase, Sentence Category and Motion (F(4,136) 
= 7.645, p-r|2 = 0.184; F2(4,168) = 3.531, p-rj2 = 0.078). Phrase 1 and 2 behaved 
similarly, with Control and Match conditions having faster times for Upwards motion, 
this was reversed in the Mismatch condition with reading times faster for Downwards 
motion. These differences produced a significant interaction between Sentence 
Category and Motion Direction for Phrase 2 (FI(2,68) = 3.830, p-ri2 = 0.101; F2 < 1) 
but not Phrase 1 (all Fs < 1). Phrase 3 had faster reading times in the Control and 
Match conditions for Downwards motion. In contrast, the Mismatch condition had 
faster reading times for Upwards motion. These differences produced a significant 
interaction between Sentence Category and Motion Direction for Phrase 3 (FI(2,68) = 
4.558, p-rj2 = 0.118; F2< 1).
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Table 8-2: Mean Reading Time (ms) for each Phrase bv Condition 
(Standard deviation in brackets)_______________________________________
P h ra s e
Control 
Downwards | Upwards
C o nd ition
Match
Downwards \ Upwards
Mismatch 
Downwards \ Upwards
P h ra s e  1
410.04 399.41 
(122.31) (118.65)
416.44 411.09 
(131.06) (134.01)
407.35
(120.91)
411.05
(127.11)
Mean 404.73(119.74) f 413.77 (131.61) 409.20 (123.16)
P h ra s e  2
413.09 402.22 
(136.48) (126.71)
426.40 411.04 
(153.08) (138.09)
415.51
(133.98)
419.11
(134.77)
Mean 407.65 (130.85) * 418.72 (144.92) 417.31 (133.41)
P h ra s e  3
509.48 523.51 
(244.48) (245.23)
521.70 542.24 
(253.24) (270.40)
535.10
(254.61)
518.36
(236.72)
Mean 516.50(243.18) 531.97(260.16) 526.73(244.18)
fSignificantly different to the Match condition. 
♦Significantly different to both other conditions.
The main effect of Sentence Category was also significant (FI (2,68) = 4.065, p-rj2 =
0.107; F2 < 1). Mean reading times were 443ms for the Control condition, 451ms for 
the Mismatch conditions and 455ms for the Match condition. Phrase 1 showed a 
marginal main effect of Sentence Category (FI (2,68) = 2.875, p = 0.063, p-r|2 = 0.078; 
F2 < 1), driven by the difference between Control (mean = 405ms) and Match 
conditions (414ms). Phrase 2 showed a significant main effect of Sentence Category 
(FI(2,68) = 5.224, p-rj2 = 0.133; F2 < 1), with the Control condition (mean = 408ms) 
significantly faster than the Match (419ms) and Mismatch condition (417ms). Phrase 3 
did not show a significant main effect of Sentence Category (FI < 1.8; F2 < l)17. See 
Table 8-3 for reading times in all conditions and Figure 8-3 for reading times for each 
Phrase and Sentence Category, collapsed across Motion Direction.
17 When Control, Down and Up conditions were compared by Subjects, a main effect of Sentence 
Category (F(2,68) = 4.514, p-rf = 0.117) was driven by the Down and Up conditions producing 
longer reading times as compared to the Control condition (F(l,34) = 10.380, p-if = 0.234; F( 1,34) = 
5.229, p-if = 0.133 respectively). They were not significantly different to each other (F < 1).
Figure 8-2: Mean reading times bv Phrase and Condition* 
* Error bars are one standard error of the mean
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8.2.4. Discussion
There was a significant main effect of Sentence Category, with Control sentences 
producing faster reaction times as compared to the Match condition in Phrase 1, and the 
Match and Mismatch conditions for Phrase 2. It is possible that the effect at Phrase 2, 
the verb, is due to the directional content of the words, however it is more likely that the 
effect present in Phrase 1 carried over and was enhanced by Phrase 2. In other words, 
general differences between the Control and directional sentences appeared early 
(following the subject phrase) and were still present when the verb was comprehended. 
The changes in reaction times indicate that the Control sentences were easier to 
comprehend than the directional sentences. This result fits with the data from auditory 
sentence comprehension (8.1b) that showed faster response times to Control sentences 
as compared to directional sentences. Therefore, at least some of the difference in 
reaction times between control and directional sentences can be attributed to general 
differences in sentence composition rather than directional content. No differences 
were present between Sentence Categories at Phrase 3, which also showed reading
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times substantially longer than the other two phrases. This result is probably due to the 
active comprehension task employed to ensure participants read the sentences properly. 
On filler trials, participants had to respond ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to a simple question about the 
content of the sentence. For example, after reading the sentence “The man drove to 
work” they might be asked the question “Did the man walk to work?” or “Did the man 
drive home?”. The longer reading times at Phrase 3 suggest that participants read the 
sentence quickly but slowed down at Phrase 3 to either recall the sentence or maintain it 
in working memory should they be asked a question. One possibility that might rescue 
the interpretation that motion (rather than general comprehension difficulty) affected 
directional sentences in experiment 8.1b, is that visual presentation for reading forced 
the participants to attend to the different elements of the sentence, decreasing the focus 
on the motion event (the verb). This returns us to the point about single words 
presenting type information (more schematic, but less constrained) in comparison to 
sentences which present token information (more concrete, but more constrained).
When presented as phrases the sentences will be comprehended in chunks that have to 
be integrated and participants would have become used to the separation of each 
sentence into 3 phrases. This may remove the salience of the motion event and increase 
the salience of the subject and object. Note that if the sentences had been presented 
word-by-word (as in Zwaan & Taylor, 2006) this might have reduced this problem as all 
words would have to be given the same attention.
The longer reading times at Phrase 3 also explain why no differences in Sentence 
Categories were found here, as this strategic slowing down was present for all sentences 
and would swamp any small differences that might have been present on the initial 
reading of the final phrase. The whole sentence was initially presented with all the 
letters replaced by Xs; therefore participants were obviously aware of where the 
sentence ended. It is perhaps not surprising that this influenced reading times in 
combination with comprehension questions. This interpretation also implies that the 
comprehension questions were not an effective manipulation, resulting in a shallow 
reading of the sentences. The surface form of the target sentence was only needed to 
correctly respond to the comprehension questions as they typically differed from the 
target in only one word. Three changes to this method may improve results. First, 
sentences could be lengthened and presented one word at a time, rather than in phrases. 
This would increase the sensitivity of the paradigm and produce a longer exposure to 
visual motion. For example, each sentence could be preceded by a context sentence,
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e.g. “Once he had finished his breakfast, the man drove to work” (e.g. Zwaan & Taylor, 
2006). It would also make it less clear where the sentence ended. Second, a 
grammaticality or sensibility judgement could be used instead of a comprehension 
question. With a careful selection of filler items, this would make the task harder and 
require a deeper reading of each sentence. Third, motion direction could be blocked, 
with each block starting with one or two filler sentences. In the present design, sentence 
presentation and motion direction were randomised; therefore the length of exposure to 
visual motion was limited. This is especially true here as programming constraints 
required each frame of the motion animation to be presented for 100ms, making the 
speed of vertical motion slower than in all other experiments. This has the unfortunate 
result that directional motion may not have been salient enough (given that it was also 
presented in the periphery) to influence reading times.
There were also interactions between Sentence Category and Motion Direction, with 
Phrase 3 and the Mismatch condition behaving in opposition to the Control and Match 
conditions for Phrase 1 and 2. The behaviour of the Mismatch condition cannot be 
attributed to general differences between the Down and Up sentences that produced 
interactions when analysed as Match vs. Mismatch (see Footnote 3), so it is unclear how 
to interpret them. The differences for Phrase 3 may well be due to the longer reading 
times evidenced here distorting effects seen in Phrase 1 and 2. However, what the 
interactions do demonstrate is that the direction of motion did influence reading times. 
For Phrase 1 and 2, upwards motion generally resulted in faster reading times as 
compared to downwards motion. For Phrase 3 this was reversed. These results do not 
agree with previous data that show upwards motion as harder to perceive/more 
interfering than downwards motion. However, they do reinforce the conclusion that 
visual motion was perhaps not salient enough to produce congruency effects in reading 
times. Based on a presentation speed of one frame every 100ms, mean reading times for 
Phrase 1 and 2 would allow 4 frames to pass, whilst in Phrase 3 this is increased to 5 or 
6 frames. Only in Phrase 3, when reading times were substantially longer, did upwards 
motion show the longer response times that we have seen more reliably elsewhere.
In sum, the self-paced reading task was beset by methodological problems. Therefore 
no conclusions can be drawn about the influence of motion perception on reading times 
for directional sentences.
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8 .3 . Visual Lexical Decision with Salient and Ambiguous 
motion
Participants are presented with single words in a visual lexical decision task. RDK 
motion patterns are presented behind the word, with motion that is either supra- 
threshold and salient or at threshold and therefore ambiguous. The manipulation of 
motion coherence is motivated by a recent finding in visual neuroscience. Tsushima et 
al (2006) gave participants a visual target identification task (reporting two digits in a 
rapid serial visual stream of letters) whilst presenting irrelevant motion in the periphery. 
They found that when the coherence of the irrelevant motion was close to threshold, 
performance on the target identification task dropped. A follow up fMRI experiment 
showed that when the irrelevant motion was salient, MT+ showed reduced activity and 
the Dorso Lateral PreFrontal Cortex (DLPFC) showed increased activity. In contrast, 
when the irrelevant motion was ambiguous, MT+ showed increased activity and the 
DLPFC showed reduced activity. The authors concluded that when the motion is 
salient, the DLPFC suppresses activity at MT+, preventing the salient motion signal 
from interfering with task performance (by taking resources). In contrast, an ambiguous 
signal does not activate suppression and is processed; thus it takes resources and 
reduces performance in a visual target identification task. By using this manipulation 
(ambiguous vs. salient motion) we can explore how a bottom-up manipulation of the 
visual system influences semantic processing in a language task. If the manipulation is 
effective, we have strong evidence of integration between semantic and visual motion.
We hypothesised that the same pattern should be true for a visual lexical decision task, 
with ambiguous motion interfering with task execution whilst salient motion does not. 
However, if semantic motion information is integrated with the visual motion signal, the 
interference from the ambiguous motion should be semantically modulated. We should 
see a difference between control words and motion words and we should see some 
effect of congruency. The ambiguous motion should interfere with lexical decision 
(producing longer reaction times) but it is not clear how congruency will interact with 
this interference effect. We predict one of two patterns: the interference will only be 
evident in the incongruent condition (as the ambiguous motion conflicts with semantic 
motion, making lexical decision harder); alternatively, the interference will be present 
for control and incongruent conditions, but reduced in the congruent condition (as the 
ambiguous motion benefits semantic processing).
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8.3.1. Participants
8.3a) 28 native English speakers, 16 female, were recruited from the subject pool at 
University College London, they were paid £6 for their time. The average age was 23.8 
years (standard deviation 5.9), 4 were left handed.
8.3b) 28 native English speakers, 11 female, were recruited from the subject pool at 
University College London, they were paid £3 for their time. The average age was 
25.64 years (standard deviation 6.31), 4 were left handed.
8.3.2. Method
8.3.2.1. Design
A 3x2 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were Word 
Category (Control, Up, Down) and Motion Direction (Upwards, Downwards). The 
dependent variables were the reaction time (ms) and accuracy in the lexical decision 
task. Participants completed 12 blocks of 34 trials. There were 6 blocks in each half, 
with each word presented once in each half. Within each half and block, items 
presentation was randomised. For 8.3a the experimental sessions were made up of two 
parts: the thresholding procedure and the lexical decision task. For 8.3b participants 
only completed the lexical decision task. Participants were tested individually in a 
small testing room. A side-light facing the wall behind the participant was used to 
provide lighting, this ensured that the motion stimuli were easy to discriminate but 
participants’ eyes did not become fatigued.
8.3.2.2. Materials
Item Set Two Single Words was used. 96 non-words were selected from the set created 
for that purpose. For the experimental items two lists were created. The lists were 
identical except that in Listl the first presentation of each word was with one motion 
direction, whereas in List 2 the first presentation was with the other direction of motion.
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The use of these lists was balanced across participants. Each list had two halves (A & 
B), with each item presented once in each half. The two halves were identical except 
that in A each item was paired with one motion direction and in B with the other 
direction; therefore over the course of the experiment each item was presented twice, 
once with each motion direction. The program for the experiment was designed so that 
it randomly selected items for presentation in each block, but presented A in the one 
half-run of the experiment and B in the other half-run (balanced across participants). In 
this way the repetition of items was kept as far apart as possible whilst maintaining 
randomization.
8.3.2.3. Graphic Display
Stimuli were identical to Experiment 6.2 except that they were 200ms in duration (15 
consecutive frames; speed = 21 °/s).
8.3.2.4. Apparatus
The apparatus was identical to Experiment 6.3.
8.3.2.5. Procedure
For experiment 8.3a participants underwent a thresholding procedure for each direction 
of motion (upwards and downwards), the structure of the thresholding task was identical 
to Experiment 6.5. The order of thresholding for each motion direction was balanced 
across participants. Individual threshold values for each motion direction (upwards and 
downwards) were used as the coherent motion signal for the RDKs. For 8.3b all RDKs 
were set at 30% coherence (5 times higher than average threshold from Experiment 1, 
see Section 8.3.3.1). For the lexical decision task, participants completed 12 practice 
trials (half words and half nonwords), auditory feedback was given on mistakes in both 
the practise and experimental sessions to encourage concentration. Participants then 
completed the experimental blocks. On each trial, a central fixation square (width = 
0.2°) was presented for 500ms. This was replaced by the item for lexical decision 
(Arial, white, 14pt) and an RDK behind the item for 200msec (SOA of 0ms). The word 
then remained on screen until a response or time out to 1500ms. Participants were
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instructed to ignore the motion patterns and complete the lexical decision task; 
throughout all tasks they placed their chin on a rest 57cm from the screen.
8.3.2.6. Analysis
Subjects whose total errors were 2 standard deviations above the group mean were 
excluded; this removed 3 participants from experiment 8.3a and 2 participants from 
8.3b. For the reaction time analysis only correct responses were included, errors on 
experimental trials were analysed separately. To remove outliers from the reaction time 
data, times under 100ms, over 1000ms or 2 standard deviations above the mean for each 
subject were excluded; this removed 7.7% of the data for Experiment 8.3a and 7% of 
the data for 8.3b. In a follow up analysis to compare ambiguous (8.3a) and salient (8.3b) 
motion, reaction times were normalised as z-scores relative to the control condition in 
each experiment. The mean and standard deviations were taken from the control 
condition for a given motion direction (upwards and downwards) and applied to the 
mean reaction times (by Subject or by Items) for Control, Up and Down words for the 
same motion direction. This was to remove any influence of a particular motion 
direction on overall reaction times.
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8.3.3. Results
8.3.3.1. Threshold Values from Experiment 8.3 a
The mean threshold value was 6.9% (SD = 2.5%) for upwards motion and 6.3% (SD = 
2.7%) for downwards motion, expressed as the percentage of coherently moving dots in 
the RDK. The thresholds for upward and downward motion were similar (t(27) =
1.238, p > 0.2 two-tailed).
Table 8-3: Mean Reaction Times bv Condition and Experiment for 8.3a and 8.3b 
(Standard Deviation in brackets)
Experiment Control 
Down \ Up
Condition
Match 
Down | Up
Mismatch 
Down | Up
Experiment 8.3a: 
Threshold
Mean
555.23 554.26 
(53.32) (57.94)
554.75(55.80)
562.80 549.34 
(65.22) (66.72)
556.07 (66.22)
572.83 574.43 
(61.82) (68.64)
573.63 (64.36)*
Experiment 8.3b: 
Supra-threshold
Mean
576.92 566.63 
(56.89) (56.76)
571.77 (56.50)
564.86 582.561 
(51.65) (56.64)
573.71 (54.41)
581.7 3 t  572.27 
(57.06) (61.93)
577.00(59.15)
* Significantly different to other conditions, p<0.05 
fUp words significantly longer than down words, p<0.05
8.3.3.2. Reaction Times
8.3a) There was a significant main effect of Word Category (FI (2,48) = 3.815, p-rj2 = 
0.137; F2(2,87) = 3.161, p-rj2 = 0.068). Planned comparisons showed that the Mismatch 
condition had significantly longer reaction times as compared to the Control (FI(1,24) = 
6.989, p-rf = 0.226; F2(l,58) = 7.929, p-T]2 = 0.120) and Match (FI(1,24) = 4.964, p-Tf 
= 0.171; F2(l,58) = 3.589, p = 0.063, p-Tf2 = 0.058) conditions. The mean reaction time 
for Mismatch conditions was 574ms, compared to 555ms for Control and 556ms for 
Match conditions.
8.3b) There was a significant interaction between Word Category and Motion Direction 
(Fl(2,50) = 3.398, p-n2 = 0.120; F2(2,87) = 2.631, p = 0.078, p-r|2 = 0.057). Planned 
comparisons showed that the interaction was significant for the Match condition as 
compared to the Control (FI(1,25) = 6.015, p-rj2 = 0.194; F2(l,58) = 5.169, p-rj2 =
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0.082) and Mismatch conditions (Fl( 1,25) = 4.271, p-r|2 = 0.146; F2(l,58) = 3.103, p = 
0.083, p-r|2 = 0.051). In the Match condition Upwards motion produced reaction times 
18ms slower than downwards motion, this was reversed for the Control and Mismatch 
conditions, in which downwards motion was on average 10ms slower than Upwards 
motion.18
Table 8-3 presents the reaction times for each experiment in each condition.
8.3.3.3. Normalised Reaction Times
The interaction between Word Category and Experiment was marginal by Subjects 
(FI(2,98) = 3.046, p = 0.052, p-rj2 = 0.059; F2 < 1). Mismatch RTs were significantly 
longer in Experiment 8.3a but not Experiment 8.3b (see Figure 8-4). Planned 
comparisons showed a significant interaction between Word Category and Experiment 
for the Mismatch as compared to Match (FI(1,49) = 5.082, p-rf = 0.094; F2 < 1) and 
Control (Fl(l,49) = 7.247, p-r|2 = 0.130; F2 < 1) conditions, with substantially longer 
reaction times for the Mismatch condition in Experiment 8.3a only. These comparisons 
also showed a significant main effect of Word Category, with longer RTs in the 
Mismatch as compared to Match (Fl(l,49) = 5.112, p-r|2 = 0.094; F2 < 1) and Control 
conditions (Fl(l,49) = 7.447, p-r|2 = 0.132; F2 < 1). Reaction times in the Mismatch 
condition were on average 0.179 SDs above those for the Match (mean = 0.067) and 
Control (0.0) conditions.
8.3.3.4. Errors
Separate Friedman tests compared the number of errors in the Control, Match and 
Mismatch conditions for each Experiment. There was no overall difference in errors for 
Experiment 1 (X2 < 2 , df = 2, p>0.4 ) but the comparison approached significance for 
Experiment 2 (X2 = 5.247, df = 2, p = 0.073). Paired sample comparisons using the 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test showed that in Experiment 1 there were significantly more 
errors in the Match than the Mismatch condition (z = -2.245, p<0.05 ). In Experiment 2 
there were significantly more errors in both the Match (z = -2.030, p<0.05) and
18 A simple 2x2 comparison between Word Category (Down, Up) and Motion Direction (Downwards, 
Upwards) showed a significant main effect of Word Category (FI (1,25) = 4.271, p-rj2 = 0.146; 
F2(l,58) = 2.250, p = 0.139, p-rf = 0.037) such that Down words were on average 14ms faster than 
Up words. This produced the observed interaction when collapsed into Match and Mismatch
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Mismatch conditions (z = 2.158, p<0.05) as compared to Control. See Table 8-4 for the 
raw error scores (the same pattern was found when error rates were compared as 
percentages).
Table 8-4: Errors for each Experiment bv Condition*
Experiment
Control
Condition
M atch M ismatch
Experiment 8.3a: 
Threshold 5.61 (4.02) 6.71 (4.71) 5.39 (3.77)
Experiment 8.3b: 
Supra-threshold 3.77 (3.93) 4 .85  (2.82) 4.81 (3.54)
* Standard deviation in brackets
8-3: Normalised reaction times for Experiment 8.3a and 8.3b bv Condition1
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
- 0.1
- 0.2
-0.3
Motion
EJ 8.3a / Threshold & Ambiguous 
□  8.3b / Supra threshold & Salient
,V<
}
-
5* \
i->,\ •,
c  *
V
control match 
W ord C ategory
’"Error bars are one standard error of the mean
mismatch
conditions.
281
8.3.3.5. Further Analysis19
The error rates suggest that the reaction time changes for experiment 8.3a may have 
been partially due to a speed-accuracy trade off in the Match condition, which has more 
errors (and faster reaction times) than the Mismatch condition. Therefore response 
times in the Match condition may actually be more similar to those found for the 
Mismatch condition, if accuracy rates between the two conditions were equal. To 
remove the influence of a speed accuracy trade-off, Down and Up items which showed 
large differences in error rates across the two presentations (with Upwards or 
Downwards motion) were removed to create a set of items whose mean difference in 
error rates across the two conditions was close to 0 (t < 1). This reduced the number of 
items in the Match and Mismatch conditions from 30 to 2320. Following the removal of 
these items, errors showed a main effect of Experiment, with 1 % more errors in 
Experiment 8.3a (threshold) as compared to 8.3b (suprathreshold) (F(l,49) = 4.331, p-rf 
= 0.081). When error rates within each experiment were compared, there were no 
significant differences; therefore, any changes in reaction times can now be attributed to 
the selective effect of visual motion.
Table 8-5 Mean Reaction Times (after Item removal) bv Condition and Experiment for 
8.3a and 8.3b
Experiment Control 
Down | Up
Condition
M atch 
Down | Up
M ismatch 
Down | Up
Experiment 8.3a: 
Threshold
Mean
555.23 554.26 
(53.32) (57.94)
554.75(55.11)
576.27 561.93 
(65.05) (72.88)
569.11 (68.74)
573.82 580.21 
(70.12) (66.77)
577.02 (67.84)*
Experiment 8.3b: 
Supra-threshold
Mean
573.54 570.00 
(53.28) (60.56)
571.77(56.50)
575.91 587.25 
(64.65) (50.14)
581.58 (57.57)
580.44 564.86 
(57.29) (56.20)
572.65(56.73)
* Significantly different to control, p<0.05
19 Following completion of the thesis work, this experiment was submitted for publication and following
reviewers comments extra participants were run. The pattern indicating a speed accuracy trade-off did 
not hold.
20 7 items were removed from the Down category and 9 from the Up category. When re-paired as Match 
and Mismatch conditions this produced 21 pairs (i.e. data points for Downwards and Upwards motion) 
with 2 Down items left unpaired. For the items analysis the missing values were replaced with the 
group mean.
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Figure 8-4 Normalised reaction times (after Item removal) for Experiment 8.3a and 8.3b 
bv Condition*
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Reaction times were then re-analysed for both experiments. For experiment 8.3a 
(threshold) there was a significant main effect of Word Category (FI (2,48) = 3.815, p-rf 
= 0.137; F2(2,73) = 3.161, p-rj2 = 0.068). Reaction times in the Mismatch condition 
23ms longer than those in the Control (F I(1,24) = 6.989, p-rj2 = 0.226; F2( 1,58) =
7.929, p-r|2 = 0.120) and 8ms longer than those in the Match condition. For experiment 
8.3b (suprathreshold), there were no significant differences (see Table 8-5).
The reaction times were then normalised and re-analysed across both experiments. This 
showed a main effect of Word Category (Fl(2,98) = 3.553, p-r|2 = 0.068; F2(2,146) = 
3.824, p-r|2 = 0.05). Planned comparisons showed that reaction times in the Match 
condition were 0.176 SDs longer than those in the Control (F I(1,49) = 5.850, p-rj2 = 
0.107; F2( 1,102) = 5.551, p-r|2 = 0.052) and that reaction times in the Mismatch 
condition were 0.169 SDs longer than those in the Control condition (F l(l,49) = 5.271, 
p-t|2 = 0.097; F2(l,102) = 5.734, p-rj2 = 0.053). There was also a main effect o f 
Experiment by Items (FI < 1; F2(l,146) = 5.701, p-r|2 = 0.033) driven by the longer 
reaction times in the Match and Mismatch condition for Experiment 8.3a (threshold) 
when compared to Experiment 8.3b (suprathreshold). This main effect was significant
283
in planned comparisons between each Experiment for Mismatch as compared to Match 
(FI < 1; F2(l,88) = 6.301, p-if = 0.067) and Control (FI < 1; F2(l,102) = 4.950, p-rf = 
0.046) conditions. However, it was not significant for comparisons between the Control 
and Match condition (FI < 0.5; F2 < 1), signalling that the long reaction times for 
Experiment 8.3a (threshold) in the Mismatch condition is an important factor in this 
main effect. Finally, planned comparisons showed a significant interaction between 
Experiment and Word Category (FI(1,49) = 4.152, p-r|2 = 0.078; F2( 1,102) = 4.950, p- 
t|2 = 0.046) when the Control and Mismatch conditions were compared (see Figure 8-4).
8.3.4. Discussion
In line with our main hypothesis, irrelevant ambiguous motion interfered with the 
lexical decision time for words referring to motion. Even after the effects of a speed- 
accuracy trade-off had been removed from the data, ambiguous motion interfered more 
than salient motion in incongruent conditions when compared to the Control condition. 
However, due to a loss of power (as we had to remove roughly a third of the critical 
experimental items) this interaction did not survive in the between subjects’ analysis 
across Experiments. The increased reaction times for ambiguous motion in the 
Mismatch condition produced a main effect of Experiment by Items, lending some extra 
support to the changes in this condition as compared to Control and Match conditions. 
Therefore, interference from ambiguous motion is semantically modulated, increasing 
when the visual motion direction was incongruent with the semantic motion direction. 
This result provides clear support for a close relationship between semantic 
representations of motion and the perception of visual motion. The visual motion was 
entirely irrelevant to the lexical decision task and it is highly unlikely that participants 
consistently noticed the direction, as it was at the threshold of conscious perception. 
Finally, the linguistic stimuli were single words, not sentences, and therefore provide a 
stronger test of embodied semantics. Sentence comprehension requires the integration 
of semantic content across individual words; therefore it is possible that modality 
specific information is only recruited during the formation of these more substantial 
semantic representations. However, we find that incongruent perceptual information 
does influence the semantic processing of single words. Therefore, the interference 
comes from the automatic integration of a single word’s semantic content with
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perceptual information. This is difficult to explain without an embodied account where 
semantic representations of motion are either based upon, or intimately associated with, 
the perceptual processing of motion. We know that the ambiguous motion is being 
processed, and we know that the semantic content of motion words is being accessed. 
The motion pattern was 200ms long, a length chosen so that it was likely to coincide 
with semantic access (e.g. Pulvermuller, 2000, 2001). It appears as though the lexical 
decision cannot be made until the obfuscating influence of the visual motion has passed, 
so it takes longer to ascertain that the lexical item is genuine. This effect is most 
pronounced when semantic and visual motion are incongruent: relative to the Control 
condition, ambiguous motion increases reaction times whereas salient motion does not. 
When the semantic and visual motion are congruent, we see a slight increase in reaction 
times for both salient and ambiguous motion. For the Match condition both Salient and 
Ambiguous motion increased reaction times (as shown in a main effect across both 
experiments), however, this increase was only significant in the overall comparison and 
was not significant in either experiment individually.
The fact that ambiguous motion was able to interfere with an irrelevant task supports the 
original finding of Tsushima et al (2006). The original interpretation, supported by 
fMRI evidence, was that salient motion signals activate inhibition mechanisms that 
reduce the influence of irrelevant stimuli, in contrast, ambiguous motion does not 
provide a strong enough signal to initiate suppression. According to a strong embodied 
account, the semantic representation of motion words is produced by activity at MT+; 
therefore suppression of this area during the perception of irrelevant salient motion 
should cause problems for the comprehension of motion words. If suppression of MT+ 
does cause problems for motion words, this may be reflected in increased activity in the 
IFG (indicating harder lexical retrieval) (Thompson-Schill, Bedney & Goldbery, 2005).
One way to expand these results would be to use MEG or fMRI techniques. For MEG, 
the time course of activation between incongruent and congruent conditions may shed 
some light on why one condition produces reaction time changes and the other does not. 
More generally, we know from Tsushima et al (2006) to expect differences in activation 
for the DLPFC and MT+ when salient or ambiguous motion is present. In addition, we 
might expect greater activity in the Inferior Frontal Areas (BA44/45) when lexical 
retrieval is more difficult (Thompson-Schill, Bedney & Goldbery, 2005) during 
Mismatch/ambiguous motion conditions. We would also expect activity in the temporal
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lobes during semantic access and it may be similar for all conditions (Halgren, et al 
2002). Of particular interest would be the relative activity of IFG, temporal and MT+ 
regions during the Match condition as compared to the Control condition. In one case 
we know that the visual motion should not impact upon semantic access (Control) and 
in the other we know that there may be some contact between the two (Match).
Detailed time-course information or the relative level of activation for different cortical 
areas may show differences where reaction times do not.
8 .4 . General Discussion
Table 8-6 summarises the results from the experiments presented in this Chapter.
Two experiments looking at single word recognition used auditory (8.1a) and then 
visual (8.3) presentation, with the passive viewing of visual motion. Reaction times for 
auditory lexical decision were longer for Control words as compared to directional 
words, regardless of congruence. It is not clear whether this difference was due to a 
general facilitation from viewing salient visual motion for motion words, or due to 
uncontrolled lexical variables. It is also possible that congruence effects were present, 
but they were either to weak to be reliable (e.g. if participants had not consistently 
viewed the visual motion) or they were masked by noise (e.g. because reaction times 
were not measured from each word’s uniqueness point). When the perception of motion 
was better controlled, in the study with visual lexical decision, congruence effects were 
found. It is also difficult to interpret why auditory presentation would produce general 
facilitation for motion words and visual presentation would produce incongruent 
interference (for ambiguous motion). Explanations touch on how the brain integrates 
information from different modalities (e.g. phonological word forms and visual motion 
versus orthographic word forms and visual motion); however, the semantic 
representation activated by both phonological and orthographic word forms should be 
similar (if not the same) and this is where congruency effects should be located.
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Table 8-6: Descriptive Summary o f results
Linguistic Stimuli Results
Auditory Lexical Decision Motion words responded to m ore quickly than control 
words for both Match and Mismatch conditions.
Visual Lexical Decision Mismatch interference with am biguous motion
Auditory sen tence com prehension Match & Mismatch sen ten ces  responded  to m ore slowly 
and less accurately than control sen tences.
Visual sen tence com prehension 
(reading)
No effects of congruence
The difference in congruency effects could be genuine and due to the different time 
courses of semantic access in auditory versus visual word recognition. During auditory 
lexical decision, participants viewed motion before, during and after the presentation of 
the item. Visual motion engages motion processing systems, pre-activating them.
When semantic access also taps motion processes, this could have produced non­
specific priming for all motion words. During visual presentation motion was presented 
at word onset for a brief time. No reliable effects for salient visual motion were found, 
but ambiguous motion produced incongruent interference. The shorter duration of 
motion may have meant that motion processing and semantic access were concurrent, 
creating incongruent interference as both tap the same directionally selective processes. 
This explanation relies on some shaky assumptions about the time course of semantic 
access, the time course of motion processing and the interaction between the two. For 
example, the general facilitation found for auditory comprehension of motion words 
requires an account where directionally selective motion processing is able to prime 
motion processing generally, this is distinctly not the case in the visual perception 
literature (e.g. Seitz & Watanabe, 2003). The auditory lexical decision experiment had 
some methodological problems; therefore it is much more sensible to avoid integrating 
the results and concentrate on conclusions that can be drawn from the visual lexical 
decision experiment. Here, in line with Tsushima et al (2006), we found that ambiguous 
motion interfered with a target task whereas salient motion did not. Crucially, the 
interference for ambiguous motion was semantically modulated, being greatest in 
incongruent conditions. When the visual system was unable to suppress the motion 
signal, it interfered with the semantic access for incongruent semantic motion. This 
result is particularly striking since manipulation of the visual system (i.e. whether or not 
the motion signal could be suppressed) affected the integration between semantic and 
perceptual motion. If the result had shown congruent interference, we could have 
concluded that directionally selective neurons were busy processing the ambiguous
motion signal and were unavailable to represent semantic motion in the same direction 
(in an extension of the explanation by Kaschak et al, 2005). However, it is when visual 
motion is incongruent that directionally selective motion processing slows the 
verification of semantic content: it takes longer to decide that the word is genuine 
because the ambiguous motion cannot be suppressed and it conflicts with the semantic 
representation of the item. It looks as though for a brief time, the semantic system 
cannot distinguish perceptual from semantic motion information. This suggests two 
things: first, a very close relationship between the perception of motion and the 
semantic representation of motion; second, a semantic system that can recruit sensory 
areas in a flexible manner. Suppression of the salient motion signal does not appear to 
affect semantic access, even though suppression of motion processing areas might be 
expected to disrupt any semantic representation that is also occurring at that site. For 
example, direct stimulation of the motor strip influences lexical decision times for 
motor words (Pulvermuller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005). The fact that 
suppression does not disrupt semantic processing as reflected by behavioural measures 
(speed and accuracy) suggests that the visual and semantic motion are being integrated 
outside the visual system. When the visual system suppresses motion processing, no 
integration takes place. However, when motion processing is obligatory (because 
suppression cannot be initiated) the visual signal is automatically integrated with 
relevant semantic content (that refers to a direction of motion). This integration is 
unproblematic when the two are congruent, but disruptive when they conflict.
For auditory sentence comprehension, directional sentences had longer reaction times 
than control sentences; more errors were also made to directional sentences as compared 
to control sentences. This result supports a general interference from viewing visual 
motion. A follow up using self-paced reading did not show any effects of congruence, 
most likely because of methodological problems. The general interference effect found 
for auditory comprehension does not support previous results which showed longer 
reaction times to motion sentences when congruent visual motion was perceived in 
comparison to incongruent motion (Kaschak et al, 2005). It is possible that congruency 
effects were weak or not present due to a lack of power. The participant numbers are 
not hugely different; the original experiment had 37 (Experiment 1) and 48 (Experiment 
2) participants, in comparison to the 33 participants who completed 8.1b. Although we 
had fewer participants, there was roughly twice the amount of directional sentences in 
comparison to the original experiment (60 versus 32). It is also possible that the
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blocked presentation of motion in Kaschak et al (2005) was important in producing 
congruency effects. Long exposure to one direction of visual motion fatigues 
directionally selective neurons, therefore it may be that congruency effects only arise 
when motion processing systems are heavily taxed. When salient motion is perceived 
during sentence comprehension but is otherwise transient (presented on a trial-by-trial 
basis), it may be that it can be effectively suppressed and so it does not produce 
congruence effects. However, the suppression of motion processing could then cause 
problems for the comprehension of directional sentences, producing longer reaction 
times and more errors (as seen in 8.1b). This pattern of general interference may be 
seen for sentences (8.1b) but not single words (8.3b) since sentences produce a more 
substantial semantic representation with more specific information (a token); thus the 
demand on motion processing systems may be greater and less transient than the 
demand created by single word comprehension. Thus, when the motion processing 
system is suppressed, it shows up as a behavioural impairment for sentences rather than 
single words (although it is present for both). This explanation is speculative, and 
would require a follow up experiment that manipulated visual motion in three ways. 
First, blocked salient visual motion and sentence comprehension should replicate 
Kaschak et al (2005), showing congruent interference. Second, randomised salient 
visual motion should produce similar effects to those seen here, showing general 
interference for motion sentences. Third, ambiguous motion should produce 
congruence effects since it cannot be suppressed and does consume motion processing 
resources.
The experiments in this chapter do not allow any strong conclusions about sentence and 
single word comprehension, at least in comparison to each other. However, the key 
finding is that low-level visual processes are essential to whether congruency effects are 
observed. By presenting salient and ambiguous motion, bottom-up modulation of visual 
processing influences the integration between semantic and perceptual information. 
When the visual information cannot be suppressed it is automatically integrated with 
semantic information; causing problems for comprehension when the two conflict. It 
would be particularly interesting to see if this holds for auditory comprehension, when 
the central task does not involve visual processing21. A more sophisticated version of
21 In Tsushima et al (2006) the implication is that visual motion is suppressed during the performance of a 
concurrent visual tax, to liberate visual processing resources. It is an open question whether the same 
suppression would occur when the central task is not in the visual modality.
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the self-paced reading task, employing salient and ambiguous motion presentation, 
would also allow this effect to be explored for a sentence context which describes a 
complete motion event (e.g. Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). The results from the lexical 
decision task cannot be reduced to strategic effects; they therefore provide a clear 
demonstration of a close and automatic connection between semantic and perceptual 
motion.
290
9. Discussion and Conclusion
The four questions posed at the beginning of this investigation will be presented and 
discussed with reference to the results presented in chapters 5-8. Following the 
discussion of these questions, two further questions will be posed. The first of these 
will ask what can be concluded once the results are integrated with the available 
literature. The second, and final, question will ask what the main conclusions of the 
investigation are and what these conclusions mean for theories of semantic 
representation. Further experiments and extensions of the current work will be 
integrated into the discussion, rather than given in a separate section.
At the beginning of this investigation we defined the sensory domain of vision as being 
a good candidate to explore effects of embodied semantics. The motor domain has 
consistently shown effects of embodied semantic representation, both in measures of 
behaviour (e.g. Glenberg & Kaschak, 2003) and neural activity (e.g. Pulvermuller et al, 
2001; 2005). Results for the visual domain are more varied and it was unclear whether 
low-level visual processes were influenced by semantic access (as predicted by strong 
embodied theories). Recall that it is possible that the motor (efferent) and perceptual 
(afferent) domains may respond differently to top-down influences such as language, 
especially since perception is more directly linked to bottom-up influences from 
perceptual stimuli. Thus, a systematic investigation of the visual system was necessary. 
It was also noted that the visual system may respond more variably to semantic 
information since it routinely integrates information in a task-dependent manner (e.g. 
Watanabe et al, 2001, Seitz & Watanabe, 2003). In order to explore the variability of 
effects we looked at different perceptual processes; crucially, there was behavioural 
work which could motivate our experiments in visuo-spatial attention (Richardson et al, 
2003; Bergen et al, in press) and motion perception (Kaschak et al, 2005).
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9 .1. Question 1: Are embodied effects present for single 
words and sentences?
According to embodied theories, the semantic representation for both sentences and 
single words is based in simulation. The empirical work was divided into three broad 
areas: comprehension on visuo-spatial attention, comprehension on motion perception 
and motion perception on comprehension. Results will be compared within each of 
these areas in order to assess whether sentences and single words produced similar 
effects. The results will also be discussed with reference to the general type 
representations produced by single words as compared to the more specific token 
representations produced by sentences. The type representations activated by single 
words may not be substantial enough to interact with perception, so sentences that 
specify particular events may be more likely to produce consistent results.
Alternatively, the specific information in sentences may constrain the interpretation to 
such a degree that broader influences are lost: a sentence may shift the focus onto a 
particular dimension and away from the perceptual event of interest. In this case, single 
words that present schematic information will produce more consistent results because 
their salient interpretation is focused on the event of interest.
9.1.1. Visuo-spatial attention
In these experiments, the task was to categorise a shape that was presented in the upper 
or lower visual field. Single word comprehension produced incongruent interference 
(longer reaction times) when presented in semantically coherent blocks, but not when 
randomly ordered. The blocked presentation means that it is possible effects were 
mediated by/a product of, strategic processes: participants may have been aware of the 
directional content of the words. However, in this case one could also expect congruent 
facilitation, since strategies should primarily work to the benefit of task performance 
and capitalise on any relevant information. Average reaction times were approximately 
100-200ms faster than categorisation in experiments where the target appeared after 
active comprehension and 500ms faster than the final experiment were the target 
appeared during active comprehension (see Table 5-2). It may not have been possible 
for further improvement in categorisation speed, so any facilitation was hidden as 
performance was close to ceiling. However, this does not explain away the interference
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effect that we found and congruent conditions actually showed a slight increase in 
reaction times, about half the size of the interference found for incongruent and mixed 
conditions. Congruent conditions were marginally faster than incongruent conditions, 
but not faster than mixed blocks. Therefore, congruent conditions also appear to 
produce some weak interference, rather than any trend for facilitation. The results show 
that categorisation processes could not exclude the confusing influence of directional 
semantic content. When the directional information was inconsistent or opposed to the 
required allocation of visuo-spatial attention, categorisation was slowed down. 
Congruent conditions, rather than benefiting the allocation of attention, interfered a little 
bit less. Interestingly, when categorisation followed the active comprehension of a 
sentence, both congruent facilitation and incongruent interference were found, relative 
to the control condition. Sentences were randomly ordered and it was unlikely that 
participants noticed their directional content, since fillers and control sentences were 
present. Therefore, whether or not participants were aware of the directional content, 
language which referred to a direction of motion opposed to the required direction of 
attention slowed categorisation. In both cases the directional context was established, 
either because comprehension had finished or there had been a sufficiently long 
exposure to directional words. In contrast, when the directional context was not 
established, there was no interference: when the target appeared after verb offset within 
a sentence, directional sentences facilitated reaction times relative to control sentences 
and when the target appeared after single word offset without semantically coherent 
blocks, there were no effects of comprehension. Therefore, both single words and 
sentences interfered with categorisation when they produced a substantive directional 
context. The general facilitation (when categorisation was during the sentence) may be 
explained by implicit expectations so is not a strong result, however, congruent 
facilitation was seen for a complete sentential context (when categorisation was at 
sentence offset). The results suggest that the token information provided by sentences, 
in particular the concrete referents that move and therefore have a location, is necessary 
to facilitate the allocation of attention (as well as interfere with it). In contrast, single 
words can bias attention over time when a strong directional context is created through 
blocked presentation and in this case we only see interference. Here, the type 
information (a direction of motion) still influences attention but in a more general and 
disruptive manner; this may be because it does not provide any concrete information 
that can be used immediately by visuo-spatial attention.
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The fact that single words and sentences can both produce interference sheds light on 
the mechanisms at work. Semantic representations of direction and space automatically 
hinder the effective allocation of visuo-spatial attention to places that conflict with that 
semantic representation. This suggests that either that semantic representation acts as a 
cue to a spatial location, or represents the spatial location itself. This second possibility 
is the embodied explanation. Previous research has found congruent interference; this 
fits with an embodied explanation that referred to results from mental imagery, which 
show similar effects (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press). The semantic 
representation acts like a mental image or a visual representation of a location which 
interfere with detection at that location (Perky, 1910).
However, our results do not show this pattern, so the explanation from mental imagery 
is less germane. Similar results are seen in the attention literature, where congruent 
distracters facilitate target identification and incongruent distracters impair target 
detection, relative to a neutral condition (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Similarly, 
congruent cues to a target location facilitate identification and incongruent cues impair 
identification (Posner, 1980). Therefore, whether a visual distracter or cue is presented, 
the attention literature demonstrates a beneficial effect of congruence, rather than its 
interference. This pattern is in line with our results and suggests that semantic content 
is influencing attention in a similar manner, perhaps like a cue (since it preceded target 
onset). Single words which refer to direction but not a spatial location do not affect 
attention unless they can form a substantial context. This context biases attention over 
time, rather than producing an immediate effect as the sentences do. Only sentences 
show facilitation and only sentences provide concrete information about moving 
objects. We find both incongruent interference and congruent facilitation when the 
location is fully specified by a sentence and there is a general benefit to attention when 
information is incomplete but directional. In this case the semantic content could act 
like a non-specific cue to target appearance along a particular axis. We know from the 
motion detection experiments that motion representations are active at this point; but 
there is no complete event and therefore no end point for the motion, i.e. a concrete 
destination. As concluded at the end of Chapter 5, the fact that some concrete spatial 
information is needed before language can affect visuo-spatial attention is in line with 
previous findings (Bergen et al, in press). This interpretation is also in line with eye- 
movement studies which show that linguistic referents are indexed quickly to relevant 
locations in the environment (Richardson & Spivey, 2002) and that the eyes follow the
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direction of described events (Spivey, Richardson, Tyler & Young, 2000). Therefore, it 
is possible that eye-movements to the target location were facilitated by congruent 
sentences. In line with embodied explanations, it has been proposed that attention is 
facilitated when semantic and visual objects are similar in appearance: visual 
simulations of the referents are produced during semantic access and these facilitate the 
visual identification of those same referents (Estes et al, submitted). In our task that 
would mean that the language described the location of circles and squares, which it did 
not. The sentences referred to all kinds of objects and we still found facilitation. This 
suggests a more abstract facilitation, one that is dependent on valid information about a 
specific location. Language is routinely used to veridically direct attention to locations 
in space and quickly respond to objects in the environment, so it may also be routine to 
integrate semantic information into the allocation of visuo-spatial attention. If this is the 
case and the allocation of visual attention is open to information from semantics, these 
results suggest that semantic information is always recruited for this purpose, even to 
the detriment of attention when the semantic and visual information conflict.
9.1.2. Comprehension on Motion Perception
The motion detection experiments used a task that was more sensitive to low-level 
visual processing. Participants were presented with patterns of moving dots and had to 
judge whether the dots moved coherently (in one direction) or randomly. By presenting 
motion that was at the threshold of visual perception, we were able to look at very 
subtle changes caused by comprehension. I will first discuss the effects on perceptual 
sensitivity (d’), and then the effects on measures of criterion (c and 8). Reaction time 
results were, for the most part, uninformative; therefore they will not be discussed at 
length, but brought in to the overall discussion when relevant.
When blocked single words were unsynchronised to the presentation of motion stimuli, 
perceptual sensitivity was reduced for incongruent conditions. When synchronised to 
motion stimuli, blocked congruent words increased perceptual sensitivity. When 
motion stimuli were presented at verb offset during a sentence, congruent conditions 
increased perceptual sensitivity. Therefore, both single words and sentences are able to 
facilitate motion detection . As for visuo-spatial attention, there are particular
22 Randomly ordered single words presented just prior to motion stimuli reduced perceptual sensitivity in
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conditions in which single word and sentence presentation influenced motion detection 
in a similar way. First, the onset of linguistic stimuli predicts RDK onset (to a greater 
or lesser degree); second, primary semantic access coincides with RDK presentation and 
third, there is a substantive motion representation (either from blocked presentation or a 
sentence). As discussed at the end of Chapter 6, this suggests that perceptual learning 
may be playing some role in the integration between semantic and visual information 
(see section 9.2 below for a fuller discussion). When the context is strong (i.e. blocked 
presentation) but is not predictive of RDK onset, congruent information cannot be used 
to benefit perception, but incongruent information does interfere. This supports the 
conclusion that semantic and perceptual information are always integrated, and 
therefore likely to share a common representation (at least at some point in visual 
processing). The finding of incongruent interference or congruent facilitation suggests 
that a common mechanism is at work; benefiting perception when reliable and 
interfering otherwise.
In order to reliably conclude that single words and sentences do operate in the same 
way, further experiments are necessary. First, randomly ordered single words with 
RDKs timed to their offset (i.e. coinciding with primary semantic access) could 
establish whether a single word’s semantic content is enough to affect motion detection. 
The results found when RDKs were presented after word offset are likely due to the 
maintenance of semantic content in working memory. Second, to frilly explore the 
importance of a sentence context, a variety of manipulations could be used. First, 
sentence comprehension with RDKs presented after sentence offset. We might not 
expect RDKs following sentence offset to show any effects, indicating that motion 
representations are dynamic and time-locked to the lexical items that specify them 
(Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). It would also be interesting to look at sentences that are 
‘empty’ in comparison to the ones we have used here, e.g. “It climbed” or “It fell”. In 
this case, results would highlight how necessary concrete referents are for motion 
representations23; these sentences provide a syntactic frame without constraining the 
verb with a particular object. We have only observed incongruent interference for 
blocked, unsynchronised single words; producing the hypothesis that perceptual
congruent and incongruent conditions. In this case, comprehension of single words preceded motion 
detection so the general interference from directional words was probably due to the maintenance of 
semantic information in working memory. This differs from the other experiments where semantic 
access was contiguous with motion perception, so it will not be discussed.
23 This manipulation would also shed light on how necessary concrete referents are for visuo-spatial 
attention.
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learning could not operate under these conditions. In that case, it is also necessary to try 
and produce similar conditions for sentences and see if the same pattern emerges (e.g. 
passive comprehension and fillers reducing the predictive relationship between 
sentences and RDKs).
Turning to measures of criterion (c and 13), two experiments showed effects of 
comprehension and two did not. The decision criterion was lowered during congruent 
conditions when RDK onset was unsynchronised to blocked single words or was after 
verb-offset within a sentence. The similarity between these two experiments is the 
relative predictability of RDK onset. When words were unsynchronised to RDK onset, 
there was no predictive relationship between the two stimuli. During sentence 
comprehension, fillers were added to increase the variability of RDK onset so that it 
was not completely predictable; occurring at some point during the sentence. Congruent 
information can benefit the accuracy of detection (d’) when it has a predictive 
relationship to the target stimulus, when it does not it can still be used to enhance 
decision processes. It is sensible to think that a congruent context would facilitate 
decision making, without necessarily improving accuracy. If semantic information 
agrees with the (unpredictable) target stimulus, the participant is more likely to respond 
that the target was present. One interpretation is that lowered decision thresholds mean 
less sensory evidence is required to detect the target (i.e. to make a decision) (e.g. 
Hawkins et al, 1990). Here, the target information appears to be more salient so the 
decision is actually easier (rather than being a product of contextual priming between 
semantic and visual information). During sentence comprehension, reaction times were 
slightly faster during congruent conditions, lending further support to the fact that 
decisions were easier to make. We will return to this when discussing the levels of 
visual processing that are influenced by comprehension (Question 2). For this question, 
the important point is that both single words and sentences affected criterion setting in a 
similar way, when the target event was relatively unpredictable.
For motion detection, both blocked single words and sentences that were contiguous 
with RDK presentation influenced motion detection. This supports a common motion 
representation for both single words and sentences. It is unclear whether randomly 
ordered single words with contiguous RDKs could produce similar effects; thus, it 
remains to be seen how effective the type motion from single words is in comparison to 
the token motion from sentences. Note that the influence of sentences was weak but
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beneficial. This may be because the token information made the representation more 
specific, shifting the focus away from the motion event per se and onto the objects that 
were moving (e.g. their path and location, as found for visuo-spatial attention).
9.1.3. Motion perception on Comprehension
In the final set of experiments, the influence of passively perceiving motion on 
comprehension was explored. Methodological problems meant that no conclusions 
could be drawn about how motion perception influenced the comprehension of motion 
sentences. In the auditory sentence judgement task the results suggested that there was 
general interference from motion perception on all directional sentences (producing 
slower reaction times and higher error rates), however this result conflicts with the 
existing literature (possibly because of methodological differences) and it was not 
backed up in other experiments (see experiment 8.2 and Appendix 3). In the final 
experiment, a visual lexical decision task showed that ambiguous motion slowed 
reaction times when incongruent with the target word. It is an open question whether 
similar effects would be found for words within a sentence context, and further 
experiments that extend this ambiguous/salient motion paradigm to sentence 
comprehension are needed. The existing literature shows that visual motion perception 
interferes with sentence comprehension during congruent conditions (Kaschak et al, 
2005); therefore it is possible that single words and sentences are influenced in different 
ways. No firm conclusions can be drawn since Kaschak et al used salient motion with 
auditory presentation and it is not clear how important auditory versus visual 
presentation is for the different effects. It would be interesting to explore why salient 
motion did have an effect in Kaschak et al (2005) but not in the lexical decision 
experiment; this could be due to the different demands on comprehension for single 
words and sentences. During sentence comprehension the semantic content of 
individual items has to be integrated, therefore perceptual information may also be more 
likely to be integrated. In contrast, visual lexical decision is a recognition process so 
salient visual motion that interferes with orthographic identification is suppressed. 
Experiments that use visual presentation (e.g. a more sophisticated self-paced reading 
task and/or visual lexical decision) whilst manipulating the salience of visual motion are 
required to pull apart the different possibilities.
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9.1.4. Summary and Conclusions
The experiments that explored the influence of comprehension on perception showed 
that, under certain conditions, single words and sentences influenced visual processing 
in similar ways. When single words are presented in a way that allows them to build up 
a directional context over time, the results are broadly similar to when a sentence is 
presented. It could be that very small effects are present with randomly ordered single 
words, but are not detected in these experiments due to a lack of power. Experiments 
that present randomly ordered single words that are contiguous with target presentation 
would help to address this point; time-locking semantic access to target presentation 
seems particularly important for motion perception, so it may be more likely to tap 
effects in both visual domains. However, the present results show that the important 
thing is not just a semantic representation; that representation has to be reliable and 
robust. When single words achieve that through blocked presentation, we see effects on 
visual perception that are similar to a sentence context. When robust semantic 
information is reliable (i.e. predictive of target onset), the visual system shows 
facilitation. When it is unreliable, the visual system shows interference. The results 
from measures of criterion also show that a robust context primes decision making, 
further supporting the integration of an established semantic context with visual 
perception. However, the importance of a robust semantic context is a hypothesis rather 
than a conclusion. Further experiments that manipulate the contiguity between 
linguistic and motion stimuli, and the content of sentences (e.g. using ‘empty’ 
sentences), are needed before it can be concluded that a robust semantic representation 
is the crucial factor.
The results from the final lexical decision experiment, which demonstrated that the 
unconscious perception of incongruent motion interfered with the recognition of motion 
words, suggest that a robust directional context is not needed in order for perception to 
influence comprehension. The results from the comprehension of randomly ordered 
single words on motion detection also showed some influence. Thus suggests that,for 
motion, contiguity between semantic and visual information may be the critical factor, 
rather than a strong directional context. When the two occur simultaneously, we see 
effects between visual and semantic processes; this supports the dynamic nature of 
semantic representations and the importance of tapping primary semantic access. For
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visuo-spatial attention, it may well be that a more robust semantic context is needed 
since representations of space and location are being tapped (see Question 3 below).
The results support analogous foundations for the semantic representations of single 
words and sentences but the type / token distinction that is present between single words 
and sentences also makes a difference. For visuo-spatial attention, the concrete 
referents provided by sentences are crucial in producing immediate, beneficial effects. 
This is in line with the fact that single words referring to objects do influence visuo- 
spatial attention (Estes et al, submitted) and supports the view that language is routinely 
used to guide attention to objects and locations in the environment. The results from 
motion detection can be taken to reinforce the results from visuo-spatial attention. In 
this case, the effect of sentence stimuli on motion may have been attenuated precisely 
because the sentences provided more information (e.g. about objects and locations) and 
shifted the focus away from the motion event itself. In contrast, blocked single words 
produced a strong motion representation that was not constrained by any particular 
object or event. Thus, the difference between the two (type vs. token) still has 
consequences for the way in which perception is affected. This demonstrates a 
remarkable subtlety in the interactions between comprehension and perception.
The results support a common representation between single words and sentences and 
embodied effects are found for both. The results vary depending on the specific 
information (type vs. token) contained within the semantic representation, this 
emphasises the importance of detailed semantic content for interactions between 
comprehension and perception. The comparison between single words and sentences 
supports strong embodied predictions about the content of semantic representations (i.e. 
lexico-semantic and sentential representations show similar effects). Weaker versions 
of embodiment can also explain these results, as long as they allow substantial detail in 
the modal content that is engaged during semantic representation. Given the complexity 
of modality specific information that is likely to be present at the conceptual and/or 
perceptual level, this is not necessarily a problem.
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9 .2 . Question 2: Are low-level visual processes implicated in 
interactions between comprehension and perception?
Previous studies which used reaction time as the dependent measure implicate some 
level of visual processing but it is not clear whether the effects are due to low-level 
visual processes (e.g. visual signal processing) or effects at later stages (e.g. decision 
and response processing). One of the main aims of this investigation was to isolate 
specific visual processes and separate the levels of processing that are being influenced. 
Therefore the key results are from the experiments which explored the effect of 
comprehension on motion detection and used Signal Detection Theory to separate levels 
of task processing. For these experiments we compared the effects on d’ (perceptual 
sensitivity), c and B (where the decision threshold is set) and reaction time (the entire 
time to complete the task). In addition, Experiment 8.3 manipulated low-level visual 
processes (presenting ambiguous or salient motion) and looked at effects on lexical 
decision; therefore results from this study shows how low-level visual processes interact 
with semantic representation.
All the experiments which used motion detection showed effects on d’ and it was effects 
at later stages that were more variable. The results showed that when semantic access 
was contiguous with motion perception, congruent conditions increased d’ (Experiments 
6.4 & 6.5) or incongruent conditions decreased d’ (Experiments 6.2). In one experiment 
where semantic access preceded motion stimuli, a general reduction in d’ was observed 
for all directional words (Experiment 6.3). The TMS experiment (Chapter 7) showed a 
tendency for congruent conditions to impair d’ relative to control (but not to 
incongruent) conditions. In contrast, only 2 out of these 5 experiments showed reliable 
changes in measures of decision threshold (Experiments 6.2 & 6.4). In one case the 
change in decision threshold was in a different condition to changes in d’ (6.2) and in 
the other case the change was in the same condition (6.4). Finally, one experiment 
showed a change in reaction times not caused by congruence (6.2); one showed reaction 
times differences that reflected an effect of congruence not seen in other measures (6.5) 
and one showed an effect of congruence that was present in other dependent measures 
(6.4). Therefore, d’ was consistently influenced by manipulating congruence between 
the semantic and visual motion stimuli where other dependent variables were not. D’ 
represents the strength of the signal as detected by the participant, being directly 
proportional to the separation of distributions of signal and noise in a detector during a
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2-altemative forced choice task. A decrease in d’ indicates impaired sensory level 
stimulus processing, resulting in a diminished separation of signal and noise 
distributions hence, poorer perceptual sensitivity (Wickens, 2002). From motion 
detection tasks we know that d’ measures the earliest stages of motion perception, since 
direct stimulation of the motion processing complex MT+ typically produces a 
reduction in d’ (e.g. Silvanto, Lavie & Walsh, 2005). Given that d’ taps the earliest 
stages of motion processing, we can conclude that low-level visual processes are 
reliably influenced by semantic content that is congruent or incongruent with visual 
stimuli. Evidence from the visual lexical decision experiment with irrelevant motion 
(Experiment 8.3) provides converging evidence for a close connection between low- 
level visual processes and semantic content. The presentation of ambiguous and salient 
motion manipulated low-level motion processing bottom-up (i.e. changes in external 
stimuli that affected processing). In line with previous findings (Tsushima et al, 2005), 
salient motion was suppressed and did not interfere with lexical decision; in contrast, 
ambiguous motion was not suppressed and it produced longer reaction times for lexical 
decision to incongruent words. In the original study the account was that general visual 
resources were consumed by the processing of the ambiguous motion signal, reducing 
performance in the central task. In contrast, our results showed interference only when 
the semantic content conflicted with the ambiguous motion. If the interference from 
ambiguous motion is the product of taxing visual resources, this suggests that semantic 
content was also placing some burden on visual processes, modifying the conditions in 
which interference occurred. I will now discuss the possible mechanisms that would 
produce these effects, in order to establish how closely our results support a weak or 
strong view of embodied semantics.
In the discussion below, I will not include the results from the TMS study (Experiment 
7.1) as unforeseen methodological problems produced results that were inconclusive. 
Changes in presenting visual stimuli also meant that the observed congruency effects 
are not directly comparable to the other experiments. However, the finding that d’ was 
the only dependent measure to show significant changes is taken as further support that 
low-level visual processes are implicated more heavily than higher order decision 
processes.
For the other experiments which used motion detection, when semantic access occurred 
at the same time as motion perception, the d’ results showed congruent facilitation and
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incongruent interference. The lexical decision experiment also showed incongruent 
interference (in reaction times). Strong embodied explanations propose this pattern is 
the product of the semantic representation of motion words engaging motion processing 
areas. In some sense, the semantic representation is similar to actual visual motion.
This argument has been used to explain why the perception of congruent motion 
interferes with comprehension of motion sentences (Kaschak et al, 2005), since when 
the two are processed concurrently they compete for the same neural resources. 
Directionally selective neurones have to process both visual and semantic motion at the 
same time. In contrast to this, we find incongruent interference and congruent 
facilitation. Rather than competition for the same resources, this pattern suggests 
integration of the semantic and visual information as i f  the two were the same. In line 
with embodied theories the visual and semantic systems appear to make no distinction 
between motion information that comes from visual or linguistic stimuli. For this 
reason, I would like to conclude that there is a close and automatic connection between 
visual and semantic information, therefore some version of embodiment is needed to 
account for the results. Strong embodied theories that stipulate sensory-motor 
simulation as semantic representation can account for the results seen here, although the 
absence of congruent interference (e.g. Kaschak et al, 2005) would need to be 
explained. However, a weaker version of embodiment can also explain the results, 
stipulating that semantic and visual information are integrated outside the visual system 
rather than supported by the same substrate within it.
As noted in the discussion of Chapter 6 (section 6.6.1) the results can be explained 
within a framework of perceptual learning, where the visual system actively integrates 
information from stimuli that are present alongside the target event (Seitz & Watanabe, 
2003; Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, 2001). This framework can be added to strong 
versions of embodiment and account for some of the task based differences in results.
In this case, the motion words do directly engage motion processing areas and if there 
are predictive relationships between visual and linguistic stimuli the visual system can 
use this semantic-visual activation to improve perception. The comparison that strong 
embodied theories invite is that semantic activity is equivalent to presenting a motion 
pattern in the same or different direction to the target. The visual perception literature 
shows that a distracter motion pattern congruent with a subsequent target has been 
shown to facilitate or interfere with motion detection (as indicated by a lowered or 
raised threshold respectively). Congruent distracters produce interference or facilitation
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depending on whether or not they are attended; supporting the idea that areas such as 
MT+ are routinely modulated by attention (Raymond, 2000). In other words, bottom-up 
manipulations of the visual system are modulated by top-down factors such as attention. 
The RDK stimuli we have used engage second-order motion processing, also known as 
‘object-based’ motion processing since information is extracted from complex stimuli 
with multiple motion vectors and segmented into discrete object representations (ibid). 
There is an “emerging consensus... that object based perceptual and attentional 
mechanisms may integrate with motion processing at this level” (ibid, p.44). This is an 
important point since it means that our results, showing consistent low-level interactions 
between motion perception and comprehension may not be a simple product of direct 
engagement, but a more complex picture where motion processing integrates 
information from several sources (e.g. the visual stimuli and whatever else is attended). 
Semantic information may present another source of information that can be integrated. 
As noted above, the fact the visual and semantic information are integrated at low-levels 
and treated as isomorphic at some point in visual processing means that the connection 
between the two is close and automatic. However, the weaker versions of embodied 
theories can also account for this data, given what we know about the visual system. In 
some embodied accounts, sensory and motor areas are co-opted into semantic 
representation through associations between the lexical stimuli and the sensory-motor 
experience (Pulvermuller, 1999). Whilst this account still places a clear emphasis of the 
necessity of sensory and motor areas in semantics, this same principle can produce a 
semantic system that is actually independent of sensory and motor information, whilst 
still benefiting from a close connection to that information. Elsewhere, theories have 
recognised a connection between semantic and sensory-motor systems, without 
committing to strong embodiment (Vigliocco et al, 2004; Rogers et al, 2004). Here, 
semantic representations are derived from conceptual information, which is grounded in 
sensory and motor information (Vigliocco et al, 2004). Semantic representations are 
one-step removed from direct engagement; derived from direct experience but not 
necessarily recreating it. It is possible that semantic representations are themselves cues 
to particular events, allowing access to the relevant information (and therefore having 
close connections to systems engaged in direct experience) but not presenting that 
information per se (Rogers et al, 2004). For our stimuli, this means a permanent 
connection between the semantic representation of motion words and motion processing 
areas. Thus, when the two are activated in close temporal proximity they can influence 
each other via a bidirectional connection; as we have seen incongruent interference
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occurs for both comprehension on perception and perception on comprehension. This 
relationship is one of mediation, rather than modulation, and is also entirely compatible 
with perceptual learning and other mechanisms at work during task execution. Indeed, 
one would expect it to be influenced by task strategies which could utilise this 
connection to a greater or lesser degree. This account is admittedly very speculative, 
but it is laid out here in order to make a point: embodiment does not imply simulation. 
There are many ways that a close and meaningful connection between semantic and 
sensory-motor information can be produced, rejecting the idea of a completely amodal, 
abstract semantic system24.
Finally, I want to discuss the possible mechanisms that would produce the results seen 
for criterion (c and B). In two experiments (6.2 & 6.4) congruence reduced the decision 
threshold: participants were more likely to respond that a target even occurred. This is 
in contrast to their accuracy in detecting whether that even actually did occur, which 
was improved by congruence in only one of these experiments (6.4). This criterion shift 
was present when a robust semantic context was present (i.e. either through blocked 
word presentation or a sentence context) and when the onset of the RDK was relatively 
unpredictable; indicating that it was due to strategic processes. The criterion shift for 
sentence comprehension was weaker as compared to blocked, unsynchronised single 
word presentation; this is in line with the token linguistic context being more 
constrained (perhaps resulting in a weaker motion representation) and the RDK being 
more predictable. RDK onset was quite predictable when sentences were 
comprehended but it was still less so than experiments where RDK onset always 
occurred either during or after the presentation of a word (6.3 & 6.5). It is possible that 
when the visual system cannot predict the onset of the RDK, a congruent context 
increases the salience of the target event (i.e. the motion direction). Therefore, deciding 
whether a particular motion direction was observed is easier and criterion is lowered 
(see below for a further discussion of criterion effects). Further experiments that 
carefully manipulated the predictability of RDK presentation in concert with the
24 This alternative account can also explain the non-specific interference from directional words found for 
Experiment 6.3. Participants heard a single word and then shortly afterwards they saw an RDK. 
Crucially, filler trials asked questions about the word so participants had to maintain semantic 
information whilst they made the motion detection judgement. We found that motion detection was 
worse for directional words as compared to control words. According to the weak embodied account 
laid out above, the maintenance of semantic information produces recurrent activity within the 
semantic system and therefore also in the connection between motion words and motion processing 
areas. The weak activation of this connection could then have impaired motion detection since it 
would consume resources that were trying to be allocated to motion detection.
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strength of the linguistic context would be needed to verify whether criterion shifts are 
modulated by these variables. Manipulating the strength of the motion in sentential 
representations (e.g. “The rocket flew upwards” versus “The women rose from bed”) 
would be an interesting way to explore the constraints of token representations on 
semantic interpretation, particular if the same directional verb was used (e.g. “The 
rocket climbed into the sky” versus “The child climbed onto the chair”).
A final point is that as criterion was lowered in response to congruent conditions 
(indicating an easier decision); speeded response times in the same conditions could be 
a product of decision priming, rather than low-level sensory or motor processing. 
However, in the one experiment where we found a trend for facilitated response times 
and decision processes, we also found facilitation at the perceptual level. In addition, if 
stimulus-response compatibility is reduced, or removed, in experimental conditions, it is 
unlikely that speeded reaction times will represent decision priming (see Question 3 for 
a fuller discussion of this argument). Therefore, this issue will not be problematic as 
long as experiments take care to tap the interactions between semantic and sensory- 
motor content implicitly (or adopt methods where low-level processing can be 
measured). Happily, much of the existing work using reaction time measures does just 
that.
9.2.1. Summary and Conclusions
All the experiments that measured perceptual sensitivity (d’) showed interactions 
between semantic content and motion detection. The unconscious and obligatory 
perception of motion (i.e. a signal at threshold that could not be suppressed) was also 
found to interfere with the recognition of incongruent motion words. Therefore low- 
level visual processes are implicated in these interactions. This connection is automatic 
and somewhat direct; this conclusion is best supported by the lexical decision 
experiment that showed interactions between irrelevant motion and comprehension 
when the visual information was not consciously perceived. The lexical decision 
experiment also showed that when perceptual information was suppressed, it did not 
influence semantic access; nor did it appear to impair semantic processing. This 
supports the weaker version of embodiment laid out above, where visual and semantic 
information is integrated (e.g. via a permanent connection). Strong embodiment 
predicts that the suppression of motion processing will impair the simulation of
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semantic motion: the resources needed for simulation are curbed. We do not find 
evidence for this.
The results mean that (at least for some tasks) visual and semantic motion information 
are not separable, they do share a common representation. Again, the results have to be 
accounted for by some version of embodiment. Embodiment implicates sensory and 
motor systems in semantic representation; therefore what is known about how these 
areas work (e.g. perceptual learning and suppression) has to be incorporated into 
explanations. For that reason, task based differences in the results support a novel 
version of weak embodiment that can account for the data.
9 .3 . Question 3: Are visuo-spatial attention and motion 
perception affected in the same way by comprehension?
In order to manipulate visuo-spatial attention, we used a shape classification task that 
had been used previously to show the effect of semantics on attention (Richardson et al, 
2003; Bergen et al, in press). Even when location is manipulated implicitly, the 
allocation of visuo-spatial attention to locations in space involves quite a lot of 
top-down control (e.g. the identification of the target space, the conscious direction of 
attention to that space, oculo-motor control). In fact, attention is considered an 
archetypal top-down influence on perception itself (Raymond, 2000). The motion 
perception task initially involved judging the direction of dynamic motion patterns, but 
the majority of experiments used motion detection where a coherent motion signal had 
to be detected. In contrast to allocating visuo-spatial attention, the detection of coherent 
motion signals in central vision requires decisions about low-level perceptual signals. 
Therefore, it is does not demand that visuo-spatial attention is adjusted and less top- 
down control is needed to complete the task. One requires the active identification of a 
location (and the object at that location) and the other requires the classification of an 
ambiguous perceptual event. The similarities and differences between the results using 
these different tasks will highlight how higher and lower order visual processes are 
affected by semantic information.
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In order to answer this question we need to, as far as possible, directly compare results 
from those experiments which differ only in their visual manipulation: visuo-spatial 
(shape categorisation in different hemifields) or motion (motion detection). There are 
three pairs that fall in this category. First, blocked passive comprehension of single 
words whilst concurrently performing the visual task; second, active comprehension of 
single words followed by the visual task; third, active comprehension of sentences with 
the visual task at verb offset. It is possible to compare and contrast the patterns of 
facilitation and interference in different conditions of congruence. The one limitation is 
that the only dependent measure for the visuo-spatial task was reaction time, whereas 
the motion detection tasks have two extra measures from Signal Detection analysis 
(sensitivity and criterion). Where possible explanations will take this into account.
For the blocked single word comprehension and visuo-spatial target (5.1), reaction 
times were longer when blocks presented incongruent or mixed directional words.
There are actually two different motion tasks that were combined with blocked single 
word comprehension: direction judgement (6.1a) and motion detection (6.2). For 
direction judgement, reaction times were faster in congruent and mixed conditions, as 
compared to incongruent conditions (the control condition had averages that were 
similar to those in the incongruent condition). For motion detection, reaction times 
were not changed by congruence, but perceptual sensitivity was reduced in incongruent 
conditions and criterion (c) was reduced in congruent conditions. The results for each 
task diverge from each other, however, there are two instances of incongruent 
interference and two instances of congruent facilitation. Incongruent conditions 
produced longer reaction times for the visuo-spatial task and lower d’ values for motion 
detection. Congruent conditions produced shorter reaction times for the motion 
direction task and lower criterion values for motion detection. In other words, measures 
of signal processing pattern with the visuo-spatial task whereas measures of decision 
threshold pattern with the motion direction task. The task in the visuo-spatial 
experiment was shape categorisation, so response options (circle or square) were 
independent from the manipulation of visuo-spatial location (top or bottom). Therefore, 
biases to allocate attention to a particular location should affect visual processes 
involved in target identification (i.e. signal processing) rather than response preparation; 
as such, the reaction times results reflect processes at this level. There was no 
difference in error rates, but this may be because performance was close to ceiling (error 
rates were around 5-6%). It was only by manipulating visual stimuli close to threshold
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levels that we were able to see small effects on sensitivity reflected in accuracy rates. 
However, in line with the interpretation that the reaction time changes in the visuo- 
spatial task reflect effects at low-levels, the motion detection task also showed 
incongruent interference for d \ In contrast, when judging the direction of motion 
(6.1a), the visual manipulation (up or down) is conflated with response preparation (up 
or down). Reaction times showed congruent facilitation. It looks as though in this task, 
the reaction times reflect changes in decision and response preparation. As noted when 
these pilot experiments were discussed, this data could reflect something like the Simon 
effect, where faster responses are made when stimulus-response variables are congruent. 
In line with this interpretation, the motion detection task shows congruent facilitation at 
the decision level; with the criterion set lower under congruent conditions. In terms of 
the congruence between stimuli and response, the motion detection task is actually half­
way between the visuo-spatial and motion direction tasks. Participants have to respond 
if motion is present or absent, but when motion is present it is either up or down; 
participants could very well be preparing the response ‘up or random’/’down or 
random’. In this case, there is some overlap between stimulus and response, producing 
congruent facilitation for decision thresholds. The effects on signal processing are 
revealed in d’, just as they are present in reaction times when stimulus-response 
compatibility is removed in the visuo-spatial task. These three experiments illustrate 
very well the importance of choosing tasks which remove this kind of compatibility 
between the critical manipulation (the stimulus) and the response; reaction times can 
reflect the processes of interest but these can also be swamped by more trivial effects at 
the decision/response stage. Despite the difference in the tasks, we see common 
patterns of incongruent interference at low-levels of visual processing and congruent 
facilitation for decision/response processes.
The second pair of experiments that can be compared is active comprehension of single 
words followed by the visual task. In this case there is no robust directional context and 
the effects of semantic content are arguably due to the maintenance of semantic 
information in working memory rather than the result of immediate semantic access.
The visuo-spatial task showed no effects of congruence; for the motion detection task, 
perceptual sensitivity was reduced for directional words. The discussion of results for 
visuo-spatial location (Ch.5 and Question 1 above) concluded that the allocation of 
attention was only affected when a robust directional context was present; either 
specifying a concrete location (as in sentence comprehension) or consistently biasing
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attention to a general location (downwards or upwards) so that a particular location 
becomes salient. In that case, it is not surprising that there were no effects of 
congruence. The visuo-spatial task was simply not sensitive to the transient semantic 
representation of motion. In contrast, the more sensitive motion detection task tapped 
not only the relevant visual stimulus (motion rather than location) but also used 
threshold stimuli that are sensitive to small effects. The results showed that motion 
detection was impaired following the comprehension of all directional words.
Therefore, maintaining semantic motion information produced a general demand on the 
motion processing system, perhaps consuming general visual resources that were then 
no longer available for motion detection. In this case, the results reflect the difference 
in sensitivity between the two visual tasks to the processes of interest. Allocating 
attention to a region in space in order to identify a target is not influenced by transient 
semantic motion; a specified concrete location is the most effective way to influence 
attention. For motion detection (being closer in nature to the semantic information) 
even the briefest activation of semantic motion is sufficient to influence low-level 
motion processing.
The final pair of experiments that can be compared are those which used active 
comprehension of sentences with the visual task at verb offset. Here, the dual-task 
method meant the visual stimulus was perceived during the remainder of the sentence. 
The visuo-spatial task showed that reaction times were faster for directional sentences 
overall, as compared to the control sentences. The motion detection task showed 
congruent facilitation at all levels; sensitivity was increased, criterion was lowered and 
reaction times were slightly faster. Therefore there is a general benefit for visuo-spatial 
attention and a specific (congruent) benefit for motion perception. This can also be 
explained by the difference between what each of these tasks actually taps. The 
semantic representation of the sentence is still under construction when the stimulus is 
perceived; there is incomplete information aside from the object being in motion along 
the vertical axis (there is no end point). Clear congruency effects in visuo-spatial tasks 
only emerge when a final destination for the motion is specified (i.e. the target appears 
after sentence offset, Experiment 5.3). The general benefit found when the target 
appeared at verb-offset might be due to some visual-semantic information being better 
than none, preparing the allocation of attention along a given axis. In the original 
experiment the target could appear at the top, bottom, left or right of the screen 
(Richardson et al, 2003); therefore axis was manipulated rather than a specific location.
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In order to conclude that partial sentence comprehension primes attention along one 
axis, we would need an experiment that showed facilitation for targets in the top and 
bottom of the visual field, but not for those in the left or right, when targets are 
presented at verb-offset.
The fact that there was a representation of motion (but perhaps not location) is 
evidenced by the result from motion detection. When RDKs were presented at verb 
offset, sensitivity was increased for congruent conditions, as though the semantic 
information primed the detection of visual motion. Congruence also produced a lower 
criterion and faster reaction times. This is in line with experiments that show transient 
(localised to the verb) but facilitatory effects of perceiving rotational motion on reading 
times for verbs referring to rotation (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006). From these experiments it 
appears that the motion representation is short-lived, occurring only at the point at 
which it is lexically specified. If we assume the same is true for the sentences we used, 
the motion representation is active shortly after the verb (thereby influencing motion 
perception) with a fuller representation of the object’s location appearing once it has 
been specified, at the end of the sentence (and thereby influencing visuo-spatial 
attention). In combination with one another, the results from these two experiments 
demonstrate the dynamic nature of semantic representations during comprehension and 
the visual processes they affect according to the content of those representations. This 
further supports the close connection between comprehension and visual processes, 
showing very subtle differences in which processes are affected. These different 
processes are engaged depending on the relevance of the semantic content to those 
processes; motion perception is influenced when motion is represented and visuo-spatial 
attention is affected when a visuo-spatial location is specified. This is quite striking in 
its specificity, supporting much other work which shows fine-grained influences of 
semantic content on visual perception (e.g. Zwaan, 2004). It is here where simulation 
offers the most intuitive account of the data; if the details of each semantic 
representation are simulated then the consequent processing of similar perceptual events 
is facilitated. The important question is whether simulation is the only explanation of 
these effects. Eye-movement studies show that semantic information is quickly 
indexed to objects in the environment and that attention to objects and locations is 
dynamically manipulated depending on content (Chambers et al, 2002; 2004). This 
indexing could be a product of simulation, with the simulation of congruent items 
allowing them to be quickly identified in the environment (as perceptual and semantic
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information agree). However, this would run against previous experiments that showed 
congruent interference for allocating visuo-spatial attention (Richardson et al, 2003; 
Bergen et al, in press; Estes et al, submitted). Congruent interference is explained by 
the simulation of visual motion interfering with the identification of objects in the 
environment (as in Perky, 1910). Therefore, these two explanations from strong 
embodiment conflict just as the results presented here conflict with the previous 
demonstrations of congruent interference for visuo-spatial attention; this will be 
discussed further in section 9.5.1.
Weak versions of embodiment would explain the present results by the perception of 
particular visual events (i.e. objects, locations, motion) being primed by connections to 
semantic content, through strong associations rather than simulation. Distributed 
network theories of semantic content propose a spreading activation across features that 
constitute a semantic representation (e.g. Farah & McClelland, 1991; McRae, de Sa & 
Seidenberg, 1997; Rogers et al, 2004). The sensory and motor systems could be part of 
this distributed network because they are involved in conceptual representations from 
which semantic content is derived (Vigliocco et al, 2004). When sensory-motor 
systems are activated by task processes, e.g. object recognition or motor preparation, as 
well as by associations to semantic content, the observed effects of congruence could be 
the cross over between these two paths of activation; one coming from semantics and 
one from the task. The associations between semantic access and experience are non- 
arbitrary, so it is not correct to speak of semantic representation as abstract or symbolic. 
This explanation is still embodied, but semantic content acts more like a cue to a 
particular event than representing the event itself (e.g. Elman, 2004) and it relies on the 
integration of sensory-motor and semantic content. This account is a post-hoc 
alternative and has some problems dealing with the apparent detail of semantic 
representations, implicitly priming the perception of things such as object form (e.g. 
whether a bird has its wings outstretched for flight or tucked in for perching; Zwaan, 
Stanfield & Yaxley, 2002). There would have to be rich, contextually variable 
connections between semantic representations and object recognition processes. 
However, it is informative to look at how other theories of semantic representation 
might account for these effects without using the mechanism of simulation.
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9.3.1. Summary and Conclusions
The barrier to comparing visuo-spatial attention and motion detection tasks was the 
difference in dependent measures. Future experiments which manipulate visuo-spatial 
attention in a similar fashion to motion detection, presenting stimuli that are on the 
threshold of detection (by manipulating their duration for example) could be used so 
that signal detection measures can be extracted. However, the comparison of results has 
been informative. First, it has shown how reaction times can reflect early visual 
processes as long as stimulus-response compatibility effects are removed. Second, it 
has shown that both tasks show incongruent facilitation when stimulus presentation is 
unsynchronized and congruent facilitation when presentation is synchronized (i.e. 
blocked word versus sentence comprehension). Therefore, both tasks are unable to 
suppress the interference when the visual and semantic information conflict, but both 
tasks are able to use that information to the benefit of perception when circumstances 
allow. Where the tasks diverge is in the precise aspect of semantic content to which 
they are sensitive. Visuo-spatial attention requires the specification of a particular 
location or a robust directional context that can progressively bias attention towards a 
location. Motion perception is apparently always sensitive to semantic motion, even 
when that information is merely being maintained in working memory. This provides 
further support for a close, automatic connection between semantic content and visual 
processing. Strong versions of embodied theory can account for these results through 
the simulation of visual motion, although the results do not support the congruent 
interference that is found in other studies (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in 
press). The patterns of incongruent interference and congruent facilitation that are 
found for both visuo-spatial attention and motion perception support the routine 
integration of semantic content at different levels of visual perception. This is more in 
line with weaker versions of embodied theory, where a permanent connection provides 
a common base for semantic and visual motion, without stipulating that the visual 
system is engaged in simulation.
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9 .4 . Question 4: For visual motion, are congruency effects 
in the same conditions for comprehension on perception and 
perception on comprehension?
Several experiments demonstrated how the comprehension of motion words variably 
influenced low-level visual processes involved in motion perception (Chapter 6 & 7). 
However, only one experiment showed reliable effects of motion perception on the 
comprehension of motion words (Experiment 8.3); this experiment will first be 
summarised in some detail, along with any conclusions that can be drawn. The result 
will then be compared to the motion detection experiments in order to find any 
similarities.
Two visual lexical decision experiments looked at the influence of passively viewed 
motion on comprehension. A 200ms RDK was presented at word onset; in 
experimental trials the motion was congruent, incongruent or neutral in comparison to 
the meaning of the word. When the motion was ambiguous (i.e. at threshold), there 
were longer reaction times for incongruent conditions. When the motion was salient, 
not effects of congruency were observed. This paradigm was motivated by previous 
results which showed that irrelevant, salient motion was suppressed so it would not take 
resources from the central task. In contrast, ambiguous motion could not be suppressed 
(since it does not breach the threshold that initiates suppression); it therefore takes 
resources from the central task and impairs performance (Tsushima et al, 2006). We 
replicated the interference from ambiguous motion, supporting the suppression of 
irrelevant salient motion in order to maintain task performance. However, the general 
resource account put forward by Tsushima et al does not explain these results. If the 
processing of the ambiguous motion signal consumed general resources, there should be 
interference in all conditions relative to salient motion (admittedly this would be 
difficult to detect with our between subjects manipulation). Instead, the interference 
was semantically modulated, appearing only when the ambiguous motion conflicted 
with the semantic motion. Directionally selective motion processing slowed the 
verification of semantic content when the two were incongruent. We assume that for 
salient motion there is direct suppression of motion processing (MT+) from the frontal 
lobes (ibid). This result shows that obligatory25 visual processing influences semantic 
access. This is very strong evidence for an automatic connection between the visual and
25 Ambiguous signals that cannot be suppressed and are therefore not open to strategic effects or reliable
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semantic systems. However, the suppression of salient motion did not affect semantic 
access (for example, slowing recognition to congruent or incongruent motion words); 
this indicates that visual motion processing can be suppressed without impairing the 
processing of motion words. This goes against predictions from strong embodiment.
The incongruent interference seen in the lexical decision experiment is in line with the 
general patterns found for the motion detection experiments; one experiment showed 
incongruent interference (6.2) and two showed congruent facilitation (6.4 & 6.5). As 
has already been discussed, perceptual learning may play an important role in the 
motion detection experiments; certainly in those which show congruent facilitation. 
However, the one experiment where the words could not be employed to benefit 
perception (as there was no predictive relationship between the motion words and the 
RDKs), we find incongruent interference for d’. In this experiment blocked single 
words were passively comprehended whilst participants detected motion. This 
experiment is not that easily compared to the lexical decision, except that both 
experiments present a single task (lexical decision or motion detection) with the other 
stimulus passively perceived. We can also argue that the in both experiments the 
irrelevant stimulus was not being used for the benefit of task performance. For lexical 
decision, apart from the fact that ambiguous motion produced interference, motion was 
not informative for lexical decision (i.e. it did not signal lexicality) since it appeared for 
all stimuli26. For motion detection, the onset of the words did not predict RDK onset so 
sensitivity could not improve. Thus, both experiments show interference during 
incongruent conditions and in both cases we know that the interference has it basis in 
low-level visual perception. In the lexical decision experiment it is the result of a 
bottom-up manipulation of visual perception on comprehension and in the motion 
detection experiment it is the result of a top-down effect of comprehension on 
sensitivity. Therefore, there are parallels in the way perception affects comprehension 
and vice-versa.
conscious perception.
26 It is an open question whether manipulations of predictability between visual and semantic motion 
would change the patterns seen for the lexical decision experiment. For example, one direction of 
motion could be predictive of lexicality (providing an opportunity for learning), whilst still congruent, 
incongruent and neutral in comparison to word meaning.
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9.4.1. Summary and Conclusions
Two experiments, each looking at a particular direction of influence between perception 
and comprehension, showed incongruent interference. Both experiments used a single 
task paradigm where the irrelevant stimulus was passively perceived. The results 
reinforce the conclusion that semantic and visual motion are treated alike; it is not just 
motion processing which shows interference from perception; perception similarly 
affects comprehension. It is important that both experiments tap low-level visual 
processes, reinforcing the inference that the link between semantic and visual motion is 
rooted in the earliest stages of visual motion processing. However, the lexical decision 
experiment also showed that when salient motion signals were suppressed, semantic 
access was not noticeably impaired. It appears that there are both top-down and 
bottom-up connections between semantic and visual motion that are automatically and 
directly activated; but they can also be modulated by controlled processes, such as 
suppression and perceptual learning. This supports a weaker version of embodiment 
that does not require simulation as the driving mechanism.
Unfortunately, no conclusions can be drawn about sentence comprehension and motion 
perception. However, the fact that results were found for single word presentation 
suggests the correct methodology should find comparable effects for sentences.
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9 .5 . Further Discussion
9.5.1. How do the present results compare with the
available literature?
9.5.1.1. Visuo-spatial attention:
The first set of experiments in this investigation were motivated by the finding that 
sentences referring to an object’s motion (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press) 
or location (Estes et al, submitted) affected the allocation of visuo-spatial attention. In 
all o f these studies, when the semantic and visual target direction/location were 
congruent, reaction times to categorise the target object were longer. Explanations of 
this effect have centred around ‘image schemas’, visual similarity and results from 
conscious visual imagery (Perky, 1910). The argument is that comprehension activates 
visual representations (similar to conscious visual imagery) which interfere with the 
identification of objects in the same location. The act of comprehension is therefore 
similar to the processes of producing visual imagery, and both (presumably) use the 
visual system. In contrast to these results, we found incongruent interference when the 
semantic and visual locations were incongruent (blocked single words and sentences) 
and congruent facilitation when the semantic and visual locations were congruent 
(sentences only). This pattern of results contrasts with the existing literature. The 
method that we used was a direct extension of that used in Richardson et al (2003) and 
Bergen et al (in press), therefore the differences may be due the kinds of sentences that 
were employed. Richardson et al used both concrete and abstract sentences and 
collapsed results across these categories. Bergen et al had a very small number of items 
(5 in each condition), but found effects only with concrete sentences. For the sentence 
stimuli, we had 30 items per condition all of which were designed to be as concrete as 
possible; admittedly the number of participants was smaller, but the effects were still 
reliable. As noted at the end of Chapter 5, an experiment which used all of the stimuli 
from all the experiments so far (within subjects) would help to clarify whether item 
selection is responsible for the different effects. However, our results do agree with the 
conclusion that language needs to refer to concrete events in order to effect visuo-spatial 
attention (Bergen et al, in press), since single words did not influence attention and the 
influence of blocked single words built up over time, suggesting that a strong context
317
was responsible (rather than the semantic content of the individual words per se). 
Elsewhere, single words have been shown to affect visuo-spatial attention if they refer 
to concrete spatial locations and relationships (Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003; Estes et al, in 
press). It is of interest that one of these studies also showed incongruent 
interference/congruent facilitation when pairs of words were presented in the correct or 
incorrect spatial relationship (e.g. ‘attic’ above or below ‘basement’) (Zwaan & Yaxley, 
2003). These results pattern with our experiments, but the methodology is very 
different (looking at comprehension on judgements about word pairs). We directly 
adapted the method from Richardson et al (2003) so replications and extensions of the 
current experiments are needed to explore how very similar tasks can produce 
congruence effects in different conditions; as for interactions between motor action and 
sentence comprehension, the timing may be critical (Borreggine & Kaschak, 2006).
The work that shows congruent interference during the allocation of visuo-spatial 
attention has been accounted for with explanations based on visual imagery (Richardson 
et al, 2003; Estes et al, submitted). This explanation is less applicable to our results 
unless we allow that ‘visual schemas’ produced during semantic access interfere with 
visuo-spatial attention in both congruent and incongruent conditions, with some as yet 
unidentified variable accounting for the difference between data sets. Experiments that 
look at the influence of comprehension on eye-movements are a good place to try and 
tease apart the conflicting results. We know that eye-movements do follow the path of 
described events and return to the location of named objects, even if there are no visual 
stimuli to see (Spivey & Geng, 2001; Spivey et al, 2000; Richardson & Spivey, 2000). 
Some of this work has been explained as the extemalisation of working memory; using 
sensory-motor markers to aid in recall and task execution (e.g. Wilson, 2002). I would 
like to argue that the embodied effects we see in our experiments (incongruent 
interference and some congruent facilitation) are due to attention, and possibly the eyes, 
going with the described event. The semantic system does influence the allocation of 
attention, when it represents locations to which attention can respond; the representation 
of the location could be embodied (i.e. coded within the visual/oculo-motor systems) 
without being an image (i.e. a visual simulation). For example, the representations of 
perceptual targets and motor plans for saccades have been shown to have a similar 
representation (Eckstein et al, 2007); if semantic information provides valid information 
about an object location this could also be coded as a saccade target, a plan for action.
If language is routinely used to veridically direct attention, the eyes and attention will
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tend to go where semantic content informs them to, and show interference (i.e. slower 
responses) when it has to work against this information.
Experiments are needed which monitor the latency and pattern of eye-movements in 
response to comprehension, with the critical comparison being whether latencies to 
targets in particular locations (e.g. up or down) are facilitated or impaired by directional 
sentences. If imagery disrupts the allocation of attention, congruent conditions should 
be slower relative to incongruent conditions. Alternatively, if attention follows 
semantic cues, incongruent conditions should be slower. It would also be particularly 
useful to explore how tracking an object with the eyes would affect the comprehension 
of directional sentences, in a reversal of the experiments presented here. Just as we 
found similar effects between comprehension and motion, it is interesting to explore the 
bidirectional relationship between visuo-spatial attention and comprehension. Finally, 
experiments could employ secondary visual tasks, e.g. the maintenance of imagery (e.g. 
a coloured shape) or a visuo-spatial location (e.g. left-top or right-bottom). If attention 
goes with the specification of a location, rather than being disrupted by an image, a 
visuo-spatial task should be more disruptive than an image. In contrast, if attention is 
disrupted by an image, the pattern should be reversed.
For the moment, I would like to argue that the ‘visual imagery’ interpretation of 
semantic representation (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press; Estes et al, 
submitted) is more complex than it appears; especially since no experiments of this kind 
have directly manipulated the degree of visual imagery (if similar processes are in 
operation, the effects of comprehension and imagery could be additive). One of the 
most well developed theories of embodied simulation states very clearly that simulation 
is a separate process to conscious visual imagery (Barsalou, 1999; see section 1.3.2.5.1), 
although the two may be tap the same apparatus. The reasons for this are sensible; first, 
if simulation underpins conceptual and semantic representation it cannot be conscious 
(since little of the conceptual and semantic processing that we do is conscious). Second, 
visual imagery experiments typically show that it takes seconds (rather than 
milliseconds) to produce and manipulate visual imagery. In comparison comprehension 
is very fast. Third, semantic representations are schematic, dynamic and (for Barsalou, 
1999) decomposed; they are not static, detailed recreations of visual scenes. If semantic 
representation is to be placed on a continuum with visual imagery, there is much more 
that needs to be specified.
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There is some evidence that a secondary visuo-spatial task interferes with narrative 
comprehension more than a verbal task (Fincher-Keifer, 2001). There are the numerous 
results which show that sentence comprehension facilitates the processing of congruent 
pictures, again supporting something like visual imagery during comprehension (e.g. 
Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001). The results from narrative comprehension also provide 
compelling evidence for image like representations or mental models that are produced 
during comprehension, for example, analogously representing space, distance and 
objects (e.g. Zwaan, 1999). However, the experiment usually referenced when 
explaining congruent interference during the allocation of visuo-spatial attention is one 
that employed conscious effortful visual imagery. In the Perky experiment (1910), 
participants actively imagined an object on the wall in front of them; they were 
subsequently slower to identify the appearance of a real visual stimulus in that location.
I find it problematic to compare automatic effects from semantic access with conscious, 
effortful visual imagery. Future experiments will need to explore the continuum 
between semantic, imagistic and conscious imagery processes to refine this account.
The long running debate about visual imagery has shown that similar neural substrates 
are active during actual visual perception and conscious visual imagery (e.g. Kosslyn, 
1996); therefore, if the semantic representation of visual information also taps these 
same substrates, it is entirely possible that there are similar processes in operation. 
However, this question has not yet been extensively investigated.
As we have seen, visuo-spatial attention responds to a linguistic context, particularly 
when concrete locations are specified. Similarly, motion perception and the semantic 
representation of motion show a bidirectional influence on each other, suggesting a 
shared representation at some point in processing. These influences are automatic, 
dynamic and transient. They are also entirely dependent on what is specified in the 
semantic content, and influences on the perceptual system vary accordingly. 
Comprehension and semantic representation are closely connected to the systems that 
we use in everyday perception and action. This is no doubt an essential part of how 
semantics works; engaging the systems through which word forms can be associated to 
referents.
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9.5.1.2. Comprehension on Motion Perception
Chapter 6 and 7 detailed experiments which explored the influence of comprehending 
language referring to motion on the perception of visual motion. All experiments found 
that comprehension influenced perception at the level of perceptual sensitivity (d’), i.e. 
the stage at which visual signal processing occurs. There are no visual perception tasks 
in the literature that are directly comparable to the motion detection task used here; the 
existing studies all use reaction times as the dependent variable. In addition, only one 
study (to the best of my knowledge) has looked at comprehension on motion perception. 
There are two experiments looking at the perception of dynamic motion on 
comprehension, but these will be discussed below (when discussing similar experiments 
from this investigation). Zwaan et al (2004) presented sentences over headphones, with 
filler sentences followed by comprehension questions. On each trial the sentence was 
followed by two pictures, separated by a brief mask, and participants had to judge if the 
second picture was the same as the first. On critical trials the sentences described the 
motion of a ball towards or away from the comprehender; for example, “The pitcher 
hurled the softball at you” and “You hurled the softball at the pitcher”. The pictures 
were of a similar ball to that described in the sentence (e.g. for the above sentences, a 
softball) and the second picture was slightly smaller or slightly larger than the first; 
thereby approximating the motion of the ball towards (larger) or away (smaller). When 
the motion of the ball in the sentence was congruent with the pictured motion, 
judgements were faster. There are two things to note about this method, first, 
comprehension precedes the motion stimuli; second, the motion is apparent. Although 
apparent motion (i.e. motion created by a succession of static stimuli) form the basis of 
all computer animation, in this experiment participants compare the first and second 
pictures, making salient the fact that the pictures are separate events. However, the 
manipulation of object size between the first and second picture (to produce apparent 
motion) is implicit; any influence of comprehension on perception is therefore 
automatic. The result showed congruent facilitation, supporting the hypothesis that 
comprehension of the motion sentences had produced a simulation of motion within the 
visual system; this system was then primed to process pictures congruent with that 
motion. We also found congruent facilitation of motion perception when the visual 
motion stimulus was presented during sentence comprehension. We found facilitation 
at every level of processing, from perceptual sensitivity (d’) to criterion setting (c and B) 
and a weak effect on reaction times. Due to demonstrations elsewhere that motion
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perception only influenced comprehension at the verb (Zwaan & Taylor, 2006), 
suggesting motion information was localised to this region, we did not look at motion 
detection following sentence comprehension. Therefore it is not possible to directly 
compare the two experiments. However, the results are in line with Zwaan et al (2004) 
and with much other work which shows facilitatory effects on congruent picture 
judgement following sentence comprehension (see section 2.1.2.3). Zwaan et al (2004) 
concluded that their experiment hinted at the dynamic nature of semantic 
representations (by using implicit apparent motion); the motion detection tasks we have 
used firmly support the dynamic representation of semantic motion. Our results also 
add to these previous findings since they did not employ a control condition; therefore 
the results could have been congruent facilitation or incongruent interference. The 
finding of congruent facilitation in our sentence comprehension experiment suggests 
that this may be the condition of interest. It is interesting that the sentence 
comprehension experiment was the only experiment in which all dependent measures 
converged on a pattern of congruent facilitation. The complete event described by 
sentences provides a stable semantic context which interacts with perception in a more 
uniform and pervasive manner. An interesting question is whether the speeded reaction 
time results we found were due to facilitation at the perceptual level (d’), the decision 
level (c and B) or both. From other experiments we know that effects at the decision 
level can diverge from effects at the perceptual level (experiment 6.2) and that reaction 
times can diverge from both SDT measures (all experiments except 6.4). One other 
experiment showed congruent facilitation at the decision level when blocked single 
words were presented (experiment 6.2), indicating that congruent contexts (when 
substantive enough) produce decision priming. It is not clear what mechanism produces 
shifts in response bias/criterion; signal detection theory allows the separation of 
criterion and stimulus factors, rather than providing a clear framework for the 
interpretation of shifts in criterion27. One interpretation is that a downwards criterion 
shift indicates less sensory evidence is needed to make a decision (e.g. Sperling, 1984). 
Congruent contexts may make the target event appear more likely, producing a 
reduction in criterion values as expectations prime responses to the target event. In this 
case the congruent context would have to be sufficiently robust to influence implicit
27 It has been noted that “An understanding of the psychological factors that are involved in bias
shifts... is, if anything, farther away than an understanding of stimulus effects” (Wickens, 2002, p.75). 
See also
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‘expectations’; this is in line with reliable criterion shifts only appearing for blocked 
single words and sentences28.
The important point for this work is that if sentence comprehension canonically 
produces a lower criterion in congruent conditions, the reaction time changes in other 
experiments could be a product of this rather than facilitated perceptual processing (i.e. 
effects at d’). As has been argued above, as long as the interactions between semantic 
and sensory-motor variables are tapped implicitly, it is unlikely that speeded reaction 
times are due to effects at the decision level. Although the influence of sentence 
comprehension on decision processes might offer a more trivial explanation of reaction 
time effects, they do provide further support for the automatic way in which semantic 
information is integrated into perceptual processing. When sentences are presented, the 
experimental manipulation of direction is never made explicit to participants and 
sentences are presented in a random order amongst fillers which disguise their content.
It is unlikely that participants use conscious strategies and any congruency effects 
between semantics and perception are automatic. It is encouraging that our experiment 
also showed facilitation in perceptual processing: sentence comprehension could have a 
pervasive influence that affects both decision and perception in similar ways. Crucially, 
the origin of both of these influences is in the automatic connection between semantic 
and perceptual motion.
It is more difficult to integrate the results we found with single words into the existing 
literature as few other studies have used single word comprehension without a sentence 
context. In fact, there are no studies looking at motion perception and single word 
comprehension aside from the ones presented here. These results have already been 
integrated with findings from the perceptual learning literature, which show that practise 
and predictable stimulus relationships improve performance (Gold, Sekuler & Bennett, 
2004; Seitz & Watanabe, 2003; Watanabe, Nanez & Sasaki, 2001). This was necessary 
in order to interpret the findings from experiment 6.5, in which congruent words 
synchronised to motion stimuli improved motion detection across the course of a block. 
This was in contrast to experiment 6.2, in which incongruent conditions impaired
28 Models of response bias based on the decoding of sensory information to produce ‘sensory likelihoods’ 
have been developed elsewhere: “the subjective experience of sensory events arises from the representation 
of sensory likelihoods, and not directly from the responses of sensory neuron populations” Jazayeri &
Movshon, 2007, p.915. Therefore congruent conditions could influence the decoding of sensory likelihoods 
towards the target event, producing a downwards shift in criterion.
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motion detection (and the words were unsynchronised to motion stimuli). Since the 
results showed changes in perceptual sensitivity we know that semantic information 
influenced perception at low-levels. It has been argued that perceptual learning (i.e. 
practice effects) work primarily to increase the strength of the perceptual signal and 
operate at early stages of perception (e.g. before the binocular integration of visual 
information) (Gold, Sekuler & Bennett, 2004). Therefore, if our results are due to 
perceptual learning, this is likely a product of the low-level connection between 
semantic and perceptual motion. Just as perceptual learning works to increase the 
strength of the signal, semantic information can sensitise the visual system towards 
congruent signals. Most importantly, when learning cannot take place, semantic 
information cannot be ignored and instead is integrated to the detriment of perception 
(possibly because it is sensitising perception in the ‘wrong’ direction).
In sum, it looks like semantic and perceptual motion are habitually integrated at low- 
levels of visual perception; in addition, the representation of semantic motion is 
dynamic, influencing the perception of RDK stimuli. This argues against the 
interpretation that shifts in criterion might be the cause of faster reaction times for 
previous experiments involving sentence comprehension (see above). The majority of 
these experiments manipulated the critical variables implicitly, so that participants were 
not aware of relationships between semantic and perceptual factors. As discussed 
elsewhere (see Question 3 above), reaction times can reflect both perceptual and 
decision/response processes. When issues of response congruence are removed reaction 
times can reflect changes in perceptual processes. I would like to conclude that when 
our results are combined with the previous literature, the results support a low-level 
locus for effects. Criterion shifts may be the exception rather than the rule, occurring 
when the context is robust and the appearance of the stimulus is unpredictable so 
decision processes are more open to beneficial, contextual information.
9.5.1.3. Motion perception on Comprehension
There are two experiments which have demonstrated the influence of motion perception 
on comprehension (Kaschak et al, 2005; 2006). Participants judged the sensibility of 
sentences whilst viewing a motion stimulus presented for approximately 30 seconds. 
Reaction times showed that sentence comprehension was slower when the semantic and 
perceptual motion were in the same direction (Kaschak et al, 2005). Following this,
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further experiments looked at the modality of sentence comprehension and motion 
perception (Kaschak et al, 2006). In Experiment 1, four second segments of auditory 
motion (white noise filtered to give the perception of motion) were presented whilst 
participants read sentences presented one word at a time via rapid serial visual 
presentation (RSVP). Participants heard each auditory percept 8 times whilst 
comprehending 10 sentences (therefore the percept was blocked in a similar fashion to 
Kaschak et al, 2005). Reaction times again showed slower responses during congruent 
conditions. In a second experiment the same auditory percept was used but sentences 
were also presented aurally; in this case reaction times were faster in congruent 
conditions (Experiment 2). This reversal of the congruence effect was replicated when 
both experiments were completed within subjects (Experiment 3). These results were 
explained by the overlap between semantic and perceptual stimuli and the assumption of 
limited resources. When the two are processed sequentially, congruent facilitation is 
produced; the same resources are used for both and priming occurs between the 
semantic simulation and the perceptual processing of a similar percept. In contrast, 
when the two are processed simultaneously, incongruent facilitation is produced; 
resources are consumed by one task and are therefore unavailable to the other.
Presenting the two in different modalities is equivalent to simultaneous processing and 
it produces congruent interference. Based on the assumption that comprehension is 
attentionally demanding, presenting the two in the same modality is equivalent to 
consecutive processing. Comprehension means that “participants were temporarily 
unable to process the ongoing auditory stimuli. On this view, the fact that the sentence 
and stimulus were not processed simultaneously means that there was no competition 
for resources. Instead, there was a priming effect that arose when participants processed 
a stimulus depicting motion in one direction immediately before processing a sentence 
that described motion in the same direction.” (Kaschak et al, 2006, p.742).
One experiment from this investigation found an effect of motion perception on 
comprehension (experiment 8.3). A visual lexical decision task showed that ambiguous 
motion slowed reaction times when incongruent with the target word. This experiment 
was motivated by a study which showed the suppression of irrelevant, salient motion 
stimuli whereas ambiguous motion did not initiate the same suppression (Tsushima et 
al, 2006). In line with this result we found that salient motion did not influence lexical 
decision times. In Kaschak et al’s experiments the motion stimulus (visual or auditory) 
was salient and irrelevant to the task, so it is possible that similar suppressive
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mechanisms were in operation (at least for the visual stimuli). In that case, the 
congruent interference may be a product of the salient stimulus being suppressed and it 
is this that causes problems for semantic representation (i.e. the semantic system cannot 
use these suppressed resources). When the two are presented aurally incongruent 
interference arises because the auditory stimulus is not suppressed, being processed 
along with the other auditory information (i.e. the sentence). Note that this explanation 
depends on suppressive mechanisms that benefit task execution in vision but not 
audition; this remains to be established. However, by employing this explanation, the 
results fit with what we find for the lexical decision experiment, stimuli that are 
obligatorily processed interfere with semantic information when they are incongruent 
with it. The lexical decision experiment did not show error rates or reaction times to 
support the inference that suppression caused problems for semantics, but the stimuli 
(words and motion) were presented for a short time. In Kaschak et al the blocking of 
motion stimuli means that these suppressive mechanisms may have been well 
established and constant during comprehension; thus it produced congruency effects. 
The benefit of this highly speculative interpretation is that it reconciles the results 
between all the experiments. It is difficult to apply the explanation from Kaschak et al 
to the lexical decision results since we find incongruent interference. The explanation 
that consecutive processing produces priming between perceptual and semantic 
information rests on interpreting their results as congruent facilitation, rather than 
incongruent interference. If we had found congruent facilitation it would be relatively 
simple to say that the brief motion stimulus primed semantic access in congruent 
conditions (although it was timed to coincide with semantic access it was present from 
word onset). However, since we find incongruent interference it is not clear how their 
explanation would fit this data.
Experiments that use visual presentation (e.g. a more sophisticated self-paced reading 
task and/or visual lexical decision) whilst manipulating the salience and blocking of 
visual motion are required to pull apart the different possibilities. In addition, since 
Tsushima et al (2006) implicate specific cortical areas, imaging experiments that look at 
motion processing (MT+), semantic processing (superior temporal areas) and the 
mechanisms of suppression (Dorsolateral PreFrontal Cortex) would also help to inform 
whether suppression is playing an important role when stimuli are presented 
concurrently.
326
9.5.2. What conclusions can be drawn about the
relationship between semantic and visual motion, what 
implications does this have for theories of semantic 
representation as a whole and embodied theories in particular?
Sensory and motor information was implicated in theories of semantics early on 
(Quillian, 1968) and there is gradient from those theories which propose semantics is 
amodal (Levelt, 1989), amodal but connected to modal information (Rogers et al, 2004; 
Jackendoff, 2002), supramodal (Vigliocco et al, 2004) and finally necessarily modal 
(Barsalou,, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Pulvermiiller, 1999; Zwaan, 2004; Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2003) (see Figure 9-1). The different theoretical assumptions about 
modality specific information produce different predictions: Abstract, amodal theories 
predict that there should be no interaction between semantic access and sensory-motor 
systems, since the two use distinct and separated domains. Intermediate theories 
propose that interactions can occur, depending on the task and situation, but that 
semantic representation is still possible without access to sensory-motor information. 
Embodied theories predict that sensory-motor information is a necessary part of 
semantic representation, so interactions between the two should be consistent and 
prevalent.
9-1: Schematic of where theories lie along the continuum from amodal to modal 
T yler & Moss; McRae, de Sa & Seidenberg and Smith, Shoben & Rips not included as no clear 
assertions are made
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The key findings from this investigation are as follows:
(1) There are bidirectional interactions between low-level visual processes and 
semantic content (lexical and sentential).
(2) Interactions are automatic, arising whenever linguistic and visual stimuli are 
presented in close temporal contiguity
(3) Interactions are subject to processes within the visual system such as perceptual 
learning and suppression.
(4) The precise content of semantic representations dictates which visual 
processes are implicated.
Taken together these key findings argue strongly against amodal theories and the results 
need some form of embodiment (i.e. stable connections between semantic and sensory- 
motor systems) to explain them. The implication for all theories of semantics is that 
they need to include non-arbitrary connections between the semantic representation of 
sensory or motor referents and the systems used to experience those referents. Semantic 
content affects all levels of task performance but this is not because comprehension has 
a global influence on cognition (i.e. it does not operate indirectly). Interactions between 
low-level visual processes and semantic content are always present whilst decision and 
response processes are variably affected depending on the task. Our experiments show 
that there is an automatic bidirectional connection between the semantic representation 
of motion and the perception/representation of visual motion. This suggests that 
connections between low-level sensory-motor processes and semantics are relatively 
direct and independent from strategic/decision effects. The connections are dynamic, 
rich and flexible: the content of semantic representations, for example the difference 
between the representation of motion and the representation of a concrete location, 
dictate which visual processes are implicated in interactions. Some form of 
embodiment is necessary to explain these results.
The strong prediction from embodied theories is direct engagement', semantic content 
necessarily and directly recruits the sensory and motor systems used during experience. 
Sensory and motor systems are essential for semantic representation and they are 
engaged during semantic access without being mediated by other cognitive processes. 
Interactions between the two are evidence of sensory or motor activity being modulated 
as they simulate semantic content. A weaker prediction is indirect engagement: 
semantic content requires close contact to sensory and motor systems but it is not
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dependent on those systems. Sensory and motor systems are implicated because of 
stable associative relationships between semantic representation and experience and 
they are engaged during semantic access in a task dependent manner. Interactions 
between the two are evidence of sensory or motor activity being mediated by semantic 
content. Although interactions between the two were always present, we did see task 
based differences in the interactions between semantic and visual motion. In particular, 
processes that operate on low-level visual perception (such as perceptual learning and 
suppression) dictated whether semantic information could be used to the benefit of 
perception (experiment 6.5) and whether visual information interfered with semantic 
comprehension (experiment 8.3).
The strong embodied interpretation is that the semantic representation uses directionally 
selective motion processes. When these are engaged in processing incongruent motion 
it takes longer for semantic content to be simulated ‘correctly’ or for visual motion to be 
perceived as easily. Perceptual learning is possible because the modulation of motion 
processes primes visual perception, just as a congruent visual stimulus would. 
Suppression of the visual system should modulate semantic representation and our 
experiment may not been sensitive to this (it is highly speculative whether it has been 
demonstrated elsewhere, Kaschak et al, 2005). A weak embodied interpretation is that 
semantic content activates links to directionally selective motion processes. The links 
allow semantic content to refer to visual experience and mean that to some extent 
semantic and visual information are analogous. These links are bidirectional so 
semantic and visual areas mediate the activity of the other (e.g. Rowe et al, 2005). This 
mediation is automatic and direct so it disrupts processing when the motion is 
incongruent. However, when the activity precedes stimulus onset it can prime 
perception. Suppression of activity in the visual system should not influence semantic 
processing although it should hinder the effective connection between them.
For strong embodiment, semantic and visual processes compete for the same resources. 
For weak embodiment, semantic and visual information can share a common 
representation through their stable connection and it is the integration between the two 
that produces congruency effects. The experiments which showed incongruent 
interference support the idea that semantic and visual information are obligatorily 
connected, but we did not find congruent interference (except when incongruent 
conditions also produces some interference so the two cannot be separated, e.g.
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experiments 6.3 and 7.1). Therefore, the results are not compatible with the argument 
that congruent conditions produce competition for identical resources (Kaschak et al, 
2005). In addition, the dependency of congruency effects on task based manipulations 
(e.g. perceptual learning, suppression, the linguistic context and contiguity) is more in 
line with a weak version of embodiment that would predict such variation. Taken 
together, the results support the mediation of visual processing by semantic information, 
rather than direct engagement. However, the weak prediction that congruent 
interference is the exception rather than the rule conflicts with the literature for both 
visuo-spatial attention (Richardson et al, 2003; Bergen et al, in press; Estes et al, 
submitted) and motion perception (Kaschak et al, 2005; 2006).
9.5.3. Concluding Statement
We have presented data demonstrating that (i) automatic interactions operate between 
semantic representations and low-levels of sensory processing and that (ii) different 
visual processes are influenced by specific semantic content. Sensory and motor 
information is involved in semantic representation, but this does not require simulation 
or a strong version o f embodied theory: the results we have presented can be explained 
by both strong and weak versions of embodiment. Figure 9-1 shows the region of 
interest that needs to be explored in order to separate these alternatives. In order to 
progress, embodied theories need to take into account what is known about sensory and 
motor processes; these systems have been intensively studied elsewhere and there is a 
wealth of information that can inform semantic theory. The manner in which sensory 
systems are affected by perceptual learning, suppression and other task based processes 
is a fruitful way to explore their interactions with semantics. This investigation has 
been a first step in that direction.
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Appendix la: Instructions for the Rebus Norming Procedure
Instructions
In this task you will be given sentences in the form:
‘circle’ verb ‘square’ 
or
‘circle’ verb
We want you to match each of these sentences with one of 8 picture representations of 
the event that the sentence describes. The pictures all take the form of a circle and 
square (or just a circle) and an arrow that represents the event.
For example:
o —o  o— *■
There are two axes along which the action can take place: vertical and horizontal. 
There are two directions along the axes.
A L Vertical
<
^  H orizontal
1r
Please select the pictures that you feel best represent the event described in the 
sentence, with your order of preference.
Use 1 for the most preferred picture, 2 for the next preferred and so on.
Please select a minimum of one picture for each sentence.
Write your choices in the box in the top left of each picture (please see examples
overleaf)
Please look at all the pictures before you make each of your choices.
Please take as much time as you like for each sentence.
If you do not understand the verb then please write so on the page and move on to the
next sentence. Your responses will be kept anonymous and confidential. If you have 
any questions please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter, you are free to leave at any 
point without penalty.
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‘circle’ writes  ‘square’
1"
1
1
i
i
i
1
3 i
i
i
2 I
i
o -n □ ir o «— 0 o □
o
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1
1
1
▼o
1 1 1 o
1
1
0
‘circle’ strolls
 j j
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Appendix lb: List of verbs presented for norming in intransitive and transitive rebus
sentences
Verb
ascend
bounce
climb
d ecrease
depart
depreciate
descend
diminish
drop
hang
hope
increase
inhale
move
sink______
slide
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Appendix lc: Instructions for the Single Word Norming Procedure
Instructions
In this task you will be given single words: e.g. stroll
We want you to match each of these words with any of 4 arrows that represents the 
event that the word describes.
There are two axes along which the event can take place: vertical and horizontal. There 
are two directions along each axes.
Vertical
Horizontal
Please select the arrows that you feel best represent the event described by the word, 
with your order of preference.
Use 1 for the most preferred arrow, 2 for the next preferred and so on.
Please select a minimum of one picture for each word.
Select as many arrows as you think are appropriate (maximum of 4). You do not have to 
choose all four.
Write your choices in the box in the top left of each picture (please see examples below) 
Please look at all the arrows before you make each of your choices.
Please take as much time as you like for each word.
If you do not understand the word then please write so on the word and move on to the 
next one. Your responses will be kept anonymous and confidential. If you have any 
questions please do not hesitate to ask the experimenter, you are free to leave at any 
point without penalty.
Examples:
! iy i
stroll
▼
1 ii
write
3 Il
 r
1 II
334
Appendix Id: Nonsense words used in lexical decision experiments
Non-word Non-word Non-word
ashed ninked treared
blirps pauve trieled
bloans pell trourts
blupped phim es twald
boids phlep tweighed
braifs phoasts twirque
caitch phresk twoob
chawled phrim pse twosts
cheel phrirl vacts
chirm s phriths varred
chirts phruth veed
cleiced phurp vorl
cleige phutched w hoats
cliel plauce yaide
clurped plird yoans
coost plom yoards
dem ps plymed yutt
dilge prouns
dirm quirts
drim es rhelts
droafed scrot
fralled sculps
freeped shrals
fryst sket
g h eed s skiest
ghirch sm oached
glead sm uck
glends snawi
giooks sparch
gonds splabe
grarked splirmed
grold spriece
him es sproal
janced sprork
kafed stelk
kelm stimb
kessed swaive
knades swerd
iailed sw oarse
leezed theint
loff threbbs
loked thun
lorn trafe
Appendix le: Nonsense sentences used in sensibility judgments
Nonsense Sentence Nonsense Sentence
the actor exited the tenan ts the puppy retrieved bus-stops
the architect created  a  spoonful the queen approved of the eyelash
the artist sculpted a  w eather the restaurant provided the blush
the author wrote another moon the rope fastened to the dream
the baby grabbed the sm oke the runner com peted in the cake
the bailiff evicted stage  left the ship endured a child
the bank invested in the grin the show am used  the light bulb
the box-office held on the hillside the siren warned us the gift
the boy received the elbows the stereo  ejected the giraffe
the bride married the bet the surgeon prepared the lawnmower
the captain punished the candle the tanks withdrew from the brat
the chef baked a  phone the teach er confiscated audience
the chem icals reacted  with knee the team  explored in a  glove
the clerk organised pig the tutor instructed the bush
the committee suggested  a  duck the war destroyed the ant
the council acquired the cloud the wom an accep ted  of danger
the couple adopted the storm the wom an decorated  in mice
the court com pensated the bicycle
the doctor injected the traffic
the family inherited in the garden
the fireman breathed in the toy
the girl learned from the eye
the grandm other sa t in the idea
the group celebrated the com m a
the group enjoyed the ea r
the house rested the tickets
the hypnotist m esm erized the m agazine
the instructions explained all month
the kidnappers th reatened  the bark
the laughter infected the jam -jar
the library lent the breakfast
the lorry blocked the insulin
the m ake-up transform ed the canyon
the m an argued with the door
the m other spoke the traitor
the noise alarm ed to his health
the officer suspended  the bash
the party drank the dog
the patient coughed the boxer
the photograph disappointed the carve
the pond stagnated  a  fortune
the program installed the chicken
the pupil borrowed the elephants
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Filler Word Associated
Target
Unassociated
Target
Filler Word Associated
Target
Unassociated
Target
add m aths bank react respond minus
ag ree compatible wood receive gift germ
am aze wonder change record album key
analyse inspect flower reduce shrink birthday
argue debate w ash refuse deny build
ask question change remind rem em ber puzzle
bake oven advise separa te apart lesson
balloon g as rem ove sit chair gift
bathe wash plan subtract minus funny
blossom flower rem em ber suggest advise deny
bring carry say teach lesson crime
carve wood memory tell say calculate
celebrate birthday recom m end transform change essay
com pute calculate oven unlock key debate
confuse puzzle chair withdraw rem ove compatible
connect join describe worship god apart
consider think boot write essay wedding
construct build borrow Appendix If: Filler words and targets used
convict crime create for active comprehension questions.
delete e rase adventure
deliver package question
destroy dam age secure
disappoint let-down breathe
em barrass blush m aths
enjoy fun give
explain describe shrink
explore adventure god
fasten secure dam age
forget memory carry
frighten afraid wonder
illustrate draw bark
infect germ knowledge
inspect exam ine join
invent create insult
invest bank fun
learn knowledge let-down
lend borrow blush
marry wedding fake
obey com m and exam ine
offend insult afraid
organise plan e rase
pretend fake discipline
provide give inspect
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Appendix lg: Filler sentences and questions used in active comprehension experiments
Filler Sentence Question with negative response
The motorists abandoned their cars the motorists abandon their lorries
The wom an accep ted  the gift the wom an return the gift
The couple adopted a  child the couple adopt a dog
The noise alarm ed the dog the noise alarm the cattle
The king banished the traitor the king banish the prince
The lorry blocked the traffic the lorry block the drive-way
The firemen breathed in the sm oke the firemen breathe in the chem icals
The teach er confiscated the m agazine the teach er confiscate the bubble-gum
The patient coughed all night the doctor cough all night
The girl craved chocolate cake the girl hate  chocolate cake
The prisoner denied the charges the prisoner accept the charges
The m an deserted  his wife the m an desert his job
The party drank to his health the party drink until dawn
The ship endured the storm the ship sink in the storm
The bailiff evicted the tenants the bailiff collect the money
The actor exited stage  left the actor exit stage right
The student feared failure the student fear spiders
The army fled the battle the army charge into battle
The baby grabbed the toy the baby grab the food
The box-office held the tickets the box-office loose the tickets
The family inherited a  fortune the family inherit nothing
The doctor injected the insulin the nurse inject the insulin
The hypnotist m esm erised his audience the hypnotist m esm erise himself
The sportsm en obeyed the rules the sportsm en disobey the rules
The drunk m an offended his friends the drunk m an offend the lady
The boy promised to be good the boy promise to brush his teeth
The jeering provoked the boxer the jeering em barrass the boxer
The man regretted his behaviour the m an regret his haircut
The house rested on the hillside the house rest on the river-bank
The criminal robbed the bank the criminal rob the jew elers
The ghost scared  the children the ghost scare  the vam pire
The superm arket sold groceries the superm arket sell clothes
The m other spoke to her child the m other speak  to her friend
The pond stagnated  in the garden the pond stagnate in the field
The cat stayed indoors in winter the cat stay by the fire
The politician thanked his supporters the politician thank his party
The fish tugged at the line the fish swim into the net
The siren warned us of danger the child warn us of danger
The film delighted the critics the film disappoint the critics
The house depreciated in value the house go up in value
The situation deteriorated quickly the m an 's health deteriorate quickly
The crowd honored the athlete the crowd cheer for the athlete
The m en mined for diam onds the m en mine for gold
The student rejoiced at her results the student cry a t her results
The fans worshipped the pop-star the fans hassle  the pop-star
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Appendix 2: Signal Detection Theory
This section provides a brief summary of signal detection theory and the calculations 
used in the present investigation. The information for this section was primarily taken 
from Wickens (2002), Stanislaw & Todorov (1999) and Gold, Sekuler & Bennett 
(2004). Graphs are adapted from Wickens (2002) unless otherwise stated.
Signal detection theory is used to explain how observers detect an event. It is based on 
the assumption that psychological (internal) responses are variable, so that a particular 
stimulus event has some probability of producing a particular internal response. This is 
in contrast to an ideal observer, for whom identical signal events will produce identical 
internal responses.
The probabilistic nature of detection is due to the fact that there is both internal and 
external noise, therefore a pure signal is never perceived. It is the internal noise that 
makes our observer non-optimal, since it means that identical external information will 
produce different internal responses. Thus, a particular signal event produces a 
distribution of internal responses as do non-signal (noise) events. The internal state of 
the observer is characterised by two distributions, one for the signal events and one for 
the noise events. Figure App2-1 presents the graphical illustration of signal and noise 
distributions.
Figure App2-2: Probability distributions for (a) a noise event and (b) a signal event.
The horizontal axis represents the internal evidence for a particular event, the x is an 
observation that could have come from either the signal or noise distributions.
Noise only
>
Signal + Noise
>
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In order to detect a particular signal event, the observer compares it to an internal 
criterion. If the event information exceeds the criterion, it is judged to be a signal. If 
the signal information falls below the criterion, it is judged to be noise (i.e. a non-signal 
event). The internal criterion is the level of evidence which acts as the decision 
threshold around which decisions are made. When the signal and noise distributions are 
both represented on the same axis (even though they are separate) along with some 
criterion value, the typical signal detection graph is produced, see Figure App2-2.
Three assumptions are made in order to extract useful measures from this model: first, 
the signal and noise distributions are Gaussian (normal); second, the noise distribution 
is given a p = 0 and a a = 1; third, the signal and noise distributions have equal 
variance. It is beyond the scope of this summary to detail why these assumptions are 
made, but they are necessary for useful parameter estimates (measures) to be made.
Figure App2-2: Signal and noise distributions from Figure App2-1 on a single axis, with 
a criterion at A,
If a particular event exceeds the criterion the observer will judge that it was a signal and 
response YES, if the event falls below the criterion the observer will respond NO, that 
the event was not a signal. In this graph the two distributions have the same variance; 
the equal-variance SDT model assumes equal variance in order to calculate measures of 
sensitivity and criterion (Wickens, 2002).
Say NO S ay YES
Noise Signal
The strength of the signal information is given by the separation between the signal and 
noise distributions, being dependent on their position and distributions. The observer’s 
sensitivity, which depends on the internal strength of the signal, is given by the ratio of 
the signal (the distance between the two distributions) to the noise (the standard 
deviation of the distributions). A stronger signal will mean that the signal distribution is 
shifted to the right, decreasing the overlap between the two distributions. The measure
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of sensitivity, d’, describes the relationship of the signal and noise distributions to each 
other. If the value is close to 0, then the distributions overlap a great deal and there is 
little separation between the two, when the value is large the two distributions are well 
separated and the signal can easily be detected. The overlap between the distributions is 
independent from the level of the criterion (X) which can be set at any point along the 
axis and reflects the observer’s strategy. The higher the criterion, the more conservative 
the decision and the more likely the observer is to respond NO (since fewer events are 
judged to be signal); the lower the criterion, the more lenient the decision and the more 
likely the observer is to respond YES (as more events are judged to be signal). This is 
the real elegance of SDT, separating decision processes (criterion setting) from signal 
processing (sensitivity). There is one measure of sensitivity (d’) and two measures of 
criterion (c and P).
Figure App2-3: The measures d’. c and Beta as they relate to the signal and noise
distributions and the criterion X
(Taken and adapted from Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999)
d ’
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Decision variable
Figure App2-3 presents the three measures and their relation to the signal and noise 
distributions. As a measure of sensitivity, d’ represents the distance between the centre 
of the signal and noise distributions, the larger the value, the greater the strength of the 
signal relative to the internal noise. Measures of criterion take two forms: c represents 
the distance of the criterion from the neutral point where the signal and noise 
distributions cross over (so there is an equal probability of both); values of c greater 
than 0 mean the criterion is above the neutral point and there is a bias to respond NO,
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values of c less than 0 mean the criterion is below the neutral point and there is a bias to 
respond YES. P is the ratio of the signal likelihood (the probability of a hit given some 
X) to the noise likelihood (the probability of a false alarm given some values less 
than 1 indicate a bias to respond YES since the criterion is set lower, values more than 1 
indicate a bias to respond NO since the criterion is set higher. Note that p is affected by 
changes in d’ (i.e. the overlap between the distributions) whereas c is not.
Table App2-1: Response Types in a 2-altemative forced choice detection task
Event ResYES
Donse
NO
SIGNAL HIT MISS
NOISE FALSE ALARM CORRECTREJECTION
Figure App2-4: Four types of response as they relate to the signal and noise 
distributions and criterion
Say NO Say YES
Noise Signal
HITMISS
Noise Signal
CORRECT REJECTION FALSE ALARM
In order to calculate measures of sensitivity (d’) and criterion X (c and p), two response 
types are used. These are summarised in Table App2-1 and Figure App2-3; in a task
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where the signal is either present or absent and the response to be made is YES (signal 
present) or NO (signal absent), four response conditions are possible. A HIT occurs 
when the signal is present and the response is YES; a FALSE ALARM (FA) occurs 
when the signal is absent and the response is YES; a MISS occurs when the signal is 
present and the response is NO and a CORRECT REJECTION occurs when the signal 
is absent and the response is NO. The frequencies of HIT and FA responses are 
converted to percentages and then z-scores so that they correspond to the areas in a 
Gaussian distribution (like the shaded areas in Figure
App2-4). The HIT rate, z(h), then gives the percentage of the signal distribution that 
falls above the criterion X and the FA rate, z(fa), gives the percentage of the noise 
distribution that falls above the criterion X. Since these values can be interpreted using 
Gaussian distributions, the centre of the signal and noise distributions can be inferred.
To calculate d’, the z-score of the false alarm rate is subtracted from the z-score of the 
hit rate:
d’ = z(h) -  z(fa)
To calculate c, the average of the z-score for hits and false alarms is found and then 
multiplied by negative one:
c = - ( z(h) + z(fa) ) / 2
To calculate the natural logarithm of p, the square of the z-score for the hit rate is 
subtracted from the square of the z-score for the false alarm rate and the total is divided 
by two. To reach p this value is then used as the exponent for the base of the natural 
logarithm e (so if this value is 0 then the result will be 1, indicating no bias).
p = exp ( (z(fa)A2 -  z(h) A2) / 2)
These are the calculations that were used in the present investigation. It is beyond the 
scope of this summary to detail how the calculations are derived, but it is hoped that 
enough information was provided so that the measures can be sensibly interpreted. For 
detailed discussion of these calculations see Stanislaw & Todorov (1999) and Wickens 
(2002).
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Appendix 3: Attempted replication and extension of Kaschak et al (2005)
Blocked perception of motion on 
single word and sentence comprehension
These two experiments adapted the procedure used by Kaschak et al (2005).
Participants were presented with single words for lexical decision (a) or sentences for 
sensibility judgements (b). They judged the linguistic stimuli in blocks during which 
they viewed a 30 second animation of black and white lines moving upwards or 
downwards. In line with the results from Kaschak et al (2005) the hypothesis is that 
when the semantic and visual motion are congruent, participants will be slower to judge 
the words or sentences; this is in comparison to the condition in which semantic and 
visual motion are congruent, and should also be the case in comparison to the control 
condition. This should be the case for sentences (as for Kashcak et al, 2005) and should 
also extend to single words (based on the assumption that semantic representations are 
accessed during auditory lexical decision and that they are analogous to the semantic 
representation of sentences).
There was a two list design in Expeirment lb as the experiment was completed at the 
Science Museum, therefore it needed to be short enough for visitors to the museum to 
complete without inconvenience to their visit.
Participants
a) 30 Native English speakers took part (22 female), the mean age was 21.8 years (SD = 
4.6 years).
b) 66 Native English speakers took part (33 female), 35 completed List 1 and 31 
completed List 2. The mean age was 35.6 years (standard deviation = 10.4 years).
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Method
Design
a) A 3x2 repeated measures design was used. The independent variables were Word 
Category (Control, Up, Down) and Motion Direction (upwards, downwards). The 
dependent variable was the reaction time (ms) to complete and errors made in the 
lexical decision. There were a total of 12 blocks, half with the lines moving upwards 
and half with the lines moving downwards; line motion was alternated between 
successive blocks. Each of the blocks contained 18 trials composed of 9 experimental 
and 9 nonsense words. The order of presentation of the words within blocks was fully 
randomised.
b) A 2x3x2 mixed design was used. The independent variables were Experimental List 
(1,2), manipulated between subjects, Sentence Category (Control, Up, Down) and 
Motion Direction (upwards, downwards) manipulated within subjects. The dependent 
variable was the reaction time (ms) and errors for the sentence judgement.
There were a total of 6 blocks, alternating between upwards and downwards motion. 
Each of the blocks contained 9 trials composed of 7 expeirmental and 2 nonsense 
sentences. The order of presentation of the sentences within blocks was fully 
randomised.
Materials
a) Item Set One Single Words was used. 54 nonsense words were selected from the set 
created for this purpose. The items were sorted into two lists, so that each word 
appeared twice, once with upwards line motion and once with downwards line motion. 
First, items were quasi-randomly sorted into 6 lists (one for each presentation block), so 
that each contained 9 nonsense words and 9 experimental words split equally between 
the three groups (Control, Down, Up). These lists comprised the first presentation of 
each item. The items were then quasi-randomly resorted into 6 other lists of the same 
composition; these comprised the second presentation of each sentence. Thus, across 
the two presentations items were randomly re-sorted so that the experimental items 
appeared with different accompanying items in the two presentation blocks they
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appeared in. This was done to further randomise presentation order and prevent 
expectations arising due to consistent block items.
b) Item Set One Sentences was used. Two sentences were randomly removed from 
each condition (Control, Up, Down) to further shorten the length of the lists. Therefore 
there were 14 sentences in each category. 12 nonsense sentences were selected from the 
set created for this purpose. The experimental and nonsense items were randomly 
assigned to two lists so that each contained 7 Up, 7 Down, 7 Control and 6 nonsense 
sentences. Lists were organised so that each sentence appeared twice, once with 
upwards and once with downwards motion. Within each list, items were quasi- 
randomly sorted into three lists, so that each contained 2 nonsense sentences and 7 
experimental sentence split as equally as possible between the three groups (3 from two 
groups and 2 from one group). These lists comprised the first presentation of each 
sentence. The items were then quasi-randomly resorted into three other lists of the same 
composition, these comprised the second presentation of each sentence.
Graphic Display
The screen displayed black and white lines moving up or down the screen. This was 
accomplished by presented a series of 8 bitmap files successively to create an animation 
of line motion. The display filled the 640 x 480 pixel screen. Black horizontal bars 
subtended 0.17° of visual angle separated by horizontal white bars subtending 0.34°; 
each image was presented for 68ms and the lines moved at approximately 7.57s. There 
was a red fixation cross constantly presented in the centre of the screen (courier font, 
18pt, bold).
Apparatus
The experiment was run using PC computers (Intel Pentium II) using E-Prime 1.0 
Software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). A standard CRT monitor was 
used with a refresh rate of 60 Hz. A pair of Beyer Dynamic DT 100 headphones (2 
x400 D ) were used. Participants responded using standard ‘qwertyuiop’ keyboards. 
Chin rests were also used to minimise head movements, these were placed at a distance 
of 57cm from the computer screen.
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Procedure
a) Participants were instructed to judge whether or not the words they heard had a 
meaning and were real words in English. They were instructed to press the smiley face 
if the word had a meaning and the frowning face if it did not. Stickers with a smiling 
and frowning face were placed on the L and A keys and balanced across participants. 
They were asked to focus on the red fixation cross in the centre of the screen whilst they 
were judging the words and to rest their eyes between blocks.
Participants completed 10 practice trials, 5 of which were non-words. In each block the 
motion animation was constant for 32.4 seconds. Individual words were played with an 
SOA of 1.8 seconds. At the end of each block, a grey screen was displayed for 10 
seconds and participants were instructed to rest their eyes.
b) The procedure was identical to 8.1a except that instructions were modified for 
judging the sensibility of sentences. Participants were instructed to press the smiley 
face if the sentence made sense and the frowny face if it did not. They completed 10 
practice trials, 4 of which were nonsense sentences. In each block sentences were 
played with an SOA of 3.7 seconds and the motion animation lasted 33.7 seconds.
Analysis
a) For each participant, trials on which the word had been judged incorrectly were 
removed and analysed separately as errors. Reaction times were measured from word 
onset so the length of each word was subtracted from the reaction time from to get the 
reaction time relative to word offset (giving an RT of 0 for a response at word offset). 
Reaction times below -500 milliseconds and above 1000 milliseconds were excluded, 
removing 2.67% of the data.
b) Trials on which the sentence had been judged incorrectly were removed and analysed 
separately as errors. Reaction times were calculated in the same manner as for 
Experiment a. Following this, reaction times below -300 milliseconds and above 
1200milliseconds were excluded, removing 2.1% of the data overall (2.8% from List 1 
and 1.3% from List 2).
Experimental conditions were collapsed into Control, Match and Mismatch conditions 
and analysed with 8.1a) 3x2 repeated measures ANOVA by Subjects and 3x2 mixed
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effects ANOVA by Items; 8. lb) A 2x3x2 mixed effects ANOVA by Subjects. Follow 
up 3x2 repeated measures ANOVAs were used to compare conditions within each List. 
A by items analysis was not performed as within each list there were only 7 items per 
condition. We judged this was too few to see any reliable effects.
Results
Reaction Times
a) There was a main effect of Word Category (FI (2,58) = 13.411, peta = 0.316;
F2(2,51) < 1.1), driven by significant differences between the Control condition and the 
Match (FI(1,29) = 20.638, peta = 0.416; F2(l,34) < 1.6 ) and Mismatch (Fl(l,29) = 
13.913, peta = 0.324; F2(l,34) = 1.2) conditions. The Control condition was 40ms 
slower than the Match condition and 33ms slower than the Mismatch condition. See 
Table App-3 and Figure App-3a.
b) Across both lists, there was a significant main effect of Motion direction (F(l,64) = 
12.995, peta = 0.169), with Downwards motion 33.61ms faster than Upwards motion. 
There was also a marginal interaction between Motion Direction and List (F(l,64) = 
3.575, p = 0.063, peta = 0.053). In List 1 the main effect of motion was not significant 
(F < 1.2) whereas in List 2 the main effect of motion was significant (F(l,29) = 21.787, 
peta = 0.429). There was also a significant interaction between Sentence Category and 
List (F(2,128) = 12.979, peta = 0.169). For List 1, the main effect of Sentence Category 
was significant (F(2,68) = 3.972, peta = 0.105) with the Control reaction times 29ms 
longer than Match (F(l,34) = 4.560, peta = 0.118) and 33ms longer than Mismatch 
(F(l,34) = 7.585, peta = 0.182) conditions. For List 2 the main effect of Sentence 
Category was also significant (F(2,58) = 7.716, peta = 0.210), however here the Control 
reaction times were 56ms shorter than Match (F(l,30) = 13.862, peta = 0.316) and 57ms 
shorter than Mismatch (F(l,30) = 15.316, peta = 0.338) conditions.
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Figure App-3: Reaction Times to judge stimuli for (a) Lexical Decision 
and (to Sentence sensibility (bv List)
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Finally, the 3 way interaction between List, Sentence Category and Motion Direction 
was significant (F(2,128) = 5.566, peta = 0.080). There was a significant interaction 
between Sentence Category and Motion direction for List 2 (F(2,58) = 5.507. peta =
0.160) but not for List 1 (F < 1.9). For List 2, there were interactions when the Match 
condition was compared to the Mismatch (F(l,30) = 6.255, peta = 0.173) and Control 
(F(l,30) = 11.441, peta = 0.276) conditions. For the Match condition in List 2 Upwards
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motion was slower than Downwards motion by 93.4 ms, but for the Mismatch and 
Control conditions Downwards motion was faster than Upwards motion by 26.8ms 
31.9ms respectively. Figure App-3b illustrates the different patterns in reaction times 
across List 1 and 2 for each Sentence Category and Motion Direction (see also Table 
App-3).
Errors
a) Friedman tests compared the errors for each condition. There was a trend by 
Subjects for more errors in the Control condition (mean = 2.14) compared to the Match 
(mean = 1.52) and Mismatch (mean = 1.76) conditions (X21 = 5.396, df = 2, p = 0.067; 
X22 < 1; by Items Mann Whitney Test, all z < 1).
b) No significant differences were found.
Table App-3: Mean response times for Lexical Decision in Experiment 8.1a and 8.2a
(Standard deviation in brackets)
Experiment Condition
Control Match Mismatch
Downwards Upwards Downwards Upwards Downwards Upwards
Exp 8.1a 
Blocked line 
motion
298.67
(117.88)
294.17
(103.04)
260.27
(111.11)
251.85
(110.35)
255.06
(108.49)
272.34
(117.23)
Mean 296.42 (109.79)* 256.06 (109.87) 263.70(112.32)
Exp 8.2a 
Trial dot 
motion
417.80 399.29 394.59 353.54 376.91 404.08
(94.09) (113.41) (86.81) (103.67) (119.34) (103.29)
Mean 408.54 (103.76)* 374.07(97.06) 390.50 (111.53)
* Significantly different to other two conditions, p<0.05
29 When each List was analysed in a 3x2 ANOVA with Word Category (Control, Up, Down) and Motion 
Direction (Downwards, Upwards), List 1 showed a main effect of Word Category (F(2,68) = 3.972, 
peta = 0.105), with reaction times for Control sentences a mean of 31ms longer than Down and Up 
sentences. List 2 also showed a main effect of Word Category (F(2,60) = 15.686, peta = 0.343), with 
all Word Categories significantly different from each other. Shortest reaction times were present for 
Control (231.545), then Down (275.932) sentences with longest times for Up sentences (305.353). 
When collapsed into Match and Mismatch conditions, this produces the interaction seen above for List 
2 .
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Discussion
Reaction times for the lexical decision showed significant differences between the 
Control words (which do not refer to motion) and directional words (congruent or 
incongruent to the direction of visual motion). Participants took more time (and had a 
tendency to make more errors) on Control words as compared to Down and Up words, 
regardless of the visual motion direction. It is possible that motion words were 
generally easier to comprehend in the presence of visual motion, whereas non- 
directional words were not. Under this explanation, the visual motion primes semantic 
access for motion words because motion processing is already active so accessing 
semantic motion information is easier (if the two are grounded in the same system). 
However, if this is the case then it is not clear why congruence between semantic and 
visual motion would not make a further difference to reaction times. For example, in 
line with Kaschak et al (2005), we could expect congruent conditions to have longer 
reaction times as semantic and visual motion compete for the same directionally 
selective resources. There are a number of reasons that could contribute to this lack of 
congruency effects. First, it is possible that uncontrolled for lexical variables separate 
the Control from the Down and Up words. These groups were matched on frequency 
and length only. If the Control words are more familiar, more concrete or have smaller 
phonological neighbourhoods, reaction times to make lexical decision would be faster 
as compared to the Down and Up words. Second, the directional words were comprised 
of both concrete (e.g. rise) and abstract (e.g. hope) items. The more abstract items may 
increase the variance in response times and may not even be influenced by visual 
motion; therefore any effects of congruence are too weak to show through in reaction 
times.
Similar patterns were found for sentence judgements, with Control sentences behaving 
differently to the directional sentences regardless of congruence; however, the two Lists 
showed this pattern in opposite directions. For List 1, the Control sentences took longer 
to judge than Down or Up sentences. For List 2, Control sentences were judged more 
quickly than Down sentences, which were also judged more quickly than Up sentences 
(therefore showing a general difference between the Down and Up sentences as well as 
the difference to Control sentences). No effect of congruence was found so the results 
from Kaschak et al (2005) have not been replicated and the hypothesis is not supported. 
As for the single words, uncontrolled lexical/sentential differences between Sentence
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Categories could have produced the different reaction times (e.g. concrete and abstract 
events and familiarity with subject, verb and object combinations). This is particularly 
likely as the two Lists showed opposite patterns between the Control and directional 
sentences. For example, in List 1 Control sentences may have been harder to 
comprehend than directional sentences (because of the particular combination of 
subject, verb and object) whereas the opposite may have been true for List 2. In 
addition, in List 2 Down sentences were responded to significantly faster than Up 
sentences, lending more weight to the argument that Control, Down and Up sentences 
differed in ways that affected their ease of comprehension. Thus, the difference in 
reaction time patterns between Lists means that no inferences can be made about the 
influence of motion direction on comprehension. In addition, it makes similar 
inferences unreliable for the single word data. Aside from the lack of congruency 
effects, Experiment 8.1b did show a significant main effect of motion direction, with 
responses faster for downwards motion as compared to upwards motion. This is in line 
with results from Chapter 6 and 7 in which differences between downwards and 
upwards motion are seen, such that downwards motion is more easy to perceive. Here, 
we see that upwards motion was more interfering across the experiment than 
downwards motion, further supporting the increased difficulty in viewing/perceiving 
upwards motion. In fact, some participants did report that the upwards motion made 
them feel slightly disorientated. A second problem with blocked perception of visual 
motion is the Motion After Effect (MAE) in which prolonged viewing of one direction 
of visual motion (30 seconds and over) leads to illusory motion in the opposite direction 
when the visual stimulus is removed. As noted by Kaschak et al (2005), black and 
white line motion animations were of a long enough duration and high enough contrast 
to produce the MAE. Although we did not find any effect of congruence, so inferences 
about the influence of visual or MAE motion on comprehension are void, it is possible 
that the MAE discouraged participants to fixate properly. For both experiments it is 
possible that participants did not fixate on the motion animation (either by averting their 
gaze or closing their eyes), thereby negating the key manipulation. Participants did 
place their chin on a chin rest to control head movements and encourage fixation; in 
addition enforced breaks of 10 seconds were introduced so that fixation was maintained 
during each block. However, it is still possible that participants did not consistently 
fixate. This is especially true in the less controlled environment of the Science 
Museum, where participants could not be closely monitored.
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These experiments failed to replicate and extend the original findings. This is most 
likely due to uncontrolled differences between linguistic items in each condition and 
prolonged viewing of strong visual motion that may have discouraged fixation. 
Therefore, Experiments 8.1a/b in Chapter 8 used different sets of linguistic stimuli (see 
Chapter 4) and presented motion on a trial by trial basis, rather than in blocks.
353
Aziz-Zadeh, L., Wilson, S. M., Rizzolatti, G., & Iacoboni, M. (2006). Congruent Embodied Representations for 
Visually Presented Actions and Linguistic Phrases Describing Actions. Current Biology, 16, 1818-1823.
Baayen, R. H., Piepenbrock, R., & Gulikers, L. (1995). The CELEX Lexical Database [CD-ROM]
Baddeley, A. (1999). Knowledge (Ch. 13) in Human Memory: Theory and Practice (Revised Edition) (pp. 229-255). 
Hove, UK.: Psychology Press.
Barsalou, L. W. (1999). Perceptual symbol systems. Brain and Behavioural Sciences, 22, 577-660.
Barsalou, L. W., Kyle Simmons, W., Barbey, A. K., & Wilson, C. D. (2003). Grounding conceptual knowledge in 
modality-specific systems. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (2), 84-91.
Beckers, G., & Zeld, S. (1995). The consequences of inactivating areas VI and V5 on visual motion perception.
Brain, 118,49-60.
Beilock, S. L., & Holt, L. E. (2007). Embodied Preference Judgements: Can Likeability Be Driven by the Motor 
System? Psychological Science, 18(1), 51-57.
Bergen, B. K., Lindsay, S., Matlock, T., & Narayanan, S. (2007). Spatial and linguistic aspects of visual imagery in 
sentence comprehension. Cognitive Science 31 (5), 733-764
Blake, R., Sekuler, R., & Grossman, E. (2004). Motion processing in the human visual cortex. In J. H. Kaas & C. E. 
Collins (Eds.), The primate visual system (pp. 311-344). Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press.
Blaser, E., Sperling, G., & Lu, Z.-L. (1999). Measuring the amplification of attention. Proceedings o f  the National 
Academy o f  Sciences, 96, 11681-11686.
Bock, K., & Griffin, Z. M. (2000). Producing words: How mind meets mouth. In L. Wheeldon (Ed.), Aspects o f 
language production (pp. 7-47). Hove, UK.: Psychology Press.
Borghi, A. M., Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2004). Putting words in perspective. Memory & Cognition, 32(6), 
863-873.
Boroditsky, L. (2000) Metaphoric structuring: understanding time through spatial metaphors. Cognition 75, 1-28.
Boroditsky, L. (2001) Does Language Shape Thought?: Mandarin and English Speakers’ Conceptions of Time. 
Cognitive Psychology A7>, 1-22.
Borreggine, K. L., & Kaschak, M. P. (2006). The Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect: It's All in the Timing. 
Cognitive Science, 30, 1097-1112.
Bosbach, S., Prinz, W., & Kerzel, D. (2004). A Simon Effect With Stationary Moving Stimuli. Journal o f  
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 30(1), 39-55.
Boulenger, V., Roy, A. C., Paulignan, Y., Deprez, V., Jeannerod, M., & Nazir, T. A. (2006). Cross-talk between 
Language Processes and Overt Motor Behaviour in the First 200msec of Processing. Journal o f  Cognitive 
Neuroscience, 18(10), 1607-1615.
Braddick, O. (1973). The masking of apparent motion in random-dot patterns. Vision Research, 13 (2), 355-369.
Braddick, O. (1980). Low-level and high-level processes in apparent motion. Philosophical Transactions o f  the Royal 
Society o f  London B Biological Sciences, 290 (1038), 137-151.
Britten, K. H., Shadlen, M. N., Newsome, W. T., & Movshon, J. A. (1993). Response of neurons in macaque MT to 
stochastic motion signals. Visual Neuroscience, 10(6), 1157-1169.
Buccino, G., RIggio, L., Melli, G., Binkofski, F., Gallese, V., & Rizzolatti, G. (2005). Listening to action-related 
sentences modulates the activity o f the motor system: A combined TMS and behavioural study. Cognitive Brain 
Research, 24, 355-363.
Chambers, C. G., Tanenhaus, M. K., Eberhard, K. M., Filip, H., & Carlson, G. N. (2002). Circumscribing Referential 
Domains during Real-Time Language Comprehension. Journal o f  Memory and Language, Al, 30-49.
Chambers, C. G., Tanenhaus, M. K., & Madden, C. J. (2004). Actions and Affordances in Syntactic Ambiguity 
Resolution. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 30(3), 687-696.
Chao, L. L., Haxby, J. V., & Martin, A. (1999). Attribute-based neural substrates in temporal cortex for perceiving 
and knowing about objects. Nature Neuroscience, 2(913-919).
354
Chao, L. L., & Martin, A. (2000). Representation of Manipulable Man-Made Objects in the Dorsal Stream. 
Neuroimage, 12,478-484.
Chater, N., & Vitanyi, P. (2003). Simplicity: a unifying principle in cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
7(1), 19-22.
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects o f  the Theory o f  Syn/ax.Cambridge, USA.: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (paperback (1998) ed.). London, UK.: 
MIT Press.
Clark, A. (1999). An embodied cognitive science? Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3(9), 345.
Clark, A., Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (1998). Embodied, situated, and distributed cognition. In A companion to 
cognitive science (pp. 506). Malden, MA.: Blackwell.
Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A Spreading-Activation Theory of Semantic Processing. Psychological 
Review, 82(6), 407-428.
Coltheart, M. (1981). The MRC Psycholinguistic Database. Quarterly Journal o f  Experimental Psychology, 33 A,
497.
Connell, L. (2006). Representing object colour in language comprehension. Cognition, 102(3), 476-485.
Dahan, D., & Tanenhaus, M. K. (2005). Looking at the rope when looking for the snake: Conceptually mediated eye 
movements dining spoken-word recognition. Psychonomic bulletin and review, 12(3), 453-459.
Damasio, H., Grabowski, T. J., Tranel, D., Ponto, L. L. B., Hichwa, R. D., & Damasio, A. R. (2001). Neural 
Correlates of Naming Actions and o f Naming Spatial Relations. Neuroimage, 13, 1053-1064.
Damasio, H., Tranel, D., Grabowski, T. J., Adolphs, R., & Damasio, A. R. (2004). Neural Systems behind word and 
concept retrieval. Cognition, 92, 179-229.
Eckstein, M.P., Beutter, B.R, Pham, B.T., Shimozaki, S.S. & Stone, L.S. (2007) Similar neural representations of the 
target for saccades and perception during search. Journal o f  Neuroscience, 27(15), 3935-3936.
Elman, J. L. (2004). An alternative view o f the mental lexicon. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(7), 301-306.
Eriksen, B.A. & Eriksen, C.W. (1974) Effects o f noise letters upon the identification of a target letter in a non-search 
task. Perception and Psychophysics 16, 143-149.
Estes, Z., Verges, M., & Barsalou, L. W. (in press) Head up, foot down: Object words orient attention to their typical 
location. Psychological Science.
Farah, M. J., & McClelland, J. L. (1991). A Computational Model of Semantic Impariment: Modality Specificity and 
Emergent Category Specificity. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: General, 120(4), 339-357.
Fincher-Kiefer, R. (2001). Perceptual components o f situation models. Memory & Cognition, 29(2), 336-343.
Fischer, M. H., & Zwaan, R. (in press). Embodied Language - A Review of the Role of the Motor System In 
Language Comprehension. Quarterly Journal o f  Experimental Psychology.
Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity o f  Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology. London: MIT Press.
Fodor, J. A. (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem o f  Meaning in the Philosophy o f  Mind. London: MIT Press.
Forster, K. I., & Forster, J. C. (2003). DMDX: A Windows display program with millisecond accuracy. Behavior 
Research Methods, Instruments & Computers, 35, 116.
Frith, C. (2007). Making up the mind: How the Brain Creates our Mental World. Oxford, UK.: Blackwell.
Gallese, V., & Lakoff, G. (2005). The brain's concepts: The role of the sensory-motor system in conceptual 
knowledge. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3/4), 455.
Garrett, M. F. (1975) The Analysis o f Sentence Production. In G. H. Gower (Ed) The Psychology o f  Learning and 
Motivation, Volume 9. Academic Press, N ew  York.
Gerlach, C., Law, I., & Paulson, O. B- (2002). When Action Turns to Words. Activation of Motor-Based Knowledge 
during Categorisation of Manipulable Objects. Journal o f  Cognitive Neuroscience, 14(8), 1230-1239.
355
Gibson, J. J. (1986). The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception. Hillsdale, NJ, USA.: Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates.
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., & Ivry, R. B. (2006). Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right visual field but 
not the left. Proceedings o f the National Academy o f  Sciences, 103(2), 489-494.
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., & Ivry, R. B. (in press 2007). Support for lateralization of the Whorf effect beyond 
the realm of color discrimination. Brain and Language.
Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2002). Grounding language in action. Psychonomic bulletin and review, 3(9), 
558-565.
Glenberg, A. M., & Kaschak, M. P. (2003). The body's contribution to language. In B.H.Ross (Ed.), The Psychology 
o f  Learning and Motivation (Vol. 43, pp. 93-126). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Glenberg, A. M., & Robertson, D. A. (2000). Symbol Grounding and Meaning: A Comparison of High-Dimensional 
and Embodied Theories of Meaning. Journal o f  Memory and Language, 43, 379-401.
Gold, J. M., Sekuler, A. B., & Bennett, P. J. (2004). Characterising perceptual learning with external noise. Cognitive 
Science, 28, 167-207.
Goldinger, S. D. (1996). Auditory Lexical Decision. Language and Cognitive Processes, 11(6), 559-567.
Goldstone, R. L., & Barsalou, L. W. (1998). Reuniting perception and conception. Cognition, 65, 231.
Grabowski, T. J., Damasio, H., & Damasio, A. R. (1998). Premotor and prefrontal correlates of category-related 
lexical retrieval. Neuroimage, 7,232-243.
Halgren, E., Dhond, P. R., Christensen, N., Van Petten, C., Marinkovic, K., Lewine, J. D., et al. (2002). N400-like 
MEG Responses Modulated by Semantic Context, Word Frequency, and Lexical Class in Sentences. Neuroimage, 
17930, 1101-1116.
Harley, T.A. (1995) The Psychology o f  Language: From Data to Theory. Erlbaum (UK) Taylor & Francis.
Hamad, S. (1990). The Symbol Grounding Problem. Physica, D 42, 335.
Hauk, O., Johnsrude, I., & Pulvermilller, F. (2004). Somatotopic Representation of Actions Words in Human Motor 
and Premotor Cortex. Neuron, 41(301-307).
Hawkins, H. L., Hillyard, S. A., Luck, S. J., Mouloua, M., Downing, C. J., & Woodward, D. P. (1990). Visual 
Attention Modulates Signal Detectability. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 
16(4), 802-811.
Henderson, J. M., & Ferreira, F. (Eds.). (2004). The Interface o f Language, Vision, and Action: Eye Movements and 
the Visual World. London, UK: Routledge.
Hesslow, G. (2002). Conscious thought as simulation of behaviour and perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6, 
242.
Holcomb, P. J. (1993). Semantic priming and stimulus degradation: Implications for the role of the N400 in language 
processing. Psychophysiology, 30, 47-61.
Horton, W. S., & Rapp, D. N. (2003). Out of sight, out of mind: Occlusion and the accessability o f information in 
narrative comprehension. Psychonomic bulletin and review, 10(1), 104-110.
Humphreys, G. W., Price, C. J., & Riddoch, M. J. (1999). From objects to names: A cognitive neuroscience approach. 
Psychological Research, 62, 118-130.
Inman, D. (2000). Parrallel Distributed Processing: An Introduction. Retrieved January 23, 2007, from 
http://www.scism.sbu.ac.uk/inmandw/tutorials/pdp/pdpintro.html
Isenberg, N., Silbersweig, D., Engelien, A., Emmerich, S., Malavade, B., Beattie, B., et al. (1999). Linguistic threat 
activates the human amygdala. Proceedings o f  the National Academy o f Sciences, 96, 10456-10459.
Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations o f  Language: Brain, Meaning, Grammar, Evolution (Large format paperback 
ed.): Oxford University Press.
Jazayeri, M., & Movshon, J. A. (2007). A new perceptual illusion reveals mechanisms o f  sensory decoding. Nature 
446, 912-915.
356
Jeannerod, M. (2001). Neural Simulation o f  Action: A Unifying Mechanism fo r  Motor Cognition. Neuroimage, 14, 
S103-S109.
Johnson-Laird, P. (1993). The computer and the mind: An introduction to Cognitive Science. Glasgow: Fontana 
Press.
Kan, I. P., Barsalou, L. W., Solomon, K. O., Minor, J. K., & Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2003). Role of mental imagery 
in a property verification task: fMRI evidence for perceptual representations of concpetual knowledge. Cognitive 
Neuropsychology, 20, 525-540.
Kaschak, M. P., Madden, C. J., Therriault, D. J., Yaxley, R. H., Aveyard, M., Blanchard, A. A., et al. (2005). 
Perception of motion affects language processing. Cognition, 94, B79.
Kaschak, M. P., Zwaan, R., Aveyard, M., & Yaxley, R. H. (2006). Perception of Auditory Motion Affects Language 
Processing. Cognitive Science, 30(4), 733-744.
Kastner, S., De Weerd, P., Pinsk, M. A., Elizondo, M. I., Desimone, R., & Ungerleider, L. G. (2001). Modulation of 
Sensory Suppression: Implications for Receptive Field Sizes in the Human Visual Cortex. The Journal o f  
Neurophsyiology, 86(3), 1398-1411.
Kaup, B., Ludtke, J., & Zwaan, R. (2006). Processing negated sentences with contradictory predicates: Is a door that 
is not open mentally closed? Journal o f  Pragmatics, 38,1033-1050.
Kaup, B., & Zwaan, R. (2003). Effects o f Negation and Situational Presence on the Accessibility of Text Information. 
Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 29(3), 439-446.
Kellenbach, M. L., Wijers, A. A., & Mulder, G. (2000). Visual semantic features are activated during the processing 
of concrete words: event-related potential evidence for perceptual semantic priming. Cognitive Brain Research, 10, 
67-75.
Kemmerer, D. (2005). The spatial and temporal meanings of English prepositions can be independently impaired. 
Neuropsychologica, 43(5), 797-806.
Kitajo, K., Nozaki, D., Ward, L. M., & Yamamoto, T. (2003). Behavioural Stochastic Resonance within the Human 
Brain. Physical Review Letters, 90(21).
Klatzky, R. L., Pellegrino, J. W., McCloskey, B. P., & Doherty, S. (1989). Can you squeeze a tomato? The role of 
motor representations in semantic sensibility judgements. Journal o f  Memory and Language, 28, 56-77.
Kolers, P. A. (1983). Perception and Representation. Annual Review o f  Psychology, 34, 129-166.
Kosslyn, S. M. (1996 (new edition)). Image and Brain: The Resolution o f  the Imagery Debate. London, England:
MIT Press.
Laeng, B., & Teodorescu, D.-S. (2002). Eye scanpaths during visual imagery re-enact those of perception of the same 
visual scene. Cognitive Science, 26, 207-231.
Lakoff, G. (1987). Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What categories reveal about the mind. Chicago, IL.: 
University of Chicago Press.
Landauer, T. K., & Dumais, S. T. (1997). A Solution to Plato's Problem: The Latent Semantic Analysis Theory of 
Acquisition, Induction and Representation of Knowledge. Psychological Review, 104(2), 211-240.
Leibowitz, H. W., Johnson, C. A., & Isabelle, E. (1972). Peripheral Motion Detection and Refractive Error. Science, 
177(4055), 1207.
Levelt, W. J. M. (1989). Speaking: From Intention to Articulation. London, England.: MIT Press.
Levelt, W. J. M., Roelofs, A., & Meyer, A. S. (1999). A theory of lexical access in speech production. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences, 22, 1-75.
Levinson, E. & Sekuler, R. (1975) Inhibition and disinhibition of direction-specific mechanisms in human vision. 
Nature, 254 (5502), 692-694.
Levinson, E. & Sekuler, R. (1976) Adaptation alters perceived direction of motion. Vision Research, 16(7), 779-781.
Levinson, E. & Sekuler, R. (1980) A two-dimensional analysis of direction-specific adaptation. Vision Research, 
20(2), 103-107.
357
Mahon, B. Z., & Caramazza, A. (2005). The orchestration of the sensory-motor systems: Clues from 
neuropsychology. Cognitive Neuropsychology, 22(3/4), 480-494.
Malikovic, A., Amunts, K., Schleicher, A., Mohlberg, H., Eickhoff, S.B., Wilms, M., Palomero-Gallagher, N., 
Armstrong. E. & Zilles, K. (2007) Cytoarchitectonic Analysis of the Human Extrastriate Cortex in the Region of 
V5/MT+: A Probabilistic, Stereotaxic Map of Area hOc5. Cerebral Cortex, 17(3), 562-574.
Markman, A. B., & Brendl, C. M. (2005). Constraining Theories of Embodied Cognition. Psychological Science, 
16(1), 6-10.
Markman, A. B., & Dietrich, E. (2000). Extending the classical view of representation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
4(12), 470-475.
Marques, J. F. (2006). Specialization and semantic organisation: Evidence for multiple semantics linked to sensory 
modalities. Memory & Cognition, 34(1), 60-67.
Martin, A., & Chao, L. L. (2001). Semantic memory and the brain: structure and processes. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 11,194-201.
Martin, A., Haxby, J. V., Lalonde, F. M., Wiggs, C. L., & Ungerleider, L. G. (1995). Discrete Cortical Regions 
Associated with Knowledge of Color and Knowledge of Action. Science, 270(5233), 102-105.
Martin, A., Wiggs, C. L., Ungerleider, L. G., & Haxby, J. V. (1996). Neural correlates of category-specific 
knowledge. Nature, 379, 649-652.
Matlock, T., & Richardson, D. C. (2004). Do eye movements go with Active motion? Proceedings o f  the 26th Annual 
Conference o f  the Cognitive Science Society, NJ, USA.
McClelland, J. L., & Rogers, T. T. (2003). The Parallel Distributed Processing Approach to Semantic Cognition. 
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4, 310-322.
McCloskey, B. P., Klatzky, R. L., & Pellegrino, J. W. (1992). Rubbing Your Stomach While Tapping Your Fingers: 
Interference Between Motor Planning and Semantic Judgements. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 18(4), 948-961.
McNamara, T. P., & Miller, D. L. (1989). Attributes of Theories of Meaning. Psychological Bulletin, 106(3), 355- 
376.
McRae, K., de Sa, V. R., & Seidenberg, M. S. (1997). On the Nature and Scope of Featural Representations of Word 
Meaning. Journal o f  Experimental Psychology: General, 126(2), 99-130.
Meteyard, L., Bahrami, B. & Vigliocco, G. (2007) Motion detection and motion verbs: Language affects low-level 
visual perception. Psychological Science, 18(11), 927-1021
Moss, F., Ward, L. M., & Sannita, W. G. (2004). Stochastic resonance and sensory information processing: a tutorial 
and review of application. Clinical Neurophysiology, 115, 267-281.
Murphy, G. L. (2002). The Big Book o f  Concepts. London, England.: MIT Press.
Myung, J., Blumstein, S. E., & Sedivy, J. C. (2005). Playing on the typewriter, typing on the piano: manipulationg 
knowledge of objects. Cognition, 98, 223-243.
Neininger, B., & Pulvermuller, F. (2001). The Right Hemisphere's Role in Action Word Processing: a Double Case 
Study. Neurocase, 7, 303-317.
Nelson, D. L., McEvoy, C. L., & Schreiber, T. A. (1998, 1998). The University o f South Florida word association, 
rhyme, and word fragment norms. Retrieved 01/2005 from http://www.usf.edu/FreeAssociation/
Newell, A. (1980). Physical Symbol Systems. Cognitive Science, 4, 135-183.
Newell, A., & Simon, H. A. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Niedenthal, P. M., Barsalou, L. W., Winkielman, P., Krauth-Gruber, S., & Ric, F. (2005). Embodiment in Attitudes, 
Social Perception, and Emotion. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(3), 184-211.
Ohtani, Y., & Ejima, Y. (1997). Anisotropy for direction discrimination in a two-frame apparent motion display. 
Vision Research, 37 (6), 765.
358
Oliveri, M., Finocchiaro, C., Shapiro, 1C, Gangitano, M., Caramazza, A., & Pascual-Leone, A. (2004). All Talk and 
No Action: A Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation Study o f Motor Cortex Activation during Action Word Production. 
Journal o f  Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(3), 374-381.
O'Shea, J., Muggleton, N.G., Cowey, A., & Walsh, V. (2004) Timing of Target Discrimination in Human Frontal 
Eye Fields. Journal o f Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 1060-106.
Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2003). Verifying Different-Modality Properties for Concepts 
Produces Switching Costs. Psychological Science, 14(2), 119-124.
Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Barsalou, L. W. (2004). Sensorimotor simulations underlie conceptual representations: 
Modality-specific effects of prior activation. Psychonomic bulletin and review, 11, 164-167.
Pecher, D., Zeelenberg, R., & Raaijmakers, J. G. W. (1998). Does Pizza Prime Coin? Perceptual Priming in Lexical 
Decision and Pronunciation. Journal o f Memory and Language, 38,401-418.
Perky, C. W. (1910). An experimental study of imagination. The American Journal o f  Psychology, 21(3), 422-452.
Phillips, J., Noppeney, U., Humphreys, G. W., & Price, C. J. (2002). Can segregation within the semantic system 
account for category-specific deficits? Brain, 125, 2067-2080.
Pisoni, D., Hernandez, L., & colleagues. (2007). Speech & Hearing Lab Neighborhood Database. Retrieved 01/2005 
from http://128.252.27.56/Neighborhood/Home.asp
Posner, M.I. (1980) Orienting of attention. Quarterly Journal o f  Experimental Psychology 32, 3-25.
Previc, F. H. (1990). Functional specialization in the upper and lower visual fields in humans: Its ecological origins 
and neurophysiological implications. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 13, 519-575.
Pulvermtiller, F. (1999). Words in the brain's language. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 253-336.
Pulvermtiller, F. (2001). Brain reflections of words and their meaning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(12), 517-524.
Pulvermtiller, F. (2002). A brian perspective on language mechanisms: from discrete neuronal ensembles to serial 
order. Progress in Neurobiology, 67, 85-111.
Pulvermttller, F., Harle, M., & Hummel, F. (2000). Neuropsychological distinction of verb categories. NeuroReport, 
11(12), 2789.
Pulvermtiller, F., Harle, M., & Hummel, F. (2001). Walking or Talking? Behavioral and Neurophysiological 
Correlates of Action Verb Processing. Brain and Language, 78, 143-168.
Pulvermtiller, F., & Hauk, O. (2005). Category-specific Conceptual Processing of Color and Form in Left Fronto- 
temporal Cortex. Cerebral Cortex, 16, 1193-1201.
Pulvermtiller, F., Hauk, O., Nikulin, V. V., & Ilmoniemi, R. J. (2005). Functional links between motor and language 
systems. European Journal o f  Neuroscience, 21, 793-797.
Pulvermuller, F., Mohr, B., & Schleichert, H. (1999). Semantic of lexico-syntactic factors: what determines word- 
class specific activity in the human brain? Neuroscience Letters, 275, 81-84.
Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1985). Computation and Cognition: Toward a Foundation fo r  Cognitive Science (2nd ed.). London, 
England.: MIT Press.
Quillian, M. R. (1968). Semantic Memory. In M. Minsky (Ed.), Semantic Information Processing (pp. 216-271). 
London, England.: MIT Press.
Rastle, K., Harrington, J., & Coltheart, M. (2006). 358,534 nonwords: The ARC Nonword Database. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 55 A, 1339.
Raymond, J. E. (2000). Attentional modulation of visual motion perception. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 4(2), 42- 
50.
Rees, G., Friston, K., & Koch, C. (2000). A direct quantitative relationship between the functional properties of 
human and macaque V5. Nature Neuroscience, 3(7), 716-723.
Richardson, D. C., & Spivey, M. J. (2000). Representation, space and Hollywood Squares: looking at things that 
aren't there anymore. Cognition, 76, 269-295.
359
Richardson, D. C., Spivey, M. J., Barsalou, L. W., & McRae, K. (2003). Spatial representations activated during real­
time comprehension of verbs. Cognitive Science, 27, 767.
Richardson, D. C., Spivey, M. J., & Cheung, J. (2001). Motor Representations in Memory And Mental Models: 
Embodiment in Cognition, NJ, USA.
Richardson, D. C., Spivey, M. J., Edelman, S., & Naples, A. J. (2001). "Language is Spatial": Experimental Evidence 
for Image Schemas of Concrete and Abstract Verbs, Proceedings o f  the 23 rd annual meeting o f  the cognitive science 
society. Mawhah, NJ: Erlbaum
Rinck, M., & Bower, G. H. (2000). Temporal and spatial distance in situation models. Memory & Cognition, 28(8), 
1310-1320.
Rinck, M., Hahnel, A., Bower, G. H., & Glowalla, U. (1997). The metrics of spatial situation models. Journal o f  
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition, 23, 622-637.
Rips, L. J . , Shoben, E. J. & Smith, E. E. (1973) Semantic Distance and the Verification of Semantic Relations. 
Journal o f  Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior, 12, 1-20.
Rogers, T. T., Lambon Ralph, M. A., Garrard, P., Bozeat, S., McClelland, J. L., Hodges, J. R., et al. (2004). Structure 
and Deterioration of Semantic Memory: A Neuropsychological and Computational Investigation. Psychological 
Review, 111(1), 205-235.
Rowe, J.B., Stephan, K.E., Friston, K., Frackowiak, R.S.J. & Passingham, R E . (2004) The Prefrontal Cortex shows 
Context-specific Changes in Effecctive Connectivity to Motor or Visual Cortex during the Selection of Action or 
Colour. Cerebral Cortex, 15, 85-95.
Rumelhart, D. E., McClelland, J. L., & Group, t. P. R  (1987). Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the  
Microstructure o f  Cognition Volume 1: Foundations (3rd ed.). London, England.: Bradford Book, MIT Press.
Sack, A.T., Kohler, A., Linden, D.E.J., Goebel, R  & Muckli, L. (2006) The temporal characteristics of motion 
processing in hMT/V5+: Combining fMRI and neuronavigated TMS. Neuroimage, 29 (4), 1326-1335.
Schneider, W., Eschman, A., & Zuccolotto, A. (2002). E-Prime Reference Guide. Pittsburgh, PA: Psychology 
Software Tools.
Scorolli, C., & Borghi, A. M. (2007). Sentence comprehension and action: Effector specific modulation of the motor 
system. Brain Research, 1130,119-124.
Searle, J. (1980). Minds, Brains and Programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 417-457.
Seitz, A. R , & Watanabe, T. (2003). Is subliminal learning really passive? Nature, 422(6927), 36-36.
Seitz, A. R , & Watanabe, T. (2003). Is subliminal learning really passive? Nature, 422(6927), 36-36.
Setola, P., & Reilly, R. G. (2005). Words in the brain's language: An experimental investigation. Brain and 
Language, 94(3), 251-259.
Siakaluk, P. D., Pexman, P. M., Aguilera, L., Owen, W. J., & Sears, C. R. (in press). Evidence for the activation o f  
sensorimotor information during visual word recognition: The body-object interaction effect. Cognition, 
doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2006.12.011.
Silvanto, J., Lavie, N., & Walsh, V. (2005). Double dissociation of VI and V5/MT activity in visual awareness. 
Cerebral Cortex, 15(11), 1736.
Simon, H. A. (1979). Information Processing Models of Cognition. Annual Review o f  Psychology, 30, 363-396.
Smith, E. E., Shoben, E. J., & Rips, L. J. (1974). Structure and Process in Semantic Memory: A featural model for 
semantic decisions. Psychological Review, 81(3), 214-241.
Solomon, K. O., & Barsalou, L. W. (2004). Perceptual Simulation in Property Verification. Memory & Cognition, 32, 
244-259.
Spence C., Nicholls M. E. R  & Driver J. (2001) The cost of expecting events in the wrong sensory modality. 
Perception & Psychophysics, 63(2), 330-336.
Spivey, M. J., & Geng, J. J. (2001). Oculomotor mechanisms activated by imagery and memory: eye movements to 
absent objects. Psychological Research, 65(235-241).
360
Spivey, M. J., Tyler, M. J., Richardson, D. C., & Young, E. E. (2000). Eye Movements during comprehension of 
Spoken Scene Descriptions, Proceedings o f  the 23rd annual meeting o f  the cognitive science society. Mawhah, N J: 
Erlbaum
Stanfield, R. A., & Zwaan, R. A. (2001). The effect of implied orientation derived from verbal context on picture 
recognition. Psychological Science, 12(2), 153-156.
Stanislaw, H. & Todorov, N. (1999) Calculation of signal detection measures. Behaviour Research Methods, 
Instruments & Computers, 31(1), 137-149.
Stillings, N. A., Feinstein, M. H., Garfield, J. L., Rissland, E. L., Rosenbaum, D. A., Weisler, S. F., et al. (1995). 
Cognitive Psychology: The Architecture of the Mind in Cognitive Science An Introduction. London, UK.: MIT Press.
Suppes, P., Pavel, M., & Falmagne, J.-C. (1994). Representations and Models in Psychology. Annual Review o f  
Psychology, 45, 517-544.
Svensson, H., Lindblom, J., Ziemke, T., Zlatev, Ziemke, & Frank. (2004). Making sense of embodied cognition: 
Simulation Theories of Shared Neural Mechanisms for Sensorimotor and Cognitive Processes, in Body, Language 
and Mind. Vol 1: Embodiment.
Talcott, J. B., Witton, C., McLean, M., Hansen, P. C., Rees, A., Green, G. G. R., et al. (2000). Dynamic sensory 
sensitivity and children's word decoding skills. Proceedings o f  the National Academy o f  Sciences, 97 (6), 2952.
Tettamanti, M., Buccino, G., Saccuman, M. C., Gallese, V., Danna, M., Scifo, P., et al. (2005). Listening to Action- 
related Sentences Activates Fronto-parietal Motor Circuits. Journal o f  Cognitive Neuroscience, 17(2), 273-281.
Thomas, N. J. T. (1999). Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to 
Conscious Mental Content. Cognitive Science, 23(2), 207-245.
Thompson-Schill, S. L., Bedney, M., & Goldberg, R. F. (2005). The frontal lobes and the regulation of mental 
activity. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 15, 219-224.
Tseng, M. J., & Bergen, B. K. (2005). Lexical Processing Drives Motor Simulation. Proceedings o f  the 27the annual 
meeting o f  the cognitive science society. Mawhah, NJ: Erlbaum
Tsushima, Y., Sasaki, Y., & Watanabe, T. (2006). Greater Disruption Due to Failure of Inhibitory Control on an 
Ambiguous Distractor. Science, 314, 1786 - 1788.
Tucker, M., & Ellis, R. (1998). On the relation between seen objects and components of potential actions. Journal o f  
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 24, 830.
Tyler, L.K. & Moss, H.E. (2001) Towards a distributed account of conceptual knowledge. Trends in Cognitive 
Science, 5(6), 244-252.
Vigliocco, G., & Vinson, D. P. (in press). Semantic Representation in G. Gaskell (Ed.), Handbook o f  
Psycholinguistics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vigliocco, G., Vinson, D. P., Lewis, W., & Garrett, M. F. (2004). Representing the meaning of object and action 
words: The featural and unitary semantic space hypothesis. Cognitive Psychology, 48, 422-488.
Vigliocco, G., Warren, J., Arcuili, J., Siri, S., Scott, S., & Wise, R. (2005). The role of semantics and grammatical 
class in the neural representation of words. Cerebral Cortex.
Vinson, D. P., & Vigliocco, G. (2002). A semantic analysis of grammatical class impairments: semantic 
representations of object nouns, action nouns and action verbs. Journal o f  Neurolinguistics, 15(3), 317-351.
Vitevich, M. S., & Luce, P. A. (2004). A Web-based interface to calculate phonotactic probability for words and 
nonwords in English. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 36(3), 481-487.
Vitevich, M. S., Luce, P. A., Pisoni, D. B., & Auer, E. T. (1999). Phonotactics, Neighbourhood Activation and 
Lexical Access for Spoken Words. Brain and Language, 68, 306-311.
Vogt, P. (2002). The physical symbol grounding problem. Cognitive Systems Research, 3, 429-457.
Vuilleumier, P., Henson, R. N., Driver, J., & Dolan, R. J. (2002). Multiple levels of visual object constancy revealed 
by event-related fMRI of repetition priming. Nature Neuroscience, 5(5), 491-499.
Wakefield, J. C. (2003). The Chinese Room Arguement Reconsidered: Essentialism, Indeterminacy, and Strong Al. 
Minds and Machines, 13, 285-319.
361
Wallentin, M., Ellegaard, T., Ostergaard, S., Ostergaard, L., & Roepstorff, A. (2005). Motion verb sentences activate 
left posterior middle temporal cortex despite static context. NeuroReport, 16(6), 649-652.
Watanabe, T., Nanez, J. E., & Sasaki, Y. (2001). Perceptual learning without perception. Nature, 413(6858), 844-848.
Wickens, T. D. (2002). Elementary Signal Detection Theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, M. (2002). Six views of embodied cognition. Psychonomic Bulletin and Review, 9 (4), 625.
Yantis, S. (2005). How visual salience wins the battle for awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 8(8), 975-977.
Zeki, S., Watson, J. D. G., Lueck, C. J., Friston, K. J., Kennard, C., & Frackowiak, R. S. J. (1991). A direct 
demonstration of functional specialisation in human visual cortex. Journal o f  Neuroscience, 11, 641-649.
Ziegler, J. C., Muneaux, M., & Grainger, J. (2003). Neighbourhood effects in auditory word recognition: 
Phonological competition and orthographic facilitation. Journal o f  Memory and Language, 779-793.
Ziemke, T. (2003). What's that Thing Called Embodiment, Proceedings o f  the 25th Annual meeting o f  the Cognitive 
Science Society NJ, USA.
Zwaan, R. (1999). Situation Models: The Mental Leap Into Imagined Worlds. Current Directions in Psychological 
Science, 8(1), 15-18.
Zwaan, R., & B.H.Ross. (2004). The immersed experiencer: toward an embodied theory o f language comprehension 
in The Psychology o f  Learning and Motivation (Vol. 44, pp. 35). San Diego, CA.: Academic Press.
Zwaan, R., Madden, C. J., Yaxley, R. H., & Aveyard, M. (2004). Moving words: Dynamic mental representations in 
language comprehension. Cognitive Science, 28, 611-619.
Zwaan, R , & Radvansky, G. A. (1998). Situation models in language comprehension and memory. Psychological 
Bulletin, 123, 162-185.
Zwaan, R., Stanfield, R. A., & Yaxley, R. H. (2002). Language comprehenders mentally represent the shapes of 
object s. Psychological Science, 13(2), 168-171.
Zwaan, R., & Taylor, L. J. (2006). Seeing, Acting, Understanding: Motor Resonance in Language Comprehension. 
Journal o f Experimental Psychology: General, 135(1), 1-11.
Zwaan, R., & Yaxley, R. H. (2003). Spatial iconicity affects semantic relatedness judgements. Psychonomic Bulletin 
and Review, 10(4), 954-958.
362
